

39063 ELW/BCE/CC
S-16-01
ARGENTINA Project

~~SECRET~~

January 28, 1975

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS -
ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

Several confidential sources abroad provided the following chronological summary of the more serious terrorist acts carried out in Argentina during the period December 6, 1974, through January 27, 1975.

December 7, 1974

A member of the Peronist Council and his assistant were murdered in Buenos Aires Province (BAP).

A University employee with Communist connections was murdered in La Plata, BAP, during a kidnap attempt.

December 9, 1974

Three badly mutilated bodies were discovered in an empty field adjacent to the Argentine Army Campo de Mayo military base in BAP. Buenos Aires Provincial Police (BAPP) investigation established that the bodies had been dynamited causing the respective parts to be blown over a considerable distance. BAPP investigation also established that the hands had been amputated from each of the bodies prior to being dynamited in an obvious attempt to hinder identification through fingerprints. An Argentine Army intelligence source advised that the bodies were those of three Argentine Army conscripts who were part of an Argentine terrorist organization, the Peoples Revolutionary Army (ERP) cell, and had been collaborating with the ERP in providing data on Argentine Army officers, especially their movements, in order to target them for ERP assassination squads.

December 12, 1974

Several bodies of terrorists were discovered in Tortuguitas, BAP.

December 13, 1974

A terrorist bomb was deactivated in Barrio Norte, Federal

- 1 - SY
- 1 - Ambassador
- 1 - POL/R
- 8 - Bureau
- 2 0 Buenos Aires
- (1 - 109-2)
- (1 - 109-103)
- RWS:jn (10) (13)

Classified by 5931
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(1)(2)
Automatically declassified on FMDT

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1240

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RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

Capital (FC) by the Federal Police of Argentina (FPA).

A bomb was detonated underneath the automobile of a Ford Motor Company executive in Martinez, BAP.

In Burzaco, BAP, a bomb was detonated in front of the residence of a printers union official. Another bomb was detonated in Burzaco in front of the residence of an Argentine businessman.

In Lanus a bomb was detonated at the office of a notary public.

In La Matanza, BAP, an Argentine industrialist was liberated by the BAPP. Two of the industrialists' kidnappers were killed in a shootout with the BAPP.

December 20, 1974

During a shootout in the FC with members of a terrorist organization, one terrorist was killed and one FPA officer was wounded.

The Production Manager of a petrochemical company was murdered after a labor dispute.

December 22, 1974

There was an alleged shootout between presumed extremists near the Palermo Argentine Army garrison in the FC.

A Catholic sociology professor was murdered by extremists while leaving a church in San Isidro, BAP.

A kidnapping attempt against a General Labor Confederation (CGT) leader was frustrated in Tres Arroyos, BAP.

December 23, 1974

The FPA Chief narrowly escaped death in an ERP bombing action carried out while the FPA Chief was returning to his residence under the protection of heavily armed bodyguards. One FPA Officer was killed and two other officers seriously wounded.

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RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

December 26, 1974

A terrorist kidnapping attempt against two foreign executives of Lever Brothers was frustrated in Avellaneda, BAP. One off-duty FPA officer was killed and another seriously wounded in this kidnapping attempt.

December 30, 1974

The personnel director of a paint factory was sought out and assassinated on the company's premises in Villa Martelli, BAP, by the ERP. The ERP indicated that this individual was assassinated because of his alleged poor treatment of workers.

January 15, 1975

A bomb attack was carried out against a Ford Motor Company showroom in Adrogué. The night watchman was slightly injured and hospitalized as a result of the bombing.

January 17, 1975

A group of terrorists machine gunned the residence of the Mayor of San Miguel de Tucuman. After completing the machine gun attack against the Mayor's residence, the terrorists tossed Molotov bombs, causing minor damages. The Montonero guerrilla organization claimed credit for this action.

A BAPP Officer was ambushed by terrorists in San Justo, BAP.

An FPA Officer was killed and another wounded when they attempted to question individuals distributing leftists propaganda near the Floresta Railroad Station.

January 20, 1975

A band of approximately 24 armed individuals dressed in green fatigue combat uniforms kidnapped and executed a farm worker in Tucuman. Subsequently this same band set fire to a station of the Tucuman Provincial Police (TPP), which was unoccupied.

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RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

TPP officials believe that the perpetrators of these acts were members of the ERP.

The residence of a construction workers official was machinegunned in Cordoba.

In Salta the residence of a former official of the municipal government was bombed.

The ERP took over a local television broadcasting station in Cordoba and broadcast propaganda for a short period of time utilizing a taped message.

January 21, 1975

A group of terrorists took over and burned the San Rafael Railroad Station in Tucuman.

In La Plata, the residence of a BAPP officer was forcibly entered and the credential and badge of this officer were stolen.

Two unoccupied houses were bombed by terrorists in Tucuman.

In Bahia Blanca, BAP, a bomb attack was carried out against a private residence.

In Corrientes bomb attacks were carried out against two brothers, who are members of the Provincial Police. The Montoneros claimed credit for these bomb attacks.

January 23, 1975

A Doctor was kidnapped and subsequently found murdered in Tucuman.

The publishing facility of the newspaper "La Voz del Interior" was taken over and subsequently destroyed by right-wing terrorists belonging to the AAA organization. An FPA

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RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

source reported that the individuals carrying out this attack against "La Voz del Interior" were the same individuals who had previously carried out a bomb attack against the printing facility of the leftist newspaper "El Mundo" in the FC during January, 1974.

January 24, 1975

In Bahia Blanca, BAP, terrorists broke into the residence of a local government official and assassinated him. The residence of the assassinated official had been subjected to a terrorist bombing during March, 1974.

In Tucuman the bodies of two ERP members were discovered.

Members of the ERP broke into the residence of a private citizen and seriously wounded him during an assassination attempt.

In Cordoba the body of RAFAEL GUSTAVO GIGENA was discovered in Villa Carlos Paz, Cordoba Province. The victim was the brother of ENRIQUE GIGENA, who was killed on November 20, 1974, during a shootout with the Cordoba Provincial Police.

January 25, 1975

An FPA Officer was robbed of his gun and badge in Rafael Calzada, BAP.

A bomb attack was carried out against the Director of "El Diario," an afternoon newspaper published in La Plata, BAP.

In Bahia Blanca, BAP, the law office of a local attorney was machine gunned.

In Tucuman the residence of a sugar workers union officer was bombed.

A Santa Fe Provincial Police Officer was kidnapped by several armed individuals. He was subsequently released after being subjected to a beating. His service revolver and police credentials were stolen.

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**RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES**

January 26, 1975

The residence of a construction worker was bombed in Cordoba.

January 27, 1975

A bookstore was bombed in the FC.

In Viedma the residence of a provincial government official was bombed. Four presumed terrorists forcibly entered a garage in Munoz, BAP, and stole two automobiles. In nearby Maro, BAP, six armed individuals presumed to be terrorists forcibly entered a garage and stole four automobiles. An official of the BAPP advised that the theft of automobiles by terrorists usually is a warning sign that some major terrorist act will occur within the next few days.

In Cordoba six pounds of high explosives, together with blasting caps and fuses, were stolen from a construction site by presumed terrorists.

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AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-201)
FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)(P)
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.
BUDED: 2/15/75

Reference my airtel and LHM 12/11/74 under the
above dual caption.

ENCLOSURES

For the Bureau eight copies of an LHM dated
and captioned as above.

ADMINISTRATIVE

The enclosed LHM being submitted at this time
at the specific request of the Ambassador in connection
with a visit to Argentina on 2/19/75 of Secretary of State HENRY
KISSINGER. The Ambassador requested information in the
enclosed LHM in connection with Embassy reporting on the
terrorist situation to assist U. S. Secret Service and
Department of State security officials in arranging for
Secretary KISSINGER's visit. *Paragraph unclassified per letter State Dept /
Sec State Dept letter dated 1-23-85*

The enclosed LHM discloses only the more serious

3 - Bureau (Encs. 8)
(1 - Foreign Liaison Unit)
2 - Buenos Aires
RWS:jn
P-2 (5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
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OTHERWISE

4/25/81
CLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/BCE/562
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 46
Argentina Project

1241

BUE 109-2; 109-103

terrorist activities which have occurred since the submission of referenced LHM.

DISSEMINATION

Ambassador, [redacted] Local dissemination has been made to the
Officer. [redacted] the Regional Security

b1 per CIA

CLASSIFICATION

The enclosed LHM has been classified SECRET,
XGDS-1 and 2, Indefinite.

SOURCES

Refer to the attached Non-Symbol Source Page.;

Non-Symbol Source Page attached.

NON-SYMBOL SOURCE PAGE

Collective confidential sources abroad referred to in the enclosed LHM are identified as follows:

Dr. ARTURO HORACIO POIRE (BUEfile 80-84)
Federal Police of Argentina (FPA)

Comisario Inspector JORGE CROVETTO (Buefile 80-87)
Chief of Federal Crime, FPA

Sub-Comisario CARLOS ALBERTO MONTENEGRO (Buefile 80-186) Department of Intelligence, FPA Estado Mayor

Comisario Inspector OSVALDO J. DE BALDRICH (Buefile 80-185)

Chief of Intelligence
Buenos Aires Provincial Police (BAPP)

Captain JUAN LUCERO (Buefile 80-173)
Argentine Army Intelligence Service (AAIS)

Colonel JUAN RIVAS
AAIS

General ALBERTO S. CACERES (Buefile 64-14)
Commander of the Argentine Army
Gendarmeria Nacional (Border Guards)

HENRY ACKERMAN (Buefile 80-163)
Associated Press Representative

Comisario FRANCISCO SPINOSA
Department of Federal Security, FPA.

Department of State
Department Pass: Ambassador MONTEVIDEO

February 12, 1975

Amplified BUENOS AIRES

Human Rights Violations in Argentina

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Summary. Human rights violations have been committed in Argentina--generally as part of the GOU's anti-terrorism campaign against those thought to be guerrillas or their supporters. The violations fall into three categories. The first is detention without charges. Hundreds of people have been arrested and held without charges under the provisions of the state of siege which was declared on November 6, 1974. The second and third types are torture and assassination. Unlike the first category, these are, of course, not policies publicly announced and openly carried out by the GOU. Given the political moment in which Argentina lives, it appears that such practices will be tolerated for the time being by the GOU (and by many Argentines) as an expedient in the struggle against terrorism. End Summary.

Violations of human rights are sometimes difficult to prove but that such violations have occurred in Argentina there is no doubt. Due to this lack of documentation, the performance of the GOA in this area must be depicted in generalized terms. Given Argentina's recent history, the fact that human rights violations have taken place is not surprising. Other governments in similar circumstances have reacted with much more systematic and widespread actions trampling the human rights of their constituents. The transition from a military to an elected government, the return of Peron, his death and the subsequent power

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MEDAC
MILGP-2
SCLAT
LEGAT
RF
CHRON

TSU 4-7015-20

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~~REDAKTIERUNGSSCHLEIFEN (IN DRUCK) POLYMERISATION (ZUSAMMENFASSUNG)~~

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Buenos Aires

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struggle among his followers have all been accompanied by widespread urban terrorism and political violence which has claimed hundreds of lives in the last few years. In response to this situation, the GCA on November 6, 1974, declared a state of siege which suspended all constitutional guarantees.

The GCA's performance in the area of human rights must be analyzed against this backdrop. It would be an exaggeration to say that people in Argentina have been imprisoned for political purposes. Those arrested are jailed because they are terrorists or suspected of being terrorists.

There have been numerous recent detentions without charges under the provisions of the state of siege. At one Buenos Aires prison, there are reported to be 30 persons at "the disposition of the executive branch". Under the Argentine constitution, such detentions without charges are permitted when a state of siege is in effect.

Torture and maltreatment are occasionally used by security forces in their interrogation of persons arrested for terrorist activities. The use of torture can neither be termed widespread nor uncommon. It is employed by the Federal Police, provincial police and Army on a sporadic basis when they have a person in custody whom they feel is an active terrorist and who will yield information on such activities. Investigations are conducted when a person claims to have been tortured, but these investigations generally prove to be inconclusive.

One case in this regard which has been followed very closely by the Embassy is that of Olga Talamante, an American citizen arrested on November 10, 1974, in Azul. Miss Talamante and her companions were arrested for allegedly possessing arms and subversive material. She claims she was tortured with an electrical device during the initial hours of her captivity, but has been well treated since that time. Medical investigations by the police doctor and by a doctor employed by the Embassy revealed no evidence which would prove she had been tortured. These devices, however, are often used precisely because they leave no marks. While the investigation was inconclusive, it was in this instance, unimpaired.

Another facet of the human rights problem is the presence of thousands of political refugees from other countries. Surrounded by military dictatorships (or in the case of Uruguay, a government heavily influenced by the military), Argentina has been a haven for those who have reason to fear these governments. As the GCA has taken on a

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Page 3

a more rightist hue, and especially since the death of Peron, these refugees have become less and less welcome. The U.N. refugee affairs representative claims that he is aware of at least ten instances of political refugees who have been assassinated. In nine of the ten cases, the victims were Uruguayans, some of whom, according to the U.N. representative, were done in by Uruguayan police. According to the SRP, Uruguayan police have cooperated with their Argentine counterparts in repressive actions against leftist Uruguayan exiles.

Another even more serious aspect of human rights violations is right-wing terrorism. Dozens of Argentine leftists have in recent months been abducted by persons posing as policemen, or have simply disappeared only to be later found riddled with bullets. There appear to be several independent groups operating in this fashion mostly on their own but with some possible official direction. The groups within the government are thought to come mainly from the Federal Police, the Army and the Ministry of Social Welfare. With regard to right-wing terrorism, it is widely suspected that some of these actions are directed by certain GOA officials. Verification of this fact is all but impossible. That there are officials who would condone such actions is without doubt.

On the whole, the GOA would publicly condemn torture and assassination. Given the political moment in which Argentina lives, however, it appears that such practices will be tolerated for the time being by the GOA (and many Argentines) as an expedient in the struggle against terrorism.

HILL

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February 12, 1975

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

Several confidential sources abroad provided the following chronological summary of the more serious terrorist acts carried out in Argentina during the period January 28, 1975 through February 9, 1975:

January 28, 1975

The Army of Liberation-August-22 Faction, a splinter group of the Argentine terrorist organization, the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), assassinated a ranking official of the Argentine Labor Ministry and his bodyguard in the Federal Capital (FC).

An Argentine citizen was wounded by gunfire by unidentified assailants in what appeared to be a traffic incident in the FC. Subsequently, T-1 reported that the assailants in this matter were officers of the Federal Police of Argentina (FPA) who became incensed at the failure of their victim to yield the right of way to their unmarked police cruiser.

In Corrientes, the residence of a Provincial Police official was machinegunned.

In Buenos Aires Province (BAP), a Buenos Aires Provincial Police (BAPP) corporal was gravely injured by machinegun fire while he was waiting for a bus.

In San Juan, a bomb exploded at the residence of a transport union official.

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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
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- 8 - Bureau
- 1 - Ambassador Hill
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - RSO
- 1 - Defense Attache
- 2 - Bue (109-2) (P)
- (1 - 109-103) (P)

Classified By 5931
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B (1) (2)
Automatically declassified on IMDET

b1 per CIA

RWS:gjk
(14)

All sources mentioned herein have furnished reliable information in the past.

109-2-1252

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions of
the FBI. It is the property of
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.

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RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS--ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

In Cordoba, a violent shoot-out took place at the headquarters of the Automotive Workers Union.

In Rosario, the residence of a carpenter was fired upon and subjected to an incendiary bomb attack.

January 29, 1975

In La Plata, BAP, the son of a high-ranking Argentine union official was assassinated. This individual was an officer in the Construction Workers Union in La Plata.

T-2 advised that BAPP investigation established that this assassination was probably related to union matters.

In La Plata, bomb attacks were carried out against the residences of three executives of the Swift Meat Packing Company.

In Mar Del Plata, BAP, the Montonero guerrilla organization kidnapped the director of a construction company.

In San Juan, a National Deputy of the Partido Bloquista was severely beaten by the provincial police when he allegedly resisted their attempts to search his residence for arms.

January 30, 1975

In Cordoba, a bomb attack was carried out against a private residence and a bar.

In Wilde, BAP, a bomb attack was carried out against a chemical company.

In Avellaneda, BAP, terrorists took over a factory of Molinos Rio De La Plata, distributed propaganda and threw tear gas grenades.

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RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

January 31, 1975

In the Federal Capital, several Molotov bombs were discovered near the University of Buenos Aires School of Medicine, where the Eleventh International Legal Medicine Seminar was being held.

In Baradero, BAP, the body of an unidentified male was discovered. This individual had been shot several times and was gagged.

In BAP, the body of a male individual was discovered in the Men's Room of a railroad station. This individual had been shot through the head and according to T-3, the FPA ruled out suicide.

February 1, 1975

The Mar Del Plata offices of a construction company were subjected to a bomb attack. The victim construction company is owned by Carlos Dazeo, who was kidnapped by the Montoneros on January 29, 1975.

In Rosario, a bomb exploded at the residence of a retired Santa Fe Provincial Police (SFPP) officer.

In Rosario, a bomb was detonated at the residence of the son of an Argentine Army non-commissioned officer.

The residence of an engineer with the Esso Petrochemical Corporation was bombed in Rosario.

The residence of an active-duty Santa Fe Provincial Police officer was bombed in Rosario.

A pickup truck parked near the Argentine Army Second Corps Headquarters was destroyed by an explosive device in Rosario.

X

RE: . FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS--ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

In Rosario, a bomb was detonated at the office of Cura Brothers Company.

The Argentine Navy Recruitment office in Rosario was subjected to a bomb attack.

A private Argentine citizen discovered a bomb near his residence on the way to work in Rosario. The bomb exploded while being handled, causing this individual's right hand to be amputated.

A bomb exploded in Rosario at a textile factory.

A bomb was deactivated by SFPP officers at the residence of an SFPP official in Rosario. Also, the SFPP deactivated a bomb at the office of a tire company in Rosario.

The ERP broke into the Civil Registry in Rosario and stole documentation.

In San Cristobal, FC, a body was discovered. According to T-3, the body had been riddled with bullets and FPA. Investigation established that the victim was a terrorist.

In Rosario, a branch of the newspaper, "La Capital", was bombed.

In San Luis, a bomb exploded at the residence of an Argentine National Deputy.

In Bahia Blanca, BAP, the law office of a local attorney was broken into and vandalized. The perpetrators of the act painted Montonero propaganda with aerosol spray before leaving the premises.

February 2, 1975

In Rosario, an SFPP officer was assassinated.

A bomb was located in a railroad freight car and deactivated by SFPP officers in Rosario. The freight car was

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RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

parked on a railroad siding and destined for a chemical company.

In Rosario, the SFPP deactivated a bomb at the residence of a Justicialista Party leader in San Lorenzo.

In San Miguel, BAP, a Molotov bomb was thrown against an automotive transport truck.

In Moron, BAP, a badly decomposed body was discovered.

February 3, 1975

In Santa Fe, a badly decomposed body was discovered. The hands and feet of the body were tied with wire.

In Villa Urquiza, BAP, unidentified armed individuals took over a private parking garage and stole three automobiles. One of the stolen automobiles was a red Ford Falcon sedan.

In Cordoba, five individuals armed with machineguns attacked the residence of a private Argentine businessman. Subsequently, the residence was subjected to an incendiary attack.

February 4, 1975

In Salta, a bomb detonated at the residence of the former vice-president of the Chamber of Deputies.

In Tucuman, a sugar workers union official and three of his bodyguards were assassinated.

A powerful bomb was detonated at the residence of a high-ranking officer of the Tucuman Provincial Police.

In BAP, various armed individuals assaulted a BAPP officer and stole his service revolver and police identification.

In the Federal Capital, approximately fifteen armed individuals kidnapped the owner of a cold storage company.

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RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

February 5, 1975

An Argentine Army soldier died as a result of wounds sustained in 1971, when an Argentine Army truck convoy, of which he was a part, was ambushed by the ERP.

In Junin, terrorists wounded the owner of a private business concern during an attack. The victim is married to the daughter of the former governor of BAP.

The blind-folded body of an unidentified individual was discovered machinegunned in the FC.

In BAP, a body was discovered in the burned-out shell of an automobile. The body had been riddled with bullets.

February 6, 1975

In Cordoba, a bomb exploded at the residence of a typewriter sales executive.

February 7, 1975

An executive of the Alba Paint Company, a subsidiary of the Bunge & Born Company, was assassinated in BAP. Perpetrators of the act utilized a red Ford Falcon sedan with a siren in order to intercept their victim before assassinating him.

A similar vehicle was stolen on February 3, 1975 from a private parking garage in Villa Urquiza, as noted above.

Subsequently, T-4 advised that various news agencies received a communique from the ERP claiming credit for the assassination.

In BAP an executive of a heater company was kidnapped by the Montoneros.

A shoot-out took place at the office of the Alianza

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RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

Libertadora Nacionalista (ALN) at the FC. A youth was killed as a result of the shoot-out.

February 8, 1975

The Montoneros carried out a Molotov bomb attack against the residence of a Telephone Company official in San Isidro, BAP.

February 9, 1975

In Mar Del Plata, an executive of a food catering company was kidnapped by several individuals armed with automatic weapons.

SECRET

2/12/75

AIRTEL

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TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-201)
FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (P)
SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA;
IS-ARGENTINA;

ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
FPM-ARGENTINA
Buded: 2/15/75

REFERENCE:

My airtel and LHM, 1/28/75, under the above dual caption.

ENCLOSURES:

For the Bureau eight (8) copies of a letterhead memorandum (LHM), dated and captioned as above.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

The enclosed LHM is being submitted at this time at the specific request of Ambassador HILL.

The enclosed LHM discloses only the more serious terrorist activities which have taken place since the submission of referenced LHM.

DISSEMINATION

Local dissemination has been made to the Ambassador, Regional Security Officer and the Defense Attache's Office.

b1 per CIA

3 - Bureau
(1 - Foreign Liaison Unit)
2 - Buenos Aires
(1 - 109-103)

RWS:gjk
(5)

NON-SYMBOL SOURCE PAGE
ATTACHED

5/23/01
CLASSIFIED BY 39063 E/w/BCE/sam
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1/6
argentine Project

SECRET

109-2-1253

BUE 109-2

CLASSIFICATION

The enclosed LHM has been classified ~~SECRET XDS-1 & 2, Indefinite~~

SOURCES

Refer to the attached Non-Symbol Source Page.

BUE 109-2; 109-103

NON-SYMBOL SOURCE PAGE

Collective confidential sources abroad referred to in the enclosed LHM are identified as follows: (S) (U)

Dr. ARTURO HORACIO POIRE (Bufile 80-84)
Federal Police of Argentina (FPA)

Comisario Inspector JORGE CROVETTO (Bufile 80-87)
Chief of Federal Crime, FPA

Sub-Comisario CARLOS ALBERTO MONTENEGRO (Bufile 80-186) Department of Intelligence, FPA Estado Mayor (T-1)

Comisario Inspector OSVALDO J. DE BALDRICH (Bufile 80-185)
Chief of Intelligence
Buenos Aires Provincial Police (BAPP) (S) (U) (T-2)

Captain JUAN LUCERO (Bufile 80-173)
Argentine Army Intelligence Service (AAIS)

Colonel JUAN RIVAS
AAIS

General ALBERTO S. CACERES (Bufile 64-14)
Commander of the Argentine Army
Gendarmeria Nacional (Border Guards) (S) (U)

HENRY ACKERMAN (Bufile 80-163)
Associated Press Representative (T-4)

Comisario FRANCISCO SPINOSA
Department of Federal Security, FPA. (S) (U) (T-3)

Colonel ALBERTO VALIN
Chief, AAIS

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THE AMBASSADOR
VIA THE DCM

2/18/75

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

THREAT AGAINST ARBOR ACRES POULTRY FARM
PILAR

On 2/18/75, Robert Mc Hose, Operations Manager, Arbor Acres Poultry Company, Pilar, Buenos Aires Province, provided the following information:

Approximately two weeks ago, an Arbor Acres night watchman was approached by two armed individuals who claimed they represented an extremist organization. The night watchman was held at gunpoint and was told that he should immediately sever his connections with Arbor Acres or that he would be killed. The foregoing incident took place at approximately 5:30 P.M., while it was still daylight, at the Arbor Acres general office located directly on Highway #8. It is noted that the building housing this office was subjected to a Montonero bomb attack on 9/23/74.

Mc Hose advised that the personnel manager of Arbor Acres, who is an attorney, has received several anonymous death threats for his alleged mistreatment of Arbor Acres employees.

It is noted that Arbor Acres is an International Basic Economy Corporation operation which is controlled by the Rockefeller family.

The foregoing is provided for information.

cc's: 11 - ~~AMC~~ see
1 - Security
1 - ECON

2 - Bue (109-103)
(109-2)

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(6)

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Classified By 5291
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on UNDET

DECLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/BCE/06
ON 5-16-01
Argentina Project

109-2-1254

F B I

Date: 2/26/75

Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)Via CABLE IMMEDIATE NIACT
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR NR. 049-26
 FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) 1P

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA.

AT APPROXIMATELY 7:00 P.M., February 26, 1975, PATRIC EGAN, JR., U. S. CONSULAR AGENT, WAS ABDUCTED FROM HIS RESIDENCE IN CORDOBA, ARGENTINA, BY THREE ARMED INDIVIDUALS BELONGING TO THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION. AS OF 9:30 P. M., FEBRUARY 26, 1975, NO COMMUNIQUE HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM EGAN'S KIDNAPPERS.

END.

1 - 109-2

RWS:jn

(1)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIEDDATE 5-16-01 BY 39063ELW/BCE/106
Argentina Project

109-2 1264

lws

Approved: lws

Special Agent in Charge

Sent 1 M Per

F B I

Date: 2/27/75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)Via CABLE IMMEDIATE
(Priority)TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-2)(X) 050-27
FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(163-604) 2P 15:00~~SECRET~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA.

AT APPROXIMATELY 1:30 A.M., FEBRUARY 27, 1975, ANONYMOUS CALL TO NEWS MEDIA IN CORDOBA DISCLOSED THAT THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION HAD KIDNAPPED CONSULAR AGENT EGAN FOR THE PURPOSE OF HOLDING HIM AS A HOSTAGE IN EXCHANGE FOR SEVERAL DETAINED TERRORISTS. THE ANONYMOUS CALL DISCLOSED THAT THE MONTONEROS WOULD ISSUE AN OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE SOMETIME LATER ON DURING THE DAY OF FEBRUARY 27, 1975.

ON FEBRUARY 27, 1975, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED THE POSITION OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WITH EGAN'S MONTONERO CAPTORS WOULD BE ONE OF NON-NEGOTIATION.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2.~~

CLASSIFIED BY 39063 ELW/BCE/PG

DECLASSIFY ON 25X 1.6

Argentina Project

ADMINISTRATIVE - RE MY CABLE FEBRUARY 26, 1975.

① - 109-2

1 - 163-604

1 - 80-87 [(CROVETTO)]

RWS:jn

(2)

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Approved: _____

Sent _____

M

Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

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Date:

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Via _____

(Priority)

PAGE TWO

BUE 109-2; 163-604

~~SECRET~~

(CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR JORGE CROVETTO,
SECRETARY GENERAL, FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA) (S) (U)

END.

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

F B I

Date: 2/28/75

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via CABLE NRX IMMEDIATE (O)
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-211) NR. -028

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2) 2P

~~SECRET~~

FPM - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA.

CLASSIFIED BY 5-16-01
39063ELW/BCE/DB
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
Argentina Project

DURING THE AFTERNOON OF FEBRUARY 27, 1975, A COMMUNIQUE
WAS RECEIVED FROM THE MONTONEROS^{GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION} IN CORDOBA, ARGENTINA,
INDICATING THAT U. S. CONSULAR AGENT JOHN PATRICK EGAN
WOULD BE EXECUTED AT SEVEN P.M., FEBRUARY 28, 1975, UNLESS
FOUR TERRORISTS ALLEGEDLY TAKEN PRISONER BY THE GOVERNMENT
ARE PRODUCED. (S) (U)

A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFOR-
IN THE PAST ADVISED THAT AT LEAST TWO OF THE TERRORISTS
WERE SUMMARILY EXECUTED BY THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA
OFFICERS IN CONNECTION WITH "NO HOLDS BARRED" CAMPAIGN
AGAINST TERRORISM IN ARGENTINA. (S) (U)

ADMINISTRATIVE: REMYCAB FEBRUARY 27, 1975. [SOURCE IS

COMISARIO MAYOR JORGE CROVETTO, SECRETARY GENERAL, FEDERAL (S) (U)

1 - 163-604

1 - 804 Crovetto (S) (U)

RWS:jn
(3)~~SECRET~~

109-2-1268

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

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(Priority)PAGE ~~TNRX~~ TWO~~SECRET~~

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[POLICE OF ARGENTINA.] (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

END.

~~SECRET~~Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date: 2/28/75

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via CABLE IMMEDIATE
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-201) NR. 053-28
 FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) 1-P
 CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA.

ON FEBRUARY 28, 1975, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS
 FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT JUDGE
 HUGO ALFREDO ANZOARREGUI, THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE BUENOS AIRES
 PROVINCIAL SUPREME COURT, WAS KIDNAPPED IN MONTE GRANDE, BUENOS
 AIRES PROVINCE, DURING THE MORNING OF FEBRUARY 28, 1975 BY THE
 MONTONERO TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2, INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE: [SOURCE IS COMISARIO INSPECTOR OSVALDO
 DE BALDRICH, CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL
 POLICE.] (S)(u)

END

3 - Buenos Aires

(1 - 109-NEW Kidnapping of Hugo Alfredo Anzoarregui, Chief Justice, Buenos Aires Provincial Supreme Court)

(1 - 80-185 - [Comisario Baldrich]) (u)

RWS:gjk

(3)

DECLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/BCE/PC
 ON 5-16-01
 Argentina Project

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

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Per _____

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Date: 3/4/75

~~SECRET~~

Transmit the following in

CABLE

(Type in plaintext or code)

PRIORITY-URGENT

Via

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201)

NR. 055-04

FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2)

2-P

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY 39063 ELW/DCE/DG

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1/6

Argentina Project

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA (HILEV).

ON MARCH 4, 1975, COMISARIO GENERAL LUIS MARGARIDE, CHIEF OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA), NOTED THAT THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION HAD KIDNAPPED ON SEPTEMBER 19, 1974, JORGE BORN, JR. AND JUAN C. BORN, BROTHERS WHO ARE CONNECTED WITH ONE OF ARGENTINA'S MOST IMPORTANT PRIVATE BUSINESS COMPANIES, THE BUNGE & BORN COMPANY. COMISARIO GENERAL MARGARIDE NOTED THAT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE MONTONEROS AND THE BORN FAMILY TO FREE THE CAPTIVE BROTHERS HAD CONTINUED WITHOUT SUCCESS. COMISARIO GENERAL MARGARIDE ADVISED THAT THE LATEST FPA INTELLIGENCE IN THE BORN BROTHERS KIDNAPPING INDICATES THAT THE MONTONEROS HAVE AGREED TO SETTLE FOR THE DELIVERY OF FIFTEEN MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF ARMS IN A THIRD NON-INTERESTED COUNTRY FOR THE BROTHERS' RELEASE. (S) (U)

3 - Buenos Aires (109-2)

(1 - 109-672)

(66-59)

RWS:gjk

(3)

Approved: *[Signature]*

Special Agent in Charge

Sent

3/4/75

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Per

[Signature]

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Date:

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(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

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PAGE TWO

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COMISARIO GENERAL MARGARIDE ADVISED THAT FPA INTELLIGENCE INDICATES
THAT THESE ARMS COULD THEN BE CLANDESTINELY SHIPPED TO ARGENTINA
FOR FUTURE USE BY THE MONTONEROS IN THEIR GUERRILLA OPERATION
AGAINST THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931, XGDS-1 AND 2, INDEFINITE.~~

END.

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Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

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DECLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/BCE/06
ON 5-16-01

Date: 3/4/75

Transmit the following in Argentina Project

CODE

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via CABLEURGENT (PRIORITY)

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. 56-04

LEGAT BRASILIA NR. 007-04

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2) 5P

~~SECRET~~

FPM-ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA. DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6

CLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/BCE/06
5-16-01
Argentina Project

REMYCAB MARCH 1, 1975, REPORTING THE ASSASSINATION OF
CONSULAR AGENT JOHN EGAN IN CORDOBA, ARGENTINA, BY THE
MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION.

FOLLOWING DATA IS PROVIDED FOR BUREAU'S CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION REGARDING CURRENT SITUATION IN BUENOS AIRES
EMBASSY AS A RESULT OF EGAN'S ASSASSINATION AND POSSIBLE
RAMIFICATIONS ON OUR OPERATIONS.

ON FEBRUARY 26, 1975, THE DAY EGAN WAS KIDNAPPED, HIS
SISTER-IN-LAW TRAVELED FROM CORDOBA TO BUENOS AIRES AND
DELIVERED A PERSONAL LETTER TO THE REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER (RSO)
FROM HER SISTER, EGAN'S WIFE. LETTER WAS DELIVERED TO RSO AT
APPROXIMATELY FIVE P.M. SINCE HE WAS OCCUPIED, RSO DID NOT
OPEN LETTER UNTIL AFTER EGAN HAD BEEN KIDNAPPED AT SEVEN P.M.,
WHEN RSO RETURNED TO EMBASSY. LETTER REPORTS THAT CORDOBA
PROVINCIAL POLICE (CPP) GUARDS ASSIGNED TO EGAN RESIDENCE, WHICH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

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(Priority)

PAGE TWO

BUE 109-2

~~SECRET~~

DOUBLED AS CONSULAR AGENCY, HAD NOT APPEARED SINCE FEBRUARY 23, 1975, AND THAT NEIGHBORS HAD REPORTED SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY OF POSSIBLE TERRORIST ORIGIN, SUCH AS CASING AND SURVEILLANCE DURING PAST FEW DAYS. MRS. EGAN INDICATED HER HUSBAND DID NOT DESIRE TO TELEPHONE THE EMBASSY TO RELAY THIS DATA SINCE HE DID NOT GIVE IT ANY CREDENCE. MRS. EGAN ADVISED SHE HAD CONTINUALLY TELEPHONED CPP TO ASK THAT GUARDS BE RESTORED TO RESIDENCE. RSO CONFIDENTIALLY ADVISED HE FEELS HE WILL BE REPRIMANDED FOR FAILING TO OPEN MRS. EGAN'S LETTER IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT. IN THIS CONNECTION, GEORGE VARROS, INSPECTOR IN CHARGE OF U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECURITY OPERATIONS FOR SOUTH AMERICA IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN BUENOS AIRES AT ONE P.M. MARCH 4, 1975, TO CONDUCT INQUIRY. RSO CONFIDENTIALLY ADVISED HE INTENDS TO RECOMMEND EMBASSY COMPLEMENT BE REDUCED TO SIXTY OFFICERS AND SECRETARIAL PERSONNEL, THAT DEPENDENTS BE EVACUATED, AND REMAINING EMBASSY PERSONNEL ESTABLISH COMPOUND-TYPE RESIDENCES.

QUESTION OF RETAINING CONSULAR AGENCY IN CORDOBA WAS REVIEWED BY STATE AFTER THE MARCH, 1974, KIDNAPPING OF USIS DIRECTOR IN

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Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

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U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

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(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)~~SECRET~~

PAGE THREE

BUE 109-2

~~SECRET~~

CORDOBA, ALFRED LAUN, BY ERP GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION. AMBASSADOR ADVISED THAT STATE INSTRUCTED THE CONSULAR AGENCY BE CLOSED, IN VIEW OF GRAVE TERRORIST SITUATION IN CORDOBA PROVINCE; HOWEVER, AMBASSADOR ADVISED THAT ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER PLEADED WITH HIM TO RETAIN CONSULAR AGENCY, SINCE TO CLOSE IT WOULD CAUSE WORLDWIDE PUBLICITY AND CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WAS NOT IN CONTROL. AMBASSADOR ADVISED FOREIGN MINISTER PROMISED TO PROVIDE COMPLETE PROTECTION FOR CONSULAR AGENT EGAN, AND BASED ON THESE FACTORS, AMBASSADOR RECOMMENDED THAT THE CONSULAR AGENCY REMAIN OPEN. AMBASSADOR ADVISED ME ON HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BASIS THAT HE EXPECTS TO BE TARGET OF SECOND-GUESSING ON THE PART OF STATE OFFICIALS, WHICH EVENTUALLY MIGHT RESULT IN HIS REMOVAL FROM ARGENTINA.

ON MARCH 4, 1975, THE AMBASSADOR AND I MET WITH THE CHIEF OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA) TO REVIEW THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION. THE FPA CHIEF TOLD AMBASSADOR HE BELIEVES EGAN WAS KIDNAPPED BY THE MONTONEROS AND DELIBERATELY EXECUTED TO ESTABLISH PRECEDENT IN ARGENTINA OF KILLING A DIPLOMAT HOSTAGE

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PAGE FOUR

BUE 109-2

~~SECRET~~

FOR RELEASE OF TERRORIST PRISONERS. FPA CHIEF POINTED OUT HE WAS CERTAIN MONTONEROS KNEW FOUR COMRADES, WHO THEY DEMANDED BE PRODUCED IN EXCHANGE FOR EGAN'S LIFE, HAD ALREADY BEEN ELIMINATED BY ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES. THUS, FPA CHIEF STATED ENTIRE EGAN AFFAIR WAS OPEN-ENDED, INSOFAR AS MONTONEROS WERE CONCERNED. FPA CHIEF ADVISED HE BELIEVES THERE WILL BE ADDITIONAL KIDNAPPINGS OF DIPLOMATS FOR PRISONER EXCHANGE, SINCE THERE ARE A NUMBER OF PRISONERS CURRENTLY BEING TAKEN BY ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES, WHICH THE TERRORISTS WOULD DESIRE TO FREE.

RSO'S RECOMMENDATION THAT EMBASSY BE REDUCED TO SIXTY OFFICERS AND SECRETARIAL PERSONNEL, IF ACCEPTED BY STATE, WOULD PROBABLY MEAN THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO CLOSE BUENOS AIRES OFFICE AND RELOCATE IN ANOTHER COUNTRY. AMBASSADOR TOLD ME HE DOUBTS STATE WOULD ACT ON SUCH A RECOMMENDATION IMMEDIATELY BUT WOULD PROBABLY FIRST CARRY OUT PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED REDUCTIONS IN EMBASSY PERSONNEL, WHICH TO DATE STILL HAVE NOT TAKEN PLACE. THESE REDUCTIONS WOULD ELIMINATE ABOUT TWENTY POSITIONS AND MIGHT SATISFY STATE

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Special Agent in Charge

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PAGE FIVE

BUE 109-2

~~SECRET~~

OFFICIALS FOR TIME BEING. HOWEVER, AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT ONE ADDITIONAL INCIDENT WOULD BE ALL IT TAKES TO CAUSE STATE TO DRASTICALLY REDUCE THE EMBASSY TO FIFTY OR SIXTY OFFICERS AND SECRETARIAL PERSONNEL.

FROM FOREGOING, CHANCES OF CLOSING BRASILIA IN SIX-MONTH TIME FRAME AND ASSIGNMENT OF ACTING LEGAT CLEGG HERE AS ASSISTANT LEGAT APPEAR REMOTE.

I WILL PERSONALLY FOLLOW THIS MATTER CLOSELY, KEEPING THE BUREAU CURRENTLY ADVISED.

IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT FOREGOING IS FOR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU AND NOT FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE BUREAU.

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END.

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Special Agent in Charge

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Date: 3/10/75

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via CABLE URGENT (PRIORITY)
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. 59-10
LEGAT BRASILIA NR. 008-10
FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2) 4P

~~SECRET, NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION - CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA, IS - ARGENTINA.

REMYCAB MARCH 4, 1975.

FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL DATA IS PROVIDED FOR BUREAU'S
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION REGARDING SECURITY SITUATION IN
ARGENTINA:

ON MARCH 9, 1975, AMBASSADOR HILL WAS URGENTLY SUMMONED
TO RESIDENCE OF ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO INFORMED
AMBASSADOR SECRET INFORMATION HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM RELIABLE
GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE SOURCES INDICATING THE AMBASSADOR
WAS TARGETED FOR KIDNAPPING BY AN UNDISCLOSED ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ORGANIZATION DURING THE PERIOD MARCH 10a14, 1975.
THIS TIME PERIOD COINCIDES WITH THE VISIT TO SOUTH AMERICA
OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS,
WILLIAM ROGERS.

b1 per CIA

REPORTED INFORMATION

- 66-50

RWS:jn

(2)

Approved: *RWS*

Special Agent in Charge

Sent

1:15 P

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Per

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE TWO

BUE 109-2

SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION - CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION
INDICATING THAT ARGENTINE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, THE
MONTONEROS AND ERP, INTEND TO COMMIT TERRORIST ACTS, INCLUDING
KIDNAPPING, AGAINST AMERICAN CITIZENS IN ARGENTINA AND
SPECIFICALLY AGAINST U. S. EMBASSY PERSONNEL. ~~(S)~~ (U)

AMBASSADOR CONFIDENTIALLY ADVISED ME THE FOLLOWING ACTION
WAS BEING IMMEDIATELY IMPLEMENTED TO FURTHER PROTECT EMBASSY
PERSONNEL FROM THE GROWING TERRORIST THREAT:

THE NOVEMBER, 1974, RECOMMENDED REDUCTION OF EMBASSY STAFF
BY 23 OFFICERS AND SECRETARIAL PERSONNEL WILL BE IMMEDIATELY
CARRIED OUT. IN THIS CONNECTION, ONLY SIX OF 23 POSITIONS
RECOMMENDED FOR ELIMINATION HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT; GUARDS
WILL BE ASSIGNED TO ALL EMBASSY PERSONNEL WITH EMPHASIS ON
OFFICERS REPRESENTING HIGHEST TERRORIST TARGET PROFILE. IN
THIS CONNECTION, AMBASSADOR INSTRUCTED THAT A 16-HOUR ARMED
GUARD BE ASSIGNED TO MY RESIDENCE UNTIL THE TERRORIST THREAT
EASES; MOBILE SECURITY PATROL SERVICE WILL BE AUGMENTED WITH
END PAGE TWO

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

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(Priority)

PAGE THREE

BUE 109-2

~~SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION - CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION~~

ADDITION OF FOUR PATROL CARS; EMBASSY OFFICE HOURS WILL BE STAGGERED ON RANDOM BASIS TWO HOURS AT BEGINNING AND END OF WORKDAY; PERSONAL TRAVEL TO ARGENTINA BY U. S. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES WILL BE PROHIBITED; OFFICIAL EMBASSY VEHICLES WILL BE REPAINTED AND ISSUED NON-DIPLOMATIC LICENSE PLATES; TWO-WAY RADIO VEHICLE ANTENNAE WILL BE CAMOUFLAGED TO AVOID IDENTIFICATION OF VEHICLE.

FROM PERSONAL EVALUATION, I BELIEVE MOST CRITICAL PERIOD FOR TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST EMBASSY PERSONNEL WILL BE DURING NEXT 90-DAY PERIOD, SINCE GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-TERRORIST DRIVE IS ACCELERATING WITH NUMEROUS PRISONERS BEING TAKEN BY THE POLICE AND MILITARY FORCES. TERRORISTS REALIZE THEY MUST TAKE SOME DRASTIC ACTION TO RELIEVE PRESSURE OF GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-TERRORIST DRIVE DURING WHICH NUMEROUS PRISONERS ARE TAKEN AND EXECUTED AFTER INTERROGATION BY TORTURE. TERRORISTS FULLY REALIZE THIS FACT AND DESIRE TO SECURE RELEASE OF THEIR CAPTIVE ASSOCIATES THROUGH KIDNAPPING OF DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL AS

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Special Agent in Charge

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U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

~~SECRET~~

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(Priority)

PAGE FOUR

BUE 109-2

~~SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION - CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION~~
HOSTAGES.

I AM PERSONALLY FOLLOWING THIS MATTER AND WILL ADVISE THE
BUREAU ON A CURRENT BASIS OF DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY OCCUR. ONCE
AGAIN IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT FOREGOING IS FOR BUREAU'S ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~DISSEMINATION INFORMATION AND NOT FOR DISSEMINATION.~~

~~CLASSIFIED SECRET, NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION, CONTROLLED~~
~~DISSEMINATION~~ AGDS-2, [REDACTED]

b1 per CIA

[REDACTED] ~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931.~~

END.

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

5-17-01
CLASSIFIED BY 39063 FLEW/12/6/00
DECLASSIFIED ON
Argentina Project

March 11, 1975

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

Several confidential sources abroad provided the following chronological summary of presumed terrorist acts carried out in Argentina during the period February 12 through March 9, 1975:

February 12, 1975

An attack was carried out against a guard post of an Army Engineering Battalion in Villa Martelli in Buenos Aires Province (BAP).

In Coronel Brandsen, BAP, the body of an unidentified male individual was discovered. This individual had been shot several times.

In BAP, a Federal Police of Argentina (FPA) Corporal was robbed of his service revolver and credentials.

February 13, 1975

In Tucuman, bombing attacks were carried out against the residences of a candidate for national office from the Radical Civic Union, an Argentine political party, and against a former leader of the Tucuman College of Attorneys.

A bombing attack was carried out against offices of Molinos Rio de la Plata in BAP.

The remains of a body were discovered in Nunez, BAP.

February 14, 1975

The bodies of two laborers were found in Villa Recondo, BAP. The laborers had been executed and investigation by the Buenos Aires Provincial Police (BAPP) established that they were connected with a paint and brick manufacturing company respectively. BAPP investigation established that officials of the paint and

b1 per CIA

- 8 - Bureau
1 - Ambassador Hill
1 -
1 - ASO
1 - DAO
2 - Buenos Aires (109-2)
 (1 - 109-103)
RWS:in (14)

Classified by 5921
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B (1) (2)
Automatically declassified on INDET

All sources mentioned herein have
furnished reliable information in the past.

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

~~SECRET~~

brick manufacturing company had previously been executed by terrorists.

A retired naval non-commissioned officer was executed by terrorists in Bernal, BAP.

In Cordoba a bomb attack was carried out against the residence of a municipal official.

In Santa Fe a national deputy was executed by terrorists.

In Lomas de Zamora, BAP, the Montoneros bombed a local pizza parlor. In flyers left at the scene of the bombing, the Montoneros accused the owner of the pizza parlor of collaborating with the police.

In Lanus, BAP, the Montoneros attacked a medical clinic and abducted a Doctor as a hostage.

In Tucuman an Argentine Army officer was killed and two non-commissioned officers seriously wounded in a terrorist ambush. These Army personnel were taking part in an anti-terrorist sweep in Tucuman Province.

In Salta a journalist was killed in a bombing by presumed terrorists.

In Mar del Plata a bombing attack was carried out against an employee of a heater company.

February 15, 1975

In Corrientes a bomb attack was carried out against the Partido Autonomista, a political party.

FPA bomb experts defused a bomb located in the Federal Capital.

In Mendoza the bodies of two male individuals were discovered in an area where several other bodies appeared in the past. The bodies contained numerous bullet wounds.

In Quilmes, BAP, the body of an unidentified male was discovered. The body bore numerous bullet wounds.

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

In La Plata, BAP, a bomb attack was carried out against an Argentine naval installation.

Also in La Plata, a grenade attack was carried out against the offices of the National University Federation.

In Cordoba a bomb attack was carried out against the residence of an individual, who was recently detained for being a member of the ERP extremist organization.

February 16, 1975

In the Federal Capital, the body of a youth was discovered tied to a tree. The youth had been executed and his body bore numerous bullet wounds. FPA investigation established that the dead youth was a member of the Montonero guerrilla organization.

February 17, 1975

In Cordoba a bomb attack was carried out against the residence of a veterinarian. Another bomb attack was carried out against the residence of a private Argentine citizen.

In Lomas de Zamora, the body of an unidentified male individual was recovered. The body contained numerous bullet wounds.

February 18, 1975

In Ciudadela, BAP, the residences of two telephone employees were bombed.

In San Isidro, BAP, an employee of an automobile parts company was executed.

February 19, 1975

In Cordoba an armored FPA personnel carrier was attacked by extremists. One FPA officer was killed and three seriously wounded.

~~SECRET~~

7

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE-TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

~~SECRET~~

A body riddled with fifty bullets was discovered in Mar del Plata.

Several bombs were thrown from a passing automobile at the Argentine Association of Telegraph Workers in Sant a Fe.

In Cordoba a bomb detonated at the office of the Taxi Workers Union.

February 20, 1975

FPA officers were fired upon in the Federal Capital, when they approached a suspicious vehicle in order to question its occupants.

In Rio Tercero, Cordoba Province, shots were exchanged between a military patrol and unknown individuals.

In Cordoba explosives, blasting caps and fuses were stolen from a mining company.

In Cordoba a dairy company was machinegunned by the Montoneros and propaganda painted on the walls of the building.

February 21, 1975

In Cordoba, bombing attacks were carried out against a farm machinery company, a branch of the National City Bank of New York, and a local office of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company.

In Rosario the ERP murdered a metal workers union leader.

In Moron, BAP, a Chevrolet automobile showroom was bombed.

February 22, 1975

A bomb detonated at a men's haberdashery store in the Federal Capital.

In Campana, BAP, two Argentine coast guard officers

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FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

were attacked and their arms stolen.

In Resistencia the residence of the Social Welfare Minister was bombed.

February 23, 1975

In Cordoba a police officer was machine-gunned to death outside of the 14th precinct of the Cordoba Provincial Police (CPP).

In Rosario, a Santa Fe Provincial Police (SFPP) officer was machine-gunned to death as he stood on a street corner.

In Rosario the body of an unidentified male individual bearing numerous bullet wounds was discovered in an irrigation ditch.

In La Plata an innocent bystander was killed as a result of a shootout between officers of the BAPP and unidentified individuals.

February 25, 1975

In Quilmes a bomb exploded at the residence of a Provincial Ministry of Justice employee.

In Lomas de Zamora, BAP, an industrialist was kidnapped.

A body riddled by numerous bullets was discovered in the Federal Capital. Shortly after the discovery, the ERP claimed credit for the act.

February 26, 1975

JOHN PATRICK EGAN, U. S. Consular Agent in Cordoba, was kidnapped by the Montoneros.

In Ramos Mejia, BAP, unknown individuals threw a hand grenade at a parked BAPP cruiser.

In Santa Fe a bomb exploded at the residence of a Santa Fe Provincial Bank employee.

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

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February 27, 1975

In Cordoba, two unidentified individuals shot up the residence of a CPP officer.

In Tigre, BAP, two unidentified men and a woman, armed with automatic weapons, held up a BAPP officer and stole his service revolver.

In Avellaneda, BAP, the body of an unidentified male individual was discovered in a garbage dump. The body contained numerous bullet wounds.

In Monte Grande, the PRESIDENT OF THE Buenos Aires Provincial Supreme Court, was kidnapped by extremists.

The body of a former Secretary to the Governor of BAP was discovered near Ezeiza International Airport.

In Lomas de Zamora, a BAPP vehicle was attacked by Montoneros and three officers killed.

In Tucuman, a bomb exploded in an abandoned automobile killing an Argentine Army enlisted man.

In Cordoba, U. S. Consular Agent JOHN EGAN was executed by his Montonero captors.

In Neuquen, a shootout took place during the general assembly of the Provincial Employees and Laborers Association of Neuquen.

In Rosario, the ERP took over two repair shops of the Mitre Railroad and distributed propaganda.

March 1, 1975

A petroleum workers union official was assassinated in the Federal Capital.

In Rosario a bomb detonated at the Mitre Railroad warehouse. This attack was carried out by the Montonero guerrilla organization.

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

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March 2, 1975

In Cordoba the body of an employee of the Ika-Renault Company was discovered. This individual had been shot and his body bore marks of torture.

In San Martin, BAP, an FPA Corporal was involved in a shootout with presumed terrorists outside of his residence.

In Sarandi, BAP, the body of a young woman was found near the Pan American Highway. The victim had been shot several times.

In Florida, BAP, presumed terrorists stole a large bulldozer, presumably for use in some future terrorist act.

March 4, 1975

In Santa Fe the Montoneros shot up the front of the residence of a political party.

In Mendoza the residence of an Argentine businessman was bombed. Also in Mendoza the Secretary General of the Newspaper Vendors Union was bombed.

In Tucuman two men and a woman were killed when the car in which they were riding exploded.

Tucuman Provincial Police investigation established that a powerful bomb apparently detonated in the trunk of the car and that the female victim apparently had been executed and was being transported to some dumping ground.

In Rosario a bomb attack was carried out by the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT) against an Argentine Navy office. This attack represented the third incident against this office in a short period of time.

In Cordoba three incendiary devices were thrown against

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

the office of the Dunlop Tire Company.

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March 5, 1975

In Temperley, BAP, a Federal Police Corporal was assaulted and robbed of his service revolver and police identification.

In the Federal Capital armed individuals invaded the office of a cattle breeding association, kidnapped the caretaker and his wife, and set the office on fire. Subsequently, the caretaker and his wife were released unharmed.

March 6, 1975

In Tucuman a police corporal was machine-gunned to death as he left his residence enroute to work.

March 7, 1975

A bomb completely destroyed an automobile in the Federal Capital.

A medical doctor employed by the Santa Fe Provincial Police was assassinated in Rosario.

March 8, 1975

An FPA office was attacked in La Plata, BAP. After subjecting the office to machine-gun fire terrorists planted a time bomb and fled the scene.

Two FPA officers were assassinated in the Federal Capital during an extremist attack against their guard post.

In Berazategui, BAP, the Montoneros bombed a glass factory, which is a subsidiary of Corning Glass Products, Corning, New York.

In Vicente Lopez, BAP, terrorists machine-gunned the front of the Bank of Tokyo office.

In Santa Fe bombing attacks were carried out against the residences of a political party official and a member of the municipal council.

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
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Another bomb attack was carried out against the residence of a Peronist official.

In Santa Fe a bomb was discovered at the Sauce Viejo Airport.

In Cordoba the residence of an assistant to the Federal Interventor was machine-gunned.

March 9, 1975

In San Justo, BAP, the body of an unidentified male individual was found. This individual had been shot several times.

In Mendoza a shootout took place between unknown individuals and the Mendoza Provincial Police near the Fourth Air Force Brigade Headquarters.

3/11/75

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AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-201)
FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(P)
SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA;
IS - ARGENTINA;

ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
FPM - ARGENTINA
BUDED: 4/15/75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

REFERENCE:

My airtel and LHM 2/12/75 under the above dual
caption.

ENCLOSURES:

For the Bureau eight (8) copies of a letterhead
memorandum (LHM) dated and captioned as above.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

The enclosed LHM is being submitted at this time
at the specific request of Ambassador HILL.

The enclosed LHM discloses only the more serious
terrorist activities, which have taken place since the submission
of referenced LHM.

DISSEMINATION:

Local dissemination has been made to the Ambassador,
Regional Security Officer and the Defense Attache's Office. b1 per CIA

- 3 - Bureau
(1 - Foreign Liaison Unit)
2 - Buenos Aires
(1 - 109-103)

RWS:jn
(5)

5/23/01
CLASSIFIED BY 39063 ETW/BCE/sem
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 46
Argentina Project 109-2-1275

~~SECRET~~

BUE 109-2

CLASSIFICATION:

The enclosed LHM has been classified ~~SECRET~~
~~XGDS-1 & 2, Indefinite.~~

SOURCES:

Refer to the attached Non-Symbol Source Page.

NON-SYMBOL SOURCE PAGE

Collective confidential sources abroad referred to in the enclosed LHM are identified as follows: ✓

Dr. ARTURO HORACIO POIRE (BUEfile 80-84)
Federal Police of Argentina (FPA)

Comisario Inspector JORGE CROVETTO (BUEfile 80-87)
Chief of Federal Crime, FPA

Sub-Comisario CARLOS ALBERTO MONTENEGRO (BUEfile 80-186) Department of Intelligence, FPA Estado Mayor

Comisario Inspector OSVALDO J. DE BALDRICH (BUEfile 80-185)
Chief of Intelligence
Buenos Aires Provincial Police (BAPP)

Captain JUAN LUCERO (BUEfile 80-173)
Argentine Army Intelligence Service (AAIS)

Colonel JUAN RIVAS
AAIS

General ALBERTO S. CACERES (BUEfile 64-14)
Commander of the Argentine Army
Gendarmeria Nacional (Border Guards)

HENRY ACKERMAN (BUEfile 80-163)
Associated Press Representative

Comisario FRANCISCO SPINOSA
Department of Federal Security, FPA

Colonel ALBERTO VALIN
Chief, AAIS

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~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

4/8/75

LEGAL ATTACHE

5-17-01
CLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/DFE/06
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
Argentina Project

DISAPPEARANCE OF RETIRED ARGENTINE
ARMY COLONEL JORGE O. MONTIEL

As reported in the news media, Colonel MONTIEL disappeared after terminating his duties at the State Secretariat for Information (SIDE), on 3/26/75. It is noted that Colonel MONTIEL at one time was the Director of Federal Security of the Federal Police of Argentina. He is currently assigned to SIDE. (S) (U)

On 4/8/75, an official of the Argentine Army Intelligence Service (SIE) provided the following information: (S) (U)

SIE has been conducting inquiries regarding the possibility that Colonel MONTIEL had been kidnapped by extremists, in view of his past connections with the Federal Police of Argentina and his current assignment to SIDE. In addition, there was some apprehension in SIE owing to Colonel MONTIEL's wide range of contacts with the Montonero organization prior to the time that the Montoneros went underground. SIE learned that on 3/26/75, President PERON signed a secret order recreating an organization known as Control de Estado and naming Colonel MONTIEL as its director. It is noted that the Control de Estado existed during the first time of President JUAN DOMINGO PERON, and it served as an investigative agency to insure that government officials were not corrupt and carried out their assigned tasks in a professional manner. SIE is now convinced that Colonel MONTIEL voluntarily disappeared in order to be able to work undisturbed organizing his new office. While MONTIEL's disappearance called attention to himself, SIE noted that MONTIEL is somewhat of a character, who is prone to carrying out ill advised actions on the spur of the moment. SIE is confident that Colonel MONTIEL will surface in the near future. (S) (U)

The foregoing information should not be discussed with any foreign officials including those of the Argentine Government.

1 - Addressee

1 - POL

1 - POL/R

1 - SY

1 - DAO

3 - Buenos Aires
(1 - 109-103) (1 - 109-2)
(1 - 80-Valin) (S) (U)

RWS:jn
(8)

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 5831
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on INDEF

109-2-1300

~~SECRET~~ April 15, 1975

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

Several confidential sources abroad provided the following chronological summary of presumed terrorist activities carried out in Argentina during the period 3/9/75 through 4/13/75:

March 9, 1975

*5-17-01
DECLASSIFIED BY 39063E W/BCE/DG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X*
Argentina Project An attack was carried out in Buenos Aires Province (BAP) by the Montonero terrorist organization against a storage lot of the Chrysler Corporation. Grenades were utilized to carry out the attack and several automobiles were completely destroyed.

March 10, 1975

In Cordoba, the Cordoba Provincial Police (CPP) recovered a package containing electric blasting caps manufactured by the Schofler Company.

In Tigre, BAP, a BAPP officer was killed and another injured during a terrorist attack against a BAPP post. Terrorists utilized hand grenades during the attack.

In the Federal Capital, an incendiary bomb attack was carried out against the Banco de Credito Rural Argentina.

In the Federal Capital, a bomb exploded outside the offices of the Association of Personnel of the University of Buenos Aires.

In Tucuman two bomb attacks were carried out against executives connected with the sugar industry.

In the Federal Capital, an anonymous telephone call was received at the residence of an Argentine executive with the General Motors Corporation, in which his life was threatened.

March 11, 1975

In San Juan, five bombing attacks were carried out against offices of various wine companies. These attacks were attributed to the Argentine terrorist organization, the Peoples Revolutionary

Army (ERP).

8 - Bureau

1 - Ambassador Hill

1 - [redacted]

1 - RSO 1 - DAO

2 - Buenos Aires (109-2)

RWS:jn (15)

Classified by 5931

Exempt from General Declassification

Schedule of Executive Order 11652

Exemption Category 5B(1)(2)

Automatically declassified on 11/11/2017

b1 per CIA

All sources mentioned herein have furnished reliable information in the past.

**FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES**

The body of a male individual, who had been shot numerous times, was discovered in Merlo, BAP.

In Tigre, the ERP interfered with a union meeting of the Shipyard Workers Union. A shootout took place between the ERP members and the members of the union.

In the Federal Capital, the Federal Police of Argentina (FPA) Bomb Squad experts defused a bomb which had been placed at the residence of the Ambassador of the Order of Malta.

In La Plata, BAP, a bomb exploded at the residence of an executive of the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires.

In the Federal Capital, a bomb exploded at the Teachers Workers Union Headquarters.

In the Federal Capital, the ERP killed two FPA officers in an attack against an FPA guard post. Two BAPP officers were wounded while attempting to apprehend the extremists.

In Rosario, Santa Fe Province, an extremist was killed in a shootout with Santa Fe Provincial Police (SFPP) officers during an ERP attempt to take over a SFPP post in General Alvear.

In Cordoba, extremists fired upon a CPP police cruiser. Also in Cordoba, extremists broke into the house of a Cordoba Provincial Judge and molested his daughter. The Judge was not at home and the intruders left without doing any harm. Additionally, in Cordoba terrorists threw three Molotov bombs against an automotive manufacturing company.

In the Federal Capital, the Union Carbide Corporation received numerous telephone calls allegedly from the Montonero guerrilla organization threatening Union Carbide with violence unless Eveready Battery production was "normalized," within 72 hours.

March 12, 1975

In Salta, a bomb attack was carried out against a former Provincial Minister. Additionally, Salta Provincial Police (SPP) deactivated a bomb in front of the residence of an engineer.

In the Federal Capital, a bomb exploded in front of the offices of the Communist Party of Argentina (CPA).

**FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES**

In Temperley, BAP, a bomb attack was carried out against an official of the municipal government of Lomas de Zamora.

Five bodies were discovered in the Federal Capital. Three of the bodies had been shot repeatedly while another had been burned beyond recognition. The fifth body was discovered floating nearby in the Riachuelo River. The area in which the bodies were discovered has been a dumping ground for extremists in the past.

In Tucuman, the nephew of the former Economy Minister was kidnapped.

March 13, 1975

In Cordoba, the Montoneros assassinated an officer of the CPP. Also in Cordoba, the ERP carried out a bomb attack against an automobile dealer.

In La Plata, BAP, a bomb exploded at the residence of an official of a bus company.

Again in Cordoba, an FPA office was fired upon by extremists with machine guns from a passing automobile.

Also in Cordoba, the ERP detonated several projectiles which contained propaganda.

In Mar del Plata, ERP members attacked a member of the BAPP and stole his service revolver. The BAPP officer resisted the attack and he was slightly wounded.

March 14, 1975

In Cordoba, the Montoneros machinegunned the residence of a CPP Doctor.

In Mar del Plata a bomb exploded at a bakery.

March 15, 1975

In La Plata, the bodies of a young couple were discovered on a deserted road. The bodies contained numerous bullet wounds and investigation by the BAPP established that one of the slain youths was related to a Peronist official who had also been assassinated on March 12, 1975, in the Federal Capital.

In Tucuman, the nephew of the former Economy Minister of Argentina, who had been kidnapped on March 12, 1975, was released after the payment of a large ransom.

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
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March 16, 1975

In Bahia Blanca, BAP, a book store belonging to an official of the Regional Peronist Youth Movement was bombed.

In Santiago del Estero, the residence of a former candidate for the Provincial Governorship from the Movimiento Popular Federalista was bombed.

In Mendoza, the Federal Police office was subjected to a bomb attack.

Also in Mendoza, the offices of a wine company were bombed.

In Cordoba, Montoneros machinegunned the residence of a private citizen.

In Mar del Plata, a bomb attack was carried out against the residence of an officer of the Volta Elevator Company.

In La Plata, extremists fired upon and seriously wounded two Naval non-commissioned officers at a guard post.

In Moreno, BAP, the body of a male individual with his hands tied behind his back was discovered. The body contained numerous bullet wounds.

In Cordoba, an incendiary bomb attack was carried out against a CPP precinct.

In Tucuman, the ERP took over a railroad station on the Belgrano line and kidnapped the station master and dynamited the station.

In Ramos Mejia, BAP, an FPA officer was attacked and his service weapon stolen.

In La Plata, the residence of a Federal Judge was machine-gunned.

March 17, 1975

In Lanus, BAP, a Mercedes Benz and a Dodge (Chrysler

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
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Corporation) showroom were bombed.

In Longchamps, BAP, a bomb attack was carried out against the telephone company office.

In San Andres de Giles, BAP, the body of the son of a Mercedes Benz dealer was discovered. This individual had been kidnapped several days previously and his father was unable to raise the ransom demanded by the kidnappers.

In Cordoba, a bomb attack was carried out against a CPP cruiser, which was parked near a CPP precinct station.

March 18, 1975

In Moron, BAP, an extremist group attacked a BAPP sub-station firing automatic weapons and throwing hand grenades.

In Cordoba, an intense fire fight took place between officers of the CPP and terrorists, attempting to attack the publishing facility of the Cordoba daily newspaper "La Voz del Interior."

Also in Cordoba, extremists shot up the broadcasting station of the University of Cordoba. There were also shooting incidents in Cordoba, which were carried out by snipers at various intersections.

The radio station "La Voz del Pueblo" was also attacked by extremists in Cordoba. The regional headquarters of the General Workers Confederation (CGT) was also fired upon by extremists in Cordoba. The 12th Precinct and the 6th Precinct of the CPP were attacked by extremists.

During an FPA raid against a safe house of the Army of Liberation, August 22nd Faction, an Argentine extremist group, in Villa Pueyrredon in the Federal Capital, an extremist and an FPA officer were killed.

March 19, 1975

In La Plata, a student center of the School of Engineering of the University of La Plata was raided by extremists and virtually destroyed.

In Tigre, a powerful bomb destroyed a shipyard.

Four bodies were discovered in the Federal Capital. The

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FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
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victims had been shot numerous times and their bodies incinerated in an abandoned truck. Additionally, the Argentine Coast Guard recovered the body of another individual in the Federal Capital, that was floating in a local river. This body contained numerous bullet wounds.

In the Federal Capital, a Doctor, who is a member of the CPA, was kidnapped from his downtown apartment.

March 20, 1975

In Rio Negro, the offices of a local newspaper were fired upon by extremists.

In Cordoba, an orthodox Peronist official was kidnapped. Also in Cordoba, a retired CPP official was murdered by terrorists.

In the Federal Capital, three automobiles were stolen at gunpoint from a local garage. Subsequently, two of these automobiles were identified by the FPA in connection with the assassination of an FPA officer in San Martin, BAP, approximately twelve hours after the automobiles had been stolen.

In Mar del Plata, an attorney, who was an advisor to the CGT, was assassinated by terrorists.

In Tucuman, two bodies were discovered. The bodies bore numerous bullet wounds.

In Bahia Blanca, the Deputy Chief of the BAPP Intelligence Service was assassinated near his residence. The BAPP official's minor son was wounded in the terrorist attack.

March 21, 1975

In Bahia Blanca, a Roman Catholic priest was assassinated by extremists. The assassinated priest was a naturalized Argentine citizen of Czechoslovakian origin, and investigation by the BAPP established that this priest was extremely outspoken against leftists guerrilla groups in Argentina.

In Bahia Blanca, the body of a young woman was discovered on a suburban road. The victim had been shot numerous times and she

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
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was subsequently identified as the wife of a leftist Peronist official.

In Bahia Blanca, the residence of a leftist Peronist University leader was bombed.

The body of an unidentified male individual was discovered inside the hulk of a burned-out automobile in the Federal Capital. The victim had been shot numerous times.

In Mar del Plata, a group of heavily armed individuals systematically sought out and executed five persons, who were characterized by the BAPP as leftists.

In Bahia Blanca, FERNANDO ALDUBINO, a student at the National University of the South, was kidnapped.

In BAP, investigation by the BAPP into an extortion against the Commercial Counselor of the Ecuadorian Embassy, established that the extortion was related to common criminals and not terrorists.

March 22, 1975

During the early morning hours, a bomb exploded in BAP at the residence of a naval architect, who resided right next door to an official of the U. S. Embassy in Buenos Aires. BAPP investigation definitely established that the bombing was directed against the naval architect in connection with union problems at the shipyard, where he is employed. The BAPP noted that this shipyard was subjected to a bombing attack on March 19, 1975, as noted above.

In Cordoba, a Molotov bomb attack was carried out against an automobile dealership.

In Temperley, BAP, a group of heavily armed individuals sought out and executed eight individuals. The victims were forcibly taken from their homes, summarily executed in a vacant lot and their bodies dynamited. BAPP investigation established that the perpetrators of this act were right wing extremists.

In Cordoba, a bomb destroyed offices of the Piresol Company.

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
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March 23, 1975

In the Federal Capital, two branches of the Banco de Galicia y Rio de la Plata were bombed.

In Bahia Blanca, the body of FERNANDO ALDUBINO was discovered on a suburban road. The victim had been shot numerous times.

In the Federal Capital, a badly burned body was discovered by the FPA in a locked trunk resting against a curb.

In Rosario, the Deputy Chief of the Villa Constitucion, SFPP, Precinct, was assassinated by the ERP.

In Merlo, BAP, an FPA officer was assaulted and his service weapon stolen.

In San Justo, BAP, a BAPP patrol vehicle was fired on by extremists. Three of the BAPP officers in the patrol car were seriously wounded.

March 24, 1975

In BAP, members of the ERP set off bombs on the tracks of the Mitre Railroad disrupting service on the line.

In Santa Fe, bomb attacks were carried out against a pharmacy and the residence of a chemical engineer.

In Cordoba, the office of the Banco del Interior y Buenos Aires was bombed.

In Santa Fe Province, terrorists attempted to take over the headquarters of the SFPP in Canada de Gomez.

A SFPP cruiser was ambushed near Villa Constitucion.

March 25, 1975

In La Plata, a book store was bombed.

In Cordoba, the 9th Precinct of the CPP was machinegunned. Also in Cordoba, extremists hijacked a truck carrying cooking oil and flour for future distribution to local shanty towns.

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In the Federal Capital, the offices of the International Business Machine Company were bombed.

In BAP, Nino's restaurant was machinegunned. It is noted that this restaurant was favored by deceased Argentine President JUAN DOMINGO PERON and was the scene of several important meetings sponsored by PERON and his political associates.

In Bahia Blanca, the law office of a provincial legislator was broken into and shot up by terrorists.

In Salta, a Salta Provincial Police (SPP) outpost was attacked and a police radio stolen.

In Rosario, it was revealed that the Minister of Government of the Santa Fe Provincial Government, left Argentina with his family to take up residence in Uruguay, after receiving a threat from the AAA, a right wing terrorist organization.

March 26, 1975

A retired Argentine Army Colonel, the Chief of Counter-intelligence of the State Secretariat for Information (SIDE) disappeared while enroute from his residence in the Federal Capital to his office. This Colonel was formerly in charge of the Security Section of the FPA.

In the Federal Capital, the residence of an official of Acindar Steel Company was bombed.

In the Federal Capital, the body of an individual who had been shot numerous times was found in a burned-out automobile.

In Cordoba, various bombs containing pamphlets of the CPA exploded in the downtown business section.

In La Cruz, Cordoba Province, terrorists took over the explosive warehouse of a commercial company and stolen 500 sticks of dynamite, 73 electric blasting caps and a quantity of fuses. Also in Cordoba, an attack was carried out against a CPP patrol cruiser. During the attack a bomb was rigged and detonated by remote control when the CPP cruiser passed a certain location. A terrorist group utilizing the initials MAR took credit for this attack.

March 27, 1975

In the Federal Capital, an Argentine Army Colonel was

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
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kidnapped and assassinated.

In Campana, BAP, terrorists attempted to take over a BAPP sub-station.

In San Rafael, a bomb destroyed the offices of a wine company.

In Theobald, a suburb of Rosario, Santa Fe Province, the body of an individual was discovered. The victim had been shot several times and a communique attached to the victim's body claimed that the ERP was responsible for the assassination.

In La Plata, a bomb exploded at the residence of the Interventor of the Faculty of Judicial Science at the National University.

In the Federal Capital, a bomb was set off at the headquarters of the Alianza Libertadora Nacionalista, an Argentine political party.

March 28, 1975

Two union delegates were kidnapped in Cordoba.

In La Plata, the body of a student at the School of Medicine at the National University, was discovered on a suburban road. The victim had been shot numerous times.

March 29, 1975

In Cordoba, the CPP 2nd Precinct was attacked by extremists.

In Brandsen, the body of an unidentified male individual was discovered. The victim had been shot numerous times and an attempt had been made to incinerate his body.

In Sarandi, a General Motors showroom was bombed.

Two grenades containing Montonero propaganda exploded in downtown San Luis.

March 30, 1975

In Resistencia, a statue of assassinated CGT leader

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
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JOSE RUCCI was destroyed by a bomb.

Two separate attacks were carried out in Rosario against offices of the Provincial Court.

In Pilar, a BAPP official was killed in a gun fight.

In the Federal Capital, an FPA recruit was attacked and his service weapon stolen. During the attack, an FPA officer was seriously wounded.

In Rosario, an attack was carried out against the 5th Precinct of the SFPP.

March 31, 1975

In Santiago del Estero, the residence of the President of the Partido Provincial was shot up by unidentified individuals.

In Mar del Plata, a BAP municipal warehouse was subjected to an incendiary attack.

In Cordoba, a television station was fired upon by extremists. Additionally, the offices of a private detective agency were raided and numerous material stolen.

In Mar del Plata, a bomb attack was carried out against the residence of an official of the Volta Elevator Company.

In Cordoba, an individual was kidnapped near Santa Rosa.

April 1, 1975

In Mar del Plata, a bakery was bombed.

A bomb was set off in Cordoba outside the headquarters of the Frente de Izquierda Popular, an Argentine political party.

In San Antonio de Padua, a Corporal of the BAPP was assassinated.

In San Luis, three pamphlet bombs exploded in different locations in the downtown business area. The bombs were the work

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
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of the Montoneros,

During the evening rush hour, a car with its siren blaring attempted to pass through the congested downtown Buenos Aires business section, approximately five blocks from the U. S. Embassy. The car bore no license plates and no visible markings to indicate it was a police vehicle. The occupants of the car fired numerous shots into the air for no apparent reason. FPA attempts to detain the car met with negative results.

Two officials of a finance company were kidnapped in the Federal Capital.

April 2, 1975

In Caseros, BAP, a BAPP officer was wounded in a shoot-out with extremists.

In Florencio Varela, a body was discovered. The victim had been shot numerous times and the body bore definite signs of torture.

In the Federal Capital, a member of a shipyard workers union was assassinated.

In the Federal Capital, an Argentine Army Lieutenant Colonel was assassinated during a gun fight with terrorists who had previously attacked the automobile carrying a retired FPA official, who is currently employed by the Social Welfare Ministry. In a subsequent communique, the Montoneros took credit for the assassination. During the attack on the retired FPA official's vehicle, a retired FPA officer was killed and another seriously wounded.

During the early evening hours, several grenades containing ERP pamphlets exploded in downtown Mendoza.

In Rosario, snipers fired upon the Federal Police Office.

April 3, 1975

In the Federal Capital, a bomb was detonated by remote control when an FPA armored personnel carrier passed alongside a parked car, which contained the bomb.

In Bahia Blanca, a student was shot in the head and

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FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
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seriously wounded while she was distributing pamphlets inviting students to an assembly.

In Lanus, a BAPP officer was killed when he attempted to question several suspicious individuals.

April 4, 1975

In the Federal Capital, an incendiary bomb attack was carried out against the Banco Italo Belga.

In La Plata, a bomb was set off at the residence of the manager of a bus company.

In Lanus, a bomb was detonated at the residence of a Social Welfare Ministry official.

In Cordoba, members of the CPA distributed pamphlets in the downtown area and threw an incendiary device to divert police from detaining them.

In La Plata, the bodies of two individuals were discovered in a parked automobile. The bodies contained numerous bullet wounds.

In Escobar, BAP, the body of an unidentified male was found partially incinerated. The body contained numerous bullet wounds.

In the Federal Capital, two grenades containing propaganda were set off.

In Cordoba, two incendiary bombs were set off at the location of two small businesses.

In Santa Fe, a SEPP officer was wounded in the head by unidentified assailants, who stole his service weapon.

April 5, 1975

In Zarate, BAP, a BAPP officer was killed when a BAPP cruiser was ambushed by terrorists.

In Bernal, an FPA Corporal was wounded during an attack by five unidentified individuals.

In Munro, BAP, the ERP assassinated a member of the metal workers union.

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

An FPA officer stationed in front of the British Embassy was fired on by individuals, who passed in an automobile. In addition, a satchel was tossed on the sidewalk, which was subsequently examined by FPA bomb squad experts and found to contain a novelty store device meant to ridicule the FPA.

In La Plata, an Argentine Army Lieutenant Colonel shot and killed an individual, whom he suspected of surveilling his house.

In San Justo, six bodies were discovered near Ezeiza International Airport. The bodies were riddled with bullet holes from 9 mm. and 45 cal. weapons.

A BAPP sub-station was attacked by terrorists and a BAPP officer wounded in Hadeo, BAP.

In Rosario, three individuals were kidnapped from three different locations by presumed terrorists.

In Cordoba, terrorists took over the Civil Registry and stole documentation. The MAR terrorist organization took credit for this act indicating that the MAR stood for Milicias Armadas Revolucionarias.

Also in Cordoba, an incendiary attack was carried out against a tractor dealership. An organization known as the Organizacion Comunista del Obrero took credit for this attack.

In Rosario, a clubhouse of the Peronist University Youth was consumed by fire. SFPP officers attributed the fire to arson.

Again in Cordoba, an incendiary bomb was thrown against the sales office of a battery company.

In Villa Urquiza, BAP, an incendiary bomb attack was carried out against the Acindar Steel Company Warehouse.

April 7, 1975

In Mendoza, the office of a supplier of the Acindar Steel Company was subjected to a bomb attack.

In Berisso, BAP, the body of an unidentified female was located. The victim had been shot numerous times.

In Boulogne, BAP, the body of an unidentified male was

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

found. The body contained numerous bullet wounds.

In La Plata, a bomb destroyed the offices of a local company owned by the defeated mayoralty candidate of the Alianza Popular Federalista.

In the Federal Capital, an attempt was made to dynamite the apartment of the Chief of the FPA.

A Municipal Housing Commission employee was kidnapped in the Federal Capital.

April 8, 1975

The body of the Municipal Housing Commission Employee kidnapped on April 7, 1975, was discovered in Nunez, BAP.

April 9, 1975

In Tucuman, the law offices of three attorneys were bombed.

In the Federal Capital, the law office of an attorney was subjected to an incendiary bomb attack.

In Salta, the residence of an attorney was bombed.

In Tucuman, an innocent passerby was killed during an attempt against the life of a school worker's employees union.

April 10, 1975

In Zarate, a number of ERP took over the Cellulose Argentina plant and distributed extremist propaganda.

In Bahia Blanca, four private residences were bombed.

In La Plata, a medical doctor was killed in his office by terrorists.

April 11, 1975

In Santa Fe, terrorists fired upon the residence of the

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

Dean of the Economic Faculty and threw incendiary bombs against his residence.

In Villa Elisa, the body of a law student was found. The victim had been shot numerous times. BAPP investigation established that the victim's father had been assassinated on August 11, 1974, by terrorists. The BAPP reported that the victim's body contained 67 bullet wounds.

In the Federal Capital, three bodies were discovered in a burned-out automobile. The victims had been shot numerous times.

In Lujan, BAP, the body of an unidentified male was found. The body bore numerous bullet wounds.

In Bahia Blanca, the residence of the secretary of the National University of the South was broken into and set fire to with an incendiary device.

In Tucuman, two bombs were recovered at a provincial agricultural station.

Again in Bahia Blanca, terrorists fired upon the residence of another functionary of the National University of the South. ERP members also painted slogans attacking a former official of the National University of the South.

April 12, 1975

In Campana, a BAPP patrol came upon a group of terrorists who had just stolen a truck containing foodstuffs. A violent shootout resulted and one extremist was killed. During the shootout, the extremists used hand grenades against the BAPP officers.

In Mar del Plata, a bomb attack was carried out against the offices of the Volta Elevator Company and against a bakery.

In Santa Fe, terrorists' bombs were set off at two private residences.

In the Federal Capital, a bomb detonated at the Administrative Offices of the Buenos Aires Subway System.

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

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In Parana, the Automotive Transport Workers Union's offices were subjected to a terrorist attack.

In Avellaneda, the body of an unidentified male individual was discovered. The victim had been shot numerous times.

In Mar del Plata, bomb attacks were carried out against the residences of two private citizens.

April 13, 1975

In Rosario, terrorists raided the Argentine Army Arsenal killing an Argentine Army Colonel and stealing a volume of weapons.

In La Plata, terrorists fired upon the residence of a Federal Judge.

In Mar del Plata, terrorists fired upon the residence of a private citizen.

In Ringulet, BAP, the body of a university student was discovered on a deserted road. The victim's body bore numerous bullet wounds.

X

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4/15/75

5-12-01
CLERK: 39063 ELW/BCE/06
DECLASSIFIED
~~Argentinian Project~~
AIRTEL

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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE~~

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-201)
FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)(P)
SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORISTS ACTIVITIES
FPM - ARGENTINA

REFERENCE:

My airtel and LHM 3/11/75 under the above dual caption.

ENCLOSURES:

For the Bureau eight (8) copies of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) dated and captioned as above.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

The enclosed LHM is being submitted at this time at the specific request of Ambassador HILL.

The enclosed LHM discloses only the more serious terrorist activities, which have taken place since the submission of referenced LHM.

DISSEMINATION:

b1 per CIA

[Redacted] Local dissemination has been made to the Ambassador, Regional Security Officer and the Defense Attache's Office. Additionally, dissemination has been made to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's Secret Service Detail.

- 3 - Bureau (Encs. 8)
- (1 - Foreign Liaison Unit)
- 2 - Buenos Aires

RWS:jn
(5)

1303

BUE 109-2; 109-103

CLASSIFICATION:

The enclosed LHM has been classified ~~SECRET XERS-1~~
~~& 2, Indefinite.~~

SOURCES:

Refer to the attached Non-Symbol Source Page.

NON-SYMBOL SOURCE PAGE

Collective confidential sources abroad referred to in the enclosed LHM are identified as follows: (S) (U)

Dr. ARTURO HORACIO POIRE (BUE file 80-84)
Federal Police of Argentina (FPA)

Comisario Mayor JORGE CROVETTO (BUE file 80-87)
Chief of Operations, Department of Federal Security, FPA

Sub-Comisario CARLOS ALBERTO MONTENEGRO (BUE file 80-186)
Department of Intelligence, FPA Estado Mayor

Comisario Inspector OSVALDO J. DE BALDRICH (BUE file 80-185)
Chief of Intelligence
Buenos Aires Provincial Police (BAPP)

Captain JUAN LUCERO (BUE file 80-173)
Argentine Army Intelligence Service (AAIS)

Colonel JUAN RIVAS
AAIS

General ALBERTO S. CACERES (BUE file 64-14)
Commander of the Argentine Army
Gendarmeria Nacional (Border Guards)

HENRY ACKERMAN (BUE file 80-163)
Associated Press Representative

Comisario FRANCISCO SPINOSA
Department of Federal Security, FPA (BUE file 80-188)

Colonel ALBERTO VALIN
Chief, AAIS (BUE file 80-205)

JOHN BARTHOLF, President
Union Carbide Corporation, Buenos Aires, Argentina

GORDON BOLING, Comptroller,
General Motors Corporation, Buenos Aires, Argentina

NORMAN INGLEY, Retired Editor
"Buenos Aires Herald," Buenos Aires, Argentina
(BUE file 80-181)

HERBERT LESHINSKY, President,
Chrysler Corporation, Buenos Aires, Argentina

~~SECRET~~

DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-201)

7/3/75

LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(P)

ARGENTINE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA

Remylet 1/15/75.

Instant letter is a semi-annual analysis of the present political situation in Argentina based on information provided by various office contacts. Data contained in this analysis has been made available to the interested United States Government agencies in the Buenos Aires Embassy, and accordingly it is suggested that it not be disseminated.

I. BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN ARGENTINA

During the past six-month period, the Argentine economy has gone from bad to worse. Rampant inflation, critical unfavorable balance of payments, lagging exports due to an unrealistically high value of the Argentine peso, shortages of prime materials, large scale distribution of currency without adequate reserves, and one of the largest Government spending sprees in history, all have brought the government of President MARIA ESTELA MARTINEZ DE PERON to the brink of economic, labor and political disaster. Increasingly, Mrs. PERON has come under the complete domination and control of her Social Welfare Minister, JOSE LOPEZ REGA. The latter, in a drive to consolidate his power, has completely isolated Mrs. PERON from other Government Ministers, the opposition political parties, labor leaders and the Military. LOPEZ REGA's performance as Social Welfare Minister and the President's Number One Man, has been both ruthless and arrogant.

During the reporting period, LOPEZ REGA manipulated the resignation of conservative, old-line Peronist Economy Minister, ALFREDO GOMEZ MORALES, replacing him with CELESTINO RODRIGO, a long-time LOPEZ REGA follower, who previously held an obscure position in LOPEZ REGA's Social Welfare Ministry. [Argentine Army Intelli-

3 - Bureau

(1 - Foreign Liaison Unit)

① - Buenos Aires

RWS:jn

(4)

CLASSIFIED BY 5931

Exempt from General Declassification

Schedule of Executive Order 11652

Exemption Category 5B(2)

Automatically declassified on IMDET

5/11/01
CLASSIFIED BY 39063 E/w BCL/sam
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 116
Argentina Project

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109-2-1340

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BUE 109-2

[gence Service (AAIS) sources advised that LOPEZ REGA is a member of the Caballeros de Fuego (Knights of Fire), a mystic society, which believes in astrology and mystic arts, including witchcraft. Not by coincidence, RODRIGO is also a member of the same cult. Unfortunately, RODRIGO's recently promulgated austerity measures were not of the occult and have brought the Government in direct open confrontation with the General Workers Confederation (CGT), the largest and most powerful labor organization in Argentina and probably in South America. RODRIGO decreed that the previously negotiated annual wage increases of between 100 to 150 percent be annulled with a 50 percent maximum increase to be granted with vague promises of an additional 15 percent increase on 10/1/75 and 1/1/76.] (S) (U)

The CGT and the labor sector in general have challenged the Government, arguing that inflation, which has been conservatively estimated to have been close to 85 percent during the past year, coupled with recent price increases on most staples and gasoline, which range between 100 percent to 250 percent, makes the 30 percent increase unrealistic and unacceptable. The Minister of Labor, RICARDO OTERO, submitted his resignation during the weekend of June 28, 1973, citing health reasons. OTERO's true reason is obvious, being an old-time CGT official, his authority and credibility were shattered in labor circles by the Government's suspension of wage increases. CGT rank and file will probably not tolerate their leadership backing down and accepting RODRIGO's demands, thus the CGT leadership realize their careers are on the line. Conversely, due to terrorist tactics employed by LOPEZ REGA, CGT leadership resistance to the Government with regard to salary increases, might well cost them their lives. As of this writing, the pot continues to boil in the labor sector.

During the reporting period, LOPEZ REGA succeeded in forcing the resignation of Army Commander-in-Chief, General LEANDRO ANAYA, who resisted LOPEZ REGA's attempts to tamper with the Army. ANAYA was replaced with a more docile and viable General, ALBERTO NUMA LAPLANE. While the Army appears to be taking a passive role during the current labor-economic crisis, AAIS contacts advise that their Service has been compiling shocking evidence of high level and far-reaching immoral conduct and corruption by ranking Government officials, primarily those in the LOPEZ REGA following. Specifically, one of LOPEZ REGA's bodyguards, who also serves in Mrs. PERON's bodyguard detail, since LOPEZ REGA and the President are virtually inseparable, appeared in a photograph taken during May 1, 1973, standing behind Mrs. PERON during an official appearance at the Argentine Congress. This individual has been identified as ESTEBAN GARCIA, a Class I Drug Enforcement Administration narcotic fugitive, who is under indictment in the Eastern District of New York for conspiracy to smuggle cocaine and heroin into the United States. (S) (U)

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BUE 109-2

Another shocking example of corruption is the case of LUIS MARIA RODRIGUEZ, the recently appointed Interventor (Acting Governor) of Mendoza Province. This individual has been identified by the AAIS as a former Argentine Federal Judge, who rendered a Declaratory Judgement in the case of fugitive U. S. financier ROBERT VESCO, which held that VESCO could not be extradited from Argentina to the United States, should his extradition be requested by the United States. RODRIGUEZ was hastily retired by the Peronist Government after the VESCO Declaratory Judgement surfaced primarily through information secured by this office. The Government announced that RODRIGUEZ was bordering on senility and was not professionally competent to hold a Federal Judgeship. Eight months after being retired, RODRIGUEZ apparently has been rejuvenated and taken a refresher course in the law, since in the press accounts appearing at the time of his appointment as the Interventor of Mendoza Province, much was made of his "past brilliant legal record." Naturally, no mention was made indicating RODRIGUEZ had previously attained notoriety in the VESCO case. (S) (U)

RAUL LASTIRI, the incumbent President of the Chamber of Deputies (equivalent to the United States House of Representatives) and son-in-law of LOPEZ REGA, has been identified by the AAIS as a cocaine user and whoremonger. The foregoing are but three examples indicating the degree of corruption in Government centered around LOPEZ REGA's followers. For the time being, the Argentine Army is noting this corruption and waiting. Given the same circumstances in any other period since the ouster of JUAN DOMINGO PERON by the Army in 1955, the Army would have already moved and staged a coup. High ranking Argentine Army contacts have indicated that the Army will not move immediately unless widespread civil unrest and disturbances occur, noting that the Army wants to be sure of their ground this time before staging another coup and assuming responsibility for finding solutions to Argentina's varied complicated problems. (S) (U)

According to AAIS sources, on June 28, 1975, Argentine Navy Admiral EMILIO MASSERA, the Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Navy, confronted Mrs. PERON and LOPEZ REGA at the Presidential residence and demanded that LOPEZ REGA immediately leave the Government, in order to defuse the critical labor-economic crisis. It is noted that a large workers demonstration sponsored by the CGT took place in front of Government House on June 27, 1975, during which the participants hurled insults at LOPEZ REGA and Economy Minister RODRIGO, demanding their removal from Government. (S) (U)

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According to AAIS sources, Admiral MASSERA was badly humiliated and after leaving the June 28, 1975, confrontation, he convoked a meeting of all active duty Argentine Navy Admirals, which was held on June 29, 1975. According to AAIS sources, ADMIRAL MASSERA offered his resignation after outlining what transpired at the June 28, 1975, confrontation. According to AAIS sources, Admiral MASSERA was extended a vote of confidence and was urged by the Admirals to continue his aggressive leadership. Thus, one can see that all is not calm in the Argentine military sector. (S) (U)

Perhaps, sensing the current vulnerability of the Government due to critical labor unrest, the Argentine Senate appears to have again found its manhood by setting in motion the necessary procedures to secure the vacant seat of the Senate Provisional President, which has been unoccupied since the April, 1975, resignation of JOSE ANTONIO ALLENDE. Peronist Senators and FREJULI (Peronist Electoral Coalition) Senators were ordered by Mrs. PERON, i.e. LOPEZ REGA, not to vote to secure the vacancy as required by the Argentine Constitution, inasmuch as the line of Presidential succession goes directly from the President to the Provisional President of the Senate, since there is no incumbent Vice President, inasmuch as this position was vacated by Mrs. PERON, when she assumed the Presidency after the death of her husband on July 1, 1974. By not filling the Provisional Senate President's post, the line of Presidential succession goes directly from the President to the President of the Chamber of Deputies, RAUL LASTIRI, LOPEZ REGA's son-in-law. Senate defiance of Mrs. PERON and LOPEZ REGA is a direct and heretofore unthinkable challenge of Presidential authority.

The Radical Civic Union (UCR) is the major non-Peronist political party in Argentina. The UCR recently ended their "loyal opposition" posture when its leader, RICARDO BALBIN, spoke out against Government policies during a press conference on June 16, 1975, specifically condemning serious leftist and rightist terrorism and Government manipulation of the news media.

Terrorism, which has plagued the Peronist Government since the death of JUAN DOMINGO PERON last year, was highlighted by the announced world record sixty million dollar ransom paid to the Montonero guerrilla organization during June, 1975, for the release of the BORN brothers, who were kidnapped during September, 1974. [AAIS sources report that the Peoples Revolutionary] (S) (U)

- 4 -
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BUE 109-2

(U) [Army (ERP) guerrilla organization, has been operating in Tucuman in northwest Argentina with two Bell Cobra helicopters and have been frustrating and harassing Argentine Army counter-terrorist operations in that mountainous jungle area. The Embassy Defense Attache reported that the Argentine Army recently approached his office in order to check into the possibility of acquiring ~~the~~ surface-to-air missiles on an emergency basis, in order to bring down the ERP helicopters. Terrorist murders, bombings and kidnappings continue to be an everyday fact of life in Argentina.]

Thus the two problems facing Mrs. PERON outlined in remylet continue to hang as an albatross around her neck, namely the Argentine economy and LOPEZ REGA. During the current reporting period, Mrs. PERON has acquired three new problem areas--the Argentine Senate, which admittedly is a lesser and probably manageable problem, the labor and union sectors, which is certainly the greatest and most dangerous problem, which if not defused might well threaten the stability of the Government, and last but not least, the Argentine military, which has the power, but at present not the desire, to terminate the PERON-LOPEZ REGA dynasty.

II. FRIENDLINESS OF ARGENTINA TO THE UNITED STATES

Argentina continues to maintain correct relations toward the United States. In an obvious attempt to attract urgently needed investment funding and to loosen the purse strings of world lending institutions, Economy Minister RODRIGO announced in mid-June, that multi-national corporations were necessary for Argentina's development and indicated that these heretofore unwelcome enterprises would now be received with open arms. Although RODRIGO's pronouncements regarding multi-national corporations appears to be a crack in the government's nationalistic foundation, the Government will nonetheless continue its so-called nationalistic and anti-imperialist posture as defined in JUAN DOMINGO PERON's famous Third Position. Commenting on this posture, one ex-Government Minister recently observed that the most serious enemy of the Argentine economy was not imperialism but stupidity.

III. INFILTRATION OF THE GOVERNMENT BY ANTI- U. S. INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS

The Federal Police of Argentina (FPA) and AAIS sources report that great strides have been made in eliminating Marxist (S) (U)

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BUE 109-2

infiltrators in the Peronist Government. These sources advise that the overwhelming majority of Peronist Government officials, while not being Marxists, lean heavily toward nationalistic-socialism. As noted under the first section of this report, many Government officials are corrupt and use their offices to further their personal fortunes. (S) (U)

~~IDENTITIES~~

IV. ~~EXTENTS~~ OF ANTI-UNITED STATES GROUPS

These groups have been identified in numerous previous semi-annual reports under the above captioned submitted by this office. No noteworthy changes in the description of these groups have taken place. As noted in remylet, the Peronist Youth Revolutionary Tendency continues to be the largest anti-United States group in Argentina. For the first time in many years, the Universities have been quiet during the past semester due to severe Government restrictions in the University sector and the weeding out of Marxist Professors and students.

The Montoneros and the ERP are the two most dangerous groups operating in Argentina today. Both groups have the capacity to carry out spectacular guerrilla operations and while important gains have been made by the Argentine Government in the anti-terrorist campaign, the leadership of both groups remains intact.

[redacted] the ERP is currently planning to kidnap an official of the U. S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, in order to exchange him for captured ERP prisoners. In spite of continued guerrilla operations in Argentina, the participating guerrilla organizations in no way pose a threat to the stability of the Government. (S) (U)

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F B I

Date: 8/14/75

Transmit the following in _____
CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)Via CABLE IMMEDIATE (O)
(Priority)TO: DIRECTOR NR. 21-14
FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(105-1188)~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES,
IS - CUBA.

ON AUGUST 13, 1975, CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT AT APPROXIMATELY 5:15 P.M. ON AUGUST 13, 1975, A TERRORIST ATTEMPT WAS MADE AGAINST CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO ARGENTINA EMILIO ARAGONES NAVARRO WHEN HE WAS RETURNING TO THE CUBAN EMBASSY LOCATED IN BELGRANO IN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL. THE SOURCE ADVISED THAT AMBASSADOR ARAGONES WAS TRAVELING IN HIS OFFICIAL CAR, WHICH WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ANOTHER CUBAN EMBASSY VEHICLE DRIVEN BY THE CUBAN REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CUBAN FISHING INSTITUTE, SANTIAGO ALBIZA, WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AN ATTACHE ASSIGNED TO THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES, FULGENCIO HERNANDEZ FALCON.

SOURCE ADVISED THAT AMBASSADOR ARAGONES' CHAUFFEUR NOTED UNSUBS; 109-792
1 - 109-New (ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF CUBAN AMBASSADOR ARAGONES NAVARRO, 8/13/75, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA)

RWS:jn
(3)Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent

10:30 AM

Per

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
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(Priority)

PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BUE 109-2 105-1188

A CAR WITH ITS MOTOR IDLING WAITING NEAR THE ENTRANCE TO THE CUBAN EMBASSY. SOURCE ADVISED THAT AMBASSADOR ARAGONES' CHAUFFEUR BELIEVED THE THREE OR FOUR OCCUPANTS OF THIS VEHICLE WERE ACTING IN A SUSPICIOUS MANNER AND THEREFORE ACCELERATED RAPIDLY IN ORDER TO ^{GAIN} ~~ATTAIN~~ THE SANCTUARY OF THE GROUNDS OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY. SOURCE ADVISED THAT IMMEDIATELY UPON NOTING THAT AMBASSADOR ARAGONES' VEHICLE WAS ACCELERATING, THE UNIDENTIFIED OCCUPANTS OF THE WAITING AUTOMOBILE ^{HASTILY} ~~FIRED~~ AT AMBASSADOR ARAGONES' VEHICLE AS WELL AS THE CUBAN EMBASSY VEHICLE CONTAINING ALBIZA AND HERNANDEZ. THE SOURCE NOTED THAT THE UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS FIRED UPON THE TWO CUBAN EMBASSY VEHICLES WITH WHAT WITNESSES DESCRIBED AS LONG BARRELED WEAPONS AND A MACHINE GUN. SOURCE ADVISED THAT AMBASSADOR ARAGONES' VEHICLE WAS NOT TOUCHED BY THE GUNFIRE; HOWEVER, THE CUBAN EMBASSY VEHICLE CARRYING ALBIZA AND HERNANDEZ HAD ^{HIS} WINDSHIELD SHOT OUT AND RECEIVED SEVERAL BULLET HOLES IN THE COACH WORK. SOURCE ADVISED THAT THERE WERE NO INJURIES

END PAGE TWO

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

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Date:

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(Priority)

PAGE THREE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BUE 109-2; 105-1188

SUSTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE ABOVE DESCRIBED INCIDENT.
SOURCE STATED THAT THE VEHICLE CONTAINING THE UNIDENTIFIED
ASSAILANTS RAPIDLY DEPARTED THE AREA AND THAT THERE ARE NO
CLUES OR LEADS AS TO THE IDENTITY OF THE ASSAILANTS.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5981 XGDSa2.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - SOURCE IS COMISARIO INSPECTOR JUAN CARLOS
GATTEI, CHIEF OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL POLICE
OF ARGENTINA, WHO REQUESTED THAT HIS IDENTITY NOT BE DISCLOSED.

BUREAU IS REQUESTED TO ADVISE MIAMI, NEW YORK AND NEWARK
AND REQUEST THESE OFFICES TO ALERT CUBAN EXILE SOURCES CONCERNING
THE ABOVE MATTER. IT IS NOTED THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA (BUFILE
105-141949), THE LEADER OF ACCION CUBAN (AC), A CUBAN EXILE
TERRORIST GROUP, HAS BEEN REPORTED BY SEVERAL MIAMI AND NEWARK
CUBAN EXILE SOURCES TO BE RESIDING IN SANTIAGO, CHILE, SINCE
DECEMBER 1974. ACCORDING TO THESE SOURCES, THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT
ALLEGEDLY HAS PROVIDED BOSCH WITH A CHILEAN PASSPORT AND AUTHORIZED
HIM AND OTHER CUBAN EXILES TO CARRY OUT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES FROM
AGAINST CUBAN DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES, USING
CHILE AS THEIR BASE OF OPERATIONS.

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

~~SECRET~~

EMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

8/26/75

LEGAT ROBERT W. SCHERRER

ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

5/10/01
CLASSIFIED BY 39043 EIW BCE/SAN
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1/6
argentine project

On 8/25/75, a ranking official of the Federal Police of Argentina (FPA) Intelligence Service provided the following information regarding the recent death of Montonero leader MARCOS OSATINSKY in Cordoba: (S) (U)

According to the FPA delegation in Cordoba, OSATINSKY, whose Montonero code name was "SANTIAGO," was picked up approximately three weeks ago by Cordoba Provincial Police and members of Governor LACABANNE's Security Detail. OSATINSKY was severely tortured by members of Governor LACABANNE's Security Detail over an extended period of time; however, he refused to divulge any information. OSATINSKY was in such bad shape that it became obvious he would have to be killed rather than produce him alive since the marks of torture would be obvious. In order to dispose of OSATINSKY, whose detention was known among extremists in Cordoba, it was decided to stage his assassination in connection with a fictitious rescue attempt. Three Cordoba Provincial Police Officers volunteered to take part in the charade with the understanding they would have to submit to being slightly wounded during the performance. (S) (U)

The hijacking of the hearse transporting OSATINSKY's body from Cordoba to Tucuman was not carried out by the Montoneros as indicated in the press, but by the same members of Governor LACABANNE's Security Staff, who had tortured OSATINSKY. The purpose of stealing his body was to prevent the body from being subjected to an autopsy, which would have clearly shown that he had been tortured. It is doubtful that OSATINSKY's body will ever turn up. (S) (U)

Attached is a photograph of OSATINSKY taken during 1973 at Rawson Prison. (S) (U)

- 1 - Addressee
5 - Buenos Aires
(1 - 109-2)(1 - 109-103)
(1 - 105-Montoneros)(1 - 801)
(1 - 105-1098-OSATINSKY)(1 - 801)

RWS:jn

(6)

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(2)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON INDET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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5/10/01
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argentine project



FBI

Date: 8/28/75

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Transmit the following in _____

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Via CABLE

URGENT

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR

125-28

LEGAT, BRASILIA

025-28

FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES.

A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD ADVISED THAT IN THE MIDST OF A POLITICAL CRISIS IN ARGENTINA ORIGINATING WITH DISSATISFACTION WITHIN THE ARGENTINE ARMY OVER THE RECENT DESIGNATION OF AN ACTIVE DUTY ARMY OFFICER AS THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS CARRIED OUT APPROXIMATELY FORTY ACTS OF TERRORISM DURING THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE LATE EVENING OF AUGUST 26, 1975 AND THE EVENING OF AUGUST 27, 1975. SOURCE NOTED THAT DURING THE EVENING OF AUGUST 27, 1975, TERRORISTS CARRIED OUT AN INCENDIARY ATTACK AGAINST THE SPANISH DAILY NEWSPAPER, "LA NACION", WHICH IS LOCATED ONE BLOCK FROM THE U. S. EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES. IN ADDITION, THE SOURCE NOTED THAT TERRORISTS CARRIED OUT A BOMBING ATTACK AGAINST THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES DURING THE EVENING OF AUGUST 27, 1975.

4 - Bue (109-2) (109-103)

RWS:gjk

(4)

(1 - 80-87 [Crovetto] (1-80-185 De
Baldrich)

5/23/01
CLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW BCF/sum
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1-6
Argentina Project

109-2-1375

Approved: *RWS*

Special Agent in Charge

Sent

8/28/75

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Per

3:11 PM

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OTHERWISE

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Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A SECOND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD REPORTED THAT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE DURING THE EVENING OF AUGUST 27, 1975 INCLUDED A BOMBING ATTACK AGAINST THE RESIDENCE OF A FORD MOTOR COMPANY EXECUTIVE IN VILLA BALLESTER AND AGAINST AN AUTOMOBILE SHOWROOM OF THE DODGE (CHRYSLER CORPORATION) IN LANUS.

SOURCES NOTED THAT THERE WERE NO PERSONAL INJURIES AS A RESULTS OF THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED TERRORIST ATTACKS.

THE FIRST SOURCE ADVISED THAT UNIDENTIFIED TERRORISTS ABDUCTED AN EMPLOYEE OF THE TRANSAX AXLE COMPANY, A SUBSIDIARY OF THE FORD MOTOR COMPANY IN CORDOBA, ARGENTINA ~~ON~~ AUGUST 27, 1975 (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2, INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE.

FIRST SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR JORGE CROVETTO, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA. (S) (U)

THE SECOND SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR OSVALDO DE BALDRICH, DIRECTOR, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE, INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.
END.

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 -- 455-574

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Date: 8/28/75

Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)Via CABLE IMMEDIATE NIACT (OO)
(Priority)~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE~~TO: DIRECTOR NR. 17-28
FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON 8/28/75, a confidential source abroad ADVISED THAT AN ARGENTINE HERCULES C-130 MILITARY AIRCRAFT EXPLODED THIS AFTERNOON, 8/28/75, WHILE TAKING OFF FROM TUCUMAN IN NORTHERN ARGENTINA. THE SOURCE ADVISED THAT INITIAL REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE EXPLOSION WAS CAUSED BY A TERRORIST CONTACT MINE PLACED ON THE RUNWAY, IN ORDER THAT IT WOULD EXPLODE WHEN THE AIRCRAFT PASSED OVER IT. SOURCE ADVISED THAT PRELIMINARY REPORTS FROM TUCUMAN IN NORTHERN ARGENTINA INDICATE THAT OVER TWENTY ~~MILITARY + POLICE~~ ARGENTINE ~~ARMY~~ PERSONNEL WERE KILLED IN THE HOLOCAUST. SOURCE NOTED THAT TUCUMAN HAS BEEN THE SCENE OF ~~OVER SIX MONTHS~~ ARGENTINE ARMY ANTI-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS FOR THE PAST SIX MONTHS, AND THAT NUMEROUS GUERRILLAS HAVE BEEN KILLED BY THE ARGENTINE ARMY. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

3 - Buenos Aires

(1) - 109-2

1 - 109-103

1 - 80-Valin

RWS:jn

(3)

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

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Per _____

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Date:

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(Type in plaintext or code)

Via _____
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - [SOURCE IS COLONEL ALBERTO VALIN, CHIEF,
ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE] (S) (U)
END.

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date: 9/4/75

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via TELETYPE URGENT-PRIORITY
(Priority)DECLASSIFIED ON 5-3-81 BY 39063 ELW/BCE/106
Argentina Project

TO: DIRECTOR NR. 134-04

FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2); (109-103)

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA.~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED THAT DURING THE WEEKEND OF AUGUST 30TH TO SEPTEMBER 1, 1975 THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE, ACTING IN CONCERT WITH THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAIS), CARRIED OUT A SERIES OF IMPORTANT RAIDS AGAINST THE ARGENTINE EXTREMIST TARGETS IN BUENOS AIRES AND BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE. SOURCE NOTED THAT SEVERAL TERRORISTS BELONGING TO THE FUERZAS ARMADAS DE LIBERATION (ARMED FORCES OF LIBERATION) (FAL), AN ARGENTINE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, WERE KILLED IN PILAR, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE.

ADDITIONALLY, THE SOURCE NOTED THAT THROUGH AN ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE PENETRATION AGENT, AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT FIGURE OF THE EJERCITO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY) (ERP) WAS EXTRALEGALLY DETAINED AND IS UNDERGOING

2 - Bue (109-2)
(1 - 109-103)

RWS:gjk

(2)

109-2-1390

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

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(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEVERE INTERROGATION.

SOURCE NOTED THAT IN WHAT IS BELIEVED TO BE RETALIATION AGAINST THE BAPP AND THE ARGENTINE ARMY, MEMBERS OF THE ERP ASSASSINATED THE BAPP CHIEF OF INVESTIGATIONS IN LA PLATA, THE CAPITAL OF BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE, DURING THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 3, 1975. ADDITIONALLY, DURING THIS ATTACK SOURCE REPORTED THAT A BAPP OFFICER WAS SEVERELY WOUNDED. SOURCE REPORTED THAT ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY TO THE ATTACK CARRIED OUT AGAINST THE BAPP OFFICIAL, THE ERP AMBUSHED AN ARGENTINE ARMY TRUCK CARRYING ARMS AND ASSASSINATED AN ARGENTINE ARMY SERGEANT.

SOURCE REPORTED THAT ANOTHER ATTACK CARRIED OUT BY ARGENTINE TERRORISTS TOOK PLACE DURING THE EVENING OF SEPTEMBER 3, 1975 IN AVELLANEDA, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE, WHEN IT CARRIED OUT A COORDINATED BAZOOKA ATTACK AGAINST A FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA RESIDENT AGENCY. SOURCE REPORTED THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES AS A RESULT OF THE LATTER ATTACK.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 3931, XGDS-2.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR OSVALDO DE BALDRICH, CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, BAPP.

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END
Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

FBI

Date: 9/8/75

Transmit the following in 1:30

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPEURGENT (PRIORITY)

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR

NR. 159-08

LEGAT, BRASILIA

NR. 033-08

FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

ON SEPTEMBER 7, 1975, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS
A RAKING OFFICIAL WITH THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA),
PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

IN ORDER TO COMMEMORATE THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE
ISSUANCE OF A DECLARATION OF WAR BY THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA
ORGANIZATION AGAINST THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, THE MONTONEROS
CARRIED OUT VARIOUS BOMBING ATTACKS IN BUENOS AIRES AND OTHER
MAJOR ARGENTINE CITIES ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1975. [A BOMB WAS
DISCOVERED AND DEACTIVATED BY FPA BOMB EXPERTS IN THE READING
ROOM OF THE PLAZA HOTEL IN DOWNTOWN BUENOS AIRES. ADDITIONALLY,
A BOMB WAS DEACTIVATED BY FPA BOMB SQUAD EXPERTS AT THE MOLINO
CAFETERIA, WHICH IS LOCATED ONE HALF BLOCK FROM THE ARGENTINE
CONGRESS BUILDING AND IS PATRONIZED BY A LARGE NUMBER OF
ARGENTINE LEGISEATORS. OTHER BOMBS DETONATED AT THE NATIONAL] (S) (U)

3 - Bue (109-2)

(1 - 109-103)

(1 - 80-87 [Jorge Crovetto]) (S) (U)

109-2-11392

RWS:gjk

(3)
Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

9/8/75

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Per _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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OTHERWISE

5-9-01
CLASSIFIED BY 39063E/WCE/KMG
DECLASSIFY ON 25X 4/1/00
Argentine Project

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(Priority)

BUE 109-2; 109-103

PAGE TWO

[COLLEGE OF BUENOS AIRES AND THE ARGENTINE WINE PRODUCERS
ASSOCIATION IN BUENOS AIRES. NUMEROUS OTHER BOMBINGS TOOK
PLACE IN THE PROVINCIAL CAPITALS OF MENDOZA, CORDOBA AND SANTA
FE.] (S) (U)

IN THE TWENTY-FOUR HOUR PERIOD PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 7, 1975,
FIFTEEN INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING A CORDOBA PROVINCIAL POLICE
OFFICER, AN ARMY LIEUTENANT AND ENLISTED MAN, DIED AS A RESULT
OF VIOLENCE CARRIED OUT BY RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS AND GUERRILLAS.

ON SEPTEMBER 7, 1975, AN ARGENTINE ARMY SENTRY FIRED
UPON A SUSPICIOUS VEHICLE IN LA PLATA, THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL
OF BUENOS AIRES, KILLING THREE INNOCENT PERSONS WHO HAPPENED TO
BE PASSING BY AN ARGENTINE ARMY INSTALLATION.

DURING THE EVENING OF SEPTEMBER 7, 1975, THE MONTONEROS
HIJACKED A MITRE RAILROAD PASSENGER TRAIN EN ROUTE TO THE
FEDERAL CAPITAL.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5841, XGDS-2, INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. [SOURCE IS COMISARIO GENERAL JORGE CROVETTO,
DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FPA.] (S) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

F B I

Date: 9/9/75

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)Via CABLE URGENT (PRIORITY)
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR NR. -09
LEGAT BRASILIA NR. -09

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS; IS - ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN OFFICIAL WITH THE
FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA) ADVISED THAT DURING THE
AFTERNOON OF 9/8/75, A POWERFUL BOMB EXPLODED IN AN AUTOMOBILE
PARKED IN FRONT OF THE ECONOMIC SCIENCE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF BELGRANO IN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL. SOURCE NOTED THAT THE
AUTOMOBILE, WHICH WAS UNOCCUPIED, WAS PARKED DIRECTLY ACROSS THE
STREET FROM THE JAPANESE EMBASSY AND THE RESIDENCE OF THE
AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR TO ARGENTINA. SOURCE REPORTED THAT ONE
PERSON WAS KILLED AND FOUR SERIOUSLY INJURED AS A RESULT OF
THE DETONATION. SOURCE ALSO NOTED THAT A GUARDHOUSE IN FRONT
OF THE JAPANESE EMBASSY SUFFERED STRUCTURAL DAMAGE AND THAT
TWENTY CARS PARKED IN THE STREET WHERE THE BOMB DETONATED
RECEIVED SERIOUS DAMAGES. SOURCE REPORTED THAT THE AUSTRALIAN
AMBASSADOR'S WIFE WAS WALKING HER DOG ALONG THE STREET, WHEN
THE BOMB DETONATED; HOWEVER, SHE WAS UNINJURED. SOURCE ADVISED

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRG)
DATE 2-10-96

11-25-96 / 5/10/01
CLASSIFIED BY: SP8 JAG/CE/sim
REASON: 1.5 (b)(1)
DECLASSIFY ON: X5.6
Argentina Project

END PAGE ONE

1 - 105-767 (MONTONEROS) *RWS*Approved: *RWS:jn* (3) Special Agent in Charge

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Per

~~SECRET~~

109-1394

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Date:

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(Priority)

PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BUE 109-2; 109-103

THAT FPA BOMB SQUAD EXPERTS WERE UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHAT TYPE EXPLOSIVE DEVICE WAS UTILIZED AND THAT FPA INVESTIGATION HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE REASON FOR THE BOMBING, SPECIFICALLY, WHETHER THE JAPANESE EMBASSY OR THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE MAY HAVE BEEN THE ACTUAL TARGETS OF THE BOMB. SOURCE NOTED THAT THE UNIVERSITY OF BELGRANO HAS NOT BEEN THE RECENT SCENE OF ANY STUDENT DISORDERS AND THUS IF THE UNIVERSITY OF BELGRANO WAS THE ^{TRUE} TARGET OF THE BOMBING~~S~~, THE MOTIVE IS NOT CLEAR. ~~(S)~~ (U)

SOURCE REPORTED THAT ON 9/8/75 THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT DECLARED THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION ILLEGAL, PLACING IT IN THE SAME CATEGORY WITH THE TROTSKYITE GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION, ~~THE~~ PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP). SOURCE NOTED THAT AT ONE TIME THE MONTONEROS CONSTITUTED A LEGAL POLITICAL ENTITY IN ARGENTINA, AND, IN FACT, HAD SUPPORTED THE RETURN OF DECEASED ARGENTINE PRESIDENT ~~PERON~~ JUAN DOMINGO PERON TO POWER IN 1973. ~~(S)~~ (U)

THE SOURCE NOTED THAT ALMOST ONE YEAR TO THE DAY PRIOR TO THE MONTONEROS BEING DECLARED ILLEGAL BY THE ARGENTINE ~~(S)~~ (U)

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Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

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PAGE THREE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GOVERNMENT, THE ORGANIZATION HAD ISSUED A DECLARATION OF
WAR AGAINST THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND INDICATING THAT ITS
MEMBERS WERE GOING UNDERGROUND IN ORDER TO WAGE THEIR CAMPAIGN
AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5821XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

SOURCE IS COMISARIO INSPECTOR JUAN CARLOS GATTEI, CHIEF
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FPA. (S) (U)

FRA COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END.

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

FBI

Date: 9/12/75

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Via TELETYPE URGENT-PRIORITY
(Priority)

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OTHERWISE

TO: DIRECTOR NR. 147 -12
LEGAT, BRASILIA NR. 036 -2
FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

ON SEPTEMBER 11, 1975 A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS A RANKING FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA) OFFICIAL, ADVISED THAT ON SEPTEMBER 10, 1975, FPA IDENTIFICATION DIVISION TECHNICIANS, AFTER A LENGTHY PAINSTAKING EXAMINATION, MANAGED TO CLASSIFY FINGERPRINTS TAKEN FROM A BADLY DECOMPOSED BODY OF A MURDER VICTIM THAT HAD BEEN DISCOVERED IN LUJAN, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE ON APRIL 10, 1975. SOURCE NOTED THAT THE VICTIM HAD BEEN SHOT IN THE BACK NUMEROUS TIMES AND DUMPED BY THE SIDE OF A RURAL COUNTRY ROAD. SOURCE ADVISED THAT THE FINGERPRINTS CORRESPONDED TO FRANK INGLEY, AN EXECUTIVE (S) (U)

5 - Bue

- (1 - 109-2)
(1 - 109-103)
(1 - 163-611 Ingrey Kidnapping)
(1 - 80- NEW Morton Rosenblum)
(1 - 105-767 Montoneros)

RWS: gjk
(5)

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

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9/12/75 U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

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PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT
FINANCIAL-INVESTMENT COMPANIES IN ARGENTINA,

OF THE ROBERTS FINANCIAL COMPANY WHO HAD BEEN KIDNAPPED ON
APRIL 1, 1975 BY A GROUP CALLING ITSELF THE AGRUPACION ALBORADA
(DAWN GROUP). SOURCE NOTED THAT INGREY WAS MARRIED TO THE
DAUGHTER OF CHARLES ROBERTS, THE ^{AILING} INCUMBENT DIRECTOR OF THE
ROBERTS FINANCIAL COMPANY. SOURCE RECALLED THAT INGREY'S
BROTHER-IN-LAW, CHARLES "CARLITOS" ROBERTS, ^{ALSO A ROBERTS FINANCIAL COMPANY} WAS ALSO KIDNAPPED
ON APRIL 1, 1975, IN A SEPARATE INCIDENT FROM THE INGREY
KIDNAPPING, BY THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION AND RELEASED
A SHORT TIME THEREAFTER AFTER THE ROBERTS FAMILY HAD PAID A
RANSOM OF \$300,000. SOURCE ALSO NOTED THAT CHARLES LOCKWOOD,
AN EXECUTIVE WHO ^{IS A MEMBER OF} SITS ON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF SEVERAL
IMPORTANT BUENOS AIRES CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING THE ROBERTS
FINANCIAL COMPANY, IS MARRIED TO THE SISTER OF CHARLES ROBERTS,
SR., SUPRA. SOURCE NOTED THAT LOCKWOOD WAS KIDNAPPED ^{ON} DURING
JUNE 6, 1973, BY THE MONTONEROS GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION AND RELEASED
AFTER A RANSOM OF TWO MILLION DOLLARS WAS PAID. IN ADDITION,
SOURCE NOTED THAT LOCKWOOD HAD AGAIN BEEN KIDNAPPED, ^{IN JULY 1974} THIS TIME
BY THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP) GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION
AND HAD BEEN FREED DURING AUGUST, 1975 BY THE BUENOS AIRES

PROVINCIAL POLICE ~~AND~~ AFTER A VIOLENT SHOOTOUT IN BUENOS AIRES ~~(X)~~ (U)Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent

~~SECRET~~

Per _____

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(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
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PAGE THREE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROVINCE. (S) (U)

ON SEPTEMBER 12, 1975, Mrs. NORMAN INGREY, MOTHER OF VICTIM FRANK INGREY, ADVISED THAT AFTER HER SON'S KIDNAPPING ON APRIL 1, 1975, THE FAMILY, ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE KIDNAPPERS, ATTEMPTED TO MAKE A RANSOM PAYMENT IN SAN ISIDRO, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE, ON APRIL 4, 1975; HOWEVER, THE RANSOM WAS NOT PICKED UP. MRS. INGREY NOTED THAT BETWEEN THE TIME OF THE ABORTIVE RANSOM PAYMENT AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF HER SON'S FINGERPRINTS ON SEPTEMBER 10, 1975, THERE HAD BEEN NO CONTACT WITH HER SON'S KIDNAPPERS. MRS. INGREY NOTED THAT BECAUSE HER SON'S BROTHER-IN-LAW, ^{CHARLES "CARLITOS" ROBERTS,} AND HER SON'S UNCLE MY MARRIAGE, CHARLES LOCKWOOD, HAD BEEN KIDNAPPED BY THE MONTONEROS ORGANIZATION, ^{LOCKWOOD IN MAY 1975,} ROBERTS FINANCIAL COMPANY EXECUTIVES APPROACHED ATTORNEYS WITH THE BUNGE & BORN INVESTMENT COMPANY, WHO AT THE TIME WERE ACTIVELY NEGOTIATING WITH THE MONTONEROS GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION ^{TWO BUNGE AND BORN EXECUTIVES,} FOR THE RELEASE OF JUAN AND JORGE BORN, IN ORDER TO USE THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE BUNGE AND BORN ATTORNEYS TO RE-ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE MONTONEROS, PRESUMED TO BE HER SON'S KIDNAPPERS. (S) (U)

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

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PAGE FOUR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MRS. INGREY ADVISED THAT THE MONTONEROS DISCLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INGREY KIDNAPPING. ~~S~~ (U)

ACCORDING TO THE FIRST SOURCE, FPA RECORDS AND THE FILES OF OTHER ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES CONTAIN NO REFERENCE TO THE AGRUPACION ALBORADA. ~~(S)~~ (U)

A SECOND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN EXECUTIVE OF AN AMERICAN WIRE SERVICE IN ARGENTINA, ADVISED THAT AFTER THE DEATH OF ARGENTINE PRESIDENT JUAN DOMINGO PERON ON JULY 1, 1974, UP TO SEPTEMBER 10, 1975, 705 INDIVIDUALS WERE KILLED AS A RESULT OF THE MOUNTING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN ARGENTINA. THE SOURCE NOTED THAT INCLUDED IN THE 705 VICTIMS WERE 75 POLICE OFFICERS AND 34 MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO LOST THEIR LIVES AS A RESULT OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THE SOURCE NOTED THAT A MORE ACCURATE FIGURE OF VICTIMS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN ARGENTINA DURING THE ABOVE DESCRIBED PERIOD WOULD PROBABLY BE CLOSE TO 800 TO 850 ^{WFO} ~~CONSIDERED~~ INDIVIDUALS/ DISAPPEARED AND WHO NEVER HAVE BEEN HEARD FROM AGAIN PRESUMABLY WERE VICTIMS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

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Date:

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(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

PAGE FIVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931, XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. FIRST [CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD IS
COMISARIO GENERAL PEDRO BRUNO GIACOMELLO, CHIEF OF CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS, FPA.] (S) (U)

SECOND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD IS MORTON ROSEMBLUM,
^{SECRET}
BUENOS AIRES CHIEF, ASSOCIATED PRESS.

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

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Per _____

F B I

Date: 9/18/75

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via CABLE URGENT (PRIORITY)
(Priority)ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISETO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR 150-18
LEGAT BRASILIA NR 150-18
FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS; IS - ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS A RANKING OFFICIAL
WITH THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, PROVIDED THE
FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON SEPTEMBER 18, 1975: (S) (U)

ON SEPTEMBER 17, 1975, MEMBERS OF THE ARGENTINE TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION, THE EJERCITO DE LIBERACION (ARMY OF LIBERATION),
AUGUST 22ND FACTION, ASSASSINATED THE CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE
OF THE ARGENTINE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, RETIRED AIR FORCE VICE
COMMODORE ROLANDO SEGUNDO SILEON. SILEON WAS ASSASSINATED
IN BROAD DAYLIGHT
FOUR BLOCKS FROM HIS RESIDENCE IN A SMALL COMMERCIAL ESTAB-
LISHMENT LOCATED IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO A ~~LARGE~~ RAILROAD
STATION AND BUS TERMINAL. SILEON, WHO RETIRED FROM THE
ARGENTINE AIR FORCE IN 1970, WORKED AS AN ADVISOR ON POLICE
MATTERS TO THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR DURING THE PERIOD
FEBRUARY, 1971, THROUGH DECEMBER, 1973, WHEN HE TOOK UP (S) (U)

1 - 80-205 (VALIN) (S) (U)
1 - 30-29 (EMILIO REY)

RWS:jn

(4)

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent 11:30 PM Per J

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

4/23/01
CLASSIFIED BY 39063-FHW/BCE/som
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X-776
Argentine Project

~~SECRET~~

RWS

109-2-1407

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Date:

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(Priority)~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE TWO

BUE 109-2; 109-103

HIS PRESENT POSITION AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. THE ARMY OF LIBERATION, AUGUST 22ND FACTION, IS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION THAT HAD ^{BROKE AWAY FROM} BELONGED TO THE TROTSKYITE GUERRILLA GROUP, THE PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP), ~~BUT BROKE AWAY FROM THE TROTSKYITE GROUP~~ ^{IT WAS ALLEGED THAT} SINCE THE ERP WAS NOT CARRYING OUT SUFFICIENT VIOLENT GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES TO TOPPLE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. (U)

A SECOND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN EXECUTIVE WITH THE BANK OF BOSTON, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON SEPTEMBER 18, 1975:

REACTING TO THE MOUNTING POLITICAL TERRORIST CAMPAIGN IN ARGENTINA, THE BANK OF BOSTON HEADQUARTERS IN BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, ORDERED THE IMMEDIATE TRANSFER ^{FROM ARGENTINA} OF A BANK OF BOSTON OFFICIAL, CARTER GEORGE, WHO HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO BUENOS AIRES FOR THE PAST NINETEEN YEARS. ~~GEORGE'S TRANSFER WAS BASED ONLY ON TERRORIST THREAT.~~ ^{THE}

~~CLASSIFIED BY 59-1 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - [FIRST SOURCE IS COLONEL ALBERTO VALIN, (U) CHIEF, ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE] ~~10~~ SECOND SOURCE IS SECURITY, EMILIO RAMON REY (NA), DIRECTOR OF BANK OF BOSTON, BUENOS AIRES.

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

Approved: _____

END. Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

~~SECRET~~

F B I

Date: 9/28/75

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via TELETYPE 272 URGENT-PRIORITY
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. 165-29

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE

TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ON SEPTEMBER 29, 1975 A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS AN OFFICIAL WITH THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1975, SEVERAL TERRORIST BOMBS WERE SET OFF IN CORDOBA, ARGENTINA. ONE OF THESE BOMBS WAS DETONATED AT THE WILLA CABRERA BRANCH OF THE FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK. THIS BOMB CAUSED NO PERSONAL INJURIES AND MODERATE MATERIAL DAMAGE.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5941 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. [SOURCE IS COMISARIO GENERAL JORGE CROVETTO, DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FPA] (S) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

3 - Bue (109-2)
(1 - 109-103)
(1 - 80-87 [Crovetto])

RWS:gjk

RWS(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

4/24/01
CLASSIFIED BY 39063 E/w BCF/sem
DECLASSIFY ON: 1, 6
argentina Project 109-2-1424

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 10:15 A M Per [Signature]

9/29/75 U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

FBI

Date: 10/2/75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISETransmit the following in 275 CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)Via CABLE URGENT (PRIORITY)
(Priority)TO: DIRECTOR(109-12-201)NR. 171 -02
FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS; IS - ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON OCTOBER 2, 1975, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS
AN OFFICIAL OF THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE (BAPP) ADVISED
THAT BAPP OFFICER SEGUNDO C. BARRIONUEVO WAS BRUTALLY ASSASSINATED
OUTSIDE OF HIS RESIDENCE IN BUENOS AIRES ON OCTOBER 1, 1975,
BY MEMBERS OF THE ARGENTINE GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION, ^{THE} PEOPLES
REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP).

A SECOND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN OFFICIAL
OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA) ADVISED THAT DURING
MORNING OF OCTOBER 1, 1975, AN FPA CRUISER WAS MACHINEGUNNED
IN THE VICINITY OF AN ARGENTINE NAVAL INSTALLATION IN BUENOS
AIRES. THIS SOURCE ADVISED THAT FPA OFFICERS OCCUPYING THE
CRUISER MIRACULOUSLY ESCAPED UNHARMED. (S) (U)

ON OCTOBER 2, 1975, THE LAST REMAINING AMERICAN EXECUTIVE
OF THE STERLING DRUG COMPANY WAS ORDERED OUT OF ARGENTINA BY

1 - 109-38 (ERP) CLASSIFIED BY 39063 E/W/BCE/sam
1 - 80-CROVETTO
RWS:jn (4) DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 106
argentina project 109-2-1429

Approved: Pax

Sent

M

Per

Special Agent in Charge

10/2/75

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE 11-9-94 P95-142

109-2-1429
9803 RDD/CAL
2-35-74
90-2530

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BUE 109-2; 109-103

HIS COMPANY BECAUSE OF THE TERRORIST ^{SITUATION} ~~THREAT~~.~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~ADMINISTRATIVE - FIRST SOURCE IS COMISARIO GENERAL ANGEL
DEGASTALDI, DEPUTY CHIEF, BAPP.SECOND SOURCE IS COMISARIO GENERAL JORGE CROVETTO,
DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FPA. ~~(S)~~ (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END.

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 10/6/75

Transmit the following in _____
CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via CABLE IMMEDIATE (O)
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. -06

FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS; IS - ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON OCTOBER 6, 1975, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS
A RANKING OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA),
PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

THE FPA RESIDENT AGENCY IN FORMOSA PROVINCE, ARGENTINA,
REPORTED THAT IN CULMINATION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES DIRECTED
AGAINST POLICE AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN ARGENTINA DURING
THE PAST THREE DAYS, THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION IN A
COORDINATED THREE-PRONGED ATTACK, HIJACKED AN AEREOLINEAS
ARGENTINA BOEING 737 JET, WHICH WAS COMPLETING FLIGHT 706 TO
CORRIENTES, ARGENTINA DURING THE AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 5, 1975. EIGHTEEN
GUERRILLAS FORCED THE PILOT TO LAND AT THE FORMOSA AIRPORT,
WHERE THE GUERRILLAS ANTICIPATED PICKING UP SEVERAL OF THEIR
IMPRISONED COMPATRIOTS WHO WERE BEING HELD IN ARGENTINE
STATE PENITENTIARY NUMBER 10 IN FORMOSA. AN EARLIER MONTONERO (S) (U)

1 - 105-767 (Montoneros)

1 - 80-87 (Crovetto) (S) (U)

RWS:jn (4)

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BUE 109-2; 109-103

ON 10/5/75 THIS
 ATTACK AGAINST THE PENITENTIARY FAILED AND WAS REPULSED BY PRISON
 GUARDS THEREBY FRUSTRATING THE MONTONERO PLAN TO LIBERATE THEIR
 COMPANIONS FROM THE PENITENTIARY AND FLY THEM OUT TO SAFETY ON
 THE HIJACKED AEREOLINEAS ARGENTINA AIRCRAFT. DURING THE AFTERNOON
 OF OCTOBER 5, 1975, THE MONTONEROS ALSO CARRIED OUT A DIVERSIONARY
 ATTACK AGAINST THE ARGENTINE ARMY 29TH MOUNTAIN INFANTRY
 REGIMENT BASED IN FORMOSA, IN ORDER TO DRAW ATTENTION AWAY
 FROM THE ATTACK AGAINST THE STATE PENITENTIARY NUMBER 10 IN
 FORMOSA. MONTONERO GUERRILLAS, REALIZING THAT THEIR COMPANIONS
 HAD FAILED IN THEIR ATTEMPT TO LIBERATE THEIR IMPRISONED COMPANIONS
 FROM STATE PENITENTIARY #10, FORCED THE AEREOLINEAS ARGENTINA PILOT TO
 TAKE OFF FROM THE FORMOSA AIRPORT AND LAND ON A DIRT LANDING
 STRIP ON A SUBURBAN RANCH IN RAFAELA, SANTA FE PROVINCE. (S) U

AS OF THE EARLY MORNING OF OCTOBER 6, 1975, SIXTEEN
 TERRORISTS HAD BEEN KILLED IN FORMOSA WITH TEN MILITARY CASUALTIES.
 ALL PASSENGERS ABOARD AEREOLINEAS FLIGHT 706 WERE RELEASED
 UNHARMED AFTER THE LANDING IN RAFAELA. THE LANDING CARRIAGE (S) U
 END PAGE TWO

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

~~SECRET~~

Per _____

F B I

Date: ~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

PAGE THREE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BUE 109-2; 109-103

OF THE HIJACKED AEREO LINEAS AIRCRAFT WAS SEVERELY DAMAGED AS
A RESULT OF LANDING ON THE DIRT STRIP. (S) (U)

THE MONTONERO COORDINATED ATTACK OF OCTOBER 5, 1975,
IS THE FIRST INSTANCE THAT ~~XX~~ THIS GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION HAS
RESORTED TO A LARGE SCALE FIELD OPERATION, IT BEING NOTED
THAT HERETOFORE THE MONTONEROS HAD CARRIED OUT ONLY URBAN
GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 593 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - [SOURCE IS COMISARIO GENERAL JORGE
CROVETTO, DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FEDERAL POLICE OF
ARGENTINA.] (S) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END.

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

F B I

Date: 10/8/75

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR
FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2)
~~SECRET~~

NR. 5-18-014 -089063 FLW/BCE/sam
CLASSIFIED BY: SP6 ag/cal
REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 10-25/95
appeal # 90-0371 Argentina Project

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

ON OCTOBER 7, 1975, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS
A PROMINENT OFFICIAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE (AAIS) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

SEVERAL AAIS PENETRATION SOURCES WITHIN THE MONTONERO
GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION REPORTED PRIOR TO THE OCTOBER 5, 1975
MONTONERO ACTIVITIES IN FORMOSA, WHICH INCLUDED COORDINATED
ATTACKS AGAINST AN ARGENTINE ARMY INSTALLATION AND AN ARGENTINE
PENITENTIARY WHERE GUERRILLA PRISONERS WERE BEING HELD, AS
WELL AS THE HIJACKING OF AN AEROLINEAS ARGENTINAS BOEING 737
JET AIRCRAFT, THAT THE MONTONEROS WERE PLANNING TO INITIATE
A TWO FRONT OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WHICH
WOULD BE INITIATED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE TWO-FRONT WERE
IDENTIFIED BY THE AAIS MONTONERO PENETRATION SOURCES AS THE (S) (U)

3 - Bue (109-2)
(1 - 109-103)
(1 - 105-767 Montoneros)

RWS:gjk
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 11/30A M Per _____

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-10-96 page 1 & 2
SP6 ag/cal/DK 11-7-96

Classified by DP/AG/bc
Declassify on: OADR 10-3-89
284394

109-2-1435
RWS

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

~~SECRET~~

COMBINED PROVINCES OF CORRIENTES AND FORMOSA AND THE COMBINED
PROVINCES OF SALTA AND SANTIAGO DEL ESTERO. THE AAIS BELIEVES
THAT THE OCTOBER 5, 1975 MONTONERO OPERATIONS IN FORMOSA
REPRESENTED THE FIRST PHASE OF THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED TWO-FRONT
OFFENSIVE. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. [SOURCE IS COL. ALBERTO VALIN, CHIEF,
AAIS.] (S) (U)
COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END.

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

F B I

Date: 10/8/75

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via TELETYPE IMMEDIATE
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR 176-08

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; FPM-CHILE;
IS-CHILE.

ON OCTOBER 8, 1975, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS AN
OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA) INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

DURING THE EARLY AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 8, 1975 A GROUP OF
CHILEAN EXILES RESIDING IN ARGENTINA, BELIEVED TO NUMBER TEN
INDIVIDUALS, FORCIBLY TOOK OVER THE DOWNTOWN BUENOS AIRES
OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO DEMAND THAT THE ARGENTINE
GOVERNMENT, SPECIFICALLY, ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES, CEASE THEIR
ALLEGED CAMPAIGN OF PERSECUTION AGAINST CHILEAN EXILES RESIDING
IN ARGENTINA. THIRTEEN ARGENTINE CITIZENS ARE BEING HELD
HOSTAGES BY THE CHILEAN EXILES.

(3) - Bue (109-2)
(1 - 109-9)
(1 - 80-87 Crovetto)
RWS:gjk
(3)

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent

4:50 PM

Per

J.

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via _____
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FPA RIOT TROOPS HAVE CORDONED OFF THE AREA OF THE UN OFFICE
AND ARE MOVING TO EVICT THE INTRUDERS.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931, XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. SOURCE IS COMISARIO GENERAL JORGE CROVETTO,
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FPA.

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date: 10/28/75

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via TELETYPE URGENT-PRIORITY
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. 193-28

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

[TWO CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES ABROAD WHO ARE OFFICIALS OF THE
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA) AND
THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE (BAPP) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING
SUMMARY OF RECENT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN ARGENTINA:

ON OCTOBER 23, 1975, TERRORISTS IN CORDOBA, ARGENTINA
ATTEMPTED TO KIDNAP EDUARDO J. JOHNES, THE DIRECTOR OF LABOR
RELATIONS OF THE TRANSAX COMPANY, A SUBSIDIARY OF THE FORD MOTOR
COMPANY. THE TERRORISTS ATTEMPTED TO INTERCEPT JOHNES AS HE
WAS RETURNING TO HIS SUBURBAN CORDOBA RESIDENCE; HOWEVER,
JOHNES ESCAPED UNHARMED AFTER A VIOLENT SHOOT-OUT BETWEEN THE
TERRORISTS AND HIS GUARDS, WHO WERE ACCOMPANYING HIM.

6 - Bue (109-2) (1 - 109-103) (80-87) (80-185)
(1 - 105-NEW Ismael Jacinto Haiek)
(1 - 105-1089 Arab Terrorists Activities)

RWS:gjk

(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

5-1-01
CLASSIFIED BY 39063 E/LW/BUE/sam
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

Argentina Project
UTL BU original

~~SECRET~~

109-2-1457

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 4011 P M Per 2

F B I

Date:

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)~~PAGE TWO~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DURING THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 20, 1975 THE BAPP ARRESTED A 30-YEAR OLD ARGENTINE CITIZEN, ISMAEL JACINTO HAIK, WHO WAS OPERATING A PRINTING SHOP AND SHORT WAVE RADIO STATION FOR THE MONTONERO ARGENTINE GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION. AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST, HAIK HAD TWO PUBLICATIONS, "CUESTIONES ARABES" ("ARAB QUESTIONS") AND "LA VOZ DE PALESTINA" ("THE VOICE OF PALESTINE") IN HIS POSSESSION. DURING INTERROGATION, HAIK ADMITTED HE HAD BEEN A MEMBER OF A PALESTINIAN TERRORIST GROUP.

DURING THE LATE EVENING OF OCTOBER 23, 1975, TERRORISTS ATTEMPTED TO ASSASSINATE COMISARIO GENERAL HORACIO ALBERTO ROJAS, THE FPA DEPUTY CHIEF, WHO WAS RETURNING TO HIS RESIDENCE FROM FPA HEADQUARTERS. AN HOUR LONG FIRE FIGHT ENSUED DURING WHICH ROJAS' BODYGUARDS MANAGED TO HOLD OFF THE TERRORISRS UNTIL FPA REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVED ON THE SCENE. ROJAS ESCAPED WITHOUT INJURY.

MEMBERS OF THE ARGENTINE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY-AUGUST 22 FACTION, ASSASSINATED RETIRED ARGENTINE AIR FORCE COLONEL ARTURO LEOPOLDO LONGINOTTI NEAR HIS RESIDENCE IN SUBURBAN CASTELAR ON OCTOBER 26, 1975. COLONEL

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

~~SECRET~~

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)~~SECRET~~Via _____
(Priority)

PAGE THREE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LONGINOTTI'S SON WAS SERIOUSLY WOUNDED BY HIS FATHER'S ASSASSINS WHEN HE ATTEMPTED TO COME TO THE DEFENSE OF HIS FATHER.

DURING THE EARLY MORNING OF OCTOBER 26, 1975, MEMBERS OF THE MONTONEROS AMBUSHED TWO BAPP CRUISERS IN SAN ISIDRO, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE UTILIZING AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND HAND GRENADES. FOUR BAPP OFFICERS DIED IN THE FIRE FIGHT.

SEVERAL IMPORTANT KIDNAPPINGS ALSO TOOK PLACE IN THE GREATER BUENOS AIRES AREA DURING THE PERIOD OCTOBER 23-27, 1975. ON OCTOBER 23, 1975, REBECA MADANES DE FRIEDENTHAL, AN ARGENTINE MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE FATE TIRE COMPANY, WAS KIDNAPPED WHILE EN ROUTE FROM HER RESIDENCE TO THE FATE PLANT. SHE WAS RELEASED ON OCTOBER 27, 1975, AFTER A LARGE RANSOM HAD BEEN PAID. ON OCTOBER 24, 1975, ARTURO R. BULLRICH, A WEALTHY ARGENTINE CATTLE BREEDER AND BUSINESS MAN, WAS KIDNAPPED BY TERRORISTS. ON OCTOBER 27, 1975, FRANZ MITZ, A WEST GERMAN CITIZEN AND THE DIRECTOR OF PRODUCTION FOR THE MERCEDES BENZ COMPANY, WAS KIDNAPPED BY THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 3931, KCDS-2, INDEFINITE.~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

F B I

Date:

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)PAGE ~~THREE~~ FOUR~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. [SOURCES ARE COMISARIO GENERAL JORGE
CROVETTO, DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FPA] ~~(S)~~ (U) AND COMISARIO MAYOR
OSVALDO DE BALDRICH, CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, BAPP.

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

Per _____

~~SECRET~~

FBI

Date: 12/24/75

356

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via CABLE IMMEDIATE
(Priority)

5-1401
CLASSIFIED BY 3906 JELW/BCE/DG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1.6
Argentine Project
470 By original

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-23) NR. 23-24
FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~SECRET~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

ON DECEMBER 23, 1975, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS
A RANKING OFFICIAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
(AIS), PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

ARGENTINE
THE ~~ARGENTINE~~ ~~ARMY~~ ~~XXX~~ AIS, THROUGH SEVERAL PENETRATION
SOURCES IN THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION, ASCERTAINED
THAT THE MONTONEROS HAD SCHEDULED AN ATTACK AGAINST AN ARGENTINE
ARMY ARSENAL LOCATED IN MONTE CHINGOLO, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE
(BAP), DURING THE AFTERNOON OF DECEMBER 23, 1975. THE SOURCE
ADVISED THAT THE ARGENTINE ARMY PREPARED AN AMBUSH AND WAITED
FOR THE MONTONEROS TO CARRY OUT THEIR PLANNED ACTION. AT
APPROXIMATELY 7:00 PM, DECEMBER 23, 1975, SEVERAL GROUPS OF
MONTONEROS NUMBERING IN EXCESS OF 100 INDIVIDUALS, BEGAN A
COORDINATED ATTACK AGAINST THE MONTE CHINGOLO ARSENAL. ADDITIONALLY (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

3 - Bue (109-2)
(1 - 109-103)
(1 - 80-

RWS:gjk

[Col. Valin] (S) (U)

109-2-1506

(3)

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

F B I

Date:

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

~~SECRET~~

OTHER DIVERSIONARY ATTACKS WERE CARRIED OUT AGAINST VARIOUS OTHER
POLICE AND ARMY INSTALLATIONS IN BAP. ~~(S) (U) ~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~

THE ARGENTINE ARMY/ROUTED THE MONTONEROS, KILLING OVER
SIXTY AND WOUNDING AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF TERRORISTS.
ADDITIONALLY, NUMEROUS PRISONERS WERE TAKEN. ~~(S)~~ (U)

THE SOURCE ADVISED THAT THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED ACTION BY THE
ARGENTINE ARMY WAS THE MOST SEVERE BLOW EVER DEALT TO ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1970. ~~(S)~~ (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 6931, XGDS-2.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. ~~XXXX~~ THE SOURCE IS COL. ALBERTO VALIN,
CHIEF, AIS. ~~(S)~~ (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END.

~~SECRET~~Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

CLASSIFIED BY: ~~sph Aglcat~~

REASON: 1.5

DECLASSIFY ON: X

FBI

~~SECRET~~

Date: 1/13/76

15:15
15:45

Transmit the following in

Argentinian Project

(Type in plaintext or code)

TELETYPE 5-3-01

IMMEDIATE

Via

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12201) NR. 607 -13

FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~SECRET~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.ON JANUARY 11, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS
A RANKING OFFICER OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
(AAIS) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)A PENETRATION SOURCE OF THE AAIS IN THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA
ORGANIZATION ADVISED THAT THE MONTONEROS ARE PLANNING A SPECTACULAR
ACT IN ORDER TO PRESSURE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO RELEASE
ROBERTO QUIETO, A ^{PROMINENT} MONTONERO LEADER WHO WAS EXTRA-LEGALLY DETAINED
BY THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA) AND THE AAIS. THE AAIS
SOURCE REPORTED THAT AS OF JANUARY 12, 1976, NO DEFINITE COURSE
OF ACTION HAD BEEN DECIDED UPON BY THE MONTONERO LEADERSHIP. (S) (U)IN ANALYZING THE ABOVE INFORMATION, THE AAIS BELIEVES THAT
THE MONTONEROS MIGHT ~~ATTEMPT~~ ^{SENIOR} TO KIDNAP A RANKING ARGENTINE
GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL OR A FOREIGN DIPLOMAT IN ORDER TO ATTEMPT TO
EXCHANGE THIS INDIVIDUAL FOR QUIETO. THE AAIS ALSO BELIEVES THERE
IS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE MONTONEROS MIGHT INSTITUTE A CAMPAIGN (S) (U)(5) - Bue (109-2), (109-103) (105-767 Montoneros)
(105-1699 R. Quieto) (80-205 [Col. Valin])

RWS:gjk

Approved: (5)

Special Agent in Charge

Sent

M

Per

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DRC)
DATE 7-10-96 BY SP6 AG/CAL/DK 11-7-96 Appeal 90-0371

F B I

Date:

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

~~SECRET~~

OF INDISCRIMINATE ASSASSINATIONS OF ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS OR FOREIGN DIPLOMATS UNTIL QUIETO IS RELEASED. INASMUCH
AS QUIETO IS BEING HELD EXTRALEGALLY BY THE AAIS, THERE IS NO
POSSIBILITY THAT ANY NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE ENTERED INTO WITH THE
MONTONEROS FOR HIS RELEASE! (S) (U)

CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-1 AND 2 INDEFINITE.

ADMINISTRATIVE. [SOURCE IS COL. ALBERTO VALIN, CHIEF, AAIS.] (S) (U)
REMYCABLE, JANUARY 9, 1976, CAPTIONED, "FOREIGN POLITICAL
MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA," [REPORTING THE EXTRALEGAL
DETENTION OF QUIETO BY THE AAIS.] (S) (U)
(U) THE FOREGOING [AAIS] INTELLIGENCE IS EXCLUSIVE AND HAS BEEN
COORDINATED LOCALLY. [REDACTED] b1 per CIA

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EMBASSY
BASED ON THE FOREGOING INFORMATION, THE AMBASSADOR HAS
INSTITUTED RADICAL SECURITY MEASURES, SINCE THERE IS A POSSIBILITY

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

~~SECRET~~

F B I

Date:

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

PAGE THREE

~~SECRET~~

THAT AN EMBASSY OFFICER MAY BE TARGETED BY THE MONTONEROS. CERTAIN EMBASSY OFFICERS HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED NOT TO REPORT TO THE EMBASSY AND TO REMAIN AT THEIR RESIDENCES DURING THE NEXT TWO WEEKS, WHICH IS THE CRITICAL PERIOD FOR THE MONTONEROS TO TAKE ACTION. ADDITIONAL PATROL AND ESCORT CARS ARE BEING SECURED AT CAR RENTAL COMPANIES AND BODYGUARDS ARE BEING ASSIGNED TO VARIOUS EMBASSY OFFICERS WHO AT THE PRESENT TIME DO NOT HAVE THEM. CERTAIN EMBASSY OFFICERS ARE BEING ORDERED BY THE AMBASSADOR TO TEMPORARILY VACATE THEIR RESIDENCES AND RESIDE AT THE SHERATON HOTEL IN BUENOS AIRES UNTIL THE CRITICAL PERIOD HAS PASSED.

I AM FOLLOWING THIS MATTER VERY CLOSELY AND WILL TAKE ALL NECESSARY SECURITY MEASURES TO PROTECT MYSELF AND MY STAFF. BUREAU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED.

end

END

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

F B I

Date: 1/29/76

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via TELETYPE IMMEDIATE
(Priority)15:34
16:00

TO: DIRECTOR

NR. 80-29

FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

ON JANUARY 29, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS
AN OFFICIAL OF THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE (BAPP)
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

ON JANUARY 29, 1976 AT APPROXIMATELY 9:45 A.M., FIFTEEN
ARMED INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING TWO WOMEN, FORCIBLY TOOK OVER
THE BENDIX CORPORATION PLANT IN MUNRO, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE.
THE INDIVIDUALS ENTERED THE BENDIX CORPORATION LOCATION IN A
PICKUP TRUCK AND FOUR AUTOMOBILES. THE INDIVIDUALS WERE
ARMED WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS. THE INTRUDERS DEMANDED THAT
THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER OF THE BENDIX CORPORATION BE
PRODUCED BUT WERE INFORMED THAT THE FORMER WAS IN EUROPE
AND THAT THE LATTER HAD NOT YET ARRIVED AT THE COMPANY
INSTALLATION. AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME THAT THE TERRORISTS

3 - Bue (109-2)
(109-103)
(1 - 80-185)

RWS:gjk
(3)

DECLASSIFIED BY 39069 E/WBCA/D1
ON 6-3-01
argentine project

109-2-1522A
RWS

Approved: RWS

Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

BUE 109-2; 109-103

PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WERE DEMANDING TO SEE THE BENDIX CORPORATION PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, THE CHIEF OF PERSONNEL AND THE CHIEF OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OF THE BENDIX CORPORATION, BOTH ARGENTINE CITIZENS, ARRIVED AT WORK. THE TERRORISTS UNCEREMONIOUSLY GUNNED THEM DOWN AND ALSO KILLED A BAPP CORPORAL WHO ATTEMPTED TO COME TO THE EXECUTIVES' DEFENSE.

THE BENDIX CORPORATION HAS BEEN HAVING RECENT LABOR PROBLEMS AND IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED ATTACK, ALTHOUGH AS OF 11:30 A.M., JANUARY 29, 1976, THE CUSTOMARY COMMUNIQUE FROM THE ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATIONS HAD NOT YET BEEN RECEIVED BY THE BUENOS AIRES NEWS MEDIA.

THE BENDIX CORPORATION IS AN ARGENTINE SUBSIDIARY OF THE BENDIX CORPORATION OF NEW YORK.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931, XDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR OSVALDO DE BALDRICH, CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, BAPP.

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1/29/76

LEGATT ROBERT W. SCHERRER

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA

On 1/29/76 an official of the Buenos Aires Provincial Police (BAPP) Intelligence Service provided the following information:

On 1/29/76 at approximately 9:45 A. M., 15 armed individuals, including two women, forcibly took over the Bendix Corporation plant in Munro, Buenos Aires Province. The individuals entered the Bendix Corporation location in a pickup truck and four automobiles. The individuals were armed with automatic weapons. The intruders demanded that the President and General Manager of the Bendix Corporation be produced but were informed that the former was in Europe and that the latter had not yet arrived at the company installation. At approximately the same time that the terrorists were demanding to see the Bendix Corporation President and General Manager, the Chief of Personnel and the Chief of Industrial Relations of the Bendix Corporation, both Argentine citizens, arrived at work. The terrorists unceremoniously gunned them down and also killed a BAPP corporal who attempted to come to the executives' defense.

The Bendix Corporation has been having recent labor problems and it is believed that the Montonero guerrilla organization was responsible for the above-described attack, although as of 11:30 A. M., January 29, 1976, the customary communique from the organization responsible for the assassinations had not yet been received by the Buenos Aires news media.

The Bendix Corporation is an Argentine subsidiary of the Bendix Corporation of New York.

cc: 1 - Addressee
1 - POL
1 - POL-R
1 - Econ Couns
1 - SY
③ - Buenos Aires (109-2)
(1 - 109-103)

DECLASSIFIED BY 39063 E/W BCE/DG
ON 5-30/

(1-80-185)
RWS:gjk
(8)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by 5931
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on Indefinite.

109-2-1522B

F B I

Date: 1/30/76

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via TELETYPE URGENT-PRIORITY
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR NR. 014 -30
LEGAT, MEXICO CITY NR. 001 -30
FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-3) (109-NEW)

SECRET

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-PARAGUAY; FPM-MEXICO; FPM-ARGENTINA.

ON JANUARY 27, 1976, PASTOR CORONEL, CHIEF OF INVESTIGATIONS,
POLICE OF THE CAPITAL, ASUNCION, PARAGUAY PROVIDED THE
FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

DURING THE MORNING OF JANUARY 27, 1976, PARAGUAYAN PRESIDENT
ALFREDO STROESSNER CONSULTED WITH CORONEL CONCERNING INFORMATION
RECENTLY RECEIVED BY THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT INDICATING THAT
THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT AMILCAR
SANTUCHO AS A POLITICAL EXILE IN MEXICO SHOULD THE PARAGUAYAN
GOVERNMENT ALLOW HIM TO DEPART PARAGUAY.

IT IS NOTED THAT AMILCAR SANTUCHO, THE BROTHER OF MARIO
ROBERTO SANTUCHO, THE LEADER OF THE ARGENTINE TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION, THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP), WAS ARRESTED

4 - Bue (109-2)
(109-3)
(109-New FPM-Mexico)
(105-1268 Amilcar Santucho)

RWS:gjk
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

5-14-01
CLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/BCE/DC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6
Argentina Project
UTL BUA Originals

~~SECRET~~

109-2-1524

REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X1
Argentina Project per 6 guidelines UTL Bu Aug 1, 1996
CLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/BCE/DC

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent

11:45 A
1/30/76

M

Per

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)~~SECRET~~

PAGE TWO

SECRET

DURING MAY, 1975 BY THE POLICE OF THE CAPITAL IN ASUNCION AFTER HE HAD ILLEGALLY ENTERED PARAGUAY USING FALSE ARGENTINE DOCUMENTATION.

CORONAL EXPRESSED HIS VIEW TO PRESIDENT STROESSNER THAT AMILCAR SANTUCHO SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO LEAVE PARAGUAY FOR MEXICO, SINCE HE IS CONSIDERED BY CORONEL TO BE A DANGEROUS HIGH-RANKING TERRORIST AND THAT, SHOULD HE BE ALLOWED TO TRAVEL TO MEXICO, HE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY CONTINUE HIS ACTIVITIES ON BEHALF OF THE ERP.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931, XGDS-2, INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. REMYCABLE, JANUARY 5, 1976 UNDER THE TRIPLE CAPTION, "FPM-ARGENTINA; FPM-NORWAY; FPM-PARAGUAY", WHICH REPORTED INFORMATION INDICATING THAT THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN APPROACHED FOR THE PURPOSE OF SOUNDING OUT THE ~~RESEEN~~ POSSIBILITIES OF ACCEPTING AMILCAR SANTURHO AS A POLITICAL EXILE IN NORWAY.

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code),Via _____
(Priority)~~SECRET~~

PAGE THREE

SECRET

REMYCABLE, JUNE 6, 1975 CAPTIONED, "JORGE ISAAC FUENTES,
AKA, IS-CHILE; IS-PARAGUAY; FPC", WHICH REPORTED THE ARREST
OF AMILCAR SANTUCHO.

[REDACTED] b1 per CIA

[REDACTED] FUENTES,

A MEMBER OF THE CHILEAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, MOVEMENT
OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR), WHO WAS APPREHENDED WITH
AMILCAR SANTUCHO, HAD BEEN SUMMARILY EXECUTED BY THE POLICE
OF THE CAPITAL IN ASUNCION. (S) (U)

XXXX COORDINATED LOCALLY IN BUENOS AIRES AND ASUNCION:

END

→ WITH U.S. EMBASSYS

~~SECRET~~Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

10-25-95 39063 ELW/BCE/DC
CLASSIFIED BY: SP6AG/CAL
REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X1
Appeal # 90-0371
Argentinian Project

FBI

Date: ~~XXXXXX~~
2/10/76

Transmit the following in 5-14-01 (Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE IMMEDIATE
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR

NR. 19 -10

FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

ON FEBRUARY 9, 1976, A RANKING OFFICIAL OF THE ARGENTINE
ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAIS) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION: (S) (U)

AT APPROXIMATELY 7:30 P.M., FEBRUARY 9, 1976, A POWERFUL
BOMB DETONATED IN THE APARTMENT OF MARCOS LANUSSE BELL, THE
SON OF FORMER ARGENTINE PRESIDENT, LT. GENERAL ALEJANDRO
AGUSTIN LANUSSE. FORMER PRESIDENT LANUSSE'S DAUGHTER-IN-LAW
MARIA CARIDE DE LANUSSE, WHO WAS INSIDE THE APARTMENT WHEN THE
BOMB DETONATED, WAS KILLED IMMEDIATELY. FORMER PRESIDENT (S) (U)

- 5 - Bue
- 1 - 109-2
- 1 - 109-103
- 1 - 80-205 [Gen. Valin]
- 1 - 80-173 [Capt. Lucero] (S) (U)
- 1 - 105-767 Montoneros

(5)
RWS:gjk
SP6AG/CAL/PK 11-7-96
CLASSIFIED BY: SP6AG/CAL/PK 11-7-96
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6
Argentinian Project
90-0371

5-14-01
CLASSIFIED BY: 39063 ELW/BCE/DC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6
Argentinian Project

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

~~SECRET~~

109-2-1527

Approved: Law
Special Agent in Charge

Sent

11:15A

Per

F B I

Date:

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LANUSSE, WHO WAS OUTSIDE OF BUENOS AIRES ON FEBRUARY 9, 1976, HAD BEEN SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO BUENOS AIRES WITH HIS SON MARCOS, WHO IS A PARAPLEGIC, BUT DELAYED HIS RETURN TO THE CITY DUE TO ^ALAST MINUTE OCCURRENCE. SHOULD FORMER PRESIDENT LANUSSE HAVE FOLLOWED HIS ORIGINAL SCHEDULE, HE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN IN THE APARTMENT WHEN THE POWERFUL BOMB DETONATED. (S) (U)

ON FEBRUARY 10, 1976, ANOTHER OFFICIAL OF THE AAIS PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

THE AAIS, THROUGH A PENETRATION SOURCE OF THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION, ASCERTAINED THAT THE MONTONEROS WERE PLANNING TO ASSASSINATE ARMY GENERAL ADEL VILAS, WHO HAD COMMANDED THE ARGENTINE ARMY ANTI-GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN IN THE PROVINCE OF TUCUMAN. IT IS NOTED THAT GENERAL VILAS IS SCHEDULED TO TAKE OVER THE COMMAND OF THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS IN BAHIA BLANCA ON FEBRUARY 11, 1976. ACTING ON THE INFORMATION THAT GENERAL VILAS HAD BEEN TARGETED FOR ASSASSINATION, THE AAIS ASCERTAINED THAT THE MONTONEROS PLANNED TO POISON GENERAL VILAS UTILIZING AN ARGENTINE ARMY DRAFTEE TO PLANT THE POISON IN GENERAL VILAS' FOOD. THE DRAFTEE INVOLVED WAS (S) (U)

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)~~SECRET~~

PAGE THREE

IDENTIFIED AND IS UNDER INTENSIVE INTERROGATION AT THE PRESENT
TIME. (S) (U)

THE AAIS BELIEVE THAT THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED TERRORIST ACTS
WERE CARRIED OUT BY THE MONTONEROS IN RETALIATION FOR THE EXTRA-
LEGAL DETENTION OF MONTONERO GUERRILLA LEADER ROBERTO QUIETO,
WHO WAS PICKED UP BY AGENTS OF THE AAIS AND FEDERAL POLICE OF
ARGENTINA (FPA) OFFICERS ON DECEMBER 28, 1975. (S) (U)

THE SECOND SOURCE NOTED THAT ^{TO HIS} ~~THERE IS~~ KNOWLEDGE THAT
THE PLANNED PROJECTED POISONING OF GENERAL VILAS IS THE FIRST
INSTANCE OF TERRORISTS UTILIZING THIS MEASURE. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGBS-2 INDEFINITE~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. [FIRST SOURCE IS COL. ALBERTO VALIN, CHIEF,
AAIS] (S) (U)

SECOND SOURCE IS CAPTAIN JUAN LUCERO, COMMANDER, AAIS
POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE BATTALION. (S) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

FBI

Date: 3/29/76

Transmit the following in 089 CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)Via CABLE URGENT (PRIORITY)
(Precedence)

TO: *3 from* DIRECTOR NR. -29
 FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE TERRORIST
 ACTIVITIES; IS - ARGENTINA.

ON MARCH 29, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN
 OFFICIAL OF THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE (BAPP) INTELLIGENCE
 SERVICE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

ON MARCH 26, 1976, TERRORISTS ATTACKED THE RESIDENCE OF A
 FORD MOTOR COMPANY ENGINEER IN HURLINGHAM, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE,
 FOR THE APPARENT PURPOSE OF KIDNAPPING THE ENGINEER. DURING
 THE GUN BATTLE AT THE RESIDENCE, TWO FORD MOTOR COMPANY
 SECURITY GUARDS WERE SLAIN AND THEIR WEAPONS STOLEN.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR OSVALDO DE
 BALDRICH, CHIEF, BAPP INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

1 - 80-DE BALDRICH

RWS:jn
 (3)

DECLASSIFIED BY 39063 ELW/BCE/PK
 ON 5-15-01

Argentina Project

109-2-1585

but

Approved: *but*
 Special Agent in Charge

Sent

3 00 PM

Per

but

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

3/30/76

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

MONTONERO BOMB ATTACK
AGAINST CHRYSLER CORPORATION,
BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA, 3/22/76

As reported in the news media, the Montoneros carried out a bomb attack on 3/22/76 at a storage lot of the Chrysler Corporation in San Justo, Buenos Aires Province. There were no personal injuries and moderate material damage as a result of the bombing.

On 3/30/76, HERB LESHINSKY, Chrysler Managing Director, advised that the above described bombing almost resulted in the loss of considerable lives at the Chrysler factory in San Justo. LESHINSKY explained that the Montonero bomb had been placed in a Dodge pick-up truck, which was stored on a holding lot in preparation to be re-introduced into the assembly line inside the Chrysler facility. LESHINSKY noted that the Dodge pick-up truck in which the Montonero bomb had been placed would have entered the assembly line within ten minutes after the bomb exploded. LESHINSKY noted that if the Dodge pick-up truck had entered inside the Chrysler facility as part of the assembly line, approximately seventy-five workers would have been in the immediate vicinity should the bomb have detonated inside the Chrysler facility.

LESHINSKY reported that the bomb was extremely powerful and that the Dodge pick-up truck in which it had been placed was reduced to scrap metal. LESHINSKY noted that the roof of this Dodge pick-up truck was projected approximately fifty yards through the air landing on the roof of a storage shed on the holding lot.

DECLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/BCE/PG
ON 5-15-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 5931

Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652

Exemption Category 5B(2)

Automatically declassified on Indefinite

- 1 - Ambassador
- 1 - POL/R
- 1 - ECON COUNSELOR
- 1 - SY

- 3 - Buenos Aires
 - (1) - 109-2)(1 - 109-103)
 - (1 - 105-767)(Montoneros)

RWS:jn
(7)

RWS

109-2-1586

FBI

Date: 4/5/76

Transmit the following in _____

CODE

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via CABLE 10.15 URGENT) PRIORITY)

(Precedence)

~~SECRET~~

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. 085-05

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)(P)

~~SECRET~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISECLASSIFIED BY 39063 ELW/BCE/DC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6
Argentina Project

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON APRIL 2, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA), DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY (INTELLIGENCE DIVISION) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

FROM MARCH 1, 1976, TO APRIL 1, 1976, THIRTY-TWO POLICE OFFICERS HAVE BEEN ASSASSINATED THROUGHOUT ARGENTINA. SINCE THE MARCH 23-24, 1976, MILITARY INTERVENTION OF THE PERON GOVERNMENT IN ARGENTINA, TWO SENIOR FPA OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN ASSASSINATED BY TERRORISTS AND ANOTHER SENIOR FPA OFFICIAL NARROWLY ESCAPED A TERRORIST ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT. (S) (U)

ON APRIL 2, 1976, A SECOND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN KNOWLEDGEABLE OFFICIAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAIS) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

FROM RECENTLY ACQUIRED INTELLIGENCE, THE AAIS ASCERTAINED THAT TACTICS OF ARGENTINE TERRORISTS WILL BE TO CONDUCT AN ACCELERATED (S) (U)

1 - 80-173 (Capt. LUCERO) (S) (U)

1 - 80-Com. Gen. BESTEIRO (S) (U)

RWS:jn (4)

~~SECRET~~

109-2-1597

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

4/5/76

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Precedence)PAGE TWO ~~SECRET~~ BUE 109-2 109-103~~SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN OF ASSASSINATIONS OF ARGENTINE POLICE AND MILITARY PERSONNEL IN AN EFFORT TO PROVOKE THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT INTO VIOLENT RETALIATION IN ORDER TO DISCREDIT THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH, SINCE THE MARCH 23-24, 1976, MILITARY INTERVENTION, HAS FOLLOWED A MODERATE COURSE. SHOULD THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT LED BY THE PRESIDENT, ARMY LIEUTENANT GENERAL JORGE RAFAEL VIDELA, FAIL TO REACT TO TERRORIST PROVOCATIONS, THE TERRORISTS HOPE THAT MORE RADICAL OFFICERS IN THE ARGENTINE MILITARY WILL TAKE STEPS TO TAKE OVER THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT BY REMOVING THE INCUMBENT MODERATE MILITARY JUNTA WHICH INCLUDES PRESIDENT VIDELA AND UNLEASHING A BLOODBATH AGAINST LEFTISTS AND TERRORISTS. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931, XGDS-2, INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - [^{SECOND} FIRST SOURCE IS CAPTAIN JUAN LUCERO, AAIS.] (S) (U)
^{FIRST} SECOND SOURCE IS [COMISARIO GENERAL ENRIQUE BESTEIRO, DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FPA] (S) (U) COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END.

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

FBI

Date: 4/9/76

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT-PRIORITY
(Precedence)

TO: DIRECTOR NR. 089 -09

FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

ON APRIL 8, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS AN
OFFICIAL OF THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE (BAPP) INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

DURING THE MORNING OF APRIL 8, 1976 TERRORISTS ATTACKED
THE RESIDENCE OF CARLOS SARDAN, AN ARGENTINE EXECUTIVE OF THE
PFIZER COMPANY, S.A.I.C., IN BOULOGNE, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE.
DURING THE ATTACK ONE OF SARDAN'S GUARDS WAS KILLED AND ANOTHER
SERIOUSLY WOUNDED. SARDAN ESCAPED INJURY.

IT IS NOTED THAT THE PFIZER COMPANY, SACI. IS THE
ARGENTINE SUBSIDIARY OF THE PFIZER CORPORATION, 235 EAST 42ND
STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 593, XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR OSVALDO DE
BALDRICH, CHIEF, BAPP INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END

4 - Bue (109-2) (109-103) (80-185 De Baldrich)

(163)

NEW Terrorist Attack against Carlos Sardan, Pf

Pfizer Co.,

4/8/76, Buenos Aires Province

Approved:

Sent

Per

Special Agent in Charge

RWS:gjk (4)

109-2-1603

F B I

Date: 4/20/76

Transmit the following in _____
CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via CABLE URGENT (PRIORITY)
(Priority)

(109-12-201)
TO: DIRECTOR NR. 100-20
FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS @, ARGENTINA; IS @, ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM @ ARGENTINA.

ON APRIL 18, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO
IS AN OFFICIAL OF THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE (BAPP)
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

ATTACKS AGAINST ARGENTINE AFFILIATES OF U. S. CORPORATIONS
RECENTLY INCREASED DRAMATICALLY IN BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA.

ON APRIL 18, 1976, TERRORISTS KILLED TWO SECURITY GUARDS
DURING AN ATTACK AGAINST THE RESIDENCE OF AN ARGENTINE EXECUTIVE"
OF THE GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY, S. A. IN SANTOS LUGARES,
BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE. THE GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY, S.A.,
IS THE ARGENTINE SUBSIDIARY OF GOODYEAR INTERNATIONAL, AKRON, OHIO.

ON APRIL 14, 1976, TERRORISTS ASSASSINATED AN ARGENTINE
EXECUTIVE OF THE CHRYSLER FEVRE ARGENTINA, S.A.I.C., COMPANY
AT HIS RESIDENCE IN MORON, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE. THE CHRYSLER
FEVRE S.A.I.C., COMPANY IS THE ARGENTINE SUBSIDIARY OF THE
CHRYSLER CORPORATION, DETROIT, MICHIGAN.

1 - 163-674 1 - 163-675 1 - 80-185 (DE BALDRICH)

1 - 163-New (UNSUBS ATTACK AGAINST THE CRISTALERIAS RIGOLLEAU CO.,
BUENOS AIRES, 4/16/76)

Approved: RWS:jn (6)

Special Agent in Charge

Sent 10 00 AM

Per

DECLASSIFIED BY 3906 S&L W BCF/BRM
ON 5/13/01 1518/01
Argentinean project

109-2-1605

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)PAGE TWO BUE 109-2 109-103 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ON APRIL 16, 1976, TERRORISTS WOUNDED A SECURITY GUARD DURING AN ATTACK AGAINST THE CRISTALERIAS RIGOLLEAU, S. A., COMPANY IN BERAZATEGUI, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE. THE CRISTALERIAS RIGOLLEAU, S. A., COMPANY IS THE ARGENTINE SUBSIDIARY OF THE CORNING GLASS WORKS, CORNING, NEW YORK.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5932 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR OSVALDO DE BALDRICH, CHIEF, BAPP INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END.

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

FBI

Date: 5/4/76

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

CODE

Via TELETYPE

URGENT (PRIORITY)

(Precedence)

CLASSIFIED

BY DEPT.

DATE: 11-9

NOT FINALIZED

NEW COMMITTEE (DRC)

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. / -04

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)(P)

~~SECRET~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON MAY 3, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS
A RANKING OFFICIAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
(AAIS) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION. (S) (U)

SEVERAL DAYS AGO AN ARGENTINE AIR FORCE LIEUTENANT COLONEL
WAS KIDNAPPED BY THE ARGENTINE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, THE
PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP). THE ERP COMMUNICATED WITH
THE ARGENTINE MILITARY GOVERNMENT INDICATING THEY DESIRED
TO EXCHANGE THE KIDNAPPED AIR FORCE LIEUTENANT COLONEL FOR
AN ERP LEADER NAMED ENRIQUEZ, WHO HAD BEEN PICKED UP BY
ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES. (S) (U)

NO NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE ENTERED INTO BY THE ARGENTINE
MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR THE RELEASE OF THE KIDNAPPED AIR
FORCE LIEUTENANT COLONEL SINCE IT IS THE FIRM POLICY OF THE
ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT NOT TO NEGOTIATE WITH TERRORISTS.

IN ADDITION, ENRIQUEZ DIED WHILE IN CAPTIVITY AND WOULD BE (S) (U)

1 - 109-38

1 - 80-VAL IN

RWS:jn (4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

Classified

Declassify

2-26-94 10-2530

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 11-9-94

5/15/01
CLASSIFIED BY 39063 E/W/BC E/5044
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 10-6-00
Argentina Project

F B I

Date:

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Precedence)

PAGE TWO

BUE 109-2; 109-103

~~SECRET~~

UNAVAILABLE FOR ANY TYPE OF EXCHANGE (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5981, XGDS-2 and -4 INDEFINITE.~~ (U)ADMINISTRATIVE - [SOURCE IS COLONEL ALBERTO VALIN, CHIEF,
AAIS. (U) COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END.

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge~~SECRET~~

F B I

Date: 5/4/76

Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via CABLE URGENT (PRIORITY)
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. 111-04
FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)(P)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT DURING LATE JANUARY AND EARLY
FEBRUARY, 1976, THE MONTONEROS, AN ARGENTINE TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION, DIRECTED A COMMUNIQUE TO VARIOUS BUSINESS ESTABLISH-
MENTS IN BUENOS AIRES THREATENING DEATH TO ANY EXECUTIVE
CONNECTED WITH THESE BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENTS THAT COLLABORATED
WITH ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES IN IDENTIFYING WORKERS WHO MIGHT
HOLD COMMUNIST IDEAS.

ON MAY 3, 1976, JAIME BRAUN BRUNET, PRESIDENT, DOW CHEMICAL
COMPANY, BUENOS AIRES, ADVISED THAT HE PERSONALLY RECENTLY RECEIVED
A COPY OF THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED MONTONERO COMMUNIQUE, WHICH WAS
DATED FEBRUARY, 1976. BRAUN NOTED THAT THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY
IN BUENOS AIRES HAD NOT RECEIVED THE EARLIER DISTRIBUTION OF THE
COMMUNIQUE BY THE MONTONEROS. BRAUN NOTED THAT AFTER THE ~~EARLIER~~
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN BUENOS AIRES ON MARCH 23-24, 1976, THE
DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY DISMISSED SEVERAL EMPLOYEES, WHO CAUSED TROUBLE

RWS:jn

DECLASSIFIED BY 39063 ELW BCE/sam

ON 5-13-06 UTL BU original

(2) Approved: argentina Project

Sent 4:00P M

Per 7-3-1678

Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

BUE 109-2 109-103

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE TWO

AND AGITATION AT THE COMPANY PLANT. BRAUN NOTED THAT THE DOW
CHEMICAL COMPANY OF ~~THE UNITED STATES~~ IS THE ARGENTINE SUBSIDIARY OF
THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY OF THE UNITED STATES.

ON MAY 3, 1976, HERBERT LESHINSKY, MANAGING DIRECTOR,
CHRYSLER FEVRE, ARGENTINA, REPORTED THAT FOUR KEY EXECUTIVES
OF THE COMPANY/^{RECENTLY}RECEIVED COPIES OF THE PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED
MONTONERO COMMUNIQUE, WHICH WAS DATED IN JANUARY, 1976.

ADDITIONALLY, LESHINSKY REPORTED THAT NUMEROUS THREATENING TELEPHONE
CALLS WERE/^{CURRENTLY}BEING RECEIVED AT THE CHRYSLER PLANT IN BUENOS AIRES.

LESHINSKY NOTED THAT CHRYSLER FEVRE, ARGENTINA, ~~WM~~ HAD NOT BEEN
INCLUDED IN THE EARLIER DISTRIBUTION OF THE MONTONERO COMMUNIQUE. &
LESHINSKY NOTED THAT CHRYSLER FEVRE, ARGENTINA, IS THE ARGENTINE
SUBSIDIARY OF THE CHRYSLER CORPORATION OF THE ^{UNITED} STATES

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 AND -4 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - COORDINATED LOCALLY.

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

F B I

Date: 5/5/76

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)Via CABLE URGENT (PRIORITY)
(Precedence)

TO: DIRECTOR NR. -05

FROM: *conf* LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)(P)

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;

ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON MAY 4, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN
OFFICIAL OF THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE ^(BAPP) ~~(BNP)~~ INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE ADVISED THAT ON THE MORNING OF MAY 4, 1976, TERRORISTS
ASSASSINATED PEDRO J. ROTA, THE DIRECTOR OF THE FIAT AUTOMOBILE
ASSEMBLY PLANT IN EL PALOMAR, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE (BAP). SOURCE
REPORTED THAT ROTA, A NATURALIZED ARGENTINE CITIZEN OF ITALIAN
ORIGIN, WAS INTERCEPTED BY THE TERRORISTS AS HE DEPARTED HIS
RESIDENCE IN HURLINHAM, BAP.

ON MAY 5, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN
OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA), DEPARTMENT OF
FEDERAL SECURITY (INTELLIGENCE DIVISION) REPORTED THAT FPA
STATISTICS INDICATE THAT THERE HAVE BEEN 354 POLITICAL ASSASSINA-
TIONS IN ARGENTINA SINCE JANUARY 1, 1976. (S) U

CLASSIFIED BY 5934 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.

ADMINISTRATIVE - FIRST SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR OSVALDO DE
BALDRICH, CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, BAPP. [SECOND SOURCE IS COMISARIO
MAYOR VICENTE GALEAZZO, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE, FPA.]

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

RWS:jn (1)
Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent 12:15 P M Per

CLASSIFIED BY 390639/W/BCE/50M

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 46

Argentina project

109-2-1619

FBI

Date: 5/7/76

Transmit the following in PLAIN CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via CABLE URGENT (PRIORITY)
(Precedence)

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR 416 -07

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON MAY 6, 1976, JOHN LOSER, AN EXECUTIVE WITH THE ST.
JOSEPH LEAD CORPORATION, ARGENTINE SUBSIDIARY IN ARGENTINA,
ADVISED THAT ANGLO-ARGENTINE FAMILY FRIENDS OF THE LOSERS
REPORTED THAT THEIR SON-IN-LAW, AN ANGLO-ARGENTINE EXECUTIVE
WITH THE MONSANTO CHEMICAL COMPANY, BUENOS AIRES, HAD BEEN
KIDNAPPED APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH AGO BY UNKNOWN INDIVIDUALS
AND HIS BODY WAS SUBSEQUENTLY DISCOVERED ALONGSIDE A ROAD IN
BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE. MR. LOSER NOTED THAT NO PUBLICITY
HAD BEEN AFFORDED TO THE ASSASSINATION AND THAT THE INFORMATION
WAS CLOSELY HELD BY THE MONSANTO CHEMICAL COMPANY.

IT IS NOTED THAT THE MONSANTO CHEMICAL COMPANY ARGENTINA
IS THE ARGENTINE SUBSIDIARY OF THE MONSANTO COMPANY, ST. LOUIS,
MISSOURI.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END.

DECLASSIFIED BY 39063 E/W Bce/lux
ON 5-4-01

Argentina Project

RWS:jn
(2)

Approved:
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 1200 A M Per

109-2-1621

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SECURITY OFFICER

DATE: JUNE 17 , 1976

FROM : RADIO NET CONTROL

SUBJECT: DEATH OF POLICE CHIEF

0135 Hs: Ambulances and several patrol cars are sent urgently to Zabala 1762.

The ambulances are from the Federal Police Hospital and from the Army Hospital. Explosives Squad also on its way to that location. Minister of Interior requests news from Police HQ.

Apparently an explosive device was placed at the residence of the Chief of Police (GRAL. CESAREO CARDOZO .) The bomb was placed in the bedroom and the explosion caused the death of the Chief of Police and seriously injured his wife and some other persons presumably members of his family. Police set up a cordon around the block and patrol cars were sent to different points of access to the city , for exhaustive vehicle control. A helicopter was also dispatched to that area.

DECLASSIFIED BY 3463 EWB/CF/kan
ON 5-15-01
original Project

109-2-1628

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|------------|---------|
| SEARCHED | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED | FILED |

JUN 18 1976

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

109-2-1628

FBI

Date: 6/18/76

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE~~Via CABLE IMMEDIATE (OO)
(Precedence)TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. 154-18
FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.ON JUNE 18, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS
A RANKING OFFICER OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA)
PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION. (S) (U)

DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF JUNE 18, 1976, ^{WHO IS} FPA CHIEF
BRIGADIER GENERAL CESAREO A. CARDOZO, ^{WHO IS} AN ACTIVE DUTY ARGENTINE
ARMY GENERAL, WAS KILLED WHEN A TERRORIST BOMB DETONATED IN HIS
APARTMENT IN DOWNTOWN BUENOS AIRES. GENERAL CARDOZO'S MOTHER-
IN-LAW, WIFE AND DAUGHTER WERE SERIOUSLY INJURED IN THE HOLOCAUST.
FPA AND ARGENTINE ARMY UNITS ARE CONDUCTING AN EXTENSIVE
SWEEPS OF BUENOS AIRES IN AN EFFORT TO DETAIN THE PERPETRATORS.
FPA INVESTIGATION INDICATES THAT THE BOMB WAS PLACED
INSIDE OF GENERAL CARDOZO'S APARTMENT BY SOMEONE HAVING ACCESS
TO THE PREMISES, IT BEING NOTED THAT GENERAL CARDOZO HAS
NUMEROUS BODYGUARDS AND HIS RESIDENCE IS PROTECTED BY GUARDS
ON A 24-HOUR DAILY BASIS. (S) (U)

CLASSIFIED BY ~~7031~~ XGBS-2 INDEFINITE.ADMINISTRATIVE - [SOURCE IS COMISARIO GENERAL ENRIQUE EVARISTO
BESTEIRO, DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FPA, COORDINATED LOCALLY.]

Approved: 1 - 180-214 [BESTEIRO]

Sent 10:00 PM Per

RWS: Special Agent in Charge
(3)

(S) (U)

10:00 1629

549-01
CLASSIFIED BY: 32063 EFW BCF/SG
REASON: 1.5 (e-b)
DECLASSIFY ON: X16
Argentina Project

FBI

Date: 6/18/76

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISETransmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

CODE

Via EXXEX CABLE IMMEDIATE (OO)
(Precedence)

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. 145-18

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)

~~SECRET~~FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

IT WAS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT THE CHIEF OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA), BRIGADIER GENERAL CESAREO A. CARDOZO, AN ACTIVE DUTY ARGENTINE ARMY OFFICER, HAD BEEN KILLED DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF JUNE 18, 1976, BY A TERRORIST BOMB, WHICH DETONATED IN HIS APARTMENT IN DOWNTOWN BUENOS AIRES.

ON JUNE 18, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN OFFICIAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAIS) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

THE PERPETRATOR OF THE BOMBING WHICH KILLED GENERAL CARDOZO AND INJURED SEVERAL MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED BY THE AAIS AS LILIANA CASAL, A MEMBER OF THE ARGENTINE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION ASSOCIATION, THE PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY (ERP). CASAL HAD BEEN DETAINED APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK AGO BY THE FPA, BASED ON INFORMATION SECURED DURING INTERROGATIONS WITH OTHER ^{CAPTURED} ERP MEMBERS INDICATING THAT SHE WAS CONNECTED WITH THE GROUP. CASAL WAS A CLOSE PERSONAL FRIEND OF GENERAL CARDOZO'S (S) (U)

END PAGE ONE

Approved: 1 - 80-VALIN (S) RWS:jn (3) *Per*
Special Agent in Charge

Sent

M

Per

109-2-1630

CLASSIFIED BY: 39063 ZAW BCK/SAM
REASON: 1.5 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X1,6
Argentin paper

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Precedence)PAGE TWO ~~SECRET~~ 109-2; 109-103

DAUGHTER, WHO ASSURED GENERAL CARDOZO THAT CASAL WAS NOT A
TERRORIST. GENERAL CARDOZO ORDERED CASAL BE RELEASED FROM
FPA CUSTODY ON HIS AUTHORITY AS CHIEF OF THE FPA. CASAL
VISITED THE CARDOZO APARTMENT DURING EARLY EVENING OF JUNE
17, 1976, TO THANK THE CARDOZO FAMILY IN ARRANGING FOR
HER RELEASE FROM FPA CUSTODY. WHILE AT THE CARDOZO APARTMENT
CASAL TOLD ~~XXXX~~ CARDOZO'S DAUGHTER THAT SHE WANTED TO MAKE
A VERY PERSONAL TELEPHONE CALL AND CARDOZO'S DAUGHTER ALLOWED
HER ^{PRIVATE} ACCESS TO GENERAL CARDOZO'S BEDROOM. ~~XXXXXXXX~~ CASAL
TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PLACE A POWERFUL
BOMB MADE UP OF PLASTIC EXPLOSIVE. ~~(S)~~ (U)

CASAL IS CURRENTLY IN THE CUSTODY OF THE AAIS AND WILL
BE TURNED OVER TO THE FPA FOR LEGAL PROCESSING. ~~(S)~~ (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - REMYCAB JUNE 18, 1976, WHICH REPORTED
ON GENERAL CARDOZO'S DEATH. SOURCE IS COLONEL ALBERTO VALIN,
CHIEF, AAIS. ~~(S)~~ (U)

THE FOREGOING INFORMATION IS EXCLUSIVE AND HAS BEEN
COORDINATED LOCALLY.

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____ Sent: _____ M Per: _____
Special Agent in Charge

FBI

Date: 7/2/76

Transmit the following in _____

CODE

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via CABLE

IMMEDIATE (O)

(Precedence)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. 153-02

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.ON JULY 2, 1976, AN OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF
ARGENTINA (FPA), DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY (INTELLIGENCE
DIVISION), PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)AT THE NOONTIME LUNCH HOUR AT FPA DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL
SECURITY HEADQUARTERS, A POWERFUL BOMB DETONATED IN THE CAFETERIA
KILLING AT LEAST TWENTY-FIVE FPA OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES AND
INJURING OVER THIRTY INDIVIDUALS. THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA
ORGANIZATION CLAIM CREDIT FOR THIS ATROCITY. (S) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.

ADMINISTRATIVE [SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR CARLOS VICENTE
MARCOTE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FPA.] (S) (U)

END.

1 - 105-767

1 - 80-217 (MARCOTE)

RWS:jn (4)

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COMMITTEE (PRO)
DATE: 7-15-96 Page 1 of 1
SP6 AG/CAL/DK 10-3-96
109-2-1644

CLASSIFIED BY: 390634/WBCE/sam RWS

REASON: 1.5 (D)

DECLASSIFY ON: X2 G

For Argentina Project
Appeal # 40-6351

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Per _____

FBI

Date: 7/6/76

Transmit the following in

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE

~~URGENT PRIORITY~~

(Precedence)

TO: DIRECTOR

NR. 158-06

FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2; 109-103)

~~SECRET~~FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

IT WAS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT A POWERFUL BOMB DETONATED
IN THE CAFETERIA OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA)
DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY (DFS) (INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)
DURING THE NOON LUNCH HOUR OF JULY 2, 1976, KILLING AND INJURING
A SCORE OF FPA OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES. (S) (U)

ON JULY 4, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS A
RANKING OFFICIALS OF THE FPA DFS, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION. (S) (U)

AS OF JULY 4, 1976, TOTAL DEAD AS A RESULT OF THE JULY
2, 1976 BOMBING AT THE FPA DFS AMOUNTED TO 18 INDIVIDUALS. SIXTY-
EIGHT OTHER FPA OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES WERE INJURED, SOME
CRITICALLY AND ARE NOT EXPECTED TO LIVE. (S) (U)

FPA INVESTIGATION ESTABLISHED THAT THE BOMB WHICH DETONATED (S) (U)

(3 - Bue (109-2)
(1 - 109-103)
(1 - 64-2)
RWS:gjk
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

109-2-1649
RWS

CLASSIFIED BY: 39063 E/w/0CF/507
REASON: 1.5 (S, D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X1, 6
argentina project

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent

7/6/76 6:30P

M

Per

btk

FBI

Date:

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Precedence)BUE 109-2; 109-103 ~~SECRET~~ PAGE TWO

AT THE FPA FEDERAL SECURITY HEADQUARTERS ON JULY 2, 1976 HAD BEEN PLACED AGAINST A SUPPORTING COLUMN IN THE CAFETERIA LOCATED ON THE FIRST FLOOR. WHEN THE BOMB DETONATED, ~~THEX~~ ^{IT} SEVERELY WEAKENED THE SUPPORTING COLUMN CAUSING THE SECOND FLOOR OF THE FPA DFS BUILDING TO COLLAPSE INTO THE CAFETERIA BELOW. EXTENSIVE STRUCTURAL ^DMAGE RESULTED IN THE FPA DFS BUILDING WHICH INCLUDES CRACKS UP TO SIX ^{INCHES} ~~FT.~~ IN WIDTH AS HIGH AS THE EIGHTH FLOOR OF THE BUILDING. NUMEROUS FILE CABINETS AND OTHER HEAVY EQUIPMENT WERE MOVED CLOSER TO OUTER WALLS AND SUPPORTING COLUMNS TO AVOID THE POSSIBLE COLLAPSE OF OTHER FLOORS IN THE BUILDING. THERE IS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY THAT THE BUILDING WILL HAVE TO BE COMPLETELY ABANDONED DUE TO ~~RESULTING~~ STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES. ~~(S)~~ (U)

FPA INVESTIGATION ESTABLISHED THAT THE BOMB WAS PROBABLY PLACED BY A RETIRED FPA SERGEANT WHO HAD BEEN RECALLED TO TEMPORARY ACTIVE DUTY. IT IS NOTED THAT THE FPA SGT. IN QUESTION WAS SEEN ENTERING FPA ^{DFS} ~~FEDERAL SECURITY~~ HEADQUARTERS APPROXIMATELY ONE HALF OUR BEFORE THE BOMB DETONATED CARRYING A PACKAGE ^{ABOUT} ~~APPROXIMATELY~~ ONE FT. SQUARE, WHICH WAS BELIEVED TO CONTAIN THE BOMB. THE SGT. WAS SUBSEQUENTLY OBSERVED DEPARTING FPA ~~(S)~~ (U)

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

Per _____

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)~~SECRET~~Via _____
(Precedence)BUE 109-2; 109-103 PAGE THREE ~~SECRET~~

~~DFS~~
~~FEDERAL SECURITY~~ HEADQUARTERS WITHOUT THE PACKAGE AND HIS
 WHEREABOUTS ARE CURRENTLY UNKNOWN. ~~(S)~~ (U)

AS A RESULT OF THE BOMBING, CONSIDERABLE BAD FEELING IMMEDIATELY DEVELOPED WITHIN THE FPA COMMISSIONED OFFICERS RANKS SINCE THE RECENTLY APPOINTED FPA CHIEF, ARMY BRIGADIER GEN. ARTURO CORBETTA HAD LAID THE LAW DOWN AS IT WERE TO FPA INTELLIGENCE DIVISION OFFICIALS WITH REGARD TO ~~EX~~TRALEGAL FPA ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE TERRORIST TARGET. GEN. CORBETTA HAD ISSUED STRICT INSTRUCTIONS THAT ALL EXTRALEGAL FPA ACTIVITY WAS TO CEASE IMMEDIATELY AND THAT ONLY LEGAL MEANS WERE TO BE EMPLOYED BY THE FPA ~~DFS~~ IN COMBATING THE WIDESPREAD TERRORISM WHICH EXISTS IN ARGENTINA. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER MANY FPA ~~DFS~~ OFFICIALS ARE CONVINCED THAT LEGAL METHODS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO CRUSH WIDESPREAD TERRORISM IN ARGENTINA AND IN FACT, EXTRALEGAL ACTIVITIES BY ARGENTINA SECURITY FORCES, INCLUDING THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES AND THE FPA, ARE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. FEELING AGAINST GEN. CORBETTA DURING THE WEEKEND OF JULY 3-4, 1976 GREW TO THE POINT THAT SEVERAL IMPORTANT FPA ~~DFS~~ OFFICIALS ACCUSED GEN. CORBETTA OF BEING A LEFTIST AND EVEN A MEMBER OF THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION. ONE SUCH OFFICIAL TO OPENLY VOICE HIS CRITICISM OF GEN. CORBETTA ~~DFS~~ WAS THE DIRECTOR OF ~~FEDERAL SECURITY~~, A CAREER FPA OFFICER WITH ~~(S)~~ (U)

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

~~SECRET~~

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)~~SECRET~~Via _____
(Precedence)BUE 109-2; 109-103 ~~SECRET~~ PAGE FOUR

THE RANK OF COMISARIO GENERAL. THE DIRECTOR OF FPA ^{DFS} ~~FEDERAL~~ SECURITY WHO VOICED HIS CRITICISM OF GEN. CORBETTA IS A TRUSTED CONFIDANT OF BRIGADIER GEN. ALBANO HARGUINDEGUY, THE INCUMBENT MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR AND FORMER FPA CHIEF. ~~(S)~~ (U)

ON JULY 5, 1976, A SECOND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS ALSO A RANKING OFFICIAL OF THE FPA DFS PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: ~~(S)~~ (U)

NUMEROUS FPA DFS OFFICIALS WHO HAVE CLOSELY WORKED WITH THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES, SPECIFICALLY THE ARGENTINA ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, IN COMBATING GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN ARGENTINA, HAVE CONTACTED THEIR ARGENTINE ARMY COUNTERPARTS TO BITTERLY COMPLAIN ABOUT GEN. CORBETTA'S ORDERS AND HIS GENERAL BEHAVIOUR IN HIS RECENTLY ACQUIRED POSITION AS FPA CHIEF. THROUGH THESE SENIOR ARGENTINE ARMY CONTACTS FPA DFS OFFICIALS WERE ASSURED THAT GEN. CORBETTA WOULD BE REPLACED AS FPA CHIEF. SEVERAL SENIOR FPA DFS OFFICIALS FEARED THAT GEN. CORBETTA, UNLESS HE WAS PROMPTLY RELIEVED FROM HIS POSITION AS FPA CHIEF, WOULD TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION AGAINST THE FPA DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL SECURITY BECAUSE OF HIS OUTSPOKEN CRITICISM. OF GEN. CORBETTA. ~~(S)~~ (U)

LATER ON JULY 5, 1976, GEN. CORBETTA ~~XXXX~~ ANNOUNCED THAT THE FPA ~~(S)~~ (U)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

~~SECRET~~

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)~~SECRET~~Via _____
(Precedence)BUE 109-2; 109-103 PAGE FIVE ~~SECRET~~

DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL SECURITY, AS WELL AS THE FPA DIRECTOR OF METROPOLITAN SECURITY, HAD BEEN FIRED FROM THEIR POSITIONS BECAUSE ~~BEFORE~~ HE HELD THEM PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE IN FAILING TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO PREVENT THE JULY 2, 1976 BOMBING OF THE FPA DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY HEADQUARTERS, AS WELL AS ^A ~~THE~~ BOMBING ON ^{JUNE} ~~JULY~~ 15, 1976 WHICH KILLED THE FORMER FPA CHIEF, BRIGADIER GENERAL CESAREO CARDOSO. GEN. CORBETTA IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENT INDICATED THAT, FOLLOWING ^{HIS} LINE OF REASONING IN ASSIGNING INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY RESULTING IN THE DISMISSAL OF THE FPA DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL SECURITY AND METROPOLITAN SECURITY, ^{HE WAS} ~~REQUESTED~~ ^{AS} THAT HIS SUPERIOR, THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, ~~WAS TO~~ CONSIDER ~~WH~~ WHETHER IT BE APPROPRIATE THAT HE CONTINUE AS FPA CHIEF. (S) (U)

ON JULY 6, 1976, A THIRD CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, ADVISED THAT THE MINISTER WAS ANGERED OVER GEN. CORBETTA'S ^{ACTUAL} ~~ACCUSATIONS~~ AND STATEMENTS AND HAD INDICATED HE BELIEVED THAT GEN. CORBETTA HAD SERIOUSLY EMBARRASSED THE ARGENTINE ARMY AND WAS RESORTING TO PETTY POLITICS IN THE DISMISSAL OF THE TWO SENIOR FPA COMISARIOS GENERALES. THIS SOURCE ADVISED THAT GEN. CORBETTA WOULD BE REPLACED BY ANOTHER ACTIVE DUTY ARGENTINE ARMY BRIGADIER GENERAL, PROBABLY BEFORE CLOSE OF BUSINESS, JULY 6, 1976. (S) (U)

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

Per _____

FBI

Date:

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in 159
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Precedence)BUE 109-2; 109-103 PAGE SIX ~~SECRET~~

THE SOURCE ADVISED THAT HE BELIEVED GEN. OJEDA, THE COMMANDER
OF ^{AN} ~~THE~~ ARGENTINE ARMY ARMORED DIVISION IN TANDIL, BUENOS AIRES
PROVINCE, WOULD BE DESIGNATED THE NEW FPA CHIEF. SOURCE ADVISED
THAT THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR HAD COMMENTED THAT FROM
ALL INFORMATION REACHING HIM, THE FPA OFFICERS CORPS WAS IN A
VIRTUAL STATE OF MUTINY WHICH ^C ~~COULD~~ ONLY BE RESOLVED BY THE
SACKING OF GEN. CORBETTA. ~~(S)~~ (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. REMYCABLE, JULY 2, 1976.

FIRST SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR CARLOS VICENTE MARCOTE,
^{RSA DFS}
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ~~DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY~~, FPA.

SECOND SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR VICENTE GALEAZZO,
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE, DFS, FPA. ~~(S)~~ (U)

THIRD SOURCE IS COMISARIO GUILLERMO OSCAR ICELY, FPA,
^{OFFICE OF THE}
DETAILED TO THE ~~MINISTER~~ OF THE INTERIOR.

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END

Approved: _____
Special Agent in ChargeSent ~~SECRET~~ M Per _____

FBI

Date: 7/6/76

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE

URGENT-PRIORITY

(Precedence)

TO: DIRECTOR NR. 109-2-1648
FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

ON JULY 5, 1976, HERBERT LESHINSKY, MANAGING DIRECTOR,
CHRYSLER FEVER ARGENTINA, A SUBSIDIARY OF THE CHRYSLER
CORPORATION OF THE UNITED STATES, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION:

DURING THE PAST WEEK, NINE EXECUTIVES OF CHRYSLER
FEVER ARGENTINA HAVE RECEIVED A FORM LETTER FROM THE MONTONERO
GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION THREATENING RETALIATION SHOULD THE
EXECUTIVES COOPERATE WITH SECURITY FORCES IN IDENTIFYING
CHRYSLER FEVER ARGENTINA EMPLOYEES AS GUERRILLAS. A POSTSCRIPT
TO THE MONTONERO FORM LETTER INDICATES THAT SIMILAR LETTERS
WERE BEING SIMULTANEOUSLY MAILED TO MORE THAN 2,000 OTHER
EXECUTIVES FROM 200 COMPANIES IN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL OF BUENOS
AIRES AND BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE.

4 - Buenos Aires
(1) - 109-2)
(1 - 109-103)
(1 - 105-767 Montoneros)
(1 - 109-38) ERP)

RWS:gjk
(4)

DECLASSIFIED BY

ON 11-1-95 5-15-01

appeal # 96-0371
argentine project

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Precedence)BUE 109-2; 109-103 PAGE TWO ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ON JUNE 30, 1976, IT WAS NECESSARY TO SPIRIT A CHRYSLER
FEBRE ARGENTINA EXECUTIVE OUT OF THE COUNTRY TO SAO PAULO,
BRAZIL BECAUSE OF SURVEILLANCE AND SHADOWING ACTIVITIES
CARRIED OUT AGAINST THE EXECUTIVE, WHO IS THE ^{COMPANIES} CHIEF OF
ADMINISTRATION AND PERSONNEL. ~~FOR CHRYSLER FEBRE ARGENTINA.~~
IN ADDITION TO SHADOWING AND SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES
AGAINST THIS EXECUTIVE, THREATENING TELEPHONE CALLS FROM THE
MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION WERE ALSO RECEIVED BY THE
EXECUTIVE AT HIS RESIDENCE AND AT THE ^{COMPANIES BUENOS AIRES} CHRYSLER FEBRE
~~ARGENTINA~~ PLANT.

ON MAY 29, 1976, THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE (AAIS) ADVISED LESHINSKY THAT MEMBERS OF A CELL OF
THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP), ANOTHER ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, HAD BEEN EXTRALEGALLY DETAINED BY THE
AAIS AND UNDER INTERROGATION PROVIDED DETAILS OF AN OPERATION
IDENTIFIED BY THE CODE NAME "MORON." ACCORDING TO INFORMATION
PROVIDED BY THE AAIS, "OPERATION MORON" ENTAILED THE ASSASSINATION
OF LESHINSKY. THE AAIS ADVISED THAT LESHINSKY HAD BEEN UNDER

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Precedence)BUE 109-2; 109-103 PAGE THREE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SURVEILLANCE AND THAT HIS COMPANY CAR AND VEHICLES USED TO TRANSPORT HIS BODYGUARDS HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED. THE AAIS ADVISED THAT THE LEADER OF THE ERP CELL, IDENTIFIED AS "CAPTAIN MIGUEL", HAD MANAGED TO ESCAPE; HOWEVER, APPROXIMATELY 60% OF THE ERP CELL ASSIGNED TO "OPERATION MORON" HAD BEEN DETAINED BY THE AAIS. THE ASSASSINATION OF LESHINSKY WAS SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE ON MAY 31, 1976. IT IS NOTED THAT LESHINSKY SPENT THE MONTH OF JUNE, 1976 IN BRAZIL ON CHRYSLER CORPORATION BUSINESS.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 3031, AGDS-2 AND 4~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END

Approved: _____ Sent: _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FBI

Date: 7/7/76

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)~~SECRET~~Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Precedence)14: N.
14:30

TO: DIRECTOR

NR. 161 -07

FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~SECRET~~FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.5-15-01
CLASSIFIED BY: 39063 ELM/Def/Sm
REASON: 1.5 (C-D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X1.6
Argentina Project

ON JULY 6, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS
A RANKING OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA)
DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY (DFS) (INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)
PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

DURING THE AFTERNOON OF JULY 6, 1976, THE WIFE OF AN FPA
DFS COMMISSIONED OFFICER WAS KIDNAPPED IN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL
BY UNKNOWN SUBJECTS PRESUMED TO BE TERRORISTS. AS OF THE
EVENING OF JULY 6, 1976 NO COMMUNICATION HAD BEEN RECEIVED
FROM THE KIDNAPPERS. (S) (U)

THE DEATH TOLL FROM THE JULY 2, 1976 MONTONERO TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION BOMBING OF DFS HEADQUARTERS ROSE TO 20 ON JULY
6, 1976, WHEN TWO OTHER INDIVIDUALS DIED OF THEIR INJURIES. (S) (U)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

(3) - Bue (109-2)
(1 - 109-103)
(1 - 80-

[Marcotte] (S) (U)

RWS:gjk
(3)

109-2-1649
RWSApproved: _____
Special Agent in ChargeSent 7/7/76 11:44 M Per gjk~~SECRET~~

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)~~SECRET~~Via _____
(Precedence)BUE 109-2 109-103 PAGE TWO ~~SECRET~~

THE FPA BOMB SQUAD COMPLETED THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE JULY 2, 1976 MONTONERO BOMBING OF DFS HEADQUARTERS AND CONCLUDED THAT THE BOMB WAS COMPOSED OF AT LEAST EIGHT KILOS OF TROTYL, SIMILAR TO PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES, AND HAD BEEN FABRICATED IN THE FORM OF A CLAYMORE-TYPE BOMB, UTILIZING BALL BEARINGS TO INSURE HEAVIER PERSONNEL CASUALTIES. A SECOND BOMB WAS DISCOVERED ON JULY 2, 1976 IN A LAVATORY AT DFS HEADQUARTERS BUT HAD BEEN DEFUSED BY FPA EXPLOSIVE EXPERTS. THE FPA BOMB SQUAD CONCLUDED THAT SHOULD THE SECOND BOMB HAVE DETONATED, IT WOULD HAVE & VIRTUALLY LEVELED DFS HEADQUARTERS. ~~(S)~~ (U)

AS ANTICIPATED, THE ARGENTINE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR CONFIRMED THE APPOINTMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL EDMUNDO OJEDA AS CHIEF OF THE FPA. ~~(S)~~ (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS 2 AND 4.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. REMYCABLE JULY 6, 1976.

[SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR CARLOS VICENTE MARCOTTE, ACTING DIRECTOR OF DFS.] ~~(S)~~ (U)

END

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

~~SECRET~~

F B I

Date: 7/8/76

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE 190 URGENT
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR NR. 165-08
LEGAT, BRASILIA NR. 020-08
FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES: FPM-ARGENTINA.

FOR INFORMATION, DURING THE EVENING OF JULY 2, 1976
AN OFFICIAL OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF THE LATTER
DAY SAINTS (MORMON CHURCH), ADVISED THAT ON JUNE ~~24~~⁶₂₇, 1976,
TWO MORMON MISSIONARIES, PETER ALLEN SHAW AND THAYNE
LARSON, WERE ABDUCTED NEAR THEIR MISSION IN CORRIENTES,
ARGENTINA AND WERE TAKEN ACROSS THE ARGENTINA-PARAGUAY
BORDER TO AN ^{ISOLATED} REMOTE JUNGLE AREA IN PARAGUAY.

THE FIRST OFFICIAL ADVISED THAT ON JUNE 27, 1976, TWO RANSOM NOTES WERE RECEIVED BY THE CHURCH IN POSADAS, ARGENTINA DEMANDING A PAYMENT OF 1.5 MILLION DOLLARS FOR SHAW'S AND LARSON'S RELEASE. THE RANSOM NOTE WAS SIGNED BY THE ORGANIZACION POLITICA MILITAR PARAGUAYA (PARAGUAYAN POLITICAL MILITARY ORGANIZATION) (OPMP). THE NOTES INDICATED THAT RANSOM MONEY WOULD BE UTILIZED TO PURCHASE WEAPONS FOR THE OPMP.

THE CHURCH REPRESENTATIVE ADVISED THAT ON JUNE 29, 1976

2 - Bue (109-2) (109-103) per:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RWS: g j k
(2)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

BUE 109-2; 109-103 PAGE TWO

ONE OF SHAW'S AND LARSON'S CAPTORS APPARENTLY HAD A CHANGE
OF HEART AND NOTIFIED THE ^{FOREIGN} POLICE, WHO SUBSEQUENTLY RAIDED
THE HOUSE WHERE THE TWO MISSIONARIES WERE BEING HELD IN ORDER
TO LIBERATE THEM. A GUN BATTLE ENSUED AND SHAW WAS
SLIGHTLY WOUNDED IN THE SHOULDER. AT THE PRESENT TIME,
SHAW AND LARSON ARE AWAITING LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN ENCARNACION,
PARAGUAY WHICH WERE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN ON JULY 5, 1976.

BUENOS AIRES INDICES CONTAIN NO INFORMATION CONCERNING
THE OPMP. IT IS NOTED THAT THE MORMON CHURCH HAS RECENTLY
BEEN THE SUBJECT OF CONSIDERABLE PUBLICITY CONCERNING AN
ALLEGED BEQUEST FROM HOWARD HUGHES, WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN THE
MOTIVATION FOR THE KIDNAPPING.

THE FOREGOING INFORMATION HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY THE
U. S. EMBASSY, BUENOS AIRES, TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AND IS ONLY FURNISHED FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU.
END

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

F B I

Date: 7/8/76

Transmit the following in

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE

PRIORITY-URGENT

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR

NR. 164-08

FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

SECRET

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF JULY 4, 1976, THREE
ROMAN CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND TWO SEMINARIANS WERE BRUTALLY
MURDERED IN THE RECTORY OF ST. PATRICK'S CHURCH IN BELGRANO,
BUENOS AIRES FEDERAL CAPITAL. INITIAL REPORTS INDICATED
THAT A MESSAGE HAD BEEN SCRAWLED ON A DOOR IN CHALK TO
THE EFFECT THAT THE CLERGYMEN HAD BEEN ASSASSINATED IN
RETALIATION FOR THE TERRORIST BOMB ATTACK AGAINST THE
FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA) DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL
SECURITY (DFS) HEADQUARTERS ON JULY 2, 1976, WHICH AS OF
JULY 8, 1976, CLAIMED 21 LIVES. THERE WAS WIDESPREAD
SPECULATION THAT THE AUTHORS OF THE ASSASSINATION OF THE
CLERGYMEN MAY HAVE BEEN MEMBERS OF THE ARGENTINE SECURITY
FORCES CARRYING OUT RETALIATION FOR THE JULY 2, 1976 FPA DFS

3 - Bue (109-2)

(109-103)

(80-217 Marcote) (S) (U)

RWS:gjk

(3)

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

Per _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

5-16-01
CLASSIFIED BY: 39063 E/W BCF Sam
REASON: 15 (e d)

DECLASSIFY ON: X 1 6
argentina project
47L BU original

109-2-1652

F B I

Date:

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

BUE 109-2; 109-103 PAGE TWO ~~SECRET~~
HEADQUARTERS BOMBING OR LEFTIST TERRORISTS WHO ASSASSINATED
THE CLERGYMEN IN ORDER TO MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THE ARGENTINE
MILITARY GOVERNMENT WAS RESPONSIBLE, THEREBY DISCREDITING
THE GOVERNMENT.

ON JULY 7, 1976, INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO THE U. S.
EMBASSY, BUENOS AIRES FROM AN EXTREMELY SENSITIVE / ^{ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT} SOURCE
WHICH INDICATED THAT THE FIVE CLERGYMEN HAD BEEN ASSASSINATED
BY A UNIT OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAIS)
WHO DISCOVERED THAT THE CLERGYMEN HAD BEEN HARBORING
MONTONERO GUERRILLA LEADER MARIO EDUARDO FIRMENICH. INFORMA-
TION WAS ALSO PASSED TO THE U. S. EMBASSY BY THIS SAME
SOURCE INDICATING THAT THE AAIS HAD ALSO MURDERED THREE
ROMAN CATHOLIC NUNS WHO HAD FACILITATED FIRMENICH'S ESCAPE
FROM ST. PATRICK'S ON JULY 4, 1976. ~~(S)~~ (U)

ON JULY 7, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS
A RANKING OFFICER OF THE FPA DFS, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION: ~~(S)~~ (U)

AFTER THE JULY 2, 1976 MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION
BOMBING OF FPA DFS HEADQUARTERS, NUMEROUS FPA OFFICERS
~~EMBARKED UPON ACTIVITIES TO RETALIATE AGAINST THE TERRORIST~~ ~~(S)~~ (U)

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent

~~SECRET~~

Per

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)~~SECRET~~Via _____
(Priority)BUE 109-2; 109-103 PAGE THREE ~~SECRET~~

~~S~~TARGET FOR THE JULY 2, 1976 BOMBING WHEREIN MANY OF THEIR FRIENDS WERE KILLED AND MAIMED. A GROUP OF SIX FPA NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS HAD INFORMATION INDICATING THAT TWO SEMINARIANS ATTACHED TO ST. PATRICK'S PARISH IN BELGRANO WERE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES AT THE OFFICE OF THE THIRD WORLD MOVEMENT LOCATED A FEW BLOCKS FROM ST. PATRICK'S CHURCH. ~~(S)~~ (U)

THE THIRD WORLD MOVEMENT IS CONSIDERED BY MANY TO BE MARXIST-ORIENTED.

THESE SIX FPA NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, WITHOUT ANY HIGHER AUTHORITY, DECIDED TO CARRY OUT A RETALIATORY ATTACK AGAINST THE TWO SEMINARIANS, WHICH RESULTED IN THE JULY 4, 1976 MURDER OF THE THREE PRIESTS AND TWO SEMINARIANS. IT WAS EMPHASIZED THAT THE ASSASSINATION OF THE CLERGYMEN WAS CARRIED OUT WITHOUT ANY SANCTION OR AUTHORITY OF FPA SUPERIOR OFFICERS OR ANY ENTITY OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. ~~(S)~~ (U)

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ASSASSINATION OF THREE NUNS PROVIDED TO THE U. S. EMBASSY ON JULY 7, 1976, AS NOTED ABOVE, IS COMPLETELY ERRONEOUS, IT BEING NOTED THAT NO CATHOLIC NUNS WERE ASSASSINATED OR MISSING DURING THE PERTINENT PERIOD. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

Per _____

~~SECRET~~

F B I

Date:

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)BUE 109-2; 109-103 PAGE FOUR ~~SECRET~~

THE SOURCE OFFERED HIS PERSONAL OPINION THAT
 INFORMATION PASSED TO THE U. S. EMBASSY ON JULY 7, 1976 WAS
 PROBABLY A MISGUIDED EFFORT TO MISINFORM ^{THE} U. S. EMBASSY
 REGARDING THE ALLEGED PRESENCE OF A RANKING TERRORIST LEADER
 AT ST. PATRICK'S PARISH IN ORDER TO ^{GIVE} ~~GET~~ SOME JUSTIFICATION
 TO THE ATROCIOUS MURDER OF THE FIVE CLERGYMEN ON JULY 4, 1976. (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5831 XGDS-2.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE.. ~~XXXXX THE~~ SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR
 CARLOS VICENTE MARCOTE, ACTING DIRECTOR, FPA DFS. (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

THE FOREGOING INFORMATION WAS PERSONALLY DISCUSSED
 WITH ~~THE~~ AMBASSADOR HILL, WHO WAS DEEPLY DISTURBED AT ITS
 CONTENT. INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE U.S. EMBASSY DURING
 THE MORNING OF JULY 7, 1976, REFERRED TO ABOVE, WAS ALLEGEDLY
 MADE AVAILABLE TO THE EMBASSY'S SECURITY OFFICER BY A MEMBER
 OF PRESIDENT VIDELA'S PRESS OFFICE. DURING THE MORNING OF
 JULY 8, 1976, THE AMBASSADOR ADVISED ME THAT HE WAS VISITED
 BY THE PAPAL NUNCIO, WHO CONFIRMED THAT THE STORY CONCERNING THE
 THREE NUNS HAVING BEEN ASSASSINATED ^{was} ~~IS~~ COMPLETELY WITHOUT (U)

~~SECRET~~Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

BUE 109-2; 109-103 PAGE FIVE ~~SECRET~~
FOUNDATION, AS WELL AS THE ALLEGATION THAT MARIO FIRMEINICH
WAS BEING HARBORED AT ST. PATRICK'S PARISH. THE PAPAL NUNCIO
TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT ONE OF THE TWO ASSASSINATED SEMINARIANS
DEFINITELY HAD QUESTIONABLE CONNECTIONS AND THAT THE ROMAN
CATHOLIC HIERARCHY IN ARGENTINA, INCLUDING CARDINAL ARAMBURU,
WERE CONVINCED THAT THE MOTIVATION FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF
THE FIVE CLERGYMEN ON JULY 4, 1976 WAS ~~FOR~~ RETALIATION
FOR THE JULY 2, 1976 FPA DFS BOMBING. (S) (U)

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ALLEGED HARBORING OF MARIO
FIRMEINICH BY THE ASSASSINATED CLERGYMEN AT ST. PATRICK'S & PARISH
AND ERRONEOUS INFORMATION CONCERNING THE MURDER OF THREE
CATHOLIC NUNS WAS REPORTED BY THE U. S. EMBASSY IN BUENOS
AIRES IN A U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM ON JULY 7, 1976.
~~THIS U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM WAS HIGHLY CLASSIFIED AND
WAS RESTRICTED FROM NORMAL DISTRIBUTION AND DISSEMINATION. (S) (U)~~
END

~~SECRET~~Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

FBI

Date: 7/12/76

Transmit the following in _____
CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)Via CABLE URGENT (PRIORITY)
(Precedence)~~SECRET~~

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. -12

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON JULY 11, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN
OFFICIAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE^(A-15), PROVIDED
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: ~~(S)~~ (U)

ACTING ON INFORMATION SECURED FROM CAPTURED MEMBERS OF THE
PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP), AN ARGENTINE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION,
COMBINED BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE AND AAIS UNITS RAIDED A
RESIDENCE IN SAN ANDRES, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE, WHICH HAD BEEN
IDENTIFIED AS AN ERP SAFE HOUSE. THE RAID TOOK PLACE DURING
THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF JULY 10, 1976, AND A VIOLENT SHOOTOUT TOOK
PLACE BETWEEN THE ERP MEMBERS AT THE RESIDENCE AND SECURITY FORCES.
AFTER SECURITY FORCES GAINED ENTRANCE TO THE RESIDENCE, THEY
DISCOVERED THE BODY OF ARGENTINE AIR FORCE LIEUTENANT COLONEL
ROBERTO ECHEGOYEN, WHO HAD BEEN KIDNAPPED OVER A MONTH AGO BY
THE ERP. LIEUTENANT COLONEL ECHEGOYEN WAS FOUND CHAINED IN ONE
OF THE ROOMS IN THE RESIDENCE AND HE HAD BEEN EXECUTED, APPARENTLY
WHEN SECURITY FORCES APPROACHED THE RESIDENCE. ~~(S)~~ (U)

1 - 109-38 (ERP)

1 - 80-Valin 16

Approved: RWS:jn (4) (U)
Special Agent in Charge

Sent

M Per

~~SECRET~~

1653

5-15-07
CLASSIFIED BY: 39063 EIW/BCE/LSM
REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X
Argentina Project
in 4x Bu original

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

F B I

Date: _____

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Precedence)PAGE TWO ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUE 109-2 109-103~~CLASSIFIED BY 8981 XGDS-2.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - RE MY CABLE MAY 4, 1976, WHICH REPORTED

[LIEUTENANT COLONEL ECHEGOYEN'S KIDNAPPING.

SOURCE IS ALBERTO VALIN, DIRECTOR, AAIS.] (S)U

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

Approved: _____ Sent: _____ M Per: _____
Special Agent in Charge

FBI

Date: 7/15/76

Transmit the following in _____

CODE

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via CABLE

URGENT (PRIORITY)

(Precedence)

TO: (109-12-201) DIRECTOR NR. 171-15

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)

~~SECRET~~FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON JULY 15, 1976, BRIGADIER GENERAL ALBANO EDUARDO HARGUINDEGUY, ARGENTINE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES: ~~(S)~~ (U)

ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES HAVE SCORED CONSIDERABLE SUCCESSES AGAINST THE ARGENTINE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, THE PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP). ARGENTINE ^{INTELLIGENCE} ~~SECURITY~~ ~~FOR~~ SERVICES HAVE DEVELOPED INFORMATION, JUDGED TO BE RELIABLE, THAT THE ERP AND THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS WILL JOIN FORCES AND WILL ANNOUNCE THEIR MERGER IN A PUBLIC MANIFESTO, WHICH WILL BE ISSUED ON AUGUST 22, 1976, THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF THE SO CALLED TRELEW INCIDENT, DURING WHICH SEVERAL ARGENTINE TERRORISTS WERE KILLED BY ARGENTINE ~~(S)~~ (U)

1 - 109-38 (ERP) 1 - 105-767 (MONTONEROS)

RWS:jn
(4)

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED

BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)

DATE: 7-10-96 pages 1, 2 only

SP6 ag/cal DK 10-2-96

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

1:00 P

M

Per _____

109-2-1657

F B I

Date:

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Precedence)PAGE TWO ~~secret~~

BUE 109-2 109-103

~~MILITARY~~
~~MILITARY SECURITY~~ FORCES DURING AN ESCAPE ATTEMPT FROM AN
 ARGENTINE MILITARY DETENTION CENTER. THE REASON FOR THE MERGER
 IS THAT THE ERP HAS BEEN SEVERELY CRIPPLED DURING THE PAST
 THREE MONTHS BY ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES. (S) (U)

~~INTELLIGENCE SERVICES~~
 ARGENTINE ~~SECURITY FORCES~~ BELIEVE THAT ERP LEADER, MARIO
 ROBERTO SANTUCHO, IS IN BUENOS AIRES, AS WELL AS MONTONERO
 LEADER, MARIO EDUARDO FIRMENICH. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XDS-1 AND 2, INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - RE MY EARLIER CABLE OF JULY 15, 1976, WHICH
 REPORTED INFORMATION DEVELOPED ON JULY 14, 1976, [FROM THE DIRECTOR
 OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, INDICATING THAT THE
 AAIS BELIEVED THAT THE ERP WOULD TURN TO THE MONTONEROS FOR
 SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE. ABOVE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY MINISTER
 OF INTERIOR] ~~CONFIRMS~~ ^{AND ADDS TO THE} INFORMATION. (S) (U)

[THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS SECURED FROM THE MINISTER OF THE
 INTERIOR] ~~CONFIRMS~~ ^{AND ADDS TO THE} DURING A PRIVATE AUDIENCE BETWEEN HIM, THE AMBASSADOR AND
 ME. (S) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END.

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

FBI

Date: 7/16/76

Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)Via CABLE URGENT (PRIORITY)
(Precedence)TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. 173-16
FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES ((109-2)(109-103))~~SECRET~~FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON JULY 15, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS
A RANKING OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA),
DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY (INTELLIGENCE DIVISION), PROVIDED
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SEVERAL RECENTLY DETAINED
MONTONERO GUERRILLA MEMBERS INDICATES THAT THE MONTONEROS
ARE PLANNING TO INITIATE LARGE SCALE ATTACKS FOR THE PURPOSE
OF ASSASSINATION & AGAINST SENIOR MILITARY AND POLICE OFFICIALS
HAVING INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES. THE MONTONEROS PLAN
TO INITIATE THE ASSASSINATION CAMPAIGN ON JULY 20, 1976,
AND AT THE PRESENT TIME ARE MOVING MEMBERS INTO THE FEDERAL
CAPITAL OF BUENOS AIRES IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT THE ASSASSINATION
OPERATION. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5001 KGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~ADMINISTRATIVE - [SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR CARLOS VICENTE
MARCOTE, ACTING DIRECTOR, FPA, DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY] (S) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

Approved: 1 - 105-767
RWS: J Special Agent in Charge
(3)

Sent

M Per

104-2-1659

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISECLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-10-96 Page 1 of 1
SP609/KAL/DAClassified by 3010g/1
Declassify on: OADR 10-3-89
28439419
CLASSIFIED BY: 39063C/W BCE/sam
REASON: 1.5 (b)(2)
DECLASSIFY ON: 10-3-89
argentina project
appeal # 90-0372
off 7-1-89 approved

FBI

Date: 7/16/76

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)Via CABLE URGENT (PRIORITY)
(Precedence)

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. 174-16

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)

~~SECRET~~FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON JULY 15, 1976, BRIGADIER GENERAL ALBANO EDUARDO HARGUINDEGUY, MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, ADVISED THAT RECENTLY DEVELOPED INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT THE ERP GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION SOMETIME DURING 1973 OBTAINED 5,000 INCENDIARY BOMBS FROM GERMANY. THE MINISTER INDICATED THAT THE TYPE OF INCENDIARY BOMB PURCHASED BY THE ERP WAS A TUBULAR DEVICE APPROXIMATELY EIGHTEEN INCHES LONG WITH A SELF-CONTAINED TIMING DEVICE. THE MINISTER REPORTED THAT THE INCENDIARY BOMB PRODUCES AN EXTREMELY INTENSE LONG-LASTING FIRE SIMILAR TO A THERMITE GRENADE. THE MINISTER NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT INQUIRIES BY THE ARGENTINE MILITARY ESTABLISHED THAT THE PARTICULAR INCENDIARY DEVICE IN QUESTION HAS A SAFE LIFE OF TWO YEARS UNDER IDEAL STORAGE CONDITIONS, AND THAT THE ARGENTINE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BELIEVE THAT THE INCENDIARY DEVICES, OWING TO THE FACT THAT THEY ARE OVER THREE YEARS OLD AND UNDOUBTEDLY STORED IN LESS THAN DESIROUS CONDITIONS, HAVE LOST THEIR EFFECTIVENESS.

1 - 109-38 (ERP) RWS:jn (3)

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M Per _____

109-2-1660

5-15-01
CLASSIFIED BY 39063 ELM/05/50M
REASON: 1.5 (C, D)
DECLASSIFY ON: N/A
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE
authentic Original
4-11-80 original

F B I

Date:

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

BUE 109-2 109-103 ~~SECRET~~~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 ADS-1 AND 2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - ~~THE~~ FOREGOING INTELLIGENCE WAS PROVIDED
DURING A PRIVATE INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF THE
INTERIOR, ~~JO~~ AMBASSADOR HILL AND MYSELF. ~~(S)~~ (U)
COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END.

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

F B I

Date: 8/3/76

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR NR. -03

FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2; 109-103)

~~SECRET~~FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

ON AUGUST 2, 1976, [A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS
AN OFFICIAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAIS)]
PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

ON JULY 28, 1976, UNITS OF THE AAIS RAIDED THE RESIDENCE
OF A RECENTLY IDENTIFIED MEMBER OF THE ARGENTINE TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION, THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP). THE ERP
RAIDING PARTY SEVERELY WOUNDED ^{THE} AN ERP MEMBER AND RECOVERED
A VOLUME OF IMPORTANT ERP DOCUMENTS. ONE OF THE DOCUMENTS
RECOVERED (THE ORIGINAL OF WHICH WAS PROVIDED BY THE SOURCE)
WAS A DOCUMENT DATED MAY 30, 1976, CAPTIONED, "DATOS OPERATIVOS"
(OPERATING DATA). THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS THE NAME, TITLE, (S) (U)

- (5) - Bue (1 - 109-2)
(1 - 109-103)
(1 - 109-38)
(1 - 80-173 Captain Lucero)
(1 - Junta Coordinadora)
RWS:gjk
(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent

11:03 PM

Per

DECLASSIFIED ON: 6-14-00
REASON: 1.5
CLASSIFIED BY: 390634/1000/1000
5-15-01 SPICUL/TAM
argentina Project / Proachet Project

109-2 - 1664

F B I

Date:

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)BUE 109-2; 109-103 PAGE TWO ~~SECRET~~

RESIDENCE ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF CURRENT AND FORMER U. S. AND ARGENTINE MEMBERS OF THE U. S. MILITARY GROUP IN ARGENTINA. A NOTATION ON THIS DOCUMENT INDICATES THAT IT HAD BEEN PREPARED BY THE ERP J. S. MANCCINI CELL AND ITS AUTHOR WAS AN ERP MEMBER KNOWN BY THE CODE NAME OF "SERGEANT DIANA." THE DOCUMENT WAS TO HAVE BEEN PROVIDED TO THE ^RJUNTA COORDINADORA REVOLUCIONARIA REVOLUTIONARY (COORDINATING/JUNTA). ~~(S)~~ (U)

THE WOUNDED ERP MEMBER IN WHOSE POSSESSION THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED DOCUMENT WAS FOUND, DIED OF HIS WOUNDS ON AUGUST 2, 1976. HOWEVER, BEFORE HE DIED THIS ERP MEMBER ADVISED THAT SEVERAL WEEKS PREVIOUSLY HE HAD SEEN INFORMATION INDICATING THAT THE ERP INTENDED TO ASSASSINATE LT. COL. LLOYD GRACEY OF THE U. S. MILITARY GROUP IN ARGENTINA. IT IS NOTED THAT LT. COL. GRACEY/^{RECENTLY}DEPARTED ARGENTINA PERMANENTLY FOR THE UNITED STATES. ~~(S)~~ (U)

IT IS NOTED THAT IN THE RECOVERED ERP DOCUMENT, FIVE ARGENTINE EMPLOYEES OF THE U. S. MILITARY GROUP IN ARGENTINA HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED WITH A RED BALLPOINT PEN X NEXT TO THEIR NAMES ~~ON~~ IN THE DOCUMENT. THE PURPOSE OF THESE MARKINGS IS UNKNOWN TO THE AAIS. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

FBI

Date:

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Precedence)BUE 109-2; 109-103 PAGE THREE ~~SECRET~~~~Revolutionary~~

THE JUNTA COORDINADORA WAS ORGANIZED BY THE ERP AND IN
ADDITION TO THE ERP, ITS MEMBERSHIP IS COMPOSED OF ^{OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS} THE NATIONAL
LIBERATION ARMY (ELN) FROM BOLIVIA, THE MLN-TUPAMAROS FROM
URUGUAY, AND THE MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR)
FROM CHILE).

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-1, 2 AND 3.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. [SOURCE IS CAPTAIN JUAN LUCERO, AAIS.] (S) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END

~~SECRET~~Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date: 8/3/76

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE~~TO: DIRECTOR NR. 163-03
FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)~~SECRET~~FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.ON AUGUST 2, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS
AN OFFICIAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAIS)
PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

IN NUMEROUS CAPTURED DOCUMENTS PICKED UP BY THE AAIS
FROM THE ARGENTINE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, THE PEOPLE'S
REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP), THERE HAS APPEARED INFORMATION
INDICATING THAT THE ERP PLANNED TO CONDUCT A BLITZ-TYPE
TERRORIST OPERATION COMMENCING APPROXIMATELY TEN DAYS PRIOR
TO AUGUST 22, 1976 WHEREIN BOMBINGS, ASSASSINATIONS AND OTHER
TERRORIST ACTS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN ORDER TO DRAMATICALLY
LEAD UP TO THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE SO-CALLED TRELEW INCIDENT ON
AUGUST 22, 1976. IT IS NOTED THAT THE TRELEW INCIDENT INVOLVED (S) (U)

4 - Bue (109-2)
(1 - 109-103)
(1 - 109-38)
(1 - 80-205 [Col. Valin]) (S) (U)

RWS:gjk
(4)

5/6/01
CLASSIFIED BY: 39033 JWC/E/5am
REASON: 1.5 (2.D)
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
urgent new project
with original

109-2-1665

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent

6:15 PM

Per

911

F B I

Date:

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)BUE 109-2; 109-103 PAGE TWO ~~SECRET~~

~~NUMEROUS~~ ^{SEVERAL} CAPTURED TERRORISTS IN TRELEW,
 ARGENTINA BY ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES DURING AN ESCAPE ATTEMPT
 FROM AN ARGENTINE ~~TERRITORIAL~~ ^{MILITARY} PRISON. THE AAIS BELIEVED
 THAT THE RECENT ELIMINATION OF ~~MANUEL~~ ^{MARIO} ROBERTO SANTUCHO,
 DOMINGO MENA AND OTHER TOP ERP LEADERS, PLUS THE CAPTURE OF
 IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS REVEALING ERP PLANS DURING THE TEN-DAY
 PERIOD PRECEDING AUGUST 22, 1976, MAY CAUSE SURVIVING ERP
 MEMBERS, WHO ARE BASICALLY WITHOUT LEADERSHIP, TO ABORT
 THEIR PLANS CONCERNING THIS PERIOD; HOWEVER, THE AAIS HAS
 NO POSITIVE INFORMATION CONFIRMING THAT THIS ERP PLAN HAS
 BEEN CALLED OFF. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 8931 XGDS-2.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. [SOURCE IS COL. ALBERTO VALIN, CHIEF, AAIS.] (S) (U)
 COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

~~SECRET~~

THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES

9/3/76

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERGER

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA;
PPM-CUBA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

On 8/31/76, a confidential source who has provided reliable information in the past, reported the following information: (U)

Various Argentine intelligence agencies have been working on a priority investigation to attempt to establish links between the Cuban Embassy in Buenos Aires and the two major Argentine terrorist organizations, the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) and the Montoneros. In this connection, a highly classified document was passed through Argentine Army Intelligence Service (SIE) channels indicating that two employees of the Cuban Embassy in Buenos Aires Jesús Cejas Arias and Cresencio Galanena Hernández, were clandestinely picked up by one of the Argentine intelligence services on 8/9/76 in Buenos Aires and under severe interrogation had admitted that they were Cuban Intelligence Service (CUIIS) officers affiliated with the DGI (U)

According to the SIP document, both CEJAS and GALANENA admitted that they were contacts of the ERP. (U)

On 9/1/76, a second confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past provided the following information: (U)

cc's: 1 - Addressee
1 - POL
1 - POL-R
1 - DAO
1 - SY
3 - Bue (109-2)
(1 - 109-5)

NOTE: Re Bue cable, 9/3/76 under the Orestes Ruiz Hernández caption. See Bue file 105-1348.

(1 - 105-1348)

RWS:gjk

(8)

~~SECRET~~
Classified by 5931
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on Indefinite

5-15-01
CLASSIFIED BY: 39063 E/W/BCE/Kem
REASON: 1.5 (C, D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X1

109-2-1677

~~SECRET~~

RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA;
PPM-CUBA

Officers of the SIE and the State Secretariat for Information (SIDE) abducted Cejas and Galanena in Buenos Aires on 8/9/76, based on evidence that they were working with the ERP. Cejas and Galanena both admitted that they were CUIS-DGI officers and that they had been in contact with ERP officers in Buenos Aires in connection with the terrorist activities of the latter organization. Cejas and Galanena also provided the identities of other CUIS-DGI officers assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Buenos Aires under diplomatic cover. After intensive interrogation lasting for approximately five days, both Cejas and Galanena were executed. (S) (U)

To cover the disappearance of Cejas and Galanena, their Argentine diplomatic credentials were mailed to the Associated Press office in Buenos Aires on 8/16/76, with a note written by them under duress before they were executed, indicating that they were defecting. (S) (U)

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

13-00000
13-00000

FBI

Date: 9/10/76

Transmit the following in _____
CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via CABLE PRIORITY (URGENT)
(Precedence)

P 10/330Z SEP 76

FM BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103) URG BU *original*
TO DIRECTOR (109-12-201) PRIORITY 196-10

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM -ARGENTINA.

ON SEPTEMBER 9, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS
AN OFFICIAL OF THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

DURING THE EVENING OF SEPTEMBER 9, 1976, MEMBERS OF THE
MONTONERO TERRORIST ORGANIZATION ASSASSINATED CARLOS BALZA, AN
EXECUTIVE OF THE CHRYSLER CORPORATION NEAR HIS RESIDENCE IN RAMOS
MEJIA, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE. IT IS NOTED THAT THE CHRYSLER
CORPORATION AND OTHER AUTOMOTIVE MANUFACTURERS IN ARGENTINA HAVE
BEEN THE OBJECTS OF VARIOUS WORK STOPPAGES AND STRIKES DURING THE
PAST SEVERAL DAYS, IN ORDER TO DEMAND HIGHER WAGES. THE CHRYSLER
CORPORATION ANNOUNCED IT WOULD SUMMARILY DISMISS ANY EMPLOYEE,
WHO TOOK PART IN WORK STOPPAGES OR UNAUTHORIZED STRIKES.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR OSVALDO DE

BALDRICH, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. *RWS*

Approved: COORDINATED LOCALLY. *RWS*
Special Agent in Charge

Sent

9:22 AM

Per

1 - 80-DE BALDRICH RWS:jn (3)

109-2-1678

~~SECRET~~

THE AMBASSADOR
BUENOS AIRES

9/29/76

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERNER

**UNDOCUMENTED THREAT AGAINST UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC
ESTABLISHMENTS IN ARGENTINA, CHILE and URUGUAY**

On 9/17/76 and 9/29/76, a confidential source who has provided reliable information in the past, provided the following: (U)

Information was received on 9/14/76 by one of the Argentine Armed Forces Intelligence Services indicating that an individual under detention in Bolivia had disclosed the possibility of synchronized hostile terrorist action being taken against the U. S. Embassies in Buenos Aires, Argentina, Montevideo, Uruguay and Santiago, Chile. The information provided by the individual under detention in Bolivia did not specify the identity of the terrorist group or groups that planned to take this action. The information was passed to the Argentine Military Intelligence Service in question by the Bolivians with the request that any information available be provided to the Bolivians to assist in their interrogation of the individual under detention. (S) (U)

The receiving Argentine Military Intelligence Service, after canvassing the other Argentine Military Intelligence Services, as well as appropriate Federal and Provincial Police Intelligence Services, were unable to develop any information indicating that imminent synchronized hostile terrorist action against the U. S. Embassies in Montevideo, Buenos Aires and Santiago was currently being planned by Argentine terrorists. (S) (U)

Copies: 1 - Addressee
1 - The Ambassador, La Paz, Bolivia
1 - The Ambassador, Montevideo, Uruguay
1 - The Ambassador, Santiago, Chile
1 - POL-2
1 - SY
1 - SAC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

3 - Bue (109-103) Classified By 5931
(1 - 109-2) Exempt from General Declassification
(1 - 80-173) Schedule of Executive Order 11652
(Lucero) Exemption Category 2B(2)
RWS:gjk Automatically declassified on Indefinite.
(10)

5/15/01
CLASSIFIED BY: 39063 EFW/BCE/sam

REASON: 1.5 (c, d)

DECLASSIFY ON: X 1 6

argentina Project

~~SECRET~~

109-2-1687

~~SECRET~~

RE: UNDOCUMENTED THREAT AGAINST UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC
ESTABLISHMENTS IN ARGENTINA, CHILE AND URUGUAY

The receiving Argentine Military Intelligence Service rated the above information as originating from a source whose reliability had not been established and who obviously was being pressured under severe interrogation by the Bolivians. The receiving Argentine Military Intelligence Service, in evaluating the information, rated it as highly improbable, specifically with regard to synchronized terrorist attacks against U. S. diplomatic establishments in Uruguay, Argentina and Chile. (S) (U)

The foregoing information should not be discussed with any foreign officials, including those of the Argentine, Bolivian, Chilean or Uruguayan Governments.

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

FBI

Date: 9/28/76

Transmit the following in _____

CODE

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via CABLE

PRIORITY

(Precedence)

~~SECRET~~

P 28 1:00 Z SEP 76

FM BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-9)

TO DIRECTOR (109-12-201)(109-12-207) PRIORITY 204-28

BRASILIA PRIORITY 26-28

MADRID PRIORITY 07-28

PARIS PRIORITY 07-28

BT

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY SPIC/K/TAM

DECLASSIFY ON: 10/6

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CHILE; IS - CHILE.

ON SEPTEMBER 28, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, [WHO IS
CONNECTED WITH THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE] PROVIDED (S) (U)
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

"OPERATION CONDOR" IS THE CODE NAME FOR THE COLLECTION,
EXCHANGE AND STORAGE OF INTELLIGENCE DATA CONCERNING SO CALLED
"LEFTISTS," COMMUNISTS AND MARXISTS, WHICH WAS RECENTLY
ESTABLISHED BETWEEN COOPERATING INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN SOUTH
AMERICA IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE MARXIST TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN
THE AREA. IN ADDITION, "OPERATION CONDOR" PROVIDES FOR JOINT

1 - 109-10 (FPM-BOLIVIA) 1 - 109-FPM PARAGUAY)
1 - 109-1 (FPM-Uruguay) (1 - 157-UNSUBS; ASSASSINATION OF ORLANDO
1 - 80-84 (POIRE) (S) (U) LETELIER)

RWS:jn (7)

Approved: 1

Special Agent in Charge

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109-1690

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5-15-81
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(Precedence)~~SECRET~~PAGE TWO
BUE 109-2 109-9 ~~SECRET~~

OPERATIONS AGAINST TERRORIST TARGETS IN MEMBER COUNTRIES OF "OPERATION CONDOR." CHILE IS THE CENTER FOR "OPERATION CONDOR" AND IN ADDITION TO CHILE ITS MEMBERS INCLUDE ARGENTINA, BOLIVIA, PARAGUAY, ^{AND} URUGUAY. BRAZIL ALSO HAS TENTATIVELY AGREED TO SUPPLY INTELLIGENCE INPUT FOR "OPERATION CONDOR." MEMBERS OF "OPERATION CONDOR" SHOWING THE MOST ENTHUSIASM TO DATE HAVE BEEN ARGENTINA, URUGUAY AND CHILE. THE LATTER THREE COUNTRIES HAVE ENGAGED IN JOINT OPERATIONS, PRIMARILY IN ARGENTINA, AGAINST THE TERRORIST TARGET. DURING THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 20, 1976, THE [DIRECTOR OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE TRAVELED TO SANTIAGO, CHILE, TO CONSULT WITH HIS CHILEAN COUNTERPARTS] WITH RESPECT TO "OPERATION CONDOR."

(S)
(U)

A THIRD AND MOST SECRET PHASE OF "OPERATION CONDOR" INVOLVES THE FORMATION OF SPECIAL TEAMS FROM MEMBER COUNTRIES WHO ARE TO TRAVEL ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD TO NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES TO CARRY OUT SANCTIONS UP TO ASSASSINATIONS AGAINST TERRORISTS OR SUPPORTERS OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS FROM "OPERATION CONDOR" MEMBER COUNTRIES. FOR EXAMPLE, SHOULD A TERRORIST OR A SUPPORTER OF A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION FROM A MEMBER COUNTRY OF "OPERATION CONDOR" BE LOCATED IN A EUROPEAN COUNTRY, A SPECIAL

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(Precedence)PAGE THREE BUE 109-2 109-9 ~~SECRET~~

TEAM FROM "OPERATION CONDOR" WOULD BE DISPATCHED TO LOCATE AND SURVEIL THE TARGET. WHEN THE LOCATION AND SURVEILLANCE OPERATION HAS TERMINATED, A SECOND TEAM FROM "OPERATION CONDOR" WOULD BE DISPATCHED TO CARRY OUT THE ACTUAL SANCTION AGAINST THE TARGET. SPECIAL TEAMS WOULD BE ISSUED FALSE DOCUMENTATION FROM MEMBER COUNTRIES OF "OPERATION CONDOR" AND MAY BE COMPOSED EXCLUSIVELY OF ^{INDIVIDUALS} ~~NATIONS~~ FROM ONE MEMBER NATION OF "OPERATION CONDOR" OR MAY BE COMPOSED OF A MIXED GROUP FROM VARIOUS "OPERATION CONDOR" MEMBER NATIONS. TWO EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED FOR POSSIBLE OPERATIONS UNDER THE THIRD PHASE OF "OPERATION CONDOR" ^{WERE} ~~ARE~~ FRANCE AND PORTUGAL.

A SPECIAL TEAM HAS BEEN ORGANIZED ^(SIDE) [IN ARGENTINA MADE UP OF MEMBERS OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AND THE STATE SECRETARIAT FOR INFORMATION ^(SIDE)] WHICH ARE BEING PREPARED FOR POSSIBLE ^(S) FUTURE ACTION UNDER THE THIRD PHASE OF "OPERATION CONDOR." (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

(2 CR 3 lf) ADMINISTRATIVE - SOURCE IS DR. ARTURO HORACIO POIRE, WHO IS A MEMBER OF THE ARGENTINE SPECIAL GROUP, WHICH WILL POSSIBLY PARTICIPATE IN THE THIRD PHASE OF "OPERATION CONDOR." ^(S) COORDINATED LOCALLY. (U)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date:

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(Precedence)~~SECRET~~PAGE FOUR BUE 109-2 109-9 ~~SECRET~~

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT NO INFORMATION HAS BEEN DEVELOPED INDICATING THAT SANCTIONS UNDER THE THIRD PHASE OF "OPERATION CONDOR" HAVE BEEN PLANNED TO BE CARRIED OUT IN THE UNITED STATES; HOWEVER, IT IS NOT BEYOND THE REALM OF POSSIBILITY THAT THE RECENT ASSASSINATION OF ORLANDO LETELIER IN WASHINGTON, D. C. MAY HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT AS A THIRD PHASE ACTION OF "OPERATION CONDOR." AS NOTED ABOVE, INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE SOURCE INDICATES THAT PARTICULAR EMPHASIS WAS PLACED ON THE THIRD PHASE ACTIONS OF "OPERATION CONDOR" IN EUROPE, SPECIFICALLY FRANCE AND PORTUGAL. THIS OFFICE WILL REMAIN ALERT FOR ANY INFORMATION INDICATING THAT THE ASSASSINATION OF LETELIER MAY BE PART OF "OPERATION CONDOR" ACTION.

Approved: _____ Sent: _____ M Per: _____
Special Agent in Charge~~SECRET~~

9/23/76

TELETYPE

P 281900Z SEP 76

FM BUENOS AIRES (109-1) (109-2)

TO DIRECTOR (109-12-227) (109-12-201) PRIORITY -28

BT

~~SECRET~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; FPM-URUGUAY;
IS-URUGUAY.

ON SEPTEMBER 28, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS
CONNECTED WITH THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, PROVIDED
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

28-47

DURING THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER 17-20, 1976, MEMBERS OF THE
ARGENTINE STATE SECRETARIAT FOR INFORMATION (SIDE) OPERATING
WITH OFFICERS OF THE URUGUAYAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
CARRIED OUT OPERATIONS AGAINST THE URUGUAYAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION,
THE OPR-33 IN BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA. AS A RESULT OF THESE JOINT
OPERATIONS, SIDE OFFICIALS CLAIMED THAT THE ENTIRE OPR-33 INFRA-
STRUCTURE IN ARGENTINA HAS BEEN ELIMINATED. A LARGE VOLUME OF U. S.
CURRENCY WAS SEIZED DURING THE COMBINED OPERATIONS DURING THE
AFOREMENTIONED PERIOD. (S) (U)

3 - Bue (109-1) 80-84 [Dr. Poire] (S) (U)
(1 - 109-2)
(1 - 105-543)

RWS:gjk (3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 04-12-2017 BY: F84M93K42

5-1-01
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REASON: 1.5 (C D)
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4th Bureau

BAGE TWO BUE 109-1 109-2 ~~SECRET~~

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5/31, AGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE

[SOURCE IS DR. ARTURO HORACIO POIRE.] (~~S~~) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ /28/76

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

ROBERT W. SCHERRER, LEGAL ATTACHE

COMBINED OPERATIONS AGAINST THE [OPR-33 IN BUENOS AIRES] (S) (U)

On 9/28/76, a source who has provided reliable information in the past advised as follows: (S) (U)

During the period September 24-27, 1976, members of the Argentine State Secretariat for Information (SIDE), operating with officers of the Uruguayan Military Intelligence Service carried out operations against the Uruguayan terrorist organization, the OPR-33 in Buenos Aires, Argentina. As a result of these joint operations, SIDE officials claimed that the entire OPR-33 infrastructure in Argentina has been eliminated. A large volume of U. S. currency was seized during the combined operations during the aforementioned period. (S) (U)

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1 - DAO
1 - SY
2 - Bue 109-1
(109-2)
RWS:gjk
(6)

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Argentina Project

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THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

9/28/76

ROBERT W. SCHERRER, LEGAL ATTACHE

"OPERATION CONDOR"

On 9/28/76, a source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised as follows:

"Operation Condor" is the code name for the collection, exchange and storage of intelligence data concerning so-called "Leftists", Communists and Marxists, which was recently established between cooperating intelligence services in South America in order to eliminate Marxist terrorist activities in the area. In addition, "Operation Condor" provides for joint operations against terrorist targets in member countries of "Operation Condor." Chile is the center for "Operation Condor" and in addition to Chile, its members include Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay. Brazil also has tentatively agreed to supply intelligence input for "Operation Condor." Members of "Operation Condor" showing the most enthusiasm to date have been Argentina, Uruguay and Chile. The latter three countries have engaged in joint operations, primarily in Argentina, against the terrorist target. During the week of September 20, 1976, the director of the Argentine Army Intelligence Service traveled to Santiago, Chile, to consult with his Chilean counterparts with respect to "Operation Condor."

A third and most secret phase of "Operation Condor" involves the formation of special teams from member countries who are to travel anywhere in the world to non-member countries to carry out sanctions up to assassination against terrorists or supporters of terrorist organizations from "Operation Condor" member countries. For example, should a terrorist or a supporter of a terrorist organization from a member country of "Operation Condor" be located in a European country, a special team from

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1 - POL-R
1 - DAO
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② - Bae (109-2)
(1 - 109-9)

RWS:gjk

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REASON: 1.5 (D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X.6

Argentina Project
Pinochet Project sp/oh/Tam

~~SECRET~~

RE: "OPERATION CONDOR"

"Operation Condor" would be dispatched to locate and surveil the target. When the location and surveillance operation has terminated, a second team from "Operation Condor" would be dispatched to carry out the actual sanction against the target. Special teams would be issued false documentation from member countries of "Operation Condor" and may be composed exclusively of individuals from one member nation of "Operation Condor", or may be composed of a mixed group from various "Operation Condor" member nations. Two European countries, specifically mentioned for possible operations under the third phase of "Operation Condor", were France and Portugal.

(S) (U)
A special team has been organized in Argentina made up of members of the Argentine Army Intelligence Service and the State Secretariat for Information (SIDE) which are being prepared for possible future action under the third phase of "Operation Condor."

- 2 -

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F B I

Date: 10/4/76

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via TELETYPE 278 URGENT
(Priority)

p 04 Z OCT 76

FM BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103) (P)

TO DIRECTOR (109-12-201) PRIORITY 211 -04 5-1-01

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~CLASSIFIED BY: 39063 E/WBC/E/SM
REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X
Argentine prospectFOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.ON OCTOBER 2, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS AN
OFFICIAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAIS)
PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)ARGENTINE PRESIDENT LT. GENERAL JOSE RAFAEL VIDELA ATTENDED
A CEREMONY AT CAMPO DE MAYO, A LARGE ARGENTINE ARMY INSTALLATION
LOCATED IN BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE, THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 2, 1976.
A SMALL REVIEWING STAND HAD BEEN SET UP AT CAMPO DE MAYO TO
ACCOMMODATE PRESIDENT VIDELA AND OTHER ATTENDING ARGENTINE
GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY OFFICIALS. APPROXIMATELY FIVE MINUTES
AFTER PRESIDENT VIDELA AND HIS ENTOURAGE DEPARTED THE REVIEWING
STAND, A MEDIUM SIZE BOMB EXPLODED, CAUSING PART OF THE REVIEWING
STAND TO COLLAPSE AND INJURING A NEWSPAPER REPORTER, AN ARGENTINE (S) (U)④ - Bue (109-2) (109-103)
(105-767 Montoneros) (80-173 Capt. Lucero) (S) 109-2 1701

RWS:gjk

RWS (4)

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent

M

Per

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

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DATE: 7-10-96 BY: 112 only
SP6H9/CAL/DK 10-28-76

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Date:

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(Priority)PAGE TWO BUE 109-2 109-103 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ARMY NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER AND AN ARGENTINE ARMY COMMISSIONED OFFICER. INVESTIGATION ESTABLISHED THAT THE BOMB WAS MADE UP OF LESS THAN FOUR OUNCES OF ~~PROTYL~~ AND IT HAD BEEN DETONATED BY A CLOCK-LIKE TIMING DEVICE. DURING THE LATE AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 2, 1976, THE AAIS DETAINED AN INDIVIDUAL WHO WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE BUENOS AIRES MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT WHO HAD TAKEN PART IN THE INSTALLATION OF THE REVIEWING STAND AT CAMPO DE MAYO AND WHO ADMITTED HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE PLACEMENT OF THE BOMB. THE ATTEMPT AGAINST PRESIDENT VIDELA'S LIFE WAS CARRIED OUT BY THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION. ~~(S)~~ (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5251 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE.

[SOURCE IS MAJOR JUAN LUCERO, AAIS.] ~~(S)~~ (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

BT

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Special Agent in Charge

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F B I

Date: 10/4/76

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Via CABLE RRX IMMEDIATE
(Priority)

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FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)
TO DIRECTOR (109-12-201) ~~PRIORITY~~ 213-04

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON OCTOBER 4, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS
AN OFFICIAL WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY (INTELLIGENCE
DIVISION), FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA), PROVIDED THE
FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

AT APPROXIMATELY 10:00 A.M., OCTOBER 4, 1976, A SUSPICIOUS
VEHICLE WAS OBSERVED NEAR A PUBLIC PLAZA IN FRONT OF THE
SHERATON HOTEL IN BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA. THE FPA BOMB SQUAD
WAS CALLED AND ASCERTAINED THAT THE VEHICLE CONTAINED FIVE ARMED
ROCKETS WHICH WERE AIMED AT THE SHERATON HOTEL AND WERE TO BE
FIRED BY A TIMING DEVICE. THE ROCKETS WERE DEACTIVATED BY THE
FPA BOMB SQUAD BEFORE THEY COULD BE FIRED (S) (U)

A PREVIOUS ROCKET ATTACK WAS CARRIED OUT AGAINST THE SHERATON
HOTEL UTILIZING THE SAME TYPE OF ROCKETS ON 10/8/73. ON THIS
OCCASION ROCKETS REACHED THE UPPER FLOORS OF THE HOTEL AND

UPON EXPLODING AGAINST THE BUILDING RELEASED PROPAGANDA TO

Approved: 1 - 80-Marcote (S) RWS (U)
Special Agent in Charge

Sent

1:00 P M

Per

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

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REASON: C, D
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Argentina ProjectALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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Date: ~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)PAGE TWO ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUE 109-2 109-103COMMEMORATE THE DEATH OF SLAIN ARGENTINE-BORN CUBAN GUERRILLA
LEADER, ERNESTO CHE GUEVARA. ~~(S)~~ (U)~~CLASSIFIED BY 5831 XGDS-2, INDEFINITE.~~ADMINISTRATIVE (2 CR, 3 lf)[SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR CARLOS VICENTE MARCOTE, DEPARTMENT
OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA.] ~~(S)~~ (U)

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TO DIRECTOR (109-12-201) PRIORITY

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;

ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON OCTOBER 8, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN OFFICIAL WITH THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA), DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY (INTELLIGENCE DIVISION), PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

DURING THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 7-8, 1976, IN COMMEMORATION OF THE CAPTURE AND DEATH OF ARGENTINE-BORN CUBAN GUERRILLA LEADER, ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA, ARGENTINE TERRORISTS CARRIED OUT A SERIES OF BOMBINGS IN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL OF BUENOS AIRES, PRIMARILY AGAINST THE SHOWROOMS OF FOREIGN CONTROLLED AUTOMOBILE COMPANIES. ONE OF THE SHOWROOMS OF THE FORD MOTOR COMPANY WAS BOMBED, AS WELL AS A BRANCH OF THE BANK OF BOSTON. (S) (U)

THERE WERE NO ~~XXXXXX~~ PHYSICAL INJURIES AS A RESULT OF THE BOMBINGS AND PROPERTY DAMAGE WAS GENERALLY REPORTED AS MODERATE. (S) (U)

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1 - 80 [MARCOTE] (S) (U)

Approved: jn (3)

Special Agent in Charge

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PAGE TWO BUE 109-2 109-103 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADMINISTRATIVE

SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR CARLOS VICENTE MARCOTE, DIRECTOR
OF OPERATIONS, FPA, DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY. (S) (U)

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Date: 10/14/76

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(Priority)*1500*
P 14 Z OCT 76FM BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103) (P)
TO DIRECTOR (109-12-201) PRIORITY *219*₁₄

BT

~~SECRET~~~~XXXXX~~ FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

ON OCTOBER 13, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS AN
OFFICIAL OF THE STATE SECRETARIAT FOR INFORMATION (SIDE), AN
ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION: *(S)* *(U)*

ON OCTOBER 8, 1976, ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES DISCOVERED WHAT
IS BELIEVED TO BE THE LAST REMAINING CELL OF THE PEOPLE'S
REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP) AUGUST 22 FACTION, AN ARGENTINE TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION. THE CELL WAS COMPOSED OF FIVE MEMBERS, WHO DIED WHEN
THEY RESISTED THE SECURITY FORCES. AMONG MATERIAL FOUND IN
POSSESSION OF THE CELL WAS A ~~BOOK WHICH WAS~~ A THREE-RING BOUND
2nd ed
LOOSE LEAF BOOK ISSUED BY THE ARGENTINE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS *(S)* *(U)*

4 - Bue (109-2)
(1 - 109-103)
(109-38 ERP) *219*
(1 - 80-84 Dr *Arturo* Poire)

RWS:gjk

5-3-01
CLASSIFIED BY: 39063ETWBCF
REASON: 1.5 (C D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X16
Argentina Project

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Declassify on: OADR *98-2530*
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BY FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-9-91 BY: [illegible]

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(Priority)PAGE TWO BUE 109-2 109-103 ~~SECRET~~

WHICH CONTAINS THE NAME, ADDRESS, TITLE AND DATE OF ACCREDITATION OF ALL FOREIGN DIPLOMATS IN ARGENTINA. THIS MATERIAL DATED BACK TO LATE 1972 OR EARLY 1973. THE SECTION CONTAINING THE ADDRESS OF U. S. EMBASSY PERSONNEL HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM THE NORMAL ORDER OF THE BINDER; HOWEVER, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT ANY PARTICULAR MEMBER CONTAINED IN THE LIST HAD BEEN SINGLED OUT FOR ANY TERRORIST ACTION. ~~(S)~~ (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE.

[SOURCE IS DR. ARTURO H. POIRE, SIDE.] ~~(S)~~ (U)

THE FOREGOING INFORMATION IS EXCLUSIVE AND WILL BE COORDINATED LOCALLY.

BT

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

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~~SECRET~~

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

10/14/76

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

ERP AUGUST 22ND FACTION

On 10/13/76, a confidential source, who is connected with one of the Argentine Government security services, provided the following information:

On 10/8/76 Argentine security forces discovered what is believed to be the last remaining cell of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) August 22 Faction, an Argentine terrorist organization. The cell was composed of five members who died when they resisted the security forces. Among material found in possession of the cell was a three-ring bound looseleaf binder issued by the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Relations, which contains the name, address, title and date of accreditation of all foreign diplomats in Argentina. This material dated back to late 1972 or early 1973. The section containing the address of U. S. Embassy personnel had been removed from the normal order of the binder; however, there is no indication that any particular member contained in the list had been singled out for any terrorist action.

- 1 - Addressee
 - 1 - POL/R
 - 1 - DAO
 - 1 - SY
 - 4 - Buenos Aires
 - (1 - 109-2)(1 - 109-103)
 - (1 - 109-38)(1 - 80-84)
- RWS:jn (8)

39063 E/W BCF So M
5-1-01
Argentina Project

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Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
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1715

TELEGRAM

CONF. 6743

14 Oct '76

1205

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM

Amembassy BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

E.O. 11652:

N/A

TAGS:

ELAB, AR

SUBJECT:

Strike in Electric Utilities Continues

ACTION:

Secstate WASHDC

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ BUENOS AIRES 6743

REF:

Buenos Aires 6671

AMB
DCM
POL-3
POL/R
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USIS
DAO
MIGLP
SCIAT
LEGAT
RF
CHRON

1. SUMMARY: The labor conflict in the Buenos Aires electric utility plants is continuing and appears to be spreading to other parts of the country. A contributing factor has been the kidnapping and disappearance of three SEGBA employees, presumably by police agents. Government and management representatives are continuing their refusal to discuss the issues in dispute, although suggesting this might be possible once the legislative proposal abrogating portions of the industry collective agreement (originally signed in 1948 and modified over the years) considered prejudicial have been enacted into law. Luz y Fuerza union leaders reportedly have refused to lead a general strike against the government and assert that they are attempting to maintain their sectoral strike within certain responsible bounds. However, they admit they may be losing their ability to control worker reactions. From their narrow perspective, union sources allege that the Energy Secretariat has found support for its precipitous actions from

DRAFTED BY:

POL:AGFreeman:cc

DRAFTING DATE

10/13/76

TEL. EXT.

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CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

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ECOM:RReed RR

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INDEXED

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DCM:MChaplin

UC: 1-19/6


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LEGAL ATTACHE - BUENOS AIRES
~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 153
(Formerly FS-413)
January 1975
Dept. of State

ambitious elements within the Navy, supposedly anxious for a banner with which ~~to~~ to effect fundamental changes in government policy, and perhaps changes in the top government leadership as well. Nevertheless, President Videla, possibly for fear of encouraging greater labor indiscipline, appears not to have taken any action which would reverse or soften the high-handed tactics of SEGBA management and the Energy Secretariat. END SUMMARY.



2. Despite official management communiques announcing the end of last week's sit-in strike and the normalization of work activities in Buenos Aires' light and power industry, it is evident that slowdowns, work stoppages, street demonstrations, work accidents produced by acts of negligence or outright sabotage and sporadic power failure are continuing, and may also be spreading to other areas in the country. There has been a fire in one of SEGBA's generators in the Buenos Aires port area, other generators are not functioning, power lines have been flooded, and there have been other incidents, further exacerbated by rain, causing temporary blackouts in various neighborhoods and outlying districts. According to press accounts, the privately-owned Italo-Argentina's light and power services have been affected even more by the labor conflict than/SEGBA and the Agua & Energia enterprise. The latter facility, which supplies electricity to cities in Buenos Aires province and other provinces, has also been affected.

3. According to union sources, over 300 employees have now been dismissed, including about 40 from Agua y Energia. An undetermined number of strikers ^{have} ~~was~~ been detained by police and released following questioning. More arrests were reported today (Oct 13). Police cleared striking workers out of SEGBA offices today after the day which the enterprise reportedly declared ~~today~~ a company holiday.

4. A complicating factor stirring up workers anew has been the kidnapping of three SEGBA employees last Friday night from their

homes by men in civilian clothes, presumed to be security or parapolice agents. Two of the three were among those dismissed by SEGBA last week. In protest against the kidnapping, over 300 employees walked out of their offices a half hour before their shift was over yesterday and demonstrated peacefully in the streets. Until yesterday's action, the strike action had appeared to be tapering off. Certainly, this was the impression given by official communiques issued by the power companies, giving the public to understand that on account of the government's firm stand not to negotiate on any of the issues at stake and ^{its} intent to apply the severe penalties provided by anti-strike laws, the strike had been "busted" and work activities had returned to normality, or were in the process thereof. SEGBA condemned the kidnapping of its three employees, however, as a "disgraceful action", and asked for an investigation by the government security agencies. There has been no further news concerning the fate of the three.

5. According to union sources, union representatives proposed to both the Labor ^{Ministry} and ~~the Navy~~ ^{the Navy} over the weekend that an ad hoc negotiating committee of six management representatives and six worker delegates meet to discuss the wide range of issues in dispute, including the recent dismissals, the clauses in the collective agreement which management deems to be prejudicial, and a sensible rationalization plan. Reportedly, the response from aides to Junta member and Commander of the Navy

Classification

Admiral Massera was that the government would only be willing to negotiate after the law unilaterally abrogating the portions of the collective contract had been issued. Ex Luz y Fuerza union secretary general Juan Jose Taccone, who appears, for all intents and purposes, to be leading the union at the moment, states that the union has ordered a strike of all employees in SEGBA's commercial offices and has also ordered a halt in all repair work, with the exception of that required by hospitals and other similar public facilities. Workers responsible to the union have been instructed to do everything they can to continue the supply of electric power, according to Taccone, i.e. the temporary cuts in service do not correspond to a

However, the union may be losing its ability to control worker actions, deliberate policy on the part of the union. / Taccone also reports (where a union leader was arrested)

Taccone admits.

that the strike action has spread to Rosario/and to Bahia Blanca, and possibly to Salta as well. Other labor sources report that labor leaders representing a wide gamut of trade unions have offered to support Taccone if he decides to lead a general strike, but Taccone reportedly declined.

6. President Videla has been briefed at least once by the members of the Secretariat of Energy and SEGBA with regard to the conflict and separately by the Labor Minister. Curiously, the Labor Minister has taken the public position that the conflict is not within the competence of his Ministry, inasmuch as the Economy Ministry has sole jurisdiction over implementation of the Junta law providing for the rationalization (i.e. dismissal)


LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Classification

[of unnecessary personnel in state enterprises. According to union sources, Labor Ministry personnel privately admit that the conflict was precipitated by the Energy Subsecretariat's arbitrary and inept handling of the problem, lending further to the impression that the Labor Ministry has been ordered to stay out of the conflict. Ratifying speculation which has appeared in the press, however, Taccone believes that the Energy Secretariat may not have consulted with Economy Min Martinez de Hoz (who has been on an official trip abroad) before deciding to fire the union leaders as part of a presumed plan to effect substantial cuts in personnel levels. The Energy Secretariat's precipitous action has given rise to speculation in labor circles that SEGBA and the Energy Secretariat have the support of elements in the Navy which allegedly are seeking an appropriate banner under which to effect more severe changes in government labor policy, and perhaps a reshuffling of government leaders at the top echelon as well. While there has been a suggestion in scanty press accounts of the meeting Oct 7 between President Videla and state secretary of energy Zubaran that Videla was not pleased with the Secretariat and SEGBA's approach to the rationalization problem, the interpretation which has been given is that he had little choice but to accept the management's action as fait accompli, at least until now. The statements emanating from the Energy Secretariat following the briefing tended to support this conclusion.]

According to media accounts, the Energy Secretary stated that the President asked lots of questions, "and we answered them entirely to his satisfaction."

HILL



FBI

Date: 10/18/76

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE

URGENT

(Precedence)

P18 15:00
Z OCT 76

FM BUENOS AIRES ((109-2)) (109-103) (P)

TO DIRECTOR (109-12-201) PRIORITY 22/-18

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

OCTOBER 17, 1976 WAS THE ANNIVERSARY OF PERONIST LOYALTY
DAY, WHICH MARKED THE RELEASE OF FORMER ARGENTINE PRESIDENT JUAN
DOMINGO PERON FROM MILITARY CUSTODY ON OCTOBER 17, 1943, ALLOW-
ING HIM TO BE SUBSEQUENTLY ELECTED PRESIDENT OF ARGENTINA.
OCTOBER 17TH IS TRADITIONALLY CELEBRATED BY PERONISTS AND THEIR
SUPPORTERS THROUGHOUT ARGENTINA.

ON OCTOBER 17, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS
AN OFFICIAL WITH THE STATE SECRETARIAT FOR INFORMATION (SIDE),
AN ARGENTINE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION: (S) (U)

AT APPROXIMATELY 12:05 A.M. OCTOBER 17, 1976, A POWERFUL

- (5) - Bue (109-2)
(1 - 109-103)
(1 - 105-767 Montoneros)
(1 - 80-84 [Dr. Poiré]) (S) (U)
(1 - 80-217 [Carlos Vicente Marcotte]) (S) (U)

RWS:gjk (5)

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M Per _____

10/18/76

109-2-1718

CLASSIFIED BY 109-2-1718
DATE 1-10-11 1,333 only

5-1-01
CLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/BCE
DECLASSIFY ON: (S) Argentina Projects
upheld # 90-0377

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Precedence)

PAGE TWO BUE 109-2 109-103 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BOMB MADE UP OF APPROXIMATELY FOUR KILOS OF TNT, WAS DETONATED BY AN AUTOMATIC TIMING DEVICE NEAR A RECREATION ROOM IN THE "CIRCULO MILITAR" (MILITARY CIRCLE), AN EXCLUSIVE CLUB FOR ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES OFFICERS IN DOWN TOWN BUENOS AIRES. AT THE TIME OF THE DETONATION, APPROXIMATELY 114 PERSONS, INCLUDING MILITARY OFFICERS AND THEIR FAMILIES, WERE VIEWING A FILM. FORTY-NINE INDIVIDUALS WERE INJURED AS A RESULT OF THE BOMBING, 19 BEING HOSPITALIZED. AMONG THE INJURED, WERE MANY WOMEN AND CHILDREN. TWO WOMEN LOST THEIR SIGHT DUE TO EXTENSIVE INJURIES RECEIVED. SHORTLY AFTER THE DETONATION, THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION TOOK CREDIT FOR THE BOMBING.

ON OCTOBER 17, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS AN OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA), DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY (INTELLIGENCE DIVISION), PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: ~~(S)~~ (U)

DURING THE LATE EVENING HOURS OF OCTOBER 17, 1976, NUMEROUS BOMB ATTACKS WERE CARRIED OUT THROUGHOUT THE CITY OF BUENOS AIRES BY UNIDENTIFIED TERRORISTS. THE PRINCIPAL TARGETS OF THESE BOMB ATTACKS WERE PARKED AUTOMOBILES AND BUSES, INCLUDING A COLOR TELEVISION TRANSMISSION TRUCK. A VEHICLE BELONGING TO THE U. S. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M Per _____

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Precedence)PAGE THREE BUE 109-2 109-103 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EMBASSY, BUENOS AIRES, BEARING DIPLOMATIC LICENSE TAGS, WAS
 ATTACKED BY AN ^{FIRE} ~~INCENDIARY~~ BOMB THROWN FROM A PASSING AUTOMOBILE.

THE U. S. EMBASSY VEHICLE WAS BEING DRIVEN BY A CHAUFFEUR WHO
 WAS UNHURT. MODERATE DAMAGE WAS CAUSED TO THE EMBASSY VEHICLE
 AS A RESULT OF THE ^{FIRE} BOMBING. NO TERRORIST GROUP HAS TAKEN CREDIT
 FOR THE AFOREMENTIONED ATTACK AGAINST THE U. S. EMBASSY VEHICLE. (S)(U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE:

THE EMBASSY VEHICLE WHICH WAS ATTACKED ON OCTOBER 17, 1976,
 BELONGED TO THE DEFENSE ATTACHE'S OFFICE OF THE EMBASSY. THE
 CHAUFFEUR WHO WAS DRIVING THE VEHICLE ADVISED HE DID NOT
 DETECT ANY SURVEILLANCE AND BELIEVES THAT HE WAS THE VICTIM OF A
 RANDOM ATTACK CARRIED OUT BY TERRORISTS.

LEGAT PERSONNEL ^{ARE} CONTINUE TO TAKE STRINGENT SECURITY
 PRECAUTIONS.

^{FIRST} SOURCES ^{IS} ARE DR. ARTURO H. POIRE, SIDE, ^{SECOND SOURCE} ^{IS} ~~XXXXX~~ CARLOS
 VICENTE MARCOTTE, ^{FRN} (S) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

BT

Approved: _____ Sent: _____ M Per: _____
 Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

TO : THE AMBASSADOR
MR. JOHN SEARS, POL/R

DATE: 10/19/76

FROM : *hws* LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

Reference my memo 9/3/76, which reported on the abduction and assassination of JESUS CEJAS ARIAS and CRESENCIO GALANENA HERNANDEZ, two employees of the Cuban Embassy in Buenos Aires, by Argentine security forces during August, 1976.

On 9/18/76, a source, who is connected with one of the Argentine intelligence services, provided the following information: ~~(S)~~ (U)

After CEJAS and GALANENA had been assassinated, their bodies were cemented into one large storage drum and thrown into the Rio Lujan near Puente Colorado in San Fernando, Buenos Aires Province. The location where the two bodies were dumped had been used in the past to dispose of other bodies by the State Secretariat for Information (SIDE). The bodies of CEJAS and GALANENA were recovered on or about 10/14/76 by members of the San Fernando Volunteer Fire Department and frog men from the National Maritime Prefectura. Because CEJAS and GALANENA had been immersed in water for such a considerable period of time, facilitating rapid decomposition, it is doubtful that they will be identified. At the time CEJAS and GALANENA were recovered, several other bodies, apparent victims of SIDE operations, were also recovered from the Rio Lujan at the same approximate location. ~~(S)~~ (U)

This document should be returned to the office of the Legal Attache.

5-1-01
CLASSIFIED BY: 39063 ETW/BCE/sam
REASON: 1.5 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X1/b
Argentina Project

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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

Classified by 5931
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on Indefinite

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

THE AMBASSADOR
MR. JOHN SEARS, POL/R

10/19/76

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

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This document should be returned to the office of the Legal Attache.

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5/1/01
CLASSIFIED BY: 39063 E/W BCL/sam
REASON: 1.8 (C, D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X1, 6
Argentine Project

~~SECRET~~

1 - Addressee
4 - Buenos Aires (109-2)
 (1 - 109-103)
 (1 - 109-5) (FPM-Cuba)
RWS:jn (1 - 80-84) [POIRE]
(5)

Classified by 5931
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on Indefinite

FBI

Date: 10/20/76

Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)Via CABLE PRIORITY
(Precedence)

P 20 Z OCT 76

FM BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

TO DIRECTOR (109-12-201) PRIORITY

BT

~~SECRET~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;

ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON OCTOBER 20, 1976, AN OFFICIAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAIS) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

ON OCTOBER 18, 1976, ELEMENTS OF THE AAIS, OPERATING WITH MEMBERS OF THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, DISCOVERED AND SUCCESSFULLY RAIDED A LOCATION IN BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE THAT HOUSED THE INTELLIGENCE RECORDS OF THE PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP), AN ARGENTINE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION. (S) (U)

VOLUMINOUS DOCUMENTS AND FILES WERE SEIZED AS A RESULT OF THIS RAID. THE ERP HAD GATHERED INFORMATION CONCERNING OVER 1,700 ARGENTINE ARMY OFFICERS, WHICH INCLUDED NAME, RANK, RESIDENCE AND ASSIGNMENT. MUCH OF THE INFORMATION REGARDING THESE ARGENTINE ARMY OFFICERS WAS SEVERAL YEARS OUT OF DATE. IN ADDITION DOCUMENTS WERE DISCOVERED INDICATING THAT THE ERP HAD GATHERED INFORMATION AGAINST PERSONNEL OF VARIOUS EMBASSIES IN ARGENTINA, INCLUDING (S) (U)

1 - ERP (109-38) 1 - 80 [LUCERO] (S) (U)

RWS:jn (4)

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

Per _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

-20

5-1-81
CLASSIFIED BY 3906381W/BCE
REASON: 1.5 (C.D.)
DECLASSIFY ON: X1/E
Argentina Project

Classified by 9803 RDD/kal
Declassify on: OADR
2-24-99
90-2530

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENTAL REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 11-9-99 195143

109-2-1720

F B I

Date:

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)PAGE TWO ~~SECRET~~ BUE 109-2 109-103THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRALIA, CANADA, FRANCE AND
SWEDEN. (~~S~~) (U)

INFORMATION REGARDING U. S. EMBASSY PERSONNEL WAS RELATED TO THE FORMER AGRICULTURAL ATTACHE, THE FORMER MILITARY GROUP COMMANDER, AND THE FORMER NAVAL ATTACHE. ALL OF THESE INDIVIDUALS WERE REASSIGNED FROM ARGENTINA SEVERAL YEARS AGO. THE INCUMBENT NAVAL ATTACHE CURRENTLY OCCUPIES THE SAME RESIDENCE AS HIS PREDECESSOR, WHICH HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED BY THE ERP. THE ERP DOCUMENTS ALSO CONTAIN THE RESULTS OF A CASING OPERATION AGAINST AN AS YET UNIDENTIFIED FIRST SECRETARY OF THE U. S. EMBASSY, WHO RESIDED IN LA LUCILA, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE. (~~S~~) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5881 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - THE FOREGOING INFORMATION IS EXCLUSIVE.
IT WILL BE COORDINATED LOCALLY.

[SOURCE IS MAJOR JUAN LUCERO, AAIS.] (~~S~~) (U)

BT

~~SECRET~~Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

F B I

Date: 11/3/76

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via TELETYPE _____
(Precedence)

P 03 . Z NOV 76

FM BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

TO DIRECTOR (109-12-201) PRIORITY -03

BT

E F T O

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

ON NOVEMBER 3, 1976, HERB LESHINSKY, CHRYSLER FEVRE,
ARGENTINA, MANAGING DIRECTOR, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA, PROVIDED
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

AT 7:30 A.M., NOVEMBER 3, 1976, THREE TERRORISTS ^{OF THE} ~~CONNECTED~~
~~WITH THE~~ MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION ASSASSINATED CHRYSLER
FEVRE ARGENTINA'S LABORATORY MANAGER, CARLOS ROBERTO SOUTO,
OUTSIDE OF HIS RESIDENCE in CASTELLAR, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE.
CHRYSLER FEVRE ARGENTINA IS THE ARGENTINE SUBSIDIARY OF THE
CHRYSLER CORPORATION IN DETROIT, MICHIGAN. SOUTO WAS AN
ARGENTINE CITIZEN.

ADMINISTRATIVE.

FOREGOING INFORMATION IS EXCLUSIVE AND WILL BE COORDINATED
LOCALLY.

BT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/25/01 BY 39063 E/w BCE/sam
argentina Project

1 - Bue 109-2
1 - 109-103

1 - 105-767 Montoneros) RWS:gjk (3) *gjk*

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

109-2-1726

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

11/3/76

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

MONTONEROS

Reference my memo 11/1/76 under the above caption.

On 11/3/76, I was again contacted by HERB LESHINSKY, Chrysler South America Managing Director, who provided the following information:

During the late afternoon and evening of 11/2/76, various telephone calls were received at the residences of the 16 Chrysler executives and managers to whom the Montonero letter described in referenced memo had been directed. The callers identified themselves as Montoneros and indicated the purpose of their calls was to confirm receipt of the Montonero written communication.

During the evening of 11/2/76, twelve of the sixteen executives and Chrysler managers to whom the earlier Montonero communication had been directed, received packages through the Argentine postal service at their residences. The son of one of the Chrysler executives opened one of the packages and discovered that it contained a small coffin.

At 7:30 A.M., Chrysler Laboratory Manager, CARLOS ROBERTO SOUTO, was assassinated by Montoneros as he left his residence enroute to the Chrysler Plant in San Justo. SOUTO was a 41-year-old Argentine citizen, who was married with three children. According to information provided by SOUTO's wife, as her husband was backing his automobile out

- 1 - Addressee
 - 1 - POL
 - 1 - POL/R
 - 1 - ECONOMIC COUNSELOR
 - 1 - SY
 - 3 - Buenos Aires
 - (1) - 109-2
 - (1 - 109-103)
 - (1 - 105-767)
- RWS:jn (8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/3/01 BY 39063 E/W/BCE/sam
Argentina Project

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

103 1727

MONTONEROS

of the family residence in Castellar, Buenos Aires Province, two male individuals with stocking masks, armed with what was believed to be an Ithaca riot gun and a sub-machine gun, riddled her husband's car. Mrs. SOUTO ran out of her residence pleading with her husband's attackers to leave him alone. The attackers pointed their weapons at Mrs. SOUTO and she beat a hasty retreat back into her residence. She observed her husband's car veering and crashing into a neighbor's fence. The two armed individuals then went to the car, opened the driver's door and fired at her husband at point blank range. Mrs. SOUTO observed a third terrorist, who was in position down the street from the SOUTO residence. This terrorist was a female and also had her face covered with a stocking mask. After her husband had been assassinated, a Dodge 1500 red sedan entered the block at high speed and picked up the three terrorists.

CLASSIFIED BY
10-16-2017

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION
~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

EO 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

NA
~~RYKA~~ EIAB PINT AR
Buenos Aires Light and Power Workers Return to Normal Work Pace

ACTION:

SECSTATE WASHDC

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ BUENOS AIRES 7402

REF: BA 7103 and previous

1. SUMMARY. Notwithstanding a new flurry of sabotage actions, Buenos Aires' light and power workers are working normally now following the government's decision to crack down on the union about two weeks ago. While the union would appear to have retreated in the wake of the government action, union leader still prefers to see signs of hope that the government's position is being reassessed at the upper levels of the armed forces. END SUMMARY.

ALB
DEM
POL-3
FOL/R
ECOM
USIS
USDAO
MIIGP2
SCIATT
LEGATT
RF
CHRON

DRAFTED BY:

DRAFTING DATE

TEL. EXT.

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:

109-2-1730
~~INDEXED~~ INDEXED
~~SERIALIZED~~ SERIALIZED
FILED

NOV 11 1976

LEGAL ATTACHE - BUENOS AIRES

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

CLASSIFICATION

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

E.O. 11652:

TAGS:

SUBJECT:

ACTION:

FROM

AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

7402

P.2

NA

ELAB PINT AR

Buenos Aires Light and Power Workers Return to Normal Work Pace

SECSTATE WASHDC

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BUENOS AIRES~~

REF: BA 7103 and previous

2. Union sources have confirmed news reports that work activities have returned to their normal state at SEGBA and Italo-Argentina installations and maintenance crews are repairing machinery damaged during the strike. Although management representatives reported continued acts of sabotage (including bombings and several "accidents") along with power and water shortages last week, the "luz y fuerza" workers evidently worked at a more or less normal pace during most of the week, with the major exception being a one-day protest over the disappearance of a fellow worker named Enrique Balbuena and his wife. Presumed by the union to have been kidnapped by police agents, Balbuena was released after being tortured; his wife has not returned and is believed to be dead. Since the end of last week we have seen no further reports of sabotage, although service was still curtailed in some areas.

DRAFTED BY:

LABATT:AFreeman:jr

DRAFTING DATE

11/10/76

TEL. EXT.

124

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

POLCOUNS:WSSmith

CLEARANCES:

CHARGE:MChaplin

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~
 CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
 JANUARY 1963

a week ago as a result of the low level of maintenance during the strike.

3. While union representatives do not admit that they have been defeated, we believe that a combination of "get tough" measures announced by the government on Oct. 27 (see reftel) have forced the union and the workers to retreat, at least temporarily.

Following the issuance of the government communique of Oct. 27, military guards were doubled at the light and power installations and over 40 union members were arrested. There was a report that ex-local leader Oscar Smith was among those detained, but this proved to be false. Nevertheless, ex-members of the board of the local union believe there are orders out for their arrest and they are taking evasive measures to protect their movements. The union was also put on the defensive by a propaganda campaign launched by the government over TV and in the other media providing estimates of the property damage wrought during the strike, exhorting the workers to cease their allegedly anti-patriotic activities, and tending to blur in the public mind the distinction between strike ~~activity~~ activity ~~work~~ by the workers and terrorist acts by the guerrillas in the supposed name of a fictitious "CGT of resistance." As de facto "Luz y Fuerza" leader Juan Jose Taccone put it in a recent conversation, "a typical worker act of reprisal is to loosen a valve and let the leak oil/~~pour~~ out; the indiscriminate bombing of machinery and workers is totally alien to union history and is clearly the work of the

guerrillas." When a guerrilla commando unit stormed a TV station in La Plata by force last week and broadcast a message exhorting the workers to support the Luz y Fuerza strikers, the union felt obliged to issue a reply disassociating itself from the subversives' exhortation.

43. While the workers would appear to have suspended their protest action without any visible sign of achieving their objectives--not even with respect to their proposal to sit down with management and discuss the ~~XXXXXX~~ issues--Taccone maintains there is still hope that a way can be found out of the impasse.

He believes the fact that the draft law derogating portions of state enterprise collective contracts was not issued last week, as scheduled, is evidence that the union's message is getting through and that the issues are being reevaluated at the upper levels of the armed forces and the government. Reports that SEGBA is unilaterally reconsidering the most obvious cases of injustice committed, i.e. the inclusion in the dismissal lists of those within a few months of meeting the minimum requirements for retirement are another suggestion perhaps of a changing attitude. Taccone also asserts that journalists and other opinion leaders express astonishment when he shows them union data demonstrating that while SEGBA's output nearly doubled between 1966 and 1976 and its customers increased by more than 42%, the quantity of direct-hire personnel actually dropped somewhat (from 25,705 in 1966 to 25,402 in 1976). Such being

the case, Taccone says, the question is being asked in high places why SEGBA was chosen to be among the first state enterprises to be subjected to a rationalization of personnel. However, we should add that with the exception of the earlier articles in "La Opinion", which we have already reported, we have seen few signs in the media in recent days that the union's position is beginning to take hold of public opinion.

CHAPLIN

Mc

11/15/76

~~SECRET~~

CABLE

URGENT

P 15 Z 76

FM BUENOS AIRES (109-9) (109-2) (P)

TO DIRECTOR PRIORITY -15

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-CHILE; IS-CHILE; FPM-ARGENTINA;
IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

ON NOVEMBER 14, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS
AN OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA), INTELLIGENCE
DIVISION, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

DURING THE EVENING OF NOVEMBER 13, 1976, TERRORISTS
MACHINE GUNNED AND SET OFF INCENDIARY BOMBS AT THE RESIDENCE
OF JAIME VALDEZ, PRESS ATTACHE OF THE CHILEAN EMBASSY IN BUENOS
AIRES. MODERATE DAMAGE WAS DONE TO THE VALDEZ RESIDENCE
WHICH IS LOCATED IN SAN ISIDRO, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE.
VALDEZ' AUTOMOBILE, WHICH WAS PARKED OUTSIDE THE RESIDENCE,
WAS SEVERELY DAMAGED. VALDEZ WAS NOT AT HOME WHEN THE ATTACK
TOOK PLACE INASMUCH AS HE WAS ACCOMPANYING ARGENTINE PRESIDENT
RAFAEL JORGE VIDELA ON A STATE VISIT TO CHILE.

AS OF NOVEMBER 14, 1976, NO TERRORIST ORGANIZATION HAD
CLAIMED CREDIT FOR THE BOMBING.

5 - Bue (109-9 FPM-Chile) 109-2 109-103
157-35 (Chilbom) 80-27 (Com. Mayor Marcotte) (S) (U)

RWS:gjk (5)

~~SECRET~~

109-2 1732

~~SECRET~~
PAGE TWO BUE 109-9; 109-2 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931, XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE:

SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR CARLOS VICENTE MARCOTTE, DEPUTY
DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FPA. (~~S~~) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

WHILE THERE IS NO APPARENT CONNECTION WITH THE ABOVE-
DESCRIBED BOMBING ATTACK AND THE ASSASSINATION OF ORLANDO
LETELIER, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE BUREAU PROVIDE A COPY OF
THIS CABLE TO WFO AND OTHER OFFICES HANDLING LEADS IN THE
CHILBOM CASE IN CONNECTION WITH CHILEAN EXILE
COMMUNITIES IN THEIR TERRITORIES.

BT

~~SECRET~~

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

— P. 8 and 9

BUENOS AIRES HERALD

11/25/76

Date:

Edition:

Author:

Editor:

Title:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 5-3-01 BY 39063 ELN/BCE/bmr

argentina press

Character:

or

Classification:

Submitting Office:

☐ Being Investigated

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| SEARCHED | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED | FILED |
| NOV 27 1976 | |
| FBI - NEW YORK | |

Perón's savage legacy

● The following article, reprinted from the Daily Telegraph, is one of the most balanced reports written so far on the complex situation in Argentina today. Extracts from it have been issued by the government's own news agency Telam. Michael Field, currently Paris bureau chief, spent several years in Latin America for the Daily Telegraph and also reported on the Vietnam War.

by Michael Field

THE Marxist left, whose publicists have filled the vacuum caused by the disinterest in Latin America of less committed observers, has had a field day since September 11, 1973. This, in case you have forgotten, was the day that the Chilean armed forces, with much more popular support than is now remembered, overthrew the late President Salvador Allende and ended "the Chilean road to Socialism".

It was a historic moment. Allende's imprudence in pushing too hard, too far and too fast with revolutionary plans for which he had insufficient mandate (a third of the vote) is constantly recalled by Mr Berlinguer, the Italian Communist leader, and can hardly be absent from the thoughts of Mr Francois Mitterrand, the French Socialist, who is looking forward to the triumph of the Socialist-Communist front in the French parliamentary elections in 1976. "The Chilean example" has entered the annals of the left as a classic warning.

Thwarted by the coup, their hatred fed by thousands of Chilean exiles in Europe and the United States, the international left and its liberal camp-followers have decreed and achieved the almost universal moral ostracism of the present régime in Santiago. The military have helped; the harshness of the new order, its slow resolution of economic problems (inherited from Allende and exacerbated by world economic conditions), above all its unique, strange ideology, have played into its critics' hands. Chile has become a dirty word.

This accomplished, the West's do-gooders, silent for so long about social conditions in South America, are now turning their attention to Argentina, which, on March 24, threw off—finally it is fervently to be hoped—the incubus of Peronism, a native populism with its roots in pre-war Fascism. Under a firm military hand, the country has embarked on "national reorganisation".

The aim of the Argentine junta, led by Lt General Jorge R. Videla, is practical and lacks the bombast of earlier "revolutions". Simply, it is the establishment (though not just yet) of "a serious republican democracy" to replace the corrupt fraud of Peronism which has frustrated the hopes of its mass supporters in two generations and twice almost ruined one of the richest countries in the world.

The proof of the general's pudding will, of course, be in the eating. There is also always the risk that President Videla, a kindly, devoutly religious man, could be set aside by ambitious, more authoritarian colleagues. Argentines are impatient and excitable. Already there are signs that the misdeeds of the last year under President Maria Estela Peron and her gun-toting Mafia of corrupt union leaders and other favourites are slipping from many minds. Real income has declined and, as always, the less-favoured feel that they are bearing more than a fair share of the strain of economic adjustment.

Nevertheless, and for what it means in such a distressing record, the present government is the most promising that Argentina has seen since the overthrow of Peron in 1955. It has yet to show that it can really control the unruly unions without excessive force and without yielding to them in exchange for insincere promises of co-operation. This is as crucial a matter as winning the war against the Marxist guerrillas.

But there is a serious threat to the new government's national and international credibility and reputation in its failure so

far to end the sinister sequence of political revenge killings which developed under Peronism. Despite President Videla's frequent assertion that the use of force must be a government monopoly, there is still much evidence that it is not. The US congress, which has already condemned Chile and Uruguay for consistent violation of human rights, is now moving towards a similar denunciation of Argentina—helped, incidentally, by politically interested witnesses. Amnesty International has mobilised its hosts in a one-sided campaign against the authorities.

These political humanitarians appear to have no sympathy at all for the victims of terrorist bombings, kidnappings and the families of policemen and members of the armed forces gunned down in what the extremists call the "struggle for national liberation".

"Police brutality" undoubtedly exists. Savagery breeds savagery and an atmosphere of hatred and revenge has been growing in Argentina for a decade, its roots in the divisions encouraged by the late President Perón, surely one of the most irresponsible national leaders to have emerged in any country.

"If I were young, I too would be throwing bombs", he said in the luxury of his Madrid exile when the guerrilla movements began to form in the late 1960s, and promptly armed and financed them. One group, the Montoneros, professing Peronism and containing elements of the former Argentine Nazi group, the Tacuara, was even legalised after his return. Its militants attended mass rallies in Buenos Aires carrying banners boasting that they had "executed" the former President, General Pedro Aramburu, in 1969. Such flagrant illegality, protected by the state, could hardly fail to provoke equally illicit reaction. "Death squads", like the notorious anti-communist "Triple A" are the inhuman response.

(Continued on page 9)



● Figure, by Alberto Zienkiewicz.

Bligh's log : £ 55,000

London
AN ANONYMOUS buyer yesterday paid £55,000 at a Christie's auction for the log kept in 1789 by Captain William Bligh after he was set adrift in a small boat by mutineers on his ship, the *Bounty*.

The leather-bound pocket book, with many of its 107 closely-written pages stained with the salt spray of the South Seas, described the epic 3,500-mile voyage in the ship's launch. It provided the most complete account of Bligh's six-week journey from Tofua in the mid-Pacific, where he was set down by the mutineers, to Timor, an island in Indonesia.

The recently unearthed log had been preserved in the Bligh family, unknown to historians, since the captain's death in 1817. The descendant who put it on sale wished to remain anonymous.

William Bligh gave in his log the list of the 25 mutineers led by Fletcher Christian, who was portrayed by Clark Gable in a 1930 film version and by Marlon Brando in a later remake (*Reuters*).

Half-a-block from calle Florida, you are welcome to visit GALATEA, book shop & art gallery, located at calle Viamonte 564.

At the moment you will find an exhibit of the painter-vázquez Malaga, an excellent exponent of real and realistic Argentine art.
Weekday 11-3-8
Saturdays: 9-1 hrs.

transforms and experiments, and strong vibrant colours give place to delicate tones, depending upon his emotional response. This indicates healthy vitality and mental growth, and is a self-searching for original expression, not of the material world, but an attempt to unite figures and landscapes with his own inner vision.

At Palatina Gallery, Arroyo 821, Raúl Soldi shows large, decorative, oil panels (dated 1955-57 of romantic figures with birds and flowers) as well as recent original porcelains. He is now combining creative and artisan activity. Soldi, a successor of Victorica as an "Intimist", achieved his fame through a sensuously lyric and poetically musical subject matter and technique. This carries-through in his porcelains, which are at times reminiscent of Classical and Oriental influences.




● Above: By Alberto Zienkiewicz, "Roquel".

Crossword Puzzle

Answer to Wedn
Puzzle

- | | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| ACROSS | 54 S-shaped molding | 37 Arrow poison |
| 1 Bitter vetch | 55 Sea in Asia | 40 Command |
| 4 Nimbus | 56 Inlet | 42 Corner |
| 8 Ugly, old women | 57 South African Dutch | 44 Periods of time |
| 12 Sign of zodiac | 58 Wise person | 45 Unit of Italian currency |
| 13 Mountains of Europe | 59 Still | 47 Great Lake |
| 14 Chills and fever | DOWN | 48 Chair |
| 15 Prefix: bad | 1 Shade trees | 49 Take illegally |
| 16 Repugnant | 2 Harvest | 50 The self |
| 18 Fascination | 3 Speech blunders | 51 Born |
| 20 Chimney carbon | 4 Tosses | 52 Scold |
| 21 Ready money | 5 Exist | |
| 23 Showy flower | 6 Turns around track | |
| 27 Lure | 7 Butter substitute (colloq.) | |
| 29 Dry | 8 Stops | |
| 32 Gildo's high note | 9 Mature | |
| 33 Otherwise | 10 Weapon | |
| 34 Nothing | 11 Deposit | |
| 35 Decorate | 17 Burden | |
| 36 Scottish cap | 19 Tardy | |
| 37 Sacred image | 22 Workman | |
| 38 Macaws | 24 Tract of land | |
| 39 Malicious burning | 25 Lamb's pen name | |
| 41 Hindu woman's garment | 26 Male sheep (pl.) | |
| 43 Walk | 27 Greek letter | |
| 46 Memoranda | 28 Winglike | |
| 49 Transmitting | 30 Spanish for "river" | |
| 53 Native metal | 31 Misfortunes | |
| | 35 Edible rootstock | |

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Distr. by United Feature Syndicate, Inc.

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Nobody cares about murdered policemen

(Continued from page 8)

The cold-blooded cruelty of the Argentine guerrillas has received little or no attention in human rights circles. Who knows or cares about Argentine professional soldiers kidnapped by these young "idealists" and really tortured, not beaten up, in the cause of "class warfare"? One example was that of Colonel Larrabure, an army weapons expert, murdered in cold blood after over a year's confinement in a "people's prison" beneath a cup-board in a small shop in the suburbs of Rosario. A chronic asthmatic, he was denied proper medicine. His cell had one small air vent and he had no room for exercise.

Captured papers after the discovery of his body included a daily diary on the prisoner's morale and health, coolly kept by a girl guerrilla. His crime, apart from membership of the army, was to have refused to help the terrorists with weapons and bomb manufacture. This is only one of a long list of official grievances which have provoked reciprocal hatred and cruelty leading to those halfburnt bodies on the rubbish dumps of Buenos Aires, the mutilated corpses found floating in the rivers and the butchery of "left-wing" priests.

The military, holding now the whip hand, have an obligation to the country and its friends to break this vicious circle. The hard-pressed police force is usually blamed for the worst crimes but there is little doubt that all branches of the services have their share of guilt. Exem-

plary punishment? There is no sign of it yet, though it is always promised. Mysterious kidnappings in lieu of formal arrests are still frequent and unexplained. General Harguindeguy, the genial, polo-playing Minister of the Interior, calls the "avengers" "mentally alienated", and their acts "totally to be repudiated. Extremists of right and left are the enemy. We shall get rid of them".

But the cleaning up process is too slow, especially as the guerrillas now have their backs to the wall and seem doomed, as in Brazil and Uruguay. It does not help to have Mrs Judith Hart and others, constantly worrying about the welfare of political kidnappers and murderers like former members of the Tupamaros (the jailers of Sir Geoffrey Jackson, former British Ambassador to Uruguay) and urging their transfer to Britain as political refugees because their "security" is threatened by Argentine repression.

The onus is nevertheless on President Videla, whose promise to restore the process of law has yet to be made good. The slow military bureaucracy could be speeded up. Political detainees, reported to number about 5,000, ought to be charged or released. Execution, when merited — there is still a war going on — may sometimes be justified. But the continuing "disposal" of prisoners cannot be defended and may lead Argentina into the limbo of world disapproval. It would be one more moral victory for the Marxists and their allies.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

Date:

Edition:

Author:

Editor:

Title:

Character:

or

Classification:

Submitting Office:

☐ Being Investigated

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 1199
14 FEB 77
1658

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM

AmEmbassy BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: ELAB, AR
SUBJECT: Local Power Union Leader Disappears

ACTION: SecState WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO: USMission GENEVA
USMission EC BRUSSELS

REF: Buenos Aires 1166

AMB
DCM
POL-3
POL/R
ECOM
EIS
USDAO
POLGP-2
LEGAT
SOCIAT
R
CARON

1. Oscar Smith, former Secretary General of the Federal Capital local of the Luz y Fuerza union, disappeared last Friday morning after leaving his house on his way to a union installation. As we reported reftel, Smith was instrumental in reaching an understanding with Labor Minister Liendo which led to the suspension of the recent conflict in the light and power industry. According to one report, Smith's car was blocked off at an intersection by armed men in three other vehicles who then whisked him and his auto away. Coincidentally, there was a rash of bombings in light and power union installations over the weekend.

2. Three alternate possibilities are being discussed as explaining his disappearance: (a) He was kidnapped by leftist

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DRAFTED BY:

BATT:AGFreeman:mg

DRAFTING DATE

2/14/77

TEL. EXT.

128

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

POL:WSSmith

AMB:RChill

DCM:MChaplin

REMARKS:

terrorists in retaliation for his alleged betrayal of the workers by reaching a compromise solution with the government;

(b) he was kidnapped by a paramilitary or parapolice group acting under the instructions of ^{hardlining} ~~hardline~~ elements of the armed forces in order to ^{coerce and/or} ~~interrogate~~ Smith, ^{perhaps including} about his links with the Labor Minister; or (c) he "pulled a powder" in light of some rank and file discontent with the decision to go back to work. Some albeit veiled commentary in the weekend's press seems to suggest that the second theory is the prevailing one at the moment.

3. Light and power union leaders have sent messages to leading government figures protesting Smith's disappearance and demanding an immediate investigation. They have also, according to press reports, sent messages to the ILO, the ICFTU and to the AFL-CIO asking for expressions of solidarity.

4. According to press reports, the military interventor of the Buenos Aires union local ~~XXXX~~ (an Army colonel) authorized the light and power workers to walk off their jobs early this past Saturday in protest against the disappearance of Smith.

HILL



DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 4442
14 JUN 77
1806

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E.O. 11652:
TAGS: PINT, PINS, AR, SHUM
SUBJECT: Argentine Human Rights Situation; A GENERAL REVIEW

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC

CHARGE
POL3
POL/R
ECOM
USIS
USDAO
LEGAT
RSO
RF
CHRON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 4442

DEPT. PLEASE PASS GRENADA FOR ASST. SECTY. TODMAN AND USOASGA DEL.

SUMMARY: The human rights situation in Argentina is still

ominous. Argentine citizens continue to "disappear",

terrorist combatants are understood to be systematically

eliminated (in detention and during counter-terrorist raids)

and security forces (who are now acknowledged to be in

complete control of the counter-terrorist effort) continue

to use harsh and arbitrary methods against suspects, including

illegal abductions, prolonged detentions and torture. These

methods have also applied to persons suspected of economic

corruption and breaking political censorship laws, although

most of these cases have eventually been assigned either to

military or civilian courts. On the positive side, increasing

numbers of detainees are being listed as being in the hands

of the Executive and authorized to leave the country, ~~XXXXXX~~

~~XX~~

DRAFTED BY: POL:YThayer:gcr DRAFTING DATE: 6-10-77 TEL. EXT. 121 CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: POL:WHallman

CLEARANCES:

DAO:PCoughlin
POL/R:DSmock
LEGATT:Scherer
RSO:RKelly

CHARGE: MChaplin

JUN 15 1977

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 100-4
(Formerly FS-100-4)
JANUARY 1975
GPO: 1975-0-250-000

President Videla has demonstrated some success in curbing the hardline zeal for a ~~more generalized~~ takeover over ^{of} the government, ~~xxx~~ the Church and courts are increasingly speaking out on the human rights problem, and there is an indication the military may establish a "rehabilitation program" in which marginally involved members of subversive organizations will be turned over to the courts for legal processing. The Videla govt continues to appear to have a moderating influence on internal political and security matters and remains probably the most acceptable and only alternative to a more repressive regime espoused by military hardliners. END SUMMARY.

While it is difficult to distinguish a specific trend in human rights practices in Argentina, certain observations can be made:

1. In general, the methods adopted by the security forces in the anti-subversive campaign remain arbitrary and harsh.

Persons continue to be abducted by armed men claiming to be police and military officials. Families are ~~xxx~~ rarely or only belatedly informed about the whereabouts and status of their detained relatives. Persons detained incommunicado are regularly subjected to both physical and psychological torture during detention and interrogation sessions. Terrorist combatants are systematically eliminated. Others are secretly kept at the disposition of the Armed Forces or police until further information is available or a decision is made concerning the individual. Some of these persons may be killed as militant

terrorists; others may be released after being threatened to keep quiet about their experiences; others may eventually be listed as persons detained at the disposition of the Executive (Poder Ejecutivo Nacional--PEN) and detained in regular prisons where normally they can receive family visits, lawyers, and reasonable food and treatment.

2. Recently, kinds of arrests under PEN have widened. Whereas previously most of those detained--either illegally or under state of siege provisions--fell into the category of terrorist ~~and~~ subversives, now persons are detained under PEN for economic "subversion", infractions of political censorship laws, ~~subversion~~ ~~of national security~~ corruption, malfeasance and improper execution of one's public responsibilities (such as in the case of Gen. Lanusse charged in the Aluar case). Many of these persons were detained with the same disregard for due process: arrested without warrant, roughly treated during detention, held incommunicado for some time before families and lawyers were notified, held under vague accusations by the Executive without the filing of formal charges. These actions involved many important journalists and public figures, also businessmen and well known figures in the Jewish community, giving rise to considerable concern that a vast right-wing purge was being launched against anyone vaguely suspected of subversive ~~and~~ or "inappropriate" attitudes as defined by hard-line elements in the Armed Forces and police. Time has assuaged some of these

fears, as Videla has managed to cool some of the more strident rhetoric and hard-line sensationalism surrounding recent economic and political scandals. The Graiver case was assigned to Army General Gallino who has completed his investigation quietly and submitted his findings to First Corps Commander Suarez Mason. Reportedly the military will determine which aspects of the case will be turned over to military courts (probably those involving allegations of subversive links) and which to the regular criminal courts (presumably those involving economic infractions). The Aluar case is currently in the hands of an appeals court which is reviewing the handling of the preliminary investigative stage by Federal Judge Marquardt. The relaxing of these two explosive issues, as well as recent diplomatic successes in Venezuela and among his own military colleagues, seem to have strengthened Videla's hand over hard-line factions within the military. There is unconfirmed information that Videla wants economic cases to be distinguished from subversive crimes and handled by normal civilian justice procedures.

3. The security forces appear to have assumed complete control of the counter-terrorism effort and the military govt must be considered fully responsible for internal security efficiency and practices. There are no para-police or para-military bands operating out of control of authorities; the Triple A has been dispersed and its members jailed for common crimes. President

Videla is aware of and, in general terms, approves of methods

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~~Classification~~

used to combat terrorism and eliminate its combatant members.

There appears to be no dispute over this goal of the three Armed Forces. Videla, however, has acknowledged and expressed public concern over "excesses in repression by the forces of order" (press conference in Venezuela on May 12), and the failure of the govt to stem the continuing disappearance of Argentine citizens. Various units of the three armed forces and the police are known to keep their own "prisoners" whose identities, status and final disposition are not always reported or subject to the president's immediate control. Videla himself is believed to regret this situation but remains unable or unwilling to confront his own corps commanders or other branches over their conduct of the war against terrorism in their own areas. He is believed to exercise a moderating influence, however, and has probably curbed more violent and widespread human rights abuses by his espousal of moderation, his support for the Church, his ability to defuse political maneuvering by hard-line factions, and his relative ~~his~~ openness and sensitivity to international opinion.

4. The battle against armed terrorism is almost won. The capability ~~has~~ ^{of} terrorist groups to launch major armed attacks has been destroyed and approximately 80 per cent of the combative strength of both the ERP and Montoneros has been wiped out. GOA estimates approximately 100 ERP combatants and 500-1000 Montonero militants remain at large. Improved counter-terrorism efficiency, ^{of the} centralized computerized intelligence and the breakdown/terrorist

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

[groups' communications network, arms factories, sources of funds
and coordination of cells have sped the demise of terrorist
strength within Argentina.]

5. Spectacular incidents including the murder of five Catholic priests and the bombing of 30 bodies in Pilar in mid-1976 have largely ceased. Refugees, some members of the Jewish community, teachers, professionals and other groups continue to be harassed by overly zealous and irresponsible elements in the security forces and possibly other right-wing fanatics but do not appear to be singled out for systematic and officially deliberate repression. On the other hand, members of the Communist party, student groups, journalists and psychologists have figured significantly among those persons reportedly disappeared or summarily detained under PEN in recent weeks.

6. The subject of human rights abuses, disappearances and general concern over the internal security situation ~~xxx~~ is being aired more openly in recent months. The Bishops Conference document denouncing torture, disappearances and human rights abuses was acknowledged by Videla and other govt officials and in newspaper editorials. The Supreme Court and federal courts have taken the Executive to task for unsatisfactory responses to habeas corpus inquiries and judicial orders. (The Executive, however, apparently continues to ignore or appeal court decisions on security cases.)

A court has declared the ban against the Divine Light Mission
[unconstitutional--the govt appealed; another court protected]

Jehovahs Witnesses schoolchildren from discrimination in enrolling in public schools. Newspapers, including the pro-government LA NACION, have written editorials commending the courts' defense of the right of habeas corpus and Videla's frank exposition on human rights problems in Argentina.

COMMENT: The human rights situation in Argentina has seen improvement in some areas and a disturbing trend toward "institutionalization" of arbitrary and abusive treatment on the part of govt and military officials on the other. The expansion of illegal and prolonged detentions for economic and ideological "crimes" is worrisome; how quickly and fairly the Graiver and Aluar cases are resolved, also those involving for example Jacobo Timerman for economic crimes and Robert Cox for violating censorship laws, should help indicate whether such arbitrary and sensational actions have grown out of control. What is now clear is that the Armed Forces are committed to elimination of all terrorist combatants—all those "with blood on their hands", regardless of whether ^{effected} ~~effected~~ during unacknowledged ^{detention} ~~detention~~ or interrogation of suspects, or in shootouts with security forces during raids or identification checks. ^{Some} ~~Some~~ possibly innocent or marginally involved persons ^{could possibly be} ~~are likely to be~~ caught in this effort. Recently there have been indications that the military is considering a "rehabilitation" program for persons believed to be only marginally involved with terrorist organizations. These persons might, after

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interrogation and investigation, be turned over to the special military tribunals or criminal courts for legal processing.

Such a program would be a move toward observation of due process guarantees, and constitutional ~~guarantees~~ and would mark, despite the significant successes in the anti-insurgency effort, the only improvement in terms of counter terrorist methods. The political and thus the human rights situations continue to be delicate and fluid. Fallout from strong US initiatives to demonstrate US concern over human rights has subsided temporarily; ~~quiet defense and~~ ~~the government's~~ certain positions and attitudes of the govt have become more clear: Argentine sovereignty and opposition to US interference in internal affairs will be staunchly defended; terrorists will be eliminated; Argentina's defense to human rights criticism will be that it is misunderstood, misrepresented and the object of a defamation campaign orchestrated from leftist agents abroad. At the same time, Videla is seeking to establish his moderate position; some notorious hardliners have been or will be retired, or at least partially neutralized; greater numbers of Argentine citizens are being listed as released from PEN and authorized to leave the country; the myth of para-military free-lance agents has been laid to rest and the govt is beginning to acknowledge internal security abuses and some limited criticism from the Church and courts.

CHAPLIN
mc

CONTROL 1679

23 JUN 77
1645

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM

AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES.

CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

GDS
SHUM, AR
Jewish Leader Leaves Argentina After Threats

ACTION:

SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 1679

L I M D I S

CHARGE
POL3
RSO
~~RSO~~
CHRON
LEGATT

1. SUMMARY: Mrs. Jacobo Kovadloff told Emboff today (June 23) that her husband ^{had} ~~was~~ left suddenly for Brazil yesterday after receiving threats against his life. A subsequent anonymous note and telephone call ordered her also to leave Argentina with her children. She is preparing to leave. Mrs. Kovadloff asked Embassy and Department not rpt not to divulge any information on this matter until she is safely out of (all Argentine citizens) Argentina. Kovadloffs may go on ~~to~~ to US, but may also decide to wait out their difficulties in Brazil. END SUMMARY.

2. Jacobo Kovadloff, American Jewish Committee (AJC) representative, left Argentina suddenly for Brazil yesterday (June 22) after being followed and receiving phone and letter threats against his life. According to Mrs. Kovadloff, who spoke with Emboff June 23, unidentified persons began

DRAFTED BY:

POL:YThayer:gcr

DRAFTING DATE

6-23-77

TEL. EXT.

121

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

CHARGE:MChaplin

CLEARANCES:

POL:WHallman

FBI-BUENOS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFICATION

calling and leaving scrawled ^{notes} ~~marked~~ in Kovadloff's apartment building on June 20 ordering him to close down the AJC office here and to leave Argentina "before it is too late." The first note read: "Traitor, you've played both ends for too long. Get out before it's too late. We don't want Yankee and Jewish offices here."

3. The Kovadloffs were apparently followed to the airport at the time of Mr. Kovadloff's June 22 departure and when Mrs. Kovadloff returned she found another note, this time addressed to herself, threatening her and her children and ordering them to leave the country immediately also. In a telephone call she was told not to go "running around talking to her amiguitos" which she took to mean the US Embassy and other Kovadloff contacts.

4. Mrs. Kovadloff said she believes uncontrolled hostile elements of the military or police are responsible, and she does not intend to report the incident to local authorities--or to anyone else, including the Israeli Embassy. She added that her husband did not believe his close contacts with Admiral Massera or other high ranking officers could protect him from harm.

5. Kovadloff ~~feeling~~ had not felt himself to be seriously threatened before this incident, she said, and she speculated that his efforts in the US to bring attention to Jacobo

Timmerman's detention (former editor to LA OPINION) could have

had something to do with the present threats.

6. Mrs. Kovadloff said she intends to leave Argentina as quickly as possible, probably first to Brazil and then possibly on to the US. She asked that neither the Embassy nor the Department divulge this information until she is safely out of the country. She added that the post-Graiver panic among the Jewish community had largely subsided and she was fearful the community would be again upset when the reason behind the Kovadloffs' departure is known. She repeated her husband's frequent observation that anti-Semitism, per se, is not a major human rights problem in Argentina, but rather, one more manifestation of general repression and lawlessness in the country.

7. Given strong suggestion threats are provocation by extreme right, Embassy is seeking Mrs. Kovadloff's agreement to call with Chargé on Minister of Government to explain circumstances and request protection. If this effort does not prosper, situation will call for strong US representation before Argentine Government here, and to Argentine Embassy in Washington. We must, however, meanwhile observe our pledge to respect Mrs. Kovadloff's request for secrecy until she is safely away from Argentina.

CHAPLIN
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Classification

CONTROL: 5943

12 AUG 77

1420

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM

AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

GDS
SHUM, PFOR, EFIN, AR
DERIAN VISIT WITH ECONOMY MINISTER MARTINEZ DE HOZ

ACTION:

SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO:

AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

CHARGE
POL-3
POL/R
ECOM
USIS
AGATT
LEGATT
DAO
DEA
MILGP
ADMIN
RE
CHRON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES: 5943

1. SUMMARY: COORDINATOR FOR HUMAN RIGHTS MET WITH ECONOMY MINISTER AT SUGGESTION OF ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR TO U.S. MINISTER STARTED WITH A DESCRIPTION OF THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND FROM THERE LED THE DISCUSSION TO THE TOPIC OF THE CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ARGENTINA. HE STRESSED THAT PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE, AND THAT WHILE IRREGULAR METHODS WERE STILL OCCASIONALLY EMPLOYED AGAINST A CONTINUING THREAT, THE TREND WAS FOR RE-INSTITUTION OF DUE PROCESS. MRS. DERIAN URGED THE GOVERNMENT TO SHOW ITS STRENGTH BY INSTITUTING LEGAL METHODS AND APPEALING TO THE PEOPLE FOR SUPPORT. SHE WARNED THAT TIME MAY BE RUNNING OUT BOTH INTERNALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY.

2. POLITICAL FACTORS - THE MINISTER DESCRIBED THE

DRAFTED BY:

D/HA:MBova:eg

DRAFTING DATE

8/11/77

TEL. EXT.

277

109-Y-1758
CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

CHARGE: MChaplin

CLEARANCES:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 10-41
(Formerly FS-41)
January 1975
Dept. State

POLITICAL HISTORY OF ARGENTINA, MARKED BY SUCCESSIVE TAKEOVERS OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTS WHICH HAS MADE LONG RANGE ECONOMIC PLANNING IMPOSSIBLE. HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT IF CURRENT GOVERNMENT, WHICH HE FEELS HAS LEARNED FROM THE MISTAKES OF PRIOR GOVERNMENTS, COULD REMAIN IN POWER AT LEAST THREE YEARS MORE THE AN EVEN NEEDED STABILITY TO KEEP THE ECONOMY MOVING ON/KEEL WOULD BE ACHIEVED. HE SAID THAT THE ARGENTINE MILITARY HAS TRADITIONALLY NOT SOUGHT PERMANENT POWER AND THEIR ~~CONSCIENTIOUS~~ CONSCIENCES DICTATE EVENTUAL RETURN TO CIVILIAN DEMOCRATIC RULE. HE STRESSED THAT THIS PROCESS HAS ALREADY BEGUN WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA'S CALL COUNTRY FOR A DIALOGUE WITH VARIOUS INTEREST GROUPS IN THE ~~COUNTRY~~, WHICH WOULD HOPEFULLY LEAD TO THE REALIZATION OF THE NEED FOR POLITICAL REALISM, PERHAPS LEADING TO THE FORMATION OF TWO STRONG PARTIES, THE ONE MIDDLE OF THE ROAD AND ONE MORE TO THE LEFT, WHICH WOULD REFLECT THE TWO MAIN STREAMS OF ARGENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT. HE LAMENTED THE TRADITIONALLY FRACTURED NATURE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN ARGENTINA CAUSED BY FREQUENCY OF ELECTIONS, PERSONALIZED NATURE OF POLITICS AND LACK OF DIRECT PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, WHICH MIGHT ENCOURAGE GREATER RESPONSIBILITY. ON LATTER POINT, HOWEVER, HE DESCRIBED ARGENTINA'S PREVIOUS ATTEMPT AT PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AS A FAILURE BECAUSE OF THE LARGE NUMBER OF PARTIES PARTICIPATING IN THE PROCESS. HE DESCRIBED CURRENT POLITICAL LEADERS AS HAVING A PRE-WORLD WAR II MENTALITY AND CRITICIZED THE TRADITIONAL PARTIES FOR NOT ALLOWING YOUNG PEOPLE TO RISE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

OPTIONAL FORM 1074
(Formerly FS 410)
January 1975
Dept. of State

THE TOP.

3. ECONOMIC FACTORS - AFTER DESCRIBING THE ECONOMIC CHAOS INHERITED BY THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT, THE MINISTER WENT ON TO DESCRIBE HIS PROGRAM WHICH INCLUDES A RESTRUCTURING AND ENFORCEMENT OF TAX PROGRAMS, BREAKING THE RUNAWAY INFLATION, MOVING TO BALANCE THE BUDGET BY ELIMINATING INEFFICIENT STATE ENTERPRISES, ELIMINATING PRICE CONTROLS TO STIMULATE PRODUCTION AND PURSUING A RELATIVE CONTAINMENT OF SALARIES. THE LATTER POLICY IS ALSO GEARED AT PREVENTING UNEMPLOYMENT WHICH, THE MINISTER DESCRIBED, WOULD HAVE BEEN A SERIOUS THREAT IN TIMES OF SUBVERSION. HE SAID THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE HAVE SHOWN A UNIFIED EFFORT IN THE FACE OF THE ~~EXCESSIVE~~ THE BLOODSHED BROUGHT ABOUT BY TERRORISM BUT ARE GETTING IMPATIENT NOW THAT THE WORST IS OVER. THIS MEANS THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE TO CHANGE MENTAL ATTITUDES, AND MARTINEZ DE HOZ FEELS THIS CAN BE DONE IF THE GOVERNMENT SPEAKS TRUTHFULLY TO ~~THE~~ THE PEOPLE AND SHOWS IT IS SERIOUS AND RESPONSIBLE.

4. HUMAN RIGHTS - AFTER THIS SOMEWHAT LENGTHY INTRODUCTION THE MINISTER ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. HE EXPLAINED THE THE PERON GOVERNMENT HAD GIVEN AMNESTY TO JAILED SUBVERSIVES WHO HE DESCRIBED AS REAL CRIMINALS AND HOW THESE PEOPLE THREATENED THE JUDGES WHICH, IN TURN, LED TO A BREAKDOWN IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND THE FORMATION OF VIGILANTE GROUPS BY CITIZENS SEEKING SELF PROTECTION. THE GOVERNMENT HAS SUPPRESSED

TERRORISM AND BROUGHT ECONOMIC RECOVERY. HE RECOGNIZED THAT FORCE SHOULD NOW BE EXERCISED ONLY THROUGH LEGAL MEANS BUT EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS DIFFICULT AS REMNANTS OF URBAN TERRORISM STILL EXIST DESPITE GREAT PROGRESS. HE SAID IT IS HARD TO GO FROM A SITUATION OF CHAOS TO ONE IN WHICH THE REINS OF CONTROL, EVEN OVER THE FORCES OF ORDER, ARE BACK TO NORMAL. THE MINISTER ASSURED MRS. DERIAN THAT NO ONE WAS BEING PERSECUTED FOR POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS BELIEFS (NO ANTI-SEMITISM) ALTHOUGH HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE EXISTANCE OF A SMALL GROUP OF ULTRA NATIONALISTS NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF PUBLIC OPINION. HE SAID THAT JACOBO TIMERMAN WAS IN JAIL NOT BECAUSE HE IS A JEW BUT BECAUSE GRAIVER OWNED 50% OF HIS NEWSPAPER. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT CHARGES HAVE NOT BEEN BROUGHT AND SAID HE HAS URGED THE PRESIDENT TO RESOLVE THIS CASE ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. THE MINISTER CITED THE FOLLOWING SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT: (1) THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE SUBJECT TO COURT PROCEDURES IS OVER 1000, (2) JUDGES NOW FEEL SAFE, AND (3) TERRORISTS ARE BEGINNING TO DESERT TO THE GOVERNMENT. IN SUM HE SAW A RETURN TO DUE PROCESS AND A RETURN TO TRADITIONAL ARGENTINE VALUES BUT THAT SOME IRREGULAR PROCEDURES AND ANTI-TERRORIST ACTION OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE, ON AN EVER LESSENING SCALE, IN THIS "MOP-UP" STAGE. HE BELIEVED THE SECURITY FORCES WERE COMING UNDER STRICTER GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

5. DERIAN RESPONSE - MRS. DERIAN SAID THAT SHE FOUND THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

OPTIONAL FORM 1050
(Formerly FS-4)
January 1975
Dept of Justice

MINISTER'S PRESENTATION VERY RATIONAL. SHE AGREED THAT ARGENTINA HAD FACED A VERY SERIOUS THREAT AND ACKNOWLEDGED THE RELUCTANCE OF THE MILITARY TO STEP IN. SHE EXPLAINED THE TIME BETWEEN SUCH A TAKEOVER AND RETURN TO NORMAL PRACTICE WAS LIMITED AND EXPRESSED HER BELIEF THAT IT MAY NOW BE UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA. SHE STRESSED THAT THE STABILITY NEEDED TO CARRY OUT SUCH GOOD WORK AS THAT ENVISIONED BY THE MINISTER'S ECONOMIC PLAN COULD BE ACHIEVED ONLY BY SATISFYING THE IMPATIENCE OF THE PEOPLE AND REINSTITUTING DUE PROCESS. SHE EXPLAINED THAT WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN ARGENTINA (I.E. THE CONTINUED ENTRY INTO HOMES BY ARMED MEN, THE TORTURE OF DETAINEES, ETC.) WOULD BE TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF BY POLITICIANS. SHE FELT THE BIGGEST PART OF THE PROBLEM NOW LAY IN GETTING CONTROL OVER THE SECURITY APPARATUS; THAT TIME WAS RUNNING OUT INTERNATIONALLY, AS WELL AS INTERNALLY. SHE CAUTIONED AGAINST THE INSTINCTIVE REACTION OF FIGHTING TERRORISTS WITH THEIR OWN METHODS, SAYING THIS ONLY HELPED THEM ACHIEVE THEIR GOAL OF UNDERMINING THE LEGAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRY. SHE URGED THE GOVERNMENT TO SHOW ITS STRENGTH BY INSTITUTING DUE PROCESS AND APPEALING TO THE PEOPLE FOR SUPPORT. SHE SAID THAT JOURNALISTS SHOULDN'T BE ARRESTED AND WARNED THAT NOTHING IS EVER A SECRET. SHE WARNED AGAINST THE USE OF A PUBLIC RELATIONS APPROACH, WHICH NO ONE BELIEVES, AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR REAL CHANGES SAYING IT WAS LUDICROUS THAT NOW THAT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

OPTIONAL FORM 100A
(Formerly FS-41-A)
January 1970
Dept. of State

THE GOVERNMENT WAS PROGRESSING THAT INTERNATIONAL OPINION WAS
DETERIORATING.

6. THE MINISTER AGREED BUT EXPLAINED THAT THE PREVIOUS
GOVERNMENT LET THINGS GO TO FAR, THAT HIS GOVERNMENT ~~COULD NOT~~
HANDLE THE SITUATION IT INHERITED BY NORMAL MEANS, AND THAT THE
GOVERNMENT DOES WISH TO RETURN TO THE NORM AND IS STRONG
ENOUGH TO DO SO. HE SAID THAT VIDELA IS A HUMANE, MODEST AND
WELL BALANCED MAN AND IS A VERY GOOD PRESIDENT.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

OPTIONAL FORM 100A
(Formerly FS 41-2)
January 1961
Dept. of State

NO. 6137

TELEGRAM

1630

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SHUM, AR
SUBJECT: Interior Minister Sees Jacobo Timerman;
Congressman Gilman Also to be ~~xxxx~~
Permitted Interview With Timerman
~~XXXXXXXX~~

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO: USIA WASHDC PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 6137

CHARGE
POLB
POL/R
USIS
ECOM
LEGATT
DAO
RF
CHRON

1. Embassy has learned ^{from Hector Timerman} that less than two hours
after US Human Rights Coordinator Patricia
Derian discussed on August 10 the mistreatment
of Argentine editor Jacobo Timerman with
Minister of Interior General Albano Eduardo
Harguindeguy, ^{according to Hector,} Harguindeguy ordered that
Timerman be cleaned up, shaved and dressed
and brought to his office free of handcuffs.
Timerman was brought to the Ministry in an
official car.

2. The meeting lasted almost an hour.
Harguindeguy first asked Timerman if he was
related to Patricia Derian, to which Timerman

DRAFTED BY: ~~2:13~~ POL:WHHallman/USIS:OBRIEN DRAFTING DATE: 8/19/77 TEL. EXT. 278 CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: CHARGE: MChaplin

CLARANCES:
POL/R: Mr. Smock
DAIT: COLCoughlin
USIS: Mr. Higgins

109-2-1759
FILED
AUG 19 1977

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

FBI BUENOS AIRES

OPTIONAL FORM 103
(Formerly FS-4)
January 1970
Dept of State

answered that they were friends. The Minister then asked Timerman how he had been treated during his imprisonment, creating the impression he had been unaware Timerman had been tortured until Derian told him.

3. Timerman at first refused to answer, citing his fear of "reprisals," but when Harguindeguy assured him there would be none Timerman spelled out in detail the mistreatment he had received in prison after his arrest. He added that his jailers constantly taunted him because he is a Jew.

4. According to Timerman's son, who saw his father the following day, Harguindeguy gave his father the impression--without actually saying this--that he would not be brought before a military tribunal and might soon be freed. He said "We will resolve this situation." This thickens the Timerman plot considerably, since an Embassy officer had been told on the same day "on good authority, from Naval intelligence sources" that Timerman had "confessed to being a communist and a Soviet spy, and that he would be tried on these charges by a military tribunal." When, however, August 18 Members of Congress Gilman and Lagomarsino requested to know what charges had been made against Timerman a reply was received late in the evening from the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

OPTIONAL FORM 10-65
(Formerly FS-41)
January 1967
Dept. of State

Ministry of Foreign Affairs that he is being held for "crimes of economic subversion." (Comment: All this probably demonstrates that the forces holding Timerman have not in fact decided just what to do about their increasingly well known prisoner.)

5. Congressman Benjamin Gilman privately asked Ministry of Foreign Affairs for an interview with Timerman, which has tentatively been set for early evening August 19. After interview we may have a better idea of state of play and what will happen next.

6. As for Timerman's family, members were taken aback at Minister Harguindeguy's new stance. What they fear is that he may not be able to prevent reprisals against Jacobo. They have strongly endorsed Gilman's visit with him.

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Classification

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TELEGRAM

6173
22 AUG 1977
1241

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

GDS
SHUM, AR
Interior Minister Sees Jacobo Timerman;
Congressman Gilman Also to be
Permitted Interview with Timerman

~~XXXXXX~~

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO: USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 6173

REF: BUENOS AIRES 6137
CHANGE CLASSIFICATION CONTROL ON

CHARGE
POL3
POL/R
USIS
ECOM
LEGATT
DAO
RF
CHRON

BUENOS AIRES 6137 TO XGDS-4.

Information contained reftel must be protected.

Its disclosure would place subject individual

in immediate jeopardy of his life and could also

have a deleterious effect on US-Argentine

relations.

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CHAPLIN

DRAFTED BY:
LABATT:AGFreeman:gcr

DRAFTING DATE
8/22/77

TEL. EXT.
277

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
POL:WHHailman

CLERANCES:

109.2-1759A

AUG 22 1977

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONTROL: 6353

26-AUG-77
1300

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

GDS
SHUM, AR
TIMERMAN MOVED

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO: USIA WASHDC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 6353

CHARGE
POL3
POLR
USIS
ECOM
LEGATT
RF
CHRON

REF: BUENOS AIRES 6137

1. According to Jacobo Timerman's son Hector,

Timerman and approximately 30 other ~~indivi~~

individuals implicated in the Graiver case

were in past several days transported together

to the military garrison in Magdalena, a

Province

town in Buenos Aires/some 60 miles South

of the Capital.

2. Hector has been told that military
defendants.

attorneys have been named for all ~~defendants~~

Further legal proceedings will take place

in Magdalena "for security reasons", he

believes. According to Hector's sources

a military tribunal will now study each

case individually to decide if ~~defendants~~

defendants should be brought before a

DRAFTED BY:

POL:WHHallman/USIS

DRAFTING DATE

8/26/77

TEL. EXT.

278

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

POL:WHHallman

CLEARANCES:

AUG 25 1977

1-BUENOS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 153
(Formerly FS-413)
January 1975
Dept. of State

military tribunal, a civilian court, or set free.
these
One estimate is that ~~xxxx~~ proceedings will be
finished by September 30.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 6559

02 SEP 77

-1130

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

| | |
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| FROM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES | CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL |
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O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

GDS
SHUM, PFOR, AR
DERIAN MEETING WITH MINISTER OF INTERIOR HARGUINDEGUY

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO:

AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
~~AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO~~

CHARGE
POL-3
POL/R
ECON
USIS
SY
LEGATT
MILGP
DAO
RF
CHRON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES: 6559

REF: (A) BUENOS AIRES 6221 (NOTAL) (B) STATE 193418 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: HUMAN RIGHTS COORDINATOR MET WITH MINISTER
OF INTERIOR ON AUGUST 10. THERE SEEMED TO BE SOME
CONFUSION AS TO WHO HAD REQUESTED THE MEETING. THE
MINISTER STRESSED HIS DUTY IN PROTECTING THE MAJORITY
OF THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE IN A TIME OF WAR AGAINST
SUBVERSION, MRS. DERIAN STRESSED THAT THE TIME HAD
NOW ARRIVED FOR A RETURN TO DUE PROCESS.

1. MRS. DERIAN STARTED BY EXPLAINING TO THE MINISTER
THAT SHE WAS VERY CONCERNED WITH THE ENORMOUS NUMBER OF
PEOPLE WHO HAD DISAPPEARED, THE NUMBER ~~XXXX~~ IN JAIL

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| DRAFTED BY: D/HA:MBova:eg | DRAFTING DATE | TEL. EXT. 277 | CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: POLCOUNS:WHallman |
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REMARKS:

RECEIVED
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SEP 2 1977

FBI-BUENOS AIRES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 100-11
(Formerly FS 413-H)
January 1975
Dept. of State

WHO ARE

WITHOUT CHARGES, THE NUMBER ~~WHO ARE~~ IS SIMPLY LOST AND THE NUMBER FOUND INNOCENT WHO REMAIN IN JAIL. SHE SAID IT APPEARS THAT ONCE A PERSON IS PICKED UP IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO GET RELEASED. SHE REFERRED TO THE HARD FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM, STATING THAT SHE THOUGHT THE BACK OF THE TERRORISTS HAD NOW BEEN BROKEN. SHE WORRIED THAT WHEN A WIDE NET IS CAST MANY INNOCENT PEOPLE GET CAUGHT. SHE EXPLAINED THAT THE CHIEF OBSTACLE FOR RETURNING TO NORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. IS OUR CONCERN FOR THE MASS OF PEOPLE CAUGHT IN THE SYSTEM WITH NOTHING HAPPENING. SHE CITED PARTICULAR CONCERN FOR JACOBO ~~TIMMERMAN~~ AS A PERSON WHO HAS BECOME A SYMBOL OF THIS PROBLEM. SHE NOTED THAT WHEN SHE TALKS WITH HIGH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS THEY SPEAK OF REGULARIZING PROCEDURES, BUT THAT WHEN SHE TALKS TO INDIVIDUALS IT APPEARS THAT THESE PLANS AREN'T BEING CARRIED OUT IN PRACTICE.

2. THE MINISTER RESPONDED THAT HER PREOCCUPATION FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE PERSON ARE NO LESS THAN THE RESPONSIBILITY THE GOA HAS FOR INTERNAL SECURITY. HE SAID THE GOA WAS FIGHTING AN UNDECLARED WAR AND OPERATING UNDER THE EXCEPTIONS GRANTED BY THE CONSTITUTION. HE SAID THIS PERMITTED THE GOVERNMENT TO SHIFT PEOPLE FROM ONE PLACE TO THE OTHER UNLESS THEY EXERCISED THE RIGHT OF OPTION. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS RIGHT WAS SUSPENDED BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT COULDN'T AFFORD TO LET 2,000 PEOPLE OUT TO GATHER AGAINST IT ON THE FRONTIER. MRS. DERIAN ASKED IF ALL THE DETAINED WERE TERRORISTS. THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

MINISTER NOTED THAT THOSE WHO WERE DETAINED WITHOUT PROCESS WERE TERRORISTS AND THAT THESE ARE FEW. HE SAID MANY ARE GOING THROUGH CIVIL AND MILITARY COURTS.

3. MRS. DERIAN SAID THAT THE INSTINCTIVE REACTION TO TERRORISM IS TO DO WHAT THE GOA HAD DONE AND THAT IT MAKES THE PEOPLE VICTIMS OF THE STATE. SHE REFERRED TO THE MOTHERS AND WIVES WHO JOIN TOGETHER IN THE PLAZA EVERY THURSDAY AND CALL ON DIFFERENT OFFICES, INCLUDING THAT IN THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, SEEKING INFORMATION ON THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS. SHE ALSO REFERRED TO LABOR LEADERS IN JAIL SINCE 1975 ??? 1976

4. THE MINISTER SAID THAT HE TOO HAD TALKED TO WOMEN WHOSE FAMILY MEMBERS DISAPPEARED AND THAT THERE WAS AN OFFICE IN HIS MINISTRY TO DEAL WITH THEIR INQUIRIES. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IF THESE WOMEN JOINED TOGETHER IN CONCERTED ACTION AND, IN EFFECT, ARE DEMONSTRATING WITHOUT A PERMIT, THAT THIS WOULD BE AGAINST THE LAW. HE ASKED MRS. DERIAN TO CONSIDER THE CAUSES FOR DISAPPEARANCES.

5. SHE SAID SHE HAD HEARD THEM MANY TIMES AND HAD SEEN A BIG BOOK, THAT SHE UNDERSTOOD THE GOA'S PROBLEM WITH TERRORISM BUT DID NOT UNDERSTAND A GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD NOT FURNISH THE NAMES OF THE TERRORISTS.

6. THE MINISTER REFERRED TO THE FACT THAT THOSE DETAINED WERE IN NORMAL JAILS AND THAT ARGENTINE JAILS WERE OPEN TO THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS (ICRC). HE HANDED HER COPIES IN

SPANISH OF ICRC REPORTS. MRS. DERIAN SPECULATED THAT PRISONERS MIGHT BE HELD IN OTHER PLACES WHICH THE RED CROSS HAS NOT SEEN. THE MINISTER SAID THEY LET THE RED CROSS GO WHEREVER IT WANTS, INCLUDING TO MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. HE SAID THERE WERE NO CONCENTRATION CAMPS. ASKED ABOUT THE NAVY MECHANICAL SCHOOL, HE SAID PEOPLE MIGHT BE HELD FOR INTERROGATION IN SUCH PLACE BUT WOULD NOT BE JAILED THERE. HE SAID SUBVERSIVES ARE JAILED IN THE MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISONS.

7. MRS. DERIAN ASKED THE MINISTER WHAT WERE THE NORMS FOR INTERROGATION. THE MINISTER RESPONDED THAT WHEN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM STARTED, THOSE CAUGHT WERE TOUGH AND HIGHLY DISCIPLINED AND HAD A HIGH MORALE. HE SAID THEY WOULDN'T CONFESS ANYTHING; BUT NOW THE FIRST THING THAT PEOPLE CAUGHT DO IS TO GIVE THE NAMES OF THEIR ACCOMPLICES. HE SAID THE SUBVERSIVES ARE NOW COOPERATING AND THE GOVERNMENT SHOWS CLEMENCY TO THOSE WHO TURN THEMSELVES IN AND IS STARTING TWO PENAL COLONIES TO REINTEGRATE THOSE WHO COOPERATE INTO SOCIETY. ONCE THE MINISTER SAID THAT ~~ONCE~~ IT IS DETERMINED THAT A PERSON HAS PROVIDED THE NEEDED INFORMATION HE PASSES INTO ONE OF THREE SITUATIONS. THE GREAT BULK, WHERE THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM IS SUFFICIENT, GO TO THE CIVIL OR MILITARY TRIBUNALS. THE OTHERS, WHO HAVE CONFESSED BUT WHERE EVIDENCE IS LACKING, OR WHO DON'T CONFESS BUT WHO ARE ACCUSED BY OTHERS BUT TANGIBLE EVIDENCE IS LACKING, ARE HELD UNDER ARTICLE 23 BY THE EXECUTIVE POWER. THESE ARE THE PEOPLE WHO COULD EXERCISE THE RIGHT OF

OPTION AND, AT THIS TIME, THERE EXIST THE JUDICIAL INSTRUMENTS NECESSARY TO REINSTITUTE THE RIGHT OF OPTION.

8. MRS. DERIAN OBSERVED THAT IT APPEARED AS IF THE GOVERNMENT USED THE CONSTITUTION WHEN IT WAS TO ITS BENEFIT AND SUSPENDED IT OTHERWISE.. THE MINISTER OBSERVED THAT IN A STATE OF WAR ONE COULDN'T LET THE ENEMY GO. MRS. DERIAN OBSERVED THAT IN THE IDEOLOGICAL KIND OF WAR WHICH ARGENTINA FACED, THE GOVERNMENTS STRENGTH AND PUBLIC SUPPORT LAG IN ITS RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAW. SHE SAID THAT THERE WAS A LIMITED TIME WHERE PEOPLE WOULD PUT UP WITH ALMOST ANYTHING TO RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC NORMS BUT THAT TIME WAS VERY LIMITED. SHE COUNSELED THAT IT WAS NOW TIME FOR THE GOA TO SHOW ITS STRENGTH BY RETURNING TO LEGAL NORMS AND PUBLISHING THE NAMES OF THOSE DETAINED.

9. THE MINISTER OBSERVED THAT MANY OF THOSE WHO HAVE DISAPPEARED WERE NOT HELD BY THE GOVERNMENT. HE ~~KKK~~ POINTED TO THE CRIME FREE ATMOSPHERE OF ARGENTINA AND STRESSED IT WAS THE GOVERNMENT'S DUTY TO PROTECT THE MANY FROM THE FEW. MRS. DERIAN ASKED HIM ABOUT PEOPLE BEING ARRESTED FOR NOT HAVING AN IDENTITY CARD AND WONDERED ~~XX~~ IF THE SITUATION IN ARGENTINA WAS LIKE THAT IN SOUTH AFRICA WHERE ALL WERE EXPECTED TO CARRY IDENTITY CARDS. THE MINISTER SAID THIS WAS THE SYSTEM.

10. RETURNING TO THE ~~TIMMERMAN~~ CASE, WHICH MRS. DERIAN HAD ~~XXX~~ MENTIONED EARLIER, THE MINISTER SAID THAT ~~TIMMERMAN~~ WAS AN OLD FRIEND, BUT THAT HE HAD HEARD TAPES AND SEEN A WRITTEN

CONFESSION. ~~MRS~~ MRS. DERIAN TOLD HIM THAT WE DID NOT HAVE CONFIDENCE IN ANY CONFESSION OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF TORTURE.

11. THE MINISTER SAID ~~TIMMERMAN~~ HAD BEEN IN HIS OFFICE AND LIED TO HIM ABOUT GRAVIER'S INTEREST IN HIS NEWSPAPER. HE SAID HIS CASE WAS BEING PROCESSED AND INVITED MRS. DERIAN OR THE CHARGE TO VISIT ~~TIMMERMAN~~. MRS. DERIAN RESPONDED THAT SHE WOULD LIKE THE MINISTER TO SEE HIM, THAT SHE HAD SEEN HIM ON A PREVIOUS VISIT BECAUSE HE REPRESENTED A DIFFERENT AND RESPECTED POINT OF VIEW, THAT HE HAD DEFENDED THE GOVERNMENT AT THAT TIME AND THAT ~~XXXX~~ HIS EDITORIALS MANIFESTED THAT SUPPORT. THE MINISTER AGREED. MRS. DERIAN ADDED THAT NOT TEN DAYS AFTER SHE SAW ~~TIMMERMAN~~ HE WAS ARRESTED, THAT CHARGES HAVE NOT YET BEEN BROUGHT AGAINST HIM AND THAT HE HAS BEEN MOVED FROM JAIL TO JAIL AND HIS HEALTH HAS SUFFERED GREATLY.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

~~SECRET~~

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RR RUESBA
DE RUEHC #5559/1 3441411
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R 101019Z DEC 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 9190
BT

~~SECRET~~

STATE 295559.

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: AR

SUBJECT: US GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN ARGENTINA
AMBASSADOR'S GOALS AND OBJECTIVES --ARGENTINA

| TO | ACT | INF | TO | ACT | INF |
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| AMB | | | DAO | | |
| DCM | | | DEA | | |
| | | | FAS | | |
| FOL | 3 | | AID | | |
| ECOM | | | MILGP | | |
| POL/R | | | FEI | | |
| UD 3 | | | GSO | | |
| ADM | | | B & F | | |
| USIS | | | CHRON | | |
| SCI | | | HF | | |
| ST | | | | | |

I. ENHANCED OBSERVATION OF POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS

-- REITERATE TO ALL LEVELS OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE US VIEWS CONTINUING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: AND THAT IF CONSIDERABLE AND VISIBLE IMPROVEMENT DOES NOT OCCUR, THE US MAY HAVE TO LIMIT FURTHER ITS ECONOMIC AND MILITARY TIES TO ARGENTINA.

-- URGE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO RESTORE BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE RESTORATION OF DUE PROCESS, THE CURBING OF OFFICIALLY COMMITTED OR SANCTIONED ABUSES, AND THE PUBLICATION OF LISTS OF DETAINEES.

-- PERSUADE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT LEADERS THAT THEIR INTERNATIONAL IMAGE CAN BE IMPROVED BY SIGNING AND RATIFYING THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS TO ASSESS THE ACCURACY OF ALLEGATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

-- GIVE SPECIAL EMPHASIS TO CULTURAL EXCHANGES OF JURISTS AND OTHER INDIVIDUALS WHO MIGHT INFLUENCE HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES.

-- ENCOURAGE STEADY PROGRESS TWARD DEMOCRATIC, CIVILIAN, AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE LIFTING OF RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL PARTIES, LABOR UNIONS AND OTHER DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS.

-- DEVELOP CONTACTS AND WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF LEGITIMATE POLITICAL PARTIES.

-- ENCOURAGE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESSIONAL VISITS TO ARGENTINA WHICH WILL STRESS US CONCERN FOR BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS.

-- ENCOURAGE A GREATER AWARENESS OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE POOR AND THE UNEMPLOYED OF THE COUNTRY AND A GREATER WILLINGNESS TO DEAL WITH THESE PROBLEMS.

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FBI-BUENOS AIRES

BA-9
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02 -- CONTRIBUTE TO THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO SETTLE ARGENTINES WHO MAY BE TARGETS FOR POLITICAL PERSECUTION, IN THE US AN ELSEWHERE.

II. ARGENTINE SUPPORT FOR OUR NPT, ARMS CONTROL POLICIES

-- PERSUADE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO RATIFY AND SUPPORT THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO AND FOREGO THE ACQUISITION OF AN INDEPENDENT REPROCESSING CAPABILITY.

-- ENCOURAGE ACTIVE ARGENTINE INVOLVEMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION PROGRAM AND N SUBSEQUENT STUDIES DEVOTED TO DEVELOPING NUCLEAR ENERGY AND ENSURING THAT IT IS USED FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES.

III. ARGENTINE ROLE ON ECONOMIC ISSUES

-- ENCOURAGE ARGENTINA TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN DEFINING AND NEGOTIATING ECONOMIC ISSUES IN THE ONGOING DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE INDUSTRIALIZED AND DEVELOPING WORLD BASED ON ITS OWN INTERESTS RATHER THAN THE CONCEPT OF

LATIN AMERICAN, THIRD WORLD OR G-77 SOLIDARITY.

-- WORK TO MAINTAIN THE 20 US SHARE OF THE ARGENTINE MARKET BY TRADE SHOWS, EXHIBITIONS, ETC.

-- DO NOT DISCOURAGE ARGENTINA FROM DIVERSIFYING ITS ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH EXTRA-HEMISPHERIC COUNTRIES.

-- ENCOURAGE ARGENTINA TO INCREASE ITS ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

-- ENCOURAGE THE PRODUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT OF ARGENTINA'S AGRICULTURE AND MANUFACTURING SECTORS.

-- ENCOURAGE ARGENTINA TO PLAY A ROLE AS INTERMEDIARY IN THE TRANSMISSION OF TECHNOLOGY BETWEEN INDUSTRIALIZED AND POOR COUNTRIES.

IV. A SATISFACTORY BILATERAL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WHICH PROMOTES US SECURITY INTERESTS

-- DISCOURAGE ARGENTINA'S PARTICIPATION IN A "SOUTHERN CONE" BLOC DEVOTED TO UNDERMINING A MULTILATERAL AND POSITIVE POLICY ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

-- PROMOTE US SECURITY INTERESTS AND MAINTAIN MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE BOUNDS AND SPIRIT OF US LAW

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13. AND CONSISTENT WITH ADMINISTRATION POLICY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS RESTRAINT AND HUMAN RIGHTS. ENCOURAGE CONTINUED PARTICIPATION IN COLLECTIVE HEMISPHERIC SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS (RIO TREATY).

-- WORK TO LIMIT SOVIET INROADS INTO ARGENTINA, KEEPING IN MIND THAT ARGENTINA'S FAVORABLE TRADE BALANCE WITH THE USSR MAY FACILITATE SUCH RELATIONS.

-- IF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION PERMITS, PRESS THE ARGENTINES TO REJOIN THE 1978 JOINT LATIN AMERICAN-US FLEET EXERCISE (UNITAS).

V. ENCOURAGEMENT OF SCIENTIFIC AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION, ESPECIALLY OVER INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ISSUES

-- MAINTAIN US-ARGENTINE SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION, PARTICULARLY IN ANTARCTICA, WHERE ONE OF OUR STATIONS IS SUPPLIED VIA ARGENTINA.

-- ENCOURAGE ARGENTINA TO PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ISSUES SUPPORTIVE OF US POSITIONS.

-- IF APPROPRIATE, ENCOURAGE ARGENTINE INVOLVEMENT IN IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ISSUES, E.G., THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA.

VII. PROMOTION OF IMPROVED HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES THROUGH CULTURAL EXCHANGES

-- GIVE SPECIAL EMPHASIS TO EXCHANGES OF JURISTS AND OTHER INDIVIDUALS WHO MIGHT INFLUENCE HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES. CHRISTOPHER

BT

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CONTROL: 0458
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TELEGRAM

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| FROM | CLASSIFICATION |
| Amembassy BUENOS AIRES | UNCLASSIFIED |

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: OREP, SHUM, AR
SUBJECT: CODEL REUSS -- Meeting with U.S. Business Community in Buenos Aires
ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC

UNCLASSIFIED BUENOS AIRES 0458

ARA/PPC - Peter Johnson

REF: RIO DE JANEIRO 0093

AMB
DCM
ECOM-4
CHRON
RF
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DAO
USIS
LEGATT
SY

At the request of Representative Henry Hyde, source cited reftel prepared following summary of subject meeting with the understanding that it will not be attributed to any person or organization:

QUOTE:

SUMMARY OF MEETINGS BETWEEN U.S. CONGRESSMEN AND LEADING MEMBERS OF THE U.S. COMMUNITY IN BUENOS AIRES, Argentina, on January 5, 1978

As senior member of the Congressional delegation, Rep. Moorhead expressed the group's interest in hearing as many points of view as possible, and its pleasure at having the opportunity to meet with leading members of the North American Community in Buenos Aires.

DRAFTED BY:

ECOM:RReed/mp RR

DRAFTING DATE

1/19/78

TEL. EXT.

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CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

ECOM:JCanott

CLEARANCES:

DCM: MCHADLIND
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Most of the discussion which followed was in answer to questions by the Congressmen and concerned terrorism and human rights problems, with the following major points made:

Anti-semitism does exist in Argentina, as in any country with a sizable Jewish population (the local Jewish community generally is described as the world's fourth largest), but anti-semitism is not official policy and allegations that Jews are being singled out for mistreatment by the armed forces and police because of their religious beliefs are exaggerated. There is considerable suspicion of the Jewish Community among other Argentines because of the disproportionate number of Jews among leftist extremists. This, however, was attributed to the fact that extremists of the left have concentrated their recruiting efforts in the universities, where the percentage of Jews enrolled is much higher than the percentage of Jews in the population at large.

It was recognized that the resentment described above is an element in the case of Jacobo Timerman, founder and publisher of the newspaper LA OPINION of Buenos Aires. But those commenting said that MR. Timerman's arrest and continued detention were primarily the result of his close ties with Peronists blamed for wrecking the economy between 1973 and 1976.

There is widespread skepticism about allegations of massive human rights violations in Argentina, especially those voiced by liberal politicians and so-called human rights "activists" in the United States who have been notably silent about atrocities committed by extremists of the left.

One participant recalled that when two Americans, Ford Motor Co. manager John Swint and U.S. Consular Agent John Patrick Egan, were murdered by leftist extremists, so-called human rights elements in the United States -- including those in the U.S. Congress -- were not heard to denounce the killings. This and similar instances, he said, have convinced many people in Argentina that "human rights" groups are motivated or at least swayed by political beliefs rather than by sincere concern over human rights. That belief, he said, was re-inforced by U.S. co-sponsorship of a United Nations resolution condemning Chile while ignoring the fact that many countries -- including co-sponsor Cuba -- have far bloodier human rights records than Chile.

Another person compared the local situation to destruction of the Symbionese Liberation Army (in Los Angeles), whose demise most Americans seemed to regard as fully justified in view of the ferocity and desperation of the SLA. Argentine extremists, he explained, have been

and remain every bit as vicious and desperate as the SLA was, and most Argentines look upon their disappearance the same way that Americans saw the SLA episode.

One executive reviewed a five-year period during which he, his family, his home, his automobile and his factory were the targets of bombs, bullets and constant threats. Despite the fact that he was heavily guarded, he never knew when he left home in the morning whether he would return that evening, or whether his family would be alive if he did so. "What about my human rights?" he asked. "Where were the people who should have been concerned about my human rights? I would like to know."

A U.S. resident cited two cases which he said help put the situation into better focus -- explaining attitudes, not justifying them. The first was that of an Army colonel kidnapped and held for months in a hole beneath the floor of a shack on the edge of Buenos Aires. His captors, he said after his escape, told him that they were prepared to wipe out 20 million people -- women and children included -- should that prove necessary to take over Argentina. (It was noted that Argentina has about 25 million people.) The second one was an attack on an off-duty Army captain and his children in which the officer and one daughter were murdered and a second child

wounded so seriously that she will be a "vegetable" as long as she lives. The North American's comment was that the officers and men who served with the colonel and the captain are not at all inclined to "go easy" on extremists who fall into their hands, regardless of instructions from above and/or protests from abroad.

Several persons complained of a general lack of understanding in the United States about what Argentina has been through, both politically and economically, and of the desire on the part of those who have suffered to see those responsible for the suffering punished -- without being afforded the benefits of the U.S. legal system. One man emphasized the fact that the laws of Argentina and other Latin nations are based on the "guilty until proven innocent" Napoleonic Code, rather than English Common Law with its emphasis on individual rights. Another cited the widely held belief that extremists have so intimidated judges -- murdering one -- that no civilian jurist would dare give a stiff sentence to convicted terrorist. Still another recalled the period during which enrollment in a school attended largely by the children of U.S. residents ~~plung~~ plunged from 1300 to less than 300 in two years. Families had to flee without telling their friends, carrying only hand luggage. People who experienced that, he said,

may find it hard to keep in mind that two wrongs do not make a right, or to work up sympathy for leftists whose rights are being violated now.

Quiet diplomacy appears much more effective in bringing about improvements than well-publicized and orchestrated criticism from Washington and the United Nations, especially since such attacks seem to be leveled almost exclusively against anti-Communist governments while excesses in Cuba, Cambodia and any number of African and Middle East nations go unnoticed or denounced. An example of counter-productive action cited was the Congressional move to include human rights in the criteria for loans from international agencies.

There also was discussion of the Argentine Government's anti-inflation program and its attitude toward U.S. investment. Most participants expressed optimism and, in particular, admiration for Economy Minister José A. Martínez de Hoz and his associates in their efforts to ~~be~~ rebuild the economy.

END QUOTE.

CASTRO



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AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E.O. 11652:

TAGS:

SUBJECT:

ACTION:

INFO:

GDS
SHUM, PINS, AR
Disappearance of French Nuns and
Mothers' Group Supporters

SECSTATE WASHDC

AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

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USIS
SY
LEGATT
CONS
CHRON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES

77 0482

REF: A) 77 BUENOS AIRES 9420 (NOTAL);
B) 77 BUENOS AIRES 9715; C) BUENOS AIRES 9763;
D) 77 BUENOS AIRES 9523 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: We have tried hard to clarify the
circumstances surrounding the disappearance
of two French nuns and some 11 other Argentine
citizens in a series of abductions December 8-10.
Our findings are contradictory and inconclusive,
and the fact remains that at this writing we
have no sure knowledge regarding the nuns'
abductors or their present whereabouts. Our
sources generally agree that the operation was
carried out by some arm of the security forces.

DRAFTED BY:

POL: WHHallman
POL: WThayer: gcr

DRAFTING DATE

1/19/78

TEL. EXT.

277

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

DCM: MChaplin

CLEARANCES:

~~POL: WHHallman~~

~~SY: RHealy~~

POLR: DSmock

LEGATT: RScherrer

CONS: Shapiro (in draft)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

BA-17

OPTIONAL FORM 153

January 1975

Dept of State

but which specific group and the level of responsibility is unclear. The supposed Montonero note claiming responsibility for the abduction has been generally discounted and the government's failure to follow up or publicly play that lead indicates that not even GOA is seriously convinced of Montonero involvement.

END SUMMARY

1. The Embassy has made considerable effort to clarify the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of two French nuns and several other Argentine citizens in a series of related abductions during December. The single aspect of the case on which there is general agreement is that the operations were probably carried out by security forces and that those persons responsible and knowledgeable about the case are guarding their information very closely.

2. The question of which group and even of which branch of the security forces--and at what level--might be responsible for the abductions remains unclear. All three military services and the police deny--apparently even to their bosses the top service commanders--having any responsibility or information on the case. Absence of knowledge is the official stance of the Argentine Government. Reportedly, government leadership--at very least President Videla--is seriously concerned about

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the international implications of the nuns' disappearance, and word has gone out from top levels in the Federal Police and the Army to locate the nuns and "cough them up" if found. The apparent lack of any publishable response is taken by some sources as evidence that the abducted persons are not being held by the Federal Police and probably not the Army--it being assumed that Videla has clout with these groups sufficient to force one or another to reveal its hand. Expression to this belief clearly implies that it was the Navy which pulled off the abductions, but this is left unsaid except during most confidential and intimate conversations.

3. Most sources strongly deny that the Federal police were in any way involved. ~~At the same time,~~ nevertheless Relatives of the disappeared persons claim that the kidnappers showed police credentials and that one of the detainees managed to send a message to his family through a prisoner subsequently released that he was being held in Federal Police Headquarters (See BUENOS AIRES 9715). It is also apparent that the kidnappers were free to operate in considerable number in a downtown church square without any interference from regular police in the area. ~~This implies that at least there was recognition of mistaken belief on the part of police forces that a regular security operation was in~~

progress and the police should stand clear. (Several of those who disappeared had been previously picked up by police in earlier arrests made at the Plaza de Mayo demonstrations, but the arrests were made openly and the persons subsequently released after questioning at the police headquarters.) XXXXX

4. There is considerable dispute and a spectrum of theory whether the abductors were some low-level group acting on its own or whether the operation was authorized by or subsequently brought to the attention of those at a higher level. The French Embassy's military attache has stated confidentially that he does not believe that the top levels of the three services can possibly be implicated in the case. Yet some sources claim it is impossible for the Army or any element of the Army to have committed the operation without the Commander in Chief, President Videla, knowing of it within a day. Those who defend the Army hint that the Navy may have abducted the nuns in order to embarrass the Videla Government and undermine his "Peace by Christmas" initiative (if, in fact, there ever was one). High-level Navy sources declare that the top Navy hierarchy is in firm control and that it is impossible for anyone in the Navy to act completely on his own authority. This discounts the possibility that some "out of control"

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navy group authored the abductions. Admiral Massera himself obliquely blamed the Army as the service most capable of such a muddled, ill-judged caper as this one. (See BUENOS AIRES 9523). The Air Force is generally discounted as not having the capability or motive to have authored the operation.

5. One theory is that security forces--affiliation unknown--were simply going about their business of rounding up suspected subversives and/or troublemakers without special consideration to the international political sensitivity of the nuns and the mothers' group supporters. (Comment: Several Argentine sources have referred to the nuns' order as being leftist or even "communist.") Once these forces discovered they had two hot potatoes on their hands--the nuns and a barrage of adverse publicity and pressure from abroad--the Army (possibly at the level of the First Corps Commander) conceived the abortive "Montonero letter ploy" (See BUENOS AIRES 9763). An extension of this theory has it that the presidency did become aware of the facts, at some point, but found the information so monstrous and embarrassing that it believed it had no choice but to stonewall all the way. (This theory of course has grim implications for the abducted persons, since the easiest course might be to liquidate the abducted group and

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hide the evidence.)

6. A variant of the above theory was information which came from a well-known American businessman who employs Army intelligence officers as moonlighting night time security watchmen. These guards claimed to have positive knowledge that a group of security officers picked up the nuns not only because they believed the nuns to be leftists but also to signal their dissatisfaction with Videla's "soft policy" on subversion. In this variant, it was also believed that the President knows of the deed but lacks the power or the determination to move against those guilty.

7. In this plethora of possibilities and theories, the one that seems the least plausible is that which suggests Montonero involvement. In their deteriorated state at present, it is unlikely the Montoneros still possess the logistical capability to have abducted and be holding the nuns and some 11 other Argentines. The fact that government officials themselves have failed to follow up or to publicly play that lead ~~indicates~~ ~~indicates~~ not only that they don't believe it but that they don't think it will "fly". (Although, as time passes and the government's silence becomes untenable, some military officers have shown an inclination to refloat the Montonero argument--when they are not hinting at the

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[involvement of some rival military service.)]

8. The one argument not touched thus far is that of "cui bono." In the muddled situation we face here perceptions of "benefit" to one party or another may seem bizarre. There could even be reason to suspect Montonero involvement on this basis, for if in fact ^{one} the aim of that movement is to discredit the Argentine Government before the world then the nuns' abductions and those of their associates performs this admirably. If we can propose that Admiral Massera's political ambitions and dislike for Videla outstrip his sense of loyalty to the Junta of which he is member and Argentina's international image, then the abductions are well made for the Admiral's benefit. In these same "cui bono" arguments we cannot even dismiss the shortsighted (in our opinion) view of a security service, which sees its mission the extirpation of subversion in all its forms. To persons of this mind the government's own discomfiture is not so important as there being one less "subversive" nucleus. About the only persons who in no way can benefit from the abductions appear to be Videla himself and those Army generals--Viola and Harguindeguy, for example--high in government and closely associated with Videla's competence and fate.

[9. We learned from deputy Nuncio Kevin Mullen]

(protect) that the Papal Nuncio received a reply to his official inquiry from Interior Minister Harguindeguy early this week to the effect that despite an "exhaustive search" GOA has no information on what happened to the nuns. Mullen said that by the tone of the letters he believes Minister of Interior Harguindeguy is suggesting that the case should be considered closed. According to today's press (January 20), Argentine Ambassador Anchorena recently told the French Foreign Ministry that Videla's answer to Giscard d'Estaing's personal letter on the nuns would be soon forthcoming. The Argentine demarche also indicated that Harguindeguy had sent a letter to French National Assembly President Faure explaining measures taken to clear up the affair. We suppose that Harguindeguy's response ^{was} to Faure in the vein of his letter to the Nuncio.

10. The French and Vatican embassies appear to have lapsed into resignation and doubt that any further action would have any positive effect. Officials from both embassies have speculated privately to Embassy officers that they fear the nuns are dead. There is also no indication that the French are inclined to take any dramatic action which might prejudice other bilateral interests, including important commercial ties. At this point there seems to be little more that diplomatic protest can produce, except possibly even greater frustration for the

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4-12-76

OPTIONAL FORM 157A
(Formerly FS-413A)

January 1975

Dept of State

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
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government in its inability to determine what happened in this case--or more surly reticence if it is deliberately withholding information which would prove too damaging to reveal.


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| SCI | | | CHRON | | |
| SY | | | RF | | |

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINT, SHUM, AR

SUBJECT: MASSERA AND HUMAN RIGHTS

1. ARTICLE WHICH APPEARED IN JANUARY 27 "WASHINGTON POST" HAS BEEN SENT TO YOU BY THE USIA WIRELESS.

2. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS ON WHETHER MASSERA IS ON THE SIDE OF THE ANGELS, AS HE SEEMS TO BE PORTRAYING HIMSELF.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE REPLY BY COB JANUARY 30. CHRISTOPHER
BT
#2648

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109-2-1780

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TELEGRAM

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| FROM | AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES | CLASSIFICATION | CONFIDENTIAL |
| E.O. 11652: | GDS | | |
| TAGS: | PINT, SHUM, AR | | |
| SUBJECT: | MASSERA AND HUMAN RIGHTS | | |
| ACTION: | SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE | | |
| | CONFIDENTIAL BUENOS AIRES | | |
| AMB | REF: STATE 22648 | | |
| DCM | | | |
| POL3 | 1. It is difficult for us to believe that | | |
| POLR | Massera is on the side of the angels where | | |
| ECOM | human rights in Argentina are concerned. | | |
| USIS | We believe this difficulty is shared by | | |
| DAO | private Argentines who give thought to | | |
| LEGATT | human rights. It is widely believed here | | |
| SY | that the Navy (as well as the Army, Air Force | | |
| RF | and Federal Police), has been responsible for | | |
| CHRON | abductions, torture during interrogations, | | |
| | summary execution, and extra-legal detention. | | |
| | 2. There is no firm evidence, however, about | | |
| | any of this. The possibility exists that | | |
| | Massera's boys in blue are truly Argentina's | | |
| | finest, pure of heart and with unstained hands. | | |
| | The fact, however, that the Navy has its own | | |

| | | | |
|-------------------|---------------|-----------|--|
| DRAFTED BY: | DRAFTING DATE | TEL. EXT. | CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: |
| POL:WHHallman:gcr | 1/30/78 | 278 | DCM:MChaplin |

CLEARANCES:

USIS:JHiggins
POLR:JSears
DAO:COLCoughlin
LEGATT:RScherr
SY:RKelly

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 53
(Formerly FS-413)
January 1976
Dept. of State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

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MRJ

individual security ~~for~~ service, and of its known involvement in security investigations leads to opposite conclusions. The Navy's anti-terrorist operations in 1976 and early 1977 was very tough in such specific areas as Mar del Plata and Bahia Blanca. The Navy Mechanics School has been cited as a tough interrogation center. Consensus here is that also Massera is responsible for whatever the Navy does. There are few "out of control" theories of rumors about the Navy.

3. Admiral Massera, whatever his other flaws, is an instinctive and savvy politician who has worked hard--and within some constituencies effectively--to create for himself a base of power grounded upon personal popularity. In addition to his own efforts, Navy officers and civilians especially trusted by Massera go about praising his name and replenishing his laurels. Massera boasts of his contact and popularity with labor people, Peronists, Jews and Civil Rights groups. He has a front man who has even ~~been~~ opened a "civic center" here in Buenos Aires to act in the Admiral's support. While his actions make him look very much like a populist, Massera especially criticizing Army Chief of Staff Viola for his "populist" tendencies. Massera, in fact, bad-mouths his Army colleagues with increasing indiscretion. It was inevitable, we believe, that some bright reporter would

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REF

open doors upon Massera's not so-private political activities. Just as Massera has used incidents like the Russian trawlers and, to an extent, the Beagle issue to gain popularity within Argentina, he now appears to be using the human rights issue to gain the good will of the US Government.

4. As of noon January 30 no press coverage of or commentary concerning the "Washington Post" story had appeared, except for brief mention in ^{a Buenos Aires} German language daily to President Carter's reference to the "Washington Post" article. We suspect nothing further will appear, but that the story will nevertheless become widely known here and will cause a stir in government circles.

5. Lastly, we should point out that the rivalry game is not one which Massera plays unopposed. Two publications-- "Creer" and "Tribuna de la Republica"--believed linked closely to Massera have had issues seized and been briefly suspended from publication. This follows the brief banning of "Conviccion", also believed a Navy supported.

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~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)



Intelligence Information Cable

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ROUTINE

IN 461591

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE


b1 per CIA

~~SECRET~~

DIST 10 JANUARY 1975

Profile 109-12-201

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA



b1 per CIA

SUBJECT: INTENTION OF THE ARGENTINE FEDERAL POLICE TO
RETALIATE FOR THE DEATH OF A POLICE OFFICER BY
KILLING A NUMBER OF ARGENTINE TERRORIST LEADERS

ACQ:


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SOURCE:

1. COMMENT: ON 26 DECEMBER 1974 AN ABORTIVE ATTEMPT

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WAS MADE TO ABDUCT TWO FOREIGN EXECUTIVES OF LEVER BROTHERS,
ARGENTINA, AS THEY WERE EN ROUTE TO THEIR OFFICES IN BUENOS
AIRES. DURING THE INCIDENT, FEDERAL POLICE OFFICIAL
OMAR CADENZZI, WHO WAS ACTING AS A GUARD FOR THE
EXECUTIVES IN HIS OFF-DUTY HOURS, WAS SHOT AND KILLED.



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WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

CADENAZZI'S PARTNER, ASSISTANT POLICE INSPECTOR LUIS ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ, WAS WOUNDED. THE TWO EXECUTIVES WERE ABLE TO ESCAPE WHILE THE TERRORISTS WERE CONCENTRATING ON THE TWO POLICE OFFICIALS WHO WERE RIDING IN A BACK-UP VEHICLE.

2. IN EARLY JANUARY 1975 MIGUEL ANGEL RODRIGUEZ, A FORMER LEADER OF THE LIBERATION ARMY-22 AUGUST (EL-22 AUGUST--FORMERLY KNOWN AS THE 22 AUGUST FACTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY--ERP-22 AUGUST), IDENTIFIED THE PICK-UP TRUCK USED BY THE TERRORISTS IN THE ABORTIVE KIDNAP ATTEMPT AS BELONGING TO THE EL-22 AUGUST. BASED ON THE DESCRIPTIONS PROVIDED, HE IDENTIFIED SOME OF THE PARTICIPANTS AS MEMBERS OF THE EL-22 AUGUST.

3. BASED ON RODRIGUEZ' INFORMATION, ELVIO ROSSI, DEPUTY CHIEF OF FEDERAL POLICE, HAS ORDERED THAT RETALIATORY MEASURES BE TAKEN AGAINST EL-22 AUGUST LEADERS; SPECIFICALLY, ROSSI ORDERED THAT EFFORTS BE MADE TO ASSASSINATE TEN EL-22 AUGUST MEMBERS. FEDERAL SECURITY (FEDERAL POLICE INTELLIGENCE) IS NOW ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE TEN INDIVIDUALS FROM A TARGET LIST OF APPROXIMATELY 14 EL-22 AUGUST MEMBERS. AMONG THE

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IN 461591

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WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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(classification) (dissem controls)

PROMINENT NAMES ON THIS LIST ARE GUSTAVO ADOLFO R O C A,
DANIEL H O P P E N AND FRANCISCO V E N T R I C I.
ACTION IS TO BE INITIATED AGAINST THE TERRORISTS WHENEVER
THEY ARE LOCATED. THE ASSASSINATIONS ARE TO BE CARRIED OUT
BY OFFICERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INDICTMENTS AND THOSE FROM
THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY POLICE CHIEF.

b1 per CIA

4. [] COMMENT: THE FOREGOING INDIVIDUALS ARE
WELL-KNOWN ARGENTINE SUBVERSIVES WHO ARE EXPERIENCED IN
CLANDESTINE EXISTENCE. THUS, THE FEDERAL POLICE MAY
HAVE SOME DIFFICULTY IN LOCATING THEM. []

b1 per CIA

[]

5. [] DISSEM: EMBASSY, DEFATT, FBI AT BUENOS AIRES:
SENT TO CINCSO, CINCLANT,
REPORT CLASS SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM.
CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B
(2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

~~SECRET~~

1/28/75

~~SECRET~~

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (109-12-201)
FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)(P)
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.
BUDED: 2/15/75

Reference my airtel and LHM 12/11/74 under the
above dual caption.

ENCLOSURES

For the Bureau eight copies of an LHM dated
and captioned as above.

ADMINISTRATIVE

The enclosed LHM being submitted at this time
at the specific request of the Ambassador in connection
with a visit to Argentina on 2/19/75 of Secretary of State HENRY
KISSINGER. The Ambassador requested information in the
enclosed LHM in connection with Embassy reporting on the
terrorist situation to assist U. S. Secret Service and
Department of State security officials in arranging for
Secretary KISSINGER's visit. *Parag. unclassifiable per State Dept
see State Dept. letter dated 1-23-85*

The enclosed LHM discloses only the more serious

- 3 - Bureau (Encs. 8)
(1 - Foreign Liaison Unit)
2 - Buenos Aires
RWS:jn
(5)

4-25-01
CLASSIFIED BY *1063ELW/ACE/RA*
DECLASSIFY ON: *25X 1, 6*
Argentina Project

NOTE

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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BUE 109-2; 109-103

terrorist activities which have occurred since the submission of referenced LHM.

DISSEMINATION

Local dissemination has been made to the Ambassador, the [redacted] and the Regional Security Officer. [redacted]

b1 per CIA

CLASSIFICATION

The enclosed LHM has been classified SECRET, ~~XGDS-1 and 2, Indefinite.~~

SOURCES

Refer to the attached Non-Symbol Source Page.;

Non-Symbol Source Page attached.

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NON-SYMBOL SOURCE PAGE

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Collective confidential sources abroad referred to in the enclosed LHM are identified as follows: (S) (U)

Dr. ARTURO HORACIO POIRE (BUEfile 80-84)
Federal Police of Argentina (FPA)

Comisario Inspector JORGE CROVETTO (Buefile 80-87)
Chief of Federal Crime, FPA (S) (U)

Sub-Comisario CARLOS ALBERTO MONTENEGRO (Buefile 80-186) Department of Intelligence, FPA Estado Mayor (S) (U)

Comisario Inspector OSVALDO J. DE BALDRICH (Buefile 80-185)

Chief of Intelligence (S) (U)
Buenos Aires Provincial Police (BAPP) (S) (U)

Captain JUAN LUCERO (Buefile 80-173)
Argentine Army Intelligence Service (AAIS)

Colonel JUAN RIVAS
AAIS

General ALBERTO S. CACERES (Buefile 64-14)
Commander of the Argentine Army
Gendarmeria Nacional (Border Guards) (S) (U)

HENRY ACKERMAN (Buefile 80-163)
Associated Press Representative T-4

Comisario FRANCISCO SPINOSA
Department of Federal Security, FPA T-3

Colonel Alberto Valin
Chief AAIS

~~SECRET~~

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0940

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM
BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

GDS
ASEC, PINS, AR
Over View of Terrorist Situation in Argentina

ACTION:

SecState WASHDC I M M E D I A T E

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 0698

FMB

From RSO Beckett

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POL

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CONSULAR

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CHRON

SUMMARY: This report is submitted for the purpose of keeping security elements of the Department informed as to local conditions which may affect the pending visit of the Secretary. This report will cover short summaries of specific terrorist actions between 1 January and 28 January, 1975; a condensed assessment analysis of the terrorist posture within Argentina and a composite of weapons and the technique of their employment currently being used by terrorist elements

Following is a chronological listing of violent incidents accredited to terrorism in Argentina from 1 January through 28 January, 1975. The information furnished ~~xxx~~ cannot necessarily be considered all inclusive since the incidents contained in this report

DRAFTED BY:

RSO:GEBECKETT:ac

DRAFTING DATE

1/28/75

TEL. EXT.

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109-103-201
CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY

AMBASSADOR HILL

CLEARANCE:

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POL

Legatt

A/DCM - Mr. Hedberg

are those which have known to be reported. The source of this information comes from the local news media, reports to the RSC's office from the Federal Police GOA (FPA) and the Legal Attache's Office.

January 2, 1975

In Mendoza bombs were placed at the homes of the Communist Party's Secretary General, a leader of the Peronist University Youth and former advisor of Governor Alberto Martinez Boca.

The offices of the evening newspaper La Tarde were bombed.

January 3, 1975

Federal Police officer was standing on a street corner waiting for a bus, three men and a woman approached him with weapons in hand, ordered him to lie face down on the pavement and machine gunned him. They removed and took with them his weapon, belt and badge.

January 3, 1975

In La Plata industrialist Rudolf Leandro Saurnier was kidnapped when he stopped at a traffic light. Kidnapping was executed by armed men employing three vehicles.

January 10, 1975

Five bodies (unidentified) were found in a Buenos Aires Province. Bodies had been blown to pieces in two separate dynamitings.

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January 13, 1975

Editorial and Administrative offices of the newspaper El Atlantico were destroyed by a bomb.

January 15, 1975

A bomb attack was carried out against a Ford Motor Company showroom in Adrogué. The night watchman was slightly injured and ~~was~~ hospitalized as a result of the bombing.

January 17, 1975

A group of terrorists machine gunned the residence of the Mayor of San Miguel de Tucuman. After completing the machine gun attack against the Mayor's residence, the terrorists tossed Molotov bombs, causing minor damages. The Montonero guerrilla organization claimed credit for this action. A BAPP Officer was ambushed by terrorists in San Justo, BAP.

An FPA Officer was killed and another wounded when they attempted to question individuals distributing leftists propaganda near the Floresta Railroad Station.

January 20, 1975

A band of approximately 24 armed individuals dressed in green fatigue combat uniforms kidnapped and executed a farm worker in Tucuman. Subsequently this same band set fire to a station of the Tucuman Provincial Police (TFP), which was unoccupied.

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January 20, 1975 (continued)

TFP officials believe that the perpetrators of these acts were members of the ERP.

The residence of a construction workers official was machinegunned in Cordoba.

In Salta the residence of a former official of the municipal government was bombed.

The ERP took over a local television broadcasting station in Cordoba and broadcast propaganda for a short period of time utilizing a taped message.

January 21, 1975

A group of terrorists took over and burned the San Rafael Railroad Station in Tucuman.

In La Plata, the residence of a BAPP officer was forcibly entered and the credential and badge of this officer were stolen.

Two unoccupied houses were bombed by terrorists in Tucuman. In Bahia Blanca, BAP, a bomb attack was carried out against a private residence.

Er Corrientes bomb attacks were carried out against two brothers, who are members of the Provincial Police. The Montoneros claimed credit for these bomb attacks.

January 23, 1975

A Doctor was kidnapped and subsequently found murdered in Tucuman.

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January 23, 1975 (continued)

The publishing facility of the newspaper "La Voz del Interior" was taken over and subsequently destroyed by right-wing terrorists belonging to the AAA organization. An FPA source reported that the individuals carrying out this attack against "La Voz del Interior" were the same individuals who had previously carried out a bomb attack against the printing facility of the leftist newspaper "El Mando" in the PC during January, 1974.

January 24, 1975

In Bahia Blanca, BAP, terrorists broke into the residence of a local government official and assassinated him. The residence of the assassinated official had been subjected to a terrorist bombing during March, 1974.

In Tucuman the bodies of two ERP members were discovered. Members of the ERP broke into the residence of a private citizen and seriously wounded him during an assassination attempt.

In Cordoba the body of Rafael Gustavo Gigena was discovered in Villa Carlos Paz, Cordoba Province. The victim was the brother of Enrique Gigena, who was killed on November 20, 1974, during a shootout with the Cordoba Provincial Police.

January 25, 1975

An FPA Officer was robbed of his gun and badge in Rafael

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January 25, 1975 (continued)

Calzada, BAP.

A bomb attack was carried out against the Director of "El Diario", an afternoon newspaper published in La Plata. In Bahia Blanca, BAP, the law office of a local attorney was machine gunned.

In Tucuman the residence of a sugar workers union officer was bombed.

A Santa Fe Provincial Police Officer was kidnapped by several armed individuals. He was subsequently released after being subjected to a beating. His service revolver and police credentials were stolen.

January 26, 1975

The residence of a construction worker was bombed in Cordoba.

January 27, 1975

A bookstore was bombed in the FC.

In Viedma the residence of a provincial government official was bombed.

Four presumed terrorists forcibly entered a garage in Nunez, BAP, and stole two automobiles. In nearby Munro, BAP, six armed individuals presumed to be terrorists forcibly entered a garage and stole four automobiles. An official of the BAPP advised that the theft of automobiles by terrorists usually is a warning sign that some major

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January 26, 1975 (continued)

terrorist act will occur within the next few days.

In Cordoba six pounds of high explosives, together with blasting caps and fuses, were stolen from a construction site by presumed terrorists.

January 28, 1975

In the suburb of B.A. Armando Canziani, National Director for Regional Delegations of the Ministry of Labor and his bodyguard were assassinated by gunmen from a moving car.

II. On January 28th, 1975 a routine liaison meeting was held between members of the Security Office and senior members of the FPA. The topic of discussion was weaponry and its employment as known to be in use by terrorist elements.

1. CONVENTIONAL HAND/SHOULDER WEAPONS: Terrorist elements (ERP and Montoneros) have in their possession an extensive quantity of hand guns and shoulder weapons of the conventional type. These weapons are of various calibers and makes. Assassinations to date have been carried out using hand guns, shot guns, and sub machine guns.
2. CREW SERVED WEAPONS: The terrorists have mortars, recoilless rifles, bazookas, heavy machine guns, rocket launchers, anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft weapons.

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CONTINUATION SHEET

a. The rocket launchers are known to have been used on at least four occasions withⁱⁿ the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires i.e., Attack on US Embassy Residence, September 13, 1973, Attack on the Chilean Embassy, September 15, 1974, Sheraton Hotel, March 1973, Metal Workers Union in 1973. A rack of four rockets mounted on a launcher (the type used in these attacks) was made available for viewing. The warhead of the rockets appeared to be approximately three to four inches in diameter and approximately seven inches long. Rockets were of both commercial and local manufacture. The FPA representatives advised that the attack on the Chilean Embassy was not as successful as it could have been because the terrorists failed to anchor the launching rack and the first discharge threw the rack out of alignment destroying accuracy. Detonation was triggered by a mechanical timer.

b. No information was furnished concerning the use of crew served machine gun, recoilless rifle or anti-tank and anti aircraft guns for assassinations.

c. FPA representatives stated that the ^{bazooka} ~~bazooka~~ had not been used for assassination attempt to date. They advised that the bazooka was being manufactured by local terrorists. ^{according to the FPA,} Ammunition for the bazooka (rockets) are

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being supplied by Cuba. The detonator of the rocket is also being supplied from Cuba but are in short supply. Attempts by terrorists to successfully manufacture a detonator which is reliable have ~~not~~ been unsuccessful to date. It was the volunteered opinion of the FPA representatives that the terrorists were saving the use of the bazooka for a "spectacular". They also stated that the FPA had tested one of the rockets which was confiscated during the course of a ^{raid} ~~raid~~ and found that at 100 meters it would penetrate ^{50 millimeters} ~~100 millimeters~~ of armor plating.

d. Bombs. The FPA advised that bombs had been employed in the last six to eight months in the assassination or attempted assassination of well known personalities. i.e. General Pratz, September 30, 1974, Chief, FPA, Alberto Villar, November 1, 1974, and attempted assassination of Chief FPA Luis Margaride, December 23, 1974. In the Pratz case the bomb was affixed to the automobile with a magnetic device and fired by a mechanical timer. In the Villar incident the bomb was attached to the bottom of a motor cruiser and detonated by RF switch. The attempt on Margaride was carried out by employing a "claymore" detonated by RF switching.

1. According to FPA the bomb ~~presently~~ presenting

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the greatest threat is the Claymore. Terrorist factions have received construction information and employment techniques on these weapons from Cuba which in turn obtained its information from the Viet Nam conflict.

2. The current trend of employment is that of attaching the bomb to the side of a vehicle, ^{driving} ~~driving~~ the vehicle into position along a known route traveled by a dignitary and detonating it as the dignitary passes. They were of the opinion that the best defensive technique against the use of this bomb and the type of MO described is that of traveling large well used streets; because, it would not be in the terrorist interests to bring about mass killing of bystanders.
3. The type of explosives used in the Claymore varies. In some cases "plastique" is being employed, on the other hand the terrorists are making use of black powder and other explosives (fertilizer based) which can be easily combined and manufactured in their own workshops. In order to obtain the desired effects of explosion the terrorists vary the size of the Claymore.
4. The explosive experts of the FPA advised that they were beginning to study the possibility of bombing from "tunneling". To date they had no information.

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indicating such an operation had been carried out in Buenos Aires.

b. The major concerns of the FPA representatives are the techniques of detection and concealment of Claymores in building structures, streets, etc. for future activation.

III. SKF furnished the following condensed analysis of terrorism as related to left wing groups in Argentina.

1. At present, there are two left-wing terrorist groups in Argentina which have the capability to engage in more than sporadic acts of violence. They are the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP, the military arm of the Marxist-Leninist-oriented Revolutionary Worker's Party--PRT,) and the Montoneros, a self-prescribed armed force compiled from within the left-wing sector of the Peronist youth movement.

2. The Montoneros, which abruptly decided to go underground in September 1974 as a result of unofficial government and right-wing Peronist repression, are involved in efforts to consolidate their forces and organize themselves for a protracted struggle against the Argentine Government. Thus, while the Montoneros continue to carry out isolated terrorist acts--such as the assassination of former Police Chief Alberto Villar and the abduction of the Born Brothers,

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the primary focus of their activists thus far has been on internal organization and political action to gain adherents among supporters of Peronism. Recent information indicates that the Montoneros are in contact with a sector within the Argentine Army which is sympathetic to the formation of a "Peruvian-style" military government. According to this information the Montoneros feel their best hope for attaining political power in the future rests with the formation of an alliance of progressive military, labor and youth sectors. It is believed that the announced intention by the Peronist youth to form a "Descamisado" Political party is an effort to forge such an alliance. Thus, the Montoneros are believed to be reluctant to become too closely involved with the ERP, although certainly contact is maintained between the two groups, and to participate in actions which the Montoneros judge are counterproductive to their long range political objectives. While firm information on this is not available, it is estimated that the Montoneros have an armed force of approximately 2,000 trained combatants.

3. In contrast to the basically defensive military posture of the Montoneros, and despite the present period of reduced terrorist activity, the ERP continues to declare publicly its intention of engaging in

assassinations, kidnapping and other acts of violence.

The tactical plans of the ERP appear to be based on the objectives of dividing the Argentine body politic and fomenting sufficient unrest and public disorder to bring about a military coup d'etat. In this manner, and especially through growing polarization of political forces, the ERP hopes to be able to assume the leadership of the forces of the left, including the Montoneros, for the struggle against the eventual military government.

4. The current reduced terrorist activity on the part of the ERP is believed to be related to two basic developments. First and undoubtedly most important, is that the ERP is being subjected to strong repression by the Argentine security forces. The ERP has ~~zug~~ suffered substantial losses in men and material during the past three months. It is quite obviously on the defensive and is busily engaged in protective measures to prevent additional reversals. Secondly, the ERP is probably reassessing its tactics in the aftermath of its random assassination campaign against Argentine Army officers. There is evidence to suggest that ERP leaders belatedly came to the conclusion that the campaign, which was initiated in retaliation for the deaths of approximately 16 ERP combatants following the abortive ERP attack on a military

[regiment in the Province of Catamarca in August, 1974]

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had become a political liability and had resulted in reducing the image of the ERP among the general public. ERP leaders reportedly decided to select future terrorist targets with more care and to place more attention on political action projects. Related to this was the assessment by the ERP that the Argentine economy would begin to show signs of significant deterioration by mid-1975. Accordingly, the ERP has decided to undergo preparations for a new terrorist offensive in the March/April 1975 timeframe. Purportedly, this offensive is to be directed primarily against the economic base of the country, including sabotage against essential industries, and designed to contribute to the expected economic deterioration.

5. Such preparations are not expected to result in a complete hiatus of ERP terrorism during the period leading up to the projected new offensive. The ERP will undoubtedly take advantage of any opportunity to create discord in the country and bring additional pressures on government stability. For example, recent reporting has indicated that the ERP was considering some terrorist action immediately preceeding or during the now postponed meeting for Foreign Ministers in Buenos Aires, which was originally scheduled to be held in March 1975. The purpose of such contemplated action was to attempt to disrupt the meeting, and

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embarrass both the government and Secretary Kissinger. Reportedly, the ERP requested the assistance of the Montoneros in an attempt to abduct a U.S. business executive or a U.S. official in Buenos Aires during Secretary Kissinger's planned visit to the country. The ERP was allegedly not considering any direct ^{action} against the U.S. Secretary of State during his stay in Buenos Aires, primarily because of the expected protection he will be afforded by the local security services. While the Montoneros reportedly rejected the ERP request for assistance, and while the Foreign Ministers Meeting has been postponed, the possibility that the ERP will attempt some terrorist action on its own to embarrass Secretary Kissinger during his projected February visit cannot be discounted.

As with the Montoneros, little information on the numerical strength of the ERP is not available. It is estimated that the ERP has some 400 to 600 trained combatants. Again, as with the Montoneros, this number only refers to armed and trained terrorists and does not include support personnel and sympathizers.

Subsequent summary reports will be submitted every seven to ten days as material is collected. Serious incident reports, should such occur, will be provided on an immediate basis.

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February 12, 1975

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

Several confidential sources abroad provided the following chronological summary of the more serious terrorist acts carried out in Argentina during the period January 28, 1975 through February 9, 1975:

January 28, 1975

The Army of Liberation-August-22 Faction, a splinter group of the Argentine terrorist organization, the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), assassinated a ranking official of the Argentine Labor Ministry and his bodyguard in the Federal Capital (FC).

An Argentine citizen was wounded by gunfire by unidentified assailants in what appeared to be a traffic incident in the FC. Subsequently, T-1 reported that the assailants in this matter were officers of the Federal Police of Argentina (FPA) who became incensed at the failure of their victim to yield the right of way to their unmarked police cruiser.

In Corrientes, the residence of a Provincial Police official was machinegunned.

In Buenos Aires Province (BAP), a Buenos Aires Provincial Police (BAPP) corporal was gravely injured by machinegun fire while he was waiting for a bus.

In San Juan, a bomb exploded at the residence of a transport union official.

bl per CIA

- 8 - Bureau
- 1 - Ambassador Hill
- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - RSO
- 1 - Defense Attache
- 2 - Bue (109-2) (P)

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Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B (1) (2)
Automatically declassified on TMDT

((1) - 109-103) (P)

All sources mentioned herein have furnished reliable information in the past.

RWS:gjk
(14)

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Argentine Project

109-103-206

RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

In Cordoba, a violent shoot-out took place at the headquarters of the Automotive Workers Union.

In Rosario, the residence of a carpenter was fired upon and subjected to an incendiary bomb attack.

January 29, 1975

In La Plata, BAP, the son of a high-ranking Argentine union official was assassinated. This individual was an officer in the Construction Workers Union in La Plata.

T-2 advised that BAPP investigation established that this assassination was probably related to union matters.

In La Plata, bomb attacks were carried out against the residences of three executives of the Swift Meat Packing Company.

In Mar Del Plata, BAP, the Montonero guerrilla organization kidnapped the director of a construction company.

In San Juan, a National Deputy of the Partido Bloquista was severely beaten by the provincial police when he allegedly resisted their attempts to search his residence for arms.

January 30, 1975

In Cordoba, a bomb attack was carried out against a private residence and a bar.

In Wilde, BAP, a bomb attack was carried out against a chemical company.

In Avellaneda, BAP, terrorists took over a factory of Molinos Rio De La Plata, distributed propaganda and threw tear gas grenades.

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RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

January 31, 1975

In the Federal Capital, several Molotov bombs were discovered near the University of Buenos Aires School of Medicine, where the Eleventh International Legal Medicine Seminar was being held.

In Baradero, BAP, the body of an unidentified male was discovered. This individual had been shot several times and was gagged.

In BAP, the body of a male individual was discovered in the Men's Room of a railroad station. This individual had been shot through the head and according to T-3, the FPA ruled out suicide.

February 1, 1975

The Mar Del Plata offices of a construction company were subjected to a bomb attack. The victim construction company is owned by Carlos Dazeo, who was kidnapped by the Montoneros on January 29, 1975.

In Rosario, a bomb exploded at the residence of a retired Santa Fe Provincial Police (SFPP) officer.

In Rosario, a bomb was detonated at the residence of the son of an Argentine Army non-commissioned officer.

The residence of an engineer with the Esso Petrochemical Corporation was bombed in Rosario.

The residence of an active-duty Santa Fe Provincial Police officer was bombed in Rosario.

A pickup truck parked near the Argentine Army Second Corps Headquarters was destroyed by an explosive device in Rosario.

RE: . FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS--ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

In Rosario, a bomb was detonated at the office of Cura Brothers Company.

The Argentine Navy Recruitment office in Rosario was subjected to a bomb attack.

A private Argentine citizen discovered a bomb near his residence on the way to work in Rosario. The bomb exploded while being handled, causing this individual's right hand to be amputated.

A bomb exploded in Rosario at a textile factory.

A bomb was deactivated by SFPP officers at the residence of an SFPP official in Rosario. Also, the SFPP deactivated a bomb at the office of a tire company in Rosario.

The ERP broke into the Civil Registry in Rosario and stole documentation.

In San Cristobal, FC, a body was discovered. According to T-3, the body had been riddled with bullets and FPA investigation established that the victim was a terrorist.

In Rosario, a branch of the newspaper, "La Capital", was bombed.

In San Luis, a bomb exploded at the residence of an Argentine National Deputy.

In Bahia Blanca, EAP, the law office of a local attorney was broken into and vandalized. The perpetrators of the act painted Montonero propaganda with aerosol spray before leaving the premises.

February 2, 1975

In Rosario, an SFPP officer was assassinated.

A bomb was located in a railroad freight car and deactivated by SFPP officers in Rosario. The freight car was

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

parked on a railroad siding and destined for a chemical company.

In Rosario, the SFPP deactivated a bomb at the residence of a Justicialista Party leader in San Lorenzo.

In San Miguel, BAP, a Molotov bomb was thrown against an automotive transport truck.

In Moron, BAP, a badly decomposed body was discovered.

February 3, 1975

In Santa Fe, a badly decomposed body was discovered. The hands and feet of the body were tied with wire.

In Villa Urquiza, BAP, unidentified armed individuals took over a private parking garage and stole three automobiles. One of the stolen automobiles was a red Ford Falcon sedan.

In Cordoba, five individuals armed with machineguns attacked the residence of a private Argentine businessman. Subsequently, the residence was subjected to an incendiary attack.

February 4, 1975

In Salta, a bomb detonated at the residence of the former vice-president of the Chamber of Deputies.

In Tucuman, a sugar workers union official and three of his bodyguards were assassinated.

A powerful bomb was detonated at the residence of a high-ranking officer of the Tucuman Provincial Police.

In BAP, various armed individuals assaulted a BAPP officer and stole his service revolver and police identification.

In the Federal Capital, approximately fifteen armed individuals kidnapped the owner of a cold storage company.

RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

February 5, 1975

An Argentine Army soldier died as a result of wounds sustained in 1971, when an Argentine Army truck convoy, of which he was a part, was ambushed by the ERP.

In Junin, terrorists wounded the owner of a private business concern during an attack. The victim is married to the daughter of the former governor of BAP.

The blind-folded body of an unidentified individual was discovered machinegunned in the FC.

In BAP, a body was discovered in the burned-out shell of an automobile. The body had been riddled with bullets.

February 6, 1975

In Cordoba, a bomb exploded at the residence of a typewriter sales executive.

February 7, 1975

An executive of the Alba Paint Company, a subsidiary of the Bunge & Born Company, was assassinated in BAP. Perpetrators of the act utilized a red Ford Falcon sedan with a siren in order to intercept their victim before assassinating him.

A similar vehicle was stolen on February 3, 1975 from a private parking garage in Villa Urquiza, as noted above.

Subsequently, T-4 advised that various news agencies received a communique from the ERP claiming credit for the assassination.

In BAP an executive of a heater company was kidnapped by the Montoneros.

A shoot-out took place at the office of the Alianza

~~SECRET~~

RE: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

Libertadora Nacionalista (ALN) at the FC. A youth was killed as a result of the shoot-out.

February 8, 1975

The Montoneros carried out a Molotov bomb attack against the residence of a Telephone Company official in San Isidro, BAP.

February 9, 1975

In Mar Del Plata, an executive of a food catering company was kidnapped by several individuals armed with automatic weapons.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

1100
14 FEB 75
1803

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM Ambassador BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION ~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

E.O. 11652:

TAGS:

SUBJECT:

N/A

PIRS, ASEC, AR

National Deputy Assassinated - PRIORITY.

ACTION:

Secstate WASHDC

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ BUENOS AIRES 1100

AMB
POL (3)
POL/R
ECOA
SCLAT
USIS
DAO
WELP (2)
REUATT
SV
CHRON
RF

1. National Deputy Hipolito Acuña was shot at midday on Feb 14 while leaving his house in the City of Santa Fe. Three persons were reported to have fired at him and he died 2 hours later in a hospital as a result of his wounds. Acuña was from MID faction of FREJULI and was therefore extreme. probably not identified with either political ~~extremes~~. The ~~motivation~~ motivation for his ~~assassination~~ assassination is thus not yet clear.
2. In addition, while details are lacking at this point, 3 other political killings were reported to have ~~occurred~~ occurred today. Two were reportedly leftists killed by ~~XXX~~ AAA and 1 retired Navy AGO ~~previously~~ apparently killed by terrorists.

FILE

109-103 - 2/3

RECEIVED BY: 26
POL:DCJ:db
CIE:WANCER

TRANSMITTING DATE:
2/14/75

SEC. EXT.
121

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
POL:WSSmith

DOM:JUN:alica

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA THE DCM

2/28/75

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

KIDNAPPING OF HUGO ALFREDO ANZOARREGUI
CHIEF JUSTICE
BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL SUPREME COURT

On 2/28/75, an official of the Buenos Aires Provincial Police advised that captioned individual was abducted by presumed terrorists this morning in Monte Grande. Source advised Buenos Aires Provincial Police have launched an extensive investigation.

1 - Addressee
cc's: 1 - POL

1 - POL-R

1 - SY

1 - DAO

③ - Bue (109-103)

(1-109-NEW) (Above) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(1 - 80-185-Baldrich) ~~Classified By 5931~~

RWS:gjk

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on IMDET

DECLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/BCE/DC
ON 4-26-01
Argentina Project

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

3/6/75

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

LEGAL ATTACHE

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA

On 2/26/75, an FPA official assigned to the
Department of Federal Security, made available the follow-
ing information: (S) (U)

A recent incident took place in Cordoba Province
when security officials assigned to Governor RAUL OSCAR
LACABANNE there detected that RAFAEL GUSTAVO GIGENA was a
member of the ERP and apparently had frequent contact with
an FPA Official Principal assigned to the FPA delegation
in Cordoba. Governor LACABANNE's security detail picked up
GIGENA and subjected him to torture during which he admitted
that he was an ERP double Agent reporting to the ERP on
activities of the FPA in Cordoba. GIGENA entered the FPA
as an intelligence agent approximately three years ago and
had been assigned to Cordoba as a penetration agent in the
ERP. Governor LACABANNE's security detail then picked up
the Official Principal assigned to the FPA Cordoba delegation,
who was GIGENA's control. This Official Principal was subjected
to torture and was found to have no knowledge that GIGENA was
in fact an ERP double Agent working against the FPA. Ultimately,
FPA Chief LUIS MARGARIDE learned of the detention of the
Official Principal GIGENA and demanded their release. The
Official Principal was eventually returned to the FPA; however,
GIGENA's body was discovered on 1/24/75 in Villa Carlos Paz,
Cordoba Province. (S) (U)

FPA Chief MARGARIDE was so incensed over this
incident that he ordered the FPA delegation in Cordoba to
be severely reduced and removed FPA troops from the Province.
The incident also resulted in the resignation of Cordoba
Provincial Police Chief LUIS GARCIA REY. It should be noted
that GIGENA's sister was also a member of the ERP, who had
been killed on 11/20/74 in the shootout with the Cordoba
Provincial Police. (S) (U)

- 1 - Addressee
- 1 - POL
- 1 - POL/R
- 1 - SY
- 1 - DAO
- 3 - Buenos Aires
 - (1 - 64-25)
 - (1 - 109-103)
 - (1 - 80-84)

RWS:jn

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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1/16

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Argentinian Project for

Classified By 5931

Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on INDET

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THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCI

3/12/75

LEGAL ATTACHE

ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

On 3/11/75, an official of the Argentine Army Intelligence Service (SIE), made available the following information: (S) (U)

The SIE has positively identified the betrayer of an Army convoy, which was ambushed in early 1971 near Pilar, Buenos Aires Province, by a joint Commando of the ERP-FAL, as Army Conscript JORGE OSVALDO PARETS. PARETS was born on 3/6/50 and has Argentine CI 6.382.244. (S) (U)

During the ambush an Argentine Army Lieutenant was killed and subsequently during February, 1975, an enlisted man, who had been wounded, died. (S) (U)

1 - Addressee

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- 1 - SY
- 1 - DAO

2 - Buenos Aires

(1 - 109-103)

(1 - 880-Balin) (S) (U)

RWS:jn
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Classified by 5931

Exempt from General Declassification

Schedule of Executive Order 11652

Exemption Category 5B(2)

Automatically declassified on INDET

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~~DATE 05-03-2017 BY 16~~
~~Argentine Project~~

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232

12 MAR 75
1402

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLEC.
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM: Embassy BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

R.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT: Terrorists Kill Five Policemen and Attack Chrysler Plant
ACTION: Secstate WASHDC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 1702

1. In five incidents in four days terrorists have killed 5 policemen and a police doctor. One of the policemen was killed and ~~xxx~~ another wounded in a March 10 attack on a police post in a Buenos Aires suburb. A police station in La Plata was also fixed upon and ~~bomb~~ bombed on March 10. Two policemen were killed on March 11 and two more ~~died~~ died. March 8 attacks on police posts on the General Paz highway which rings the Federal Capital. A police doctor was shot and killed on March 7 in Rosario. In total there have been fifteen policemen killed since the first of the year.
2. Terrorists used grenades to destroy six ~~automobiles~~ automobiles at the Chrysler plant near Buenos Aires. No injuries were reported. A Montoneros communique claimed credit for the act saying it was in retribution of Asst. Sec. Rogers.

DRAFTED BY:

POL:WASHDC

DRAFTING DATE:

3/12/75

TEL. SY. G.

120

CONTENT AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

POL:WASHDC

CLEARANCES:

AMBASSADOR ROBERT C. HILL

DCM:JJM



preparatory trip for the visit of Secretary Kissinger.
is

3. The rash of attacks on police ~~was~~ at least in part the work of the Montoneros as, according to SRF, they were responsible for ambushing a police vehicle on Feb. 28 in a Buenos Aires suburb. Three of the four policemen riding in it were killed. As policemen are responsible for a large portion of rightwing terrorism this may be the Montoneros (and possibly the ERP's) method of retaliation.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classification~~

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCI

3/14/75

LEGAL ATTACHE

ANONYMOUS THREAT AGAINST
GENERAL MOTORS ARGENTINA'S
COMPTROLLER

On 3/13/75, GORDON BOLING, General Motors Argentina's Financial Director, advised that during the afternoon of 3/10/75, the wife of General Motor Argentina's Comptroller, DUILIO DI BELLA, received an anonymous telephone call at the DI BELLA residence during which the caller told Mrs. DI BELLA that her husband had better watch his step or there would be serious consequences. BOLING advised the caller did not identify himself with any terrorist organization nor did he give any indication that he was connected with any labor organization.

BOLING advised that the DI BELLA residence has had guards assigned to it for a considerable period of time, and that in view of the threat the Buenos Aires Provincial Police are providing two armed escorts for DI BELLA and arrangements have been made for a follow car with three armed off-duty officers to accompany DI BELLA.

- 1 - Addressee
- 1 - POL
- 1 - POL/R
- 1 - ECON COUNSELOR
- 1 - SY

(1 - Buenos Aires (109-103)

RWS:jn

(6)

4-26-81 39065UJACE/PC
Argentinian Project

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

| | | |
|--|---------------------------------|------------|
| 1. COUNTRY: Argentina | 8. REPORT NUMBER: [REDACTED] | b3 per DIA |
| 2. SUBJECT: (U) Worsening Terror Situation in Argentina (U) | 9. DATE OF REPORT: 1975, Mar 21 | |
| 3. ISC NUMBER: N/A | 10. NO. OF PAGES: 13 | |
| 4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 1974 Dec - 1975 March | 11. REFERENCES: [REDACTED] | |
| 5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: 1974 Dec - 1975 March Argentina | 12. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED] | b3 per DIA |
| 6. EVALUATION: SOURCE [REDACTED] INFORMATION [REDACTED] | | |
| 7. SOURCE: A: Press (Various) B: USEMB REPORT: LEGATT C: RECORDS | | |

| | |
|--|---------------|
| 15. SUMMARY: This IR forwards a chronological listing of some of the presumed and/or known terrorist activities in Argentina during the Dec 1974 through March 1975 timeframe; report is essentially raw material; [REDACTED] of significance of data and potential projections. (U) | (Leave Blank) |
|--|---------------|

NO FORN to Protect Source B and to avoid embarrassment to GOA.

- (U) Dec 2, 1974
Tucuman: Capt. Viola, Argentine Army, Assassinated - his 3 year old daughter also killed.
- (U) Dec 5, 1974
Buenos Aires: La Cantabrica Manager assassinated - firm manager shot by ERP who distributed leaflets accusing manager of mistreating workers.
- (U) Dec 7, 1974
Buenos Aires: Brother of ERP activist Oscar Montenegro, Luis Montenegro, found murdered.

| | | |
|--|---|---|
| 16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: USCINCSO USARSO USNAVSO USAFSO LEGATT | 17. DOWNGRADING DATA: (TOP SECRET) [REDACTED] CLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED] EXEMPTION OR (4) AUTOMATICALLY UNCLASSIFIED (EFF DATE) 2005 SECRET NOFORN (Classification and Control Markings) | 18. ATTACHMENT DATA: None 109-103-242 SEARCHED INDEXED SERIALIZED FILED MAR 20 1975 LEGAL ATTACHE - BUENOS AIRES Rwx |
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DD FORM 1396
1 SEP 62

REP. 115 DA FORM 1046, 1 AUG 60,
OPNAV FORM 3820 (Rev 10-61),
AF FORM 112, JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE
USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63.

CONTINUATION SHEET

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OF

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Buenos Aires

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Rosario: Four armed ERP men distributed gifts (appliances, money) after taking over a school - then they fled.

4. (U) Dec 10, 1974
Rosario: In an apparent extremist attack to take over Police Station the attempt was aborted.
5. (U) Dec 11, 1974
Rosario: Two policemen were ambushed by extremists and wounded.
6. (U) Dec 12, 1974
Buenos Aires (Campo de Mayo): Three bodies were blown to bits. Apparently shot and then blown up to cover trail.
7. (U) Dec 13, 1974
Buenos Aires: ERP issued statement calling off random Army Army officer assassination campaign, probably due to reaction against death of Capt. Viola's 3 year old daughter. (N.B. item of Dec 2, 1974).
8. (U) Dec 13, 1974
Buenos Aires: Five bodies found on same day - one, an ex-leftist Peronist Youth Activist, two others found in front of Colon Theater with their bodies draped with ERP flag, final two found in other parts of the city, apparently victims of right wing terrorism.
9. (U) Dec 15, 1974
Rosario/Santa Fe: Bomb attacks against residences in Rosario as well as against Mechanic's Union Local in Santa Fe.

Mar del Plata: A fish packing company owner was assassinated after his home had been bombed on two occasions and his car shot up.
10. (U) Dec 16, 1974
Avellaneada: A third cadaver-without- hands discovered - hands apparently cut off after victim was shot up and killed.
11. (U) Dec 18, 1974
Rosario: ERP Extremists threw "Molotov Cocktails" aimed at 3-M Company Offices - property damage resulted but no personal injuries.

Cordoba: A group of five (3 men, 2 women) Subversives were found in possession of leftist literature and hand grenades.

Buenos Aires: Bodyguard of the Governor of Buenos Aires Province shot up but escaped death.
12. (U) Dec 19, 1974
Rosario: During a Police Raid arms, ammunitio, medical supplies, and literature were discovered at a Subversive Refuge.

San Luis/Tucuman: The homes and cars of Government and Labor Officials were bombed. No personal injuries reported.

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Buenos Aires

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Rosario: Police Raid turned up apparent Cell Hq. complete with arms and equipment.

13. (U) Dec 20, 1974
Beccar: Body found - a nearby sign read "Tupamaros"

14. (U) Dec 21, 1974
La Plata: Extremists killed chemical engineer on the street; apparently in reprisal for labor disputes at plant where he was director.

Buenos Aires: A Plaza San Martin thief identified later as extremist. The thief was killed while trying to rob an old woman.

15. (U) Dec 21, 1974
Talleres: Police Station was hit by terrorist; small amount of arms and ammunition stolen.

16. (U) Dec 23, 1974
Buenos Aires: A University Professor was assassinated; he was a noted Catholic nationalist and a news paper writer.

17. (U) Dec 24, 1974
Buenos Aires: Chief of Police Margaride was nearly killed as bomb exploded; the bomb exploded in a truck which passed the car Margaride was driving - two police escorts wounded and 1 killed.

18. (U) Dec 26, 1974
Rosario: Extremist attacked Police Station taking police seals, books, and guns. A Sergeant was killed returning to the station.

19. (U) Dec 27, 1974
Buenos Aires: Police, tipped by phone call, investigated murder of a Uruguayan student found dead at Leftist Student Group Headquarters.

20. (U) Dec 28, 1974
Ezeiza International Airport: A guerrilla courier, allegedly carrying coded ERP documents, was arrested.

Quilmes: Extremists, believed to be 22 August Faction ERP) robbed bank truck - 2 guards wounded.

21. (U) Dec 30, 1974
Buenos Aires: Bodies of a bullet-riddled couple found near Panamerican Highway.

22. (U) Jan 2, 1975
Mendoza: Bombs planted at homes of 3 leftwing politicians explode - no injuries reported.

23. (U) Jan 3, 1975
Avellaneda: Federal Policeman Hernando gunned down - his gun and badge confiscated.

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REPORT NO. 4

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ORIGINATOR

Buenos Aires

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24. (U) Jan 9, 1975

La Plata: Industrialist Sauriener kidnapped - apparently by ERP as ERP emblems were later found in abandoned get-a-way car.

Buenos Aires: One injury resulted in the intentional crash of presumed terrorist truck and police car - a prolonged shoot out followed crash.

25. (U) Jan 13, 1975

Santiago Del Estero: Bombs destroyed two automobiles - no injuries.

26. (U) Jan 16, 1975

Buenos Aires (San Justo): Shootout resulted when terrorists attempted to take over factory - harangued workers.

27. (U) Jan 17, 1975

Tucuman: Mayor's home shot up by 10-man group who also painted anti-mayor slogans as well as tossing a few molotov cocktails - no personal injury.

28. (U) Jan 18, 1975

La Plata: Attack on La Prensa's (National Newspaper) La Plata office: Police arrested alleged ERP member believed responsible.

Buenos Aires: Extremists killed a policeman and wounded another. Incident occurred when Police approached persons handing out leaflets.

29. (U) Jan 19, 1975

Santa Fe: Bomb explosion - powerful bomb went off in Light and Power Workers' Union Headquarters. While there were no serious injuries, grave property damage resulted.

Tucuman: Laborer assassinated - sought out, taken away and murdered by 20 terrorist in green uniforms.

Tucuman: Group of terrorists, reported to be the same 20 as mentioned in above item, burned a Tucuman Province Police Station - no casualties resulted.

Buenos Aires: In the restroom of a popular bar six were wounded in bomb explosion.

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REPORT PAGE 5 OF 13 PAGES
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30. (U)

February 13, 1975

An attack was carried out against a guard post of an Army Engineering Battalion in Villa Martelli in Buenos Aires Province (BAP).

In Coronel Brandsen, BAP, the body of an unidentified male individual was discovered. This individual had been shot several times.

In BAP, a Federal Police of Argentina (FPA) Corporal was robbed of his service revolver and credentials.

31. (U)

February 13, 1975

In Tucuman, bombing attacks were carried out against the residences of a candidate for national office from the Radical Civic Union, an Argentine political party, and against a former leader of the Tucuman College of Attorneys.

A bombing attack was carried out against offices of Molinos Rio de la Plata in BAP.

The remains of a body were discovered in Nunez, BAP.

32. (U)

February 14, 1975

The bodies of two laborers were found in Villa Recondo, BAP. The laborers had been executed and investigation by the Buenos Aires Provincial Police (BAPP) established that they were connected with a paint and brick manufacturing company respectively. BAPP investigation established that officials of the paint and

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Buenos Aires

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FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

brick manufacturing company had previously been executed by terrorists.

A retired naval non-commissioned officer was executed by terrorists in Bernal, BAP.

In Cordoba a bomb attack was carried out against the residence of a municipal official.

In Santa Fe a national deputy was executed by terrorists.

In Lomas de Zamora, BAP, the Montoneros bombed a local pizza parlor. In flyers left at the scene of the bombing, the Montoneros accused the owner of the pizza parlor of collaborating with the police.

In Lanus, BAP, the Montoneros attacked a medical clinic and abducted a Doctor as a hostage.

In Tucuman an Argentine Army officer was killed and two non-commissioned officers seriously wounded in a terrorist ambush. These Army personnel were taking part in an anti-terrorist sweep in Tucuman Province.

In Salta a journalist was killed in a bombing by presumed terrorists.

In Mar del Plata a bombing attack was carried out against an employee of a heater company.

33. (U)

February 15, 1975

In Corrientes a bomb attack was carried out against the Partido Antonomista, a political party.

FPA bomb experts defused a bomb located in the Federal Capital.

In Mendoza the bodies of two male individuals were discovered in an area where several other bodies appeared in the past. The bodies contained numerous bullet wounds.

In Quilmes, BAP, the body of an unidentified male was discovered. The body bore numerous bullet wounds.

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Buenos Aires

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FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

In La Plata, BAP, a bomb attack was carried out against an Argentine naval installation.

Also in La Plata, a grenade attack was carried out against the offices of the National University Federation.

In Cordoba a bomb attack was carried out against the residence of an individual, who was recently detained for being a member of the ERP extremist organization.

34. (S/NED)

February 19, 1975

In the Federal Capital, the body of a youth was discovered tied to a tree. The youth had been executed and his body bore numerous bullet wounds. EPA investigation established that the dead youth was a member of the Montonero guerrilla organization.

35. (U)

February 17, 1975

In Cordoba a bomb attack was carried out against the residence of a veterinarian. Another bomb attack was carried out against the residence of a private Argentine citizen.

In Lomas de Zamora, the body of an unidentified male individual was recovered. The body contained numerous bullet wounds.

36. (U)

February 13, 1975

In Ciudadela, BAP, the residences of two telephone employees were bombed.

In San Isidro, BAP, an employee of an automobile parts company was executed.

37. (U)

February 19, 1975

In Cordoba an armored EPA personnel carrier was attacked by extremists. One EPA officer was killed and three seriously wounded.

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Buenos Aires

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FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

A body riddled with fifty bullets was discovered in Mar del Plata.

Several bombs were thrown from a passing automobile at the Argentine Association of Telegraph Workers in Santa Fe.

In Cordoba, a bomb detonated at the office of the Taxi Workers Union.

38. (U)

February 20, 1975

FPA officers were fired upon in the Federal Capital, when they approached a suspicious vehicle in order to question its occupants.

In Rio Tercero, Cordoba Province, shots were exchanged between a military patrol and unknown individuals.

In Cordoba, explosives, blasting caps and fuses were stolen from a mining company.

In Cordoba, a dairy company was machinegunned by the Montoneros and propaganda painted on the walls of the building.

39. (U)

February 21, 1975

In Cordoba, bombing attacks were carried out against a farm machinery company, a branch of the National City Bank of New York, and a local office of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company.

In Rosario, the ERP murdered a metal workers union leader.

In Moron, BAP, a Chevrolet automobile showroom was bombed.

40. (U)

February 22, 1975

A bomb detonated at a men's haberdashery store in the Federal Capital.

In Campana, BAP, two Argentine coast guard officers

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FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORISM CONTINUES

were attacked and their arms stolen.

In Resistencia, the residence of the Social Welfare Minister was bombed.

41. (U) February 25, 1975

In Cordoba, a police officer was machine-gunned to death outside of the 14th precinct of the Cordoba Provincial Police (CPP).

In Rosario, a Santa Fe Provincial Police (SFP) officer was machine-gunned to death as he stood on a street corner.

In Rosario the body of an unidentified male individual bearing numerous bullet wounds was discovered in an irrigation ditch.

In La Plata, an innocent bystander was killed as a result of a shootout between officers of the BAP and unidentified individuals.

42. (U) February 25, 1975

In Quilmes, a bomb exploded at the residence of a Provincial Ministry of Justice employee.

In Lomas de Zamora, BAP, an industrialist was kidnapped.

A body riddled by numerous bullets was discovered in the Federal Capital. Shortly after the discovery, the ERP claimed credit for the act.

43. (U) February 26, 1975

JOHN PATRICK EGAN, U. S. Consular Agent in Cordoba, was kidnapped by the Montoneros.

In Ramos Mejia, BAP, unknown individuals threw a hand grenade at a parked BAP cruiser.

In Santa Fe, a bomb exploded at the residence of a Santa Fe Provincial Bank employee.

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CONTINUATION SHEET

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b3 per DIA (Leave Blank)

**FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES**

44. (U)

February 27, 1975

In Cordoba, two unidentified individuals shot up the residence of a CPP officer.

In Tigre, BAP, two unidentified men and a woman, armed with automatic weapons, held up a BAPP officer and stole his service revolver.

In Avellaneda, BAP, the body of an unidentified male individual was discovered in a garbage dump. The body contained numerous bullet wounds.

In Monte Grande, the PRESIDENT OF THE Buenos Aires Provincial Supreme Court, was kidnapped by extremists.

The body of a former Secretary to the Governor of BAP was discovered near Ezeiza International Airport.

In Lomas de Zamora, a BAPP vehicle was attacked by Montoneros and three officers killed.

In Tucuman, a bomb exploded in an abandoned automobile killing an Argentine Army enlisted man.

In Cordoba, U. S. Consular Agent JOHN EGAN was executed by his Montonero captors.

In Neuquen, a shootout took place during the general assembly of the Provincial Employees and Laborers Association of Neuquen.

In Rosario, the ERP took over two repair shops of the Mitre Railroad and distributed propaganda.

45. (U)

March 1, 1975

A petroleum workers union official was assassinated in the Federal Capital.

In Rosario, a bomb detonated at the Mitre Railroad warehouse. This attack was carried out by the Montonero guerrilla organization.

- 6 -

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(Classification and Control Markings)

CONTINUATION SHEET

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FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

46. (U)

March 2, 1975

In Cordoba, the body of an employee of the Ika-Renault Company was discovered. This individual had been shot and his body bore marks of torture.

In San Martin, P12, an FPA Corporal was involved in a shootout with presumed terrorists outside of his residence.

In Sarandi, P12, the body of a young woman was found near the Pan American Highway. The victim had been shot several times.

In Florida, BAP, presumed terrorists stole a large bulldozer, presumably for use in some future terrorist act.

March 4, 1975

47. (U)

In Santa Fe, the Montoneros shot up the front of the residence of a political party.

48. (U)

In Mendoza, the residence of an Argentine businessman was bombed. Also in Mendoza the Secretary General of the Newspaper Vendors Union was bombed.

49. (U)

In Tucuman, two men and a woman were killed when the car in which they were riding exploded.

50. (U)

Tucuman Provincial Police investigation established that a powerful bomb apparently detonated in the trunk of the car and that the female victim apparently had been executed and was being transported to some dumping ground.

50. (C)

In Rosario a bomb attack was carried out by the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT) against an Argentine Navy office. This attack represented the third incident against this office in a short period of time.

51. (U)

In Cordoba three incendiary devices were thrown against

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FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITY

the office of the Dunlop Tire Company.

52. (U)

March 5, 1975

In Temerley, BAP, a Federal Police Corporal was assaulted and robbed of his service revolver and police identification.

In the Federal Capital, armed individuals invaded the office of a cattle-breeding association, kidnapped the caretaker and his wife, and set the office on fire. Subsequently, the caretaker and his wife were released unharmed.

53. (U)

March 6, 1975

In Tucuman, a police corporal was machine-gunned to death as he left his residence enroute to work.

54. (U)

March 7, 1975

A bomb completely destroyed an automobile in the Federal Capital.

A medical doctor employed by the Santa Fe Provincial Police was assassinated in Rosario.

55. (U)

March 8, 1975

An FPA office was attacked in La Plata, EAP. After subjecting the office to machine-gun fire terrorists planted a time bomb and fled the scene.

Two FPA officers were assassinated in the Federal Capital during an extremist attack against their guard post.

In Berazategui, BAP, the Montoneros bombed a glass factory, which is a subsidiary of Corning Glass Products, Corning, New York.

In Vicente Lopez, BAP, terrorists machine-gunned the front of the Bank of Tokyo office.

In Santa Fe, bombing attacks were carried out against the residences of a political party official and a member of the municipal council.

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(Classification and Control Markings)

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b3 per DIA

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FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

Another bomb attack was carried out against the residence of a Peronist official.

In Santa Fe, a bomb was discovered at the Sauce Viejo Airport.

In Cordoba, the residence of an assistant to the Federal Interventor was machine-gunned.

56. (U)

March 9, 1975

In San Justo, RP, the body of an unidentified male individual was found. This individual had been shot several times.

In Mendoza, a shootout took place between unknown individuals and the Mendoza Provincial Police near the Fourth Air Force Brigade Headquarters.

March 17, 1975

b1 per DIA
b3

57. (U) Berrisico: Marxist-Leninists Guerrillas claimed responsibility for seriously wounding two Navy

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(Classification and Control Markings)

P. 9

BUENOS AIRES
HERALD

BUENOS AIRES

3/23/75

and Social Welfare Minister
Jose Lopez Rega to demand
that all efforts be employed
to find the missing doctor.
Schapachnik a PCR
member, worked at the
Argerich Hospital, party
sources said. (NA)

THE ARGENTINE
Rural Society (SRA) has
refuted remarks by
Commerce Secretary José

THE KIDNAPPING of
cardiologist Edgardo
Schapachnik on Wednesday
has been denounced by the
Communist Party's (PCR)
central committee.

The PCR said they had
cabled President María
Estela Martínez de Perón

Character

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TELEGRAM

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FROM

BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

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E.O. 11652:

TAGS:

SUBJECT:

ACTION:

GDS

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Target Profile, British Diplomatic Community

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1. A representative of the Federal Police, GOA (FP) during the course of a discussion with the RSO advised the following: It was their (FP) general opinion the ERP-Montonero movement selected the appropriate time when the most could be gained from attacks, assassinations and/or kidnappings, on members of the diplomatic community. The Egan incident had been timed to coincide with the pending visit of Assistant Secretary Rogers. Source further stated that it was believed that the target profile of the British/Community would accelerate pending the visit of Secretary Kissinger to Argentina. In the eyes of the ERP-Montoneros the timing would be perfect to carry out a terrorist act against the British Diplomatic Community. Such an act against a member of the British Diplomatic Community prior to or

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3/25/75

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CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

Ambassador Hill

DISSEMINANCE:

SEARCHED INDEXED
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MAR 27 1975

LEGAL ATTACHE - WASHINGTON

during the Secretary's visit would be supported by the general Argentine population. The premise for assuming popular support for the act is the high degree of of resentment of the Argentine population toward the British Community as a result of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands. Such an act may be carried out in order to attempt to bring pressure on the United States to support the Argentine position of releasing of the islands to the Argentine Government.

2. RSO COMMENT:

The information furnished cannot be evaluated and may in itself be an observation of a single individual or a small group. This information should not be necessarily construed to be an official opinion of the Federal Police of GOA. By direction of the Ambassador the information was related to the British Embassy. RSO was careful to point out that the information could not be evaluated and should not be treated as a fact.

HILL

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109-103-246

racy is "weak and ineffective," the *Journal*, said, "industry can make things work by sliding around regulation and controls, staying a few steps ahead of the bureaucrats. But FEA has power and determination. . . ." So Zarb's offense is that he does his job too well, at least as Congress meant him to do it. Because he won't bend the law to suit the industry, the argument goes, the law should be eliminated. Though it's not usually put in these terms, that's just what President Ford wants Congress to do. He would remove the chains of price control and turn the energy giants loose to go on the prowl again—a state of nature the President fondly calls the "free market."

This urgent campaign to decontrol oil ignores some tough questions that have come up in the year since the embargo. For example people wonder why Arab oil that costs only 15 cents a barrel to produce sells on the President's "free market" for \$11 a barrel. Why does American oil that a couple of years ago sold for three or four dollars a barrel sell for as much as \$11 a barrel today? The cost of producing it hasn't gone up that much. John Lamont, a Washington attorney who watched the oil companies for many years for the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and for the Federal Trade Commission, believes that Ford's proposal to end price controls is akin to suggesting that we blow up Boulder Dam. Lifting controls, Lamont says, would "literally wipe out large segments on the fringes of the oil industry—they would disappear without a trace." He thinks that the fringe companies, independent refiners and marketers, are more vulnerable to attack from the majors now than they were a year ago when the federal controls were passed.

Congressmen who are serious about making oil competitive don't tinker with pricing mechanisms but attack the market structure directly. As Sen. Frank Church has said many times, the reform should begin at the international level with the creation of a federal auction house to buy oil from abroad and sell it back on an open market to the highest bidders in the US. This would permanently end the special trade agreements between the major oil companies and the OPEC nations. A similar clearinghouse should be established for domestic oil so that owners of major oilfields won't be able to manipulate the price of crude as they have in the past. At the same time, the government ought to exercise more direct control over the pipelines, buying them perhaps, so that even small competitors will have easy access to transportation. If all this were to happen we'd be glad to see FEA die.

NEXT WEEK: Richard N. Cooper
discusses the likelihood
of a serious Depression

Endangered Embassies High-Risk Diplomacy

An elderly American, wrapped in a grisly, hand-daubed flag marked "Muerte" (Death) lies murdered on a road outside the violence-wracked Argentine city of Cordoba. John Patrick Egan, 62, a retired American businessman who served his country as honorary consul for the princely stipend of \$1200 a year becomes the latest in a growing number of American diplomats abroad who, in recent years, have become victims of political fanatics.

High State Department officials worried a year ago about Egan's isolation in an Argentina torn by violence. Some suggested closing down the semi-official consulate but Egan said it would make little difference. He would live out his life in Cordoba, he told them; and even if they took the plaque down everybody would still know him as "el Cónsul Americano."

So they left him as he wanted to be left, trusting in the Argentine guards assigned to protect him. But they were removed a few weeks ago without notice and so Egan died. And now US Ambassador Robert C. Hill—a forceful and vigorous man—intends to find out from the Argentine government, why?

It was in 1965 that the State Department began seriously worrying about the safety of its ambassadors and mission chiefs, principally in the Southeast Asian war zones. In 1968 came the murder of US Ambassador John Gordon Mein, in Guatemala, and the emphasis shifted to Latin America. In the early '70s, with the rise of Middle East fanaticism, it became clear that this was a global—not a regional—problem.

Since 1965 13 American diplomats (State, AID, Pentagon, etc.) have been assassinated; 12 have been wounded; 20 kidnapped and later released. In Latin America alone, seven Americans serving the government overseas have died at the hands of politically motivated criminals, five have been wounded, 10, after being kidnapped, are still alive. All over the world diplomats are becoming an easy mark.

How easy it is to pistol-whip some middle-aged fellow; race him away in a U-Haul van; stuff him, blindfolded and drugged, into a cellar; and demand the release of "political prisoners."

The problem has preoccupied Dr. Kissinger (himself closely guarded by the Secret Service) and his top aides. Last summer L. Dean Brown, then deputy undersecretary for management, won from John J. Rooney, Wayne L. Hays and their congressional associates, \$15 million to beef up security at the 140 or more overseas missions. The bulk of the money went to about 24 "high-risk" posts: Saigon, Phnompenh, Beirut, Nicosia, Montevideo, Mexico City and Buenos Aires among them.

Take Buenos Aires. Some 50 years ago it was the "Paris of Latin America"; a gracious fin de siècle city

*Furnished by
Ambassador Hill
3/26/75 Rux*

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| APR 1 1975 | |
| FBI - NEW YORK | |

Rux

where three opera houses played simultaneously to packed houses. Today it is still gracious, still handsome, as befits a dowager; but its underclothes are tattered and, despite the bustle in the streets, there is a murderous undertone.

At least 50 persons have died by assassins' bullets in Argentina so far this year—many in Buenos Aires—and as in early Hitler's Germany the struggle escalates between the "death squads" of the left and right.

Foreign ambassadors are prime targets in this sanguinary madness—and not solely the US ambassador: the British, West German and Israeli ambassadors, among others, also are guarded around the clock.

Seven days a week US embassy security officer George Beckett, three civilian assistants and 14 marine embassy guards protect the life of Ambassador Hill, his family and senior assistants. In addition the Argentine government has assigned more than 40 plainclothesmen for protective duty. When Hill's wife, Cecilia, her children or her houseguests use the swimming pool on the residence grounds, at least two Argentine guards are in the surrounding shrubbery. The Hills, like other American diplomatic families in high-risk posts, accept these confinements as their duty.

Hill himself drives between his official residence and his chancery office in downtown Buenos Aires, preceded and followed by Argentine police cars carrying eight armed men. He and his family go nowhere without close coordination with the Argentine government.

A month or so ago Hill sent his embassy limousine to bring friends from a visiting cruise ship to lunch. Driving through the city's parks, the chauffeur stayed in constant contact with the embassy message center by radio-telephone. As the vehicle approached the residence, the iron gates were swung back by two burly men; two more—Argentine detectives—stood near Hill on the steps as he emerged to greet his guests. "How many guards did you see as you drove in?" Hill inquired. "Four? Great! There were at least a dozen more you didn't see—and that's the way we want it!"

Normally a government is responsible for the protection of diplomats accredited to it; two Vienna conventions lay out the rules. But sometimes an unsophisticated government in Africa or Asia will provide "guards" for the protection of the US mission so unkempt, undernourished or ill-trained as to be virtually worthless. Then the US itself will help feed, clothe, train and pay them. Even with relatively sophisticated Argentine detectives on hand, for instance, the yearly cost of protecting Hill, his family and top staff exceeds \$800,000.

Buenos Aires, as I've said, is not the only high-risk post. A few years ago Ambassador Douglas MacArthur, II, evaded two close kidnapping attempts by "leftists" in Teheran. Dean Brown, when envoy in Jordan, helped frustrate a Fedayeen plan in early 1973 to set up a katisha rocket in a boarding house near the

embassy, train it on the embassy snack bar, and fire it once it was filled with junior officers and secretaries.

Two years ago Thomas Enders, then chargé d'affaires in Pnompenh and now Assistant Secretary of State for economics, narrowly escaped death when a grenade thrown by a passing cyclist exploded near his official limousine. The heavy armor saved his life although a bomb fragment severed a gasoline line and the car blazed. It taught the State Department security experts a lesson.

Ever since the special armored cars bought for high-risk posts abroad now carry at least 800 pounds more special bullet-proofing. The engines are specially geared for fast getaways and the gas tanks, radiators and batteries now have extra protection.

The special limousine assigned Hill in Buenos Aires costs the US taxpayer more than \$50,000. Each tire weighs 150 pounds. The windows are two inches thick, as is the steel of the body. On the dashboard is a special switch that can envelop the car in foam in seconds in the event of a bomb or grenade attack.

Beside the chauffeur sits a karate-trained US marine guard and once seated in the back, Hill—or other envoys in high-risk posts—are automatically locked in. No guerrillas blocking the car by a faked accident, for instance, could fling back the doors and get at the ambassador.

Victor H. Dikeos, the State Department's security chief and his assistant, Kenneth W. Knauf, have under their direction some 80 officers in at least 60 posts around the world. Some are experts in closed circuit television or electronics; others are men recruited from various police forces, from military security and intelligence agencies or directly from campuses. Their pay ranges from \$12,000 to \$36,000 yearly and it takes five to six years before a man is ready to direct security at a high-risk US embassy.

Dikeos' office has begun recruiting women. There are four now, including Mary McAteer who guards Mrs. Kissinger on trips. In security work intelligence information is requisite so that liaison with the CIA, FBI, Secret Service, Interpol and foreign intelligence services is vital.

If Dikeos or one of his men hear, for instance, that the Swiss consulate in Beirut has reported the loss of passport blanks, security is tightened. The immediate suspicion is that the PFLP, or another Fedayeen group, may be plotting to infiltrate an agent into the US with false Swiss travel documents.

It is a curious irony that the one region on earth where US diplomats now feel—and are—perfectly safe is Communist Eastern Europe. The only American ambassador to whom no bodyguard is provided is Walt Stoessel, our man in Moscow.

Benjamin Welles

Benjamin Welles is the former diplomatic correspondent of *The New York Times*.

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RUEHCR/AMCONSUL CURACAO 2342
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 072506

INFORM CONSULS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ASEC, SNAR, VE, NA

SUBJECT: KIDNAPPING THREAT

REF: A) CURACAO 2171 (NOTAL); B) CURACAO 3179 (NOTAL);
C) CARACAS 3333 (NOTAL)

1. ALFREDO FLORES IS CURRENTLY IMPRISONED IN US ON NARCOTICS CONVICTION. HIS LAWYER ERIC ZIELINSKI TOLD CONGEN CURACAO THAT ALFREDO FLORES' BROTHER, CARLOS, HAD BEEN APPROACHED BY A VENEZUELAN, CARLOS VARGAS, WITH PROPOSITION TO KIDNAP US AMBASSADOR OR OTHER HIGH US OFFICIAL IN VENEZUELA. ACCORDING TO THIS PLAN, AMERICAN WOULD BE HELD UNTIL ALFREDO FLORES RELEASED FROM JAIL IN US.

2. ZIELINSKI REFUSED TO ASSOCIATE HIMSELF OR CLIENT WITH PROPOSAL, BUT BELIEVES IT WARRANTS USG ATTENTION. HE FURTHER STATED KIDNAP ATTEMPT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE LIMITED TO VENEZUELA OR CURACAO BUT COULD TAKE PLACE ANYWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA. HE COULD NOT SUPPLY ANYTHING MORE SPECIFIC.

3. THREAT IS ADMITTEDLY A VAGUE ONE, BUT ADDRESSEES SHOULD EXERCISE EXTRA CAUTION IN COMING WEEKS. WE HOPE CARACAS WILL BE ABLE TO ASSESS THREAT MORE PRECISELY AS RESULT OF INQUIRIES MENTIONED IN CARACAS REFTEL.

KISSINGER
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LEGAL ATTACHE-DEPT OF STATE

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THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

4/9/75

LEGAL ATTACHE

KIDNAPPING OF TWO C. G. ROBERTS
INVESTMENT COMPANY EXECUTIVES,
BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA, 4/1/75

On 4/8/75, NORMAN INGNEY, retired editor, "Buenos Aires Herald," advised his son, FRANCIS INGNEY, an executive with the above mentioned company, was kidnapped by unknown individuals on 4/1/75. INGNEY advised that the son of the founder of the C. G. Roberts Investment Company, "CARLITO" ROBERTS, was also kidnapped on the same day. INGNEY stated both his son and ROBERTS were kidnapped together near the Buenos Aires port area after returning on the ferry from Colonia.

INGNEY advised that his son's kidnappers have been in touch with the family to assure them that no harm would come to their son, and that all that was desired was the payment of a ransom. INGNEY advised his son's kidnappers advised the family that his son was suffering from a mild cold, and that this illness was being treated by professional medical personnel available to the kidnappers. INGNEY advised that a pay-off was scheduled for 4/4/75; however, the kidnappers did not appear to take the ransom and it is believed that the 4/4/75 pay-off was a dry run to establish the INGNEY family's bonafides.

INGNEY advised that the family has not made a "denuncia" to the Federal Police and are attempting to keep the matter quiet until after his son's release; I note, however, that "La Nacion" reports on the abductions in today's edition on Page 11.

1 - Addressee

1 - POL/R

1 - SY

1 - ECON COUNSELOR

3 - Buenos Aires (1 - 109-103-163-New (Kidnapping of two C.G. Robts. Co. execs)
(1 - 80-INGNEY)

RWS:jn
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Schedule of Executive Order 11652
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Automatically declassified on
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

~~SECRET~~

4/8/75

LEGAL ATTACHE

DISAPPEARANCE OF RETIRED ARGENTINE
ARMY COLONEL JORGE O. MONTIEL

As reported in the news media, Colonel MONTIEL disappeared after terminating his duties at the State Secretariat for Information (SIDE), on 3/26/75. It is noted that Colonel MONTIEL at one time was the Director of Federal Security of the Federal Police of Argentina. He is currently assigned to SIDE. (S) (U)

On 4/8/75, an official of the Argentine Army Intelligence Service (SIE) provided the following information: (S) (U)

SIE has been conducting inquiries regarding the possibility that Colonel MONTIEL had been kidnapped by extremists, in view of his past connections with the Federal Police of Argentina and his current assignment to SIDE. In addition, there was some apprehension in SIE owing to Colonel MONTIEL's wide range of contacts with the Montonero organization prior to the time that the Montoneros went underground. SIE learned that on 3/26/75, President PERON signed a secret order recreating an organization known as Control de Estado and naming Colonel MONTIEL as its director. It is noted that the Control de Estado existed during the first time of President JUAN DOMINGO PERON, and it served as an investigative agency to insure that government officials were not corrupt and carried out their assigned tasks in a professional manner. SIE is now convinced that Colonel MONTIEL voluntarily disappeared in order to be able to work undisturbed organizing his new office. While MONTIEL's disappearance called attention to himself, SIE noted that MONTIEL is somewhat of a character, who is prone to carrying out ill advised actions on the spur of the moment. SIE is confident that Colonel MONTIEL will surface in the near future. (S) (U)

The foregoing information should not be discussed with any foreign officials including those of the Argentine Government.

1 - Addressee

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1 - POL/R

1 - SY

1 - DAO

3 - Buenos Aires

(1 - 109-103) (1 - 109-2)

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RWS:jn

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Schedule of Executive Order 11652
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April 13, 1975

**FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES**

Several confidential sources abroad provided the following chronological summary of presumed terrorist activities carried out in Argentina during the period March 9 through April 13, 1975:

March 9, 1975

An attack was carried out in Buenos Aires Province (BAP) by the Montonero terrorist organization against a storage lot of the Chrysler Corporation. Grenades were utilized to carry out the attack and several automobiles were completely destroyed.

March 10, 1975

In Cordoba, the Cordoba Provincial Police (CPP) recovered a package containing electric blasting caps manufactured by the Schofield Company.

In Tigre, BAP, a BAPP officer was killed and another injured during a terrorist attack against a BAPP post. Terrorists utilized hand grenades during the attack.

In the Federal Capital, an incendiary bomb attack was carried out against the Banco de Credito Rural Argentina.

In the Federal Capital, a bomb exploded outside the offices of the Association of Personnel of the University of Buenos Aires.

In Tucuman two bomb attacks were carried out against executives connected with the sugar industry.

In the Federal Capital, an anonymous telephone call was received at the residence of an Argentine executive with the General Motors Corporation, in which his life was threatened.

March 11, 1975

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ON 7-26-01

In San Juan, five bombing attacks were carried out against offices of various wine companies. These attacks were attributed to the Argentine terrorist organization, the Peoples Revolutionary Army (ERP).

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Exemption Category 25(1)(2)
Automatically declassified on EO 12958

8 - Bureau
1 - Ambassador 1 - SRF
1 - RSO 1 - DAO
1 - U.S. Secret Svc.
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All sources mentioned herein have furnished reliable information in the past.

RLX

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**FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES**

The body of a male individual, who had been shot numerous times, was discovered in Merlo, BAP.

In Tigre, the ERP interfered with a union meeting of the Shipyard Workers Union. A shootout took place between the ERP members and the members of the union.

In the Federal Capital, the Federal Police of Argentina (FPA) Bomb Squad experts defused a bomb which had been placed at the residence of the Ambassador of the Order of Malta.

In La Plata, BAP, a bomb exploded at the residence of an executive of the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires.

In the Federal Capital, a bomb exploded at the Teachers Workers Union Headquarters.

In the Federal Capital, the ERP killed two FPA officers in an attack against an FPA guard post. Two BAPP officers were wounded while attempting to apprehend the extremists.

In Rosario, Santa Fe Province, an extremist was killed in a shootout with Santa Fe Provincial Police (SFPP) officers during an ERP attempt to take over a SFPP post in General Alvear.

In Cordoba, extremists fired upon a CPP police cruiser. Also in Cordoba, extremists broke into the house of a Cordoba Provincial Judge and molested his daughter. The Judge was not at home and the intruders left without doing any harm. Additionally, in Cordoba terrorists threw three Molotov bombs against an automotive manufacturing company.

In the Federal Capital, the Union Carbide Corporation received numerous telephone calls allegedly from the Montonero guerrilla organization threatening Union Carbide with violence unless Eveready Battery production was "normalized," within 72 hours.

March 12, 1975

In Salta, a bomb attack was carried out against a former Provincial Minister. Additionally, Salta Provincial Police (SPP) deactivated a bomb in front of the residence of an engineer.

In the Federal Capital, a bomb exploded in front of the offices of the Communist Party of Argentina (CPA).

**FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES**

In Temperley, BAP, a bomb attack was carried out against an official of the municipal government of Lomas de Zamora.

Five bodies were discovered in the Federal Capital. Three of the bodies had been shot repeatedly while another had been burned beyond recognition. The fifth body was discovered floating nearby in the Riachuelo River. The area in which the bodies were discovered has been a dumping ground for extremists in the past.

In Tucuman, the nephew of the former Economy Minister was kidnapped.

March 13, 1973

In Cordoba, the Montoneros assassinated an officer of the CPP. Also in Cordoba, the ERP carried out a bomb attack against an automobile dealer.

In La Plata, BAP, a bomb exploded at the residence of an official of a bus company.

Again in Cordoba, an FPA office was fired upon by extremists with machine guns from a passing automobile.

Also in Cordoba, the ERP detonated several projectiles which contained propaganda.

In Mar del Plata, ERP members attacked a member of the BAPP and stole his service revolver. The BAPP officer resisted the attack and he was slightly wounded.

March 14, 1973

In Cordoba, the Montoneros machinegunned the residence of a CPP Doctor.

In Mar del Plata a bomb exploded at a bakery.

March 15, 1973

In La Plata, the bodies of a young couple were discovered on a deserted road. The bodies contained numerous bullet wounds and investigation by the BAPP established that one of the slain youths was related to a Peronist official who had also been assassinated on March 13, 1973, in the Federal Capital.

In Tucuman, the nephew of the former Economy Minister of Argentina, who had been kidnapped on March 12, 1973, was released after the payment of a large ransom.

**FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS -- ARGENTINA:
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES**

March 16, 1975

In Bahia Blanca, BAP, a book store belonging to an official of the Regional Peronist Youth Movement was bombed.

In Santiago del Estero, the residence of a former candidate for the Provincial Governorship from the Movimiento Popular Federalista was bombed.

In Mendoza, the Federal Police office was subjected to a bomb attack.

Also in Mendoza, the offices of a wine company were bombed.

In Cordoba, Montenegro machinegunned the residence of a private citizen.

In Mar del Plata, a bomb attack was carried out against the residence of an officer of the Volta Elevator Company.

In La Plata, extremists fired upon and seriously wounded two Naval non-commissioned officers at a guard post.

In Moreno, BAP, the body of a male individual with his hands tied behind his back was discovered. The body contained numerous bullet wounds.

In Cordoba, an incendiary bomb attack was carried out against a CPP precinct.

In Tucuman, the ERP took over a railroad station on the Belgrano line and kidnapped the station master and dynamited the station.

In Ramon Mejia, BAP, an FPA officer was attacked and his service weapon stolen.

In La Plata, the residence of a Federal Judge was machine-gunned.

March 17, 1975

In La Plata, BAP, a Mercedes Benz and a Dodge (Chrysler

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

Corporation) airplanes were bombed.

In Longchamps, BAP, a bomb attack was carried out against the telephone company office.

In San Andres de Giron, BAP, the body of the son of a Mercedes Benz dealer was discovered. This individual had been kidnapped several days previously and his father was unable to raise the ransom demanded by the kidnappers.

In Cordoba, a bomb attack was carried out against a CPP cruiser, which was parked near a CPP precinct station.

March 18, 1973

In Maraca, BAP, an extremist group attacked a BAPF substation firing automatic weapons and throwing hand grenades.

In Cordoba, an intense fire fight took place between officers of the CPP and terrorists, attempting to attack the publishing facility of the Cordoba daily newspaper "La Voz del Interior."

Also in Cordoba, extremists shot up the broadcasting station of the University of Cordoba. There were also shooting incidents in Cordoba, which were carried out by snipers at various intersections.

The radio station "La Voz del Pueblo" was also attacked by extremists in Cordoba. The regional headquarters of the General Workers Confederation (CGT) was also fired upon by extremists in Cordoba. The 12th Precinct and the 6th Precinct of the CPP were attacked by extremists.

During an FPA raid against a safe house of the Army of Liberation, August 22nd Faction, an Argentine extremist group, in Villa Pueyrredon in the Federal Capital, an extremist and an FPA officer were killed.

March 19, 1973

In La Plata, a student center of the School of Engineering of the University of La Plata was raided by extremists and virtually destroyed.

In Tigre, a powerful bomb destroyed a shipyard.

Four bodies were discovered in the Federal Capital. The

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

victim had been shot numerous times and their bodies incinerated in an abandoned truck. Additionally, the Argentine Coast Guard recovered the body of another individual in the Federal Capital, that was floating in a local river. This body contained numerous bullet wounds.

In the Federal Capital, a Doctor, who is a member of the CPA, was kidnapped from his downtown apartment.

March 20, 1975

In Rio Negro, the offices of a local newspaper were fired upon by extremists.

In Cordoba, an orthodox Peronist official was kidnapped. Also in Cordoba, a retired CPF official was murdered by terrorists.

In the Federal Capital, three automobiles were stolen at gunpoint from a local garage. Subsequently, two of these automobiles were identified by the FPA in connection with the assassination of an FPA officer in San Martin, BAP, approximately twelve hours after the automobiles had been stolen.

In Mar del Plata, an attorney, who was an adviser to the CGT, was assassinated by terrorists.

In Tucuman, two bodies were discovered. The bodies bore numerous bullet wounds.

In Bahia Blanca, the Deputy Chief of the BAPP Intelligence Service was assassinated near his residence. The BAPP official's minor son was wounded in the terrorist attack.

March 21, 1975

In Bahia Blanca, a Roman Catholic priest was assassinated by extremists. The assassinated priest was a naturalized Argentine citizen of Czechoslovakian origin, and investigation by the BAPP established that this priest was extremely outspoken against leftist guerrilla groups in Argentina.

In Bahia Blanca, the body of a young woman was discovered on a suburban road. The victim had been shot numerous times and she

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
ARGENTINE THROBIST ACTIVITIES

was subsequently identified as the wife of a leftist Peronist official.

In Bahia Blanca, the residence of a leftist Peronist University leader was bombed.

The body of an unidentified male individual was discovered inside the bulk of a burned-out automobile in the Federal Capital. The victim had been shot numerous times.

In Mar del Plata, a group of heavily armed individuals systematically sought out and executed five persons, who were characterized by the BAPP as leftists.

In Bahia Blanca, FERNANDO ALONSO, a student at the National University of the South, was kidnapped.

In BAP, investigation by the BAPP into an extortion against the Commercial Counselor of the Ecuadorian Embassy, established that the extortion was related to common criminals and not terrorists.

March 23, 1978

During the early morning hours, a bomb exploded in BAP at the residence of a naval architect, who resided right next door to an official of the U. S. Embassy in Buenos Aires. BAPP investigation definitely established that the bombing was directed against the naval architect in connection with union problems at the shipyard, where he is employed. The BAPP noted that this shipyard was subjected to a bombing attack on March 18, 1978, as noted above.

In Cordoba, a Molotov bomb attack was carried out against an automobile dealership.

In Temperley, BAP, a group of heavily armed individuals sought out and executed eight individuals. The victims were forcibly taken from their homes, summarily executed in a vacant lot and their bodies dynamited. BAPP investigation established that the perpetrators of this act were right wing extremists.

In Cordoba, a bomb destroyed offices of the Pirelli Company.

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

March 23, 1975

In the Federal Capital, two branches of the Banco de Galicia y Rio de la Plata were bombed.

In Bahia Blanca, the body of FERNANDO ALDEBINO was discovered on a suburban road. The victim had been shot numerous times.

In the Federal Capital, a badly burned body was discovered by the FPA in a locked trunk resting against a curb.

In Rosario, the Deputy Chief of the Villa Constitucion, SFPF, Precinct, was assassinated by the ERP.

In Merlo, BAP, an FPA officer was assaulted and his service weapon stolen.

In San Justo, BAP, a SFPF patrol vehicle was fired on by extremists. Three of the SFPF officers in the patrol car were seriously wounded.

March 24, 1975

In BAP, members of the ERP set off bombs on the tracks of the Mitre Railroad disrupting service on the line.

In Santa Fe, bomb attacks were carried out against a pharmacy and the residence of a chemical engineer.

In Cordoba, the office of the Banco del Interior y Buenos Aires was bombed.

In Santa Fe Province, terrorists attempted to take over the headquarters of the SFPF in Canada de Gomez.

A SFPF cruiser was ambushed near Villa Constitucion.

March 25, 1975

In La Plata, a book store was bombed.

In Cordoba, the 8th Precinct of the CPP was machinegunned. Also in Cordoba, extremists hijacked a truck carrying cooking oil and flour for future distribution to local shanty towns.

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

In the Federal Capital, the offices of the International Business Machine Company were bombed.

In BAP, Bino's restaurant was machinegunned. It is noted that this restaurant was favored by deceased Argentine President JEAN DOUMINGO PERON and was the scene of several important meetings sponsored by PERON and his political associates.

In Bahia Blanca, the law office of a provincial legislator was broken into and shot up by terrorists.

In Salta, a Salta Provincial Police (SPP) outpost was attacked and a police radio stolen.

In Rosario, it was revealed that the Minister of Government of the Santa Fe Provincial Government, left Argentina with his family to take up residence in Uruguay, after receiving a threat from the AAA, a right wing terrorist organization.

March 26, 1973

A retired Argentine Army Colonel, the Chief of Counter-intelligence of the State Secretariat for Information (SEINSE) disappeared while enroute from his residence in the Federal Capital to his office. This Colonel was formerly in charge of the Security Section of the FPA.

In the Federal Capital, the residence of an official of Acindar Steel Company was bombed.

In the Federal Capital, the body of an individual who had been shot numerous times was found in a burned-out automobile.

In Cordoba, various bombs containing pamphlets of the CPA exploded in the downtown business section.

In La Cruz, Cordoba Province, terrorists took over the explosive warehouse of a commercial company and stolen 500 sticks of dynamite, 75 electric blasting caps and a quantity of fuses. Also in Cordoba, an attack was carried out against a CPP patrol cruiser. During the attack a bomb was rigged and detonated by remote control when the CPP cruiser passed a certain location. A terrorist group utilizing the initials EIA took credit for this attack.

March 27, 1973

In the Federal Capital, an Argentine Army Colonel was

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

kidnapped and assassinated.

In Campana, BAP, terrorists attempted to take over a BAPF sub-station.

In San Rafael, a bomb destroyed the offices of a wine company.

In Eschbald, a suburb of Rosario, Santa Fe Province, the body of an individual was discovered. The victim had been shot several times and a communique attached to the victim's body claimed that the ERP was responsible for the assassination.

In La Plata, a bomb exploded at the residence of the Intervenor of the Faculty of Judicial Science at the National University.

In the Federal Capital, a bomb was set off at the headquarters of the Alianza Libertadora Nacionalista, an Argentine political party.

March 25, 1975

Two union delegates were kidnapped in Cordoba.

In La Plata, the body of a student at the School of Medicine at the National University, was discovered on a suburban road. The victim had been shot numerous times.

March 26, 1975

In Cordoba, the CUP 2nd Precinct was attacked by extremists.

In Branson, the body of an unidentified male individual was discovered. The victim had been shot numerous times and an attempt had been made to incinerate his body.

In Sarandi, a General Motors Chevrolet van bombed.

Two grenades containing Montonero propaganda exploded in downtown San Luis.

March 28, 1975

In Resistencia, a statue of assassinated CGT leader

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

JOSE MUCCI was destroyed by a bomb.

Two separate attacks were carried out in Rosario against offices of the Provincial Court.

In Pilar, a DAPP official was killed in a gun fight.

In the Federal Capital, an FPA recruit was attacked and his service weapon stolen. During the attack, an FPA officer was seriously wounded.

In Rosario, an attack was carried out against the 3rd Precinct of the AFPP.

March 31, 1975

In Santiago del Estero, the residence of the President of the Partido Provincial was shot up by unidentified individuals.

In Mar del Plata, a DAP municipal warehouse was subjected to an incendiary attack.

In Cordoba, a television station was fired upon by extremists. Additionally, the offices of a private detective agency were raided and numerous material stolen.

In Mar del Plata, a bomb attack was carried out against the residence of an official of the Volta Elevator Company.

In Cordoba, an individual was kidnapped near Santa Rosa.

April 1, 1975

In Mar del Plata, a bakery was bombed.

A bomb was set off in Cordoba outside the headquarters of the Frente de Izquierda Popular, an Argentine political party.

In San Antonio de Padua, a Corporal of the AFPP was assassinated.

In San Luis, three pamphlet bombs exploded in different locations in the downtown business area. The bombs were the work

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

of the Montoneros.

During the evening rush hour, a car with its siren blaring attempted to pass through the congested downtown Buenos Aires business section, approximately five blocks from the U. S. Embassy. The car bore no license plates and no visible markings to indicate it was a police vehicle. The occupants of the car fired numerous shots into the air for no apparent reason. FPA attempts to detain the car met with negative results.

Two officials of a finance company were kidnapped in the Federal Capital.

April 2, 1975

In Capatzen, BAP, a BAPP officer was wounded in a shoot-out with extremists.

In Floresio Varela, a body was discovered. The victim had been shot numerous times and the body bore definite signs of torture.

In the Federal Capital, a member of a shipyard workers union was assassinated.

In the Federal Capital, an Argentine Army Lieutenant Colonel was assassinated during a gun fight with terrorists who had previously attacked the automobile carrying a retired FPA official, who is currently employed by the Social Welfare Ministry. In a subsequent communique, the Montoneros took credit for the assassination. During the attack on the retired FPA official's vehicle, a retired FPA officer was killed and another seriously wounded.

During the early evening hours, several grenades containing EMP phosphite exploded in downtown Buenos Aires.

In Rosario, snipers fired upon the Federal Police Office.

April 3, 1975

In the Federal Capital, a bomb was detonated by remote control when an FPA armored personnel carrier passed alongside a parked car, which contained the bomb.

In Bahia Blanca, a student was shot in the head and

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

seriously wounded while she was distributing pamphlets inviting students to an assembly.

In Lausanne, a BAPP officer was killed when he attempted to question several suspicious individuals.

April 4, 1973

In the Federal Capital, an incendiary bomb attack was carried out against the House Italia Solara.

In La Plata, a bomb was set off at the residence of the manager of a bus company.

In Lausanne, a bomb was detonated at the residence of a Social Welfare Ministry official.

In Cordoba, members of the CPA distributed pamphlets in the downtown area and threw an incendiary device to divert police from detaining them.

In La Plata, the bodies of two individuals were discovered in a parked automobile. The bodies contained numerous bullet wounds.

In Ensenada, BAP, the body of an unidentified male was found partially incinerated. The body contained numerous bullet wounds.

In the Federal Capital, two grenades containing propaganda were set off.

In Cordoba, two incendiary bombs were set off at the location of two small businesses.

In Santa Fe, a BPP officer was wounded in the hand by unidentified assailants, who stole his service weapon.

April 5, 1973

In Zarate, BAP, a BAPP officer was killed when a BAPP cruiser was ambushed by terrorists.

In Buenos Aires, an FPA Corporal was wounded during an attack by five unidentified individuals.

In Rosario, BAP, the BAP assassinated a member of the metal workers union.

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
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In FPA officer stationed in front of the British Embassy was fired on by individuals, who passed in an automobile. In addition, a catchel was tossed on the sidewalk, which was subsequently examined by FPA bomb squad experts and found to contain a novelty store device meant to ridicule the FPA.

In La Plata, an Argentine Army Lieutenant Colonel shot and killed an individual, whom he suspected of surveilling his home.

In San Joto, six bodies were discovered near Ezeiza International Airport. The bodies were riddled with bullet holes from 9 mm. and 45 cal. weapons.

A RAPP sub-station was attacked by terrorists and a RAPP officer wounded in Haco, RAP.

In Rosario, three individuals were kidnapped from three different locations by presumed terrorists.

In Cordoba, terrorists took over the Civil Registry and stole documentation. The ~~RAP~~ terrorist organization took credit for this act indicating that the ~~RAE~~ stood for ~~Revolucionarios~~ ~~Revolucionarios~~.

Also in Cordoba, an incendiary attack was carried out against a tractor dealership. An organization known as the ~~Organizacion Comunista del Chorro~~ took credit for this attack.

In Rosario, a clubhouse of the Peronist University Youth was consumed by fire. RAPP officers attributed the fire to arson.

Again in Cordoba, an incendiary bomb was thrown against the sales office of a battery company.

In Villa Guaymas, RAP, an incendiary bomb attack was carried out against the Acindar Steel Company Warehouse.

April 7, 1978

In Montevideo, the office of a supplier of the Acindar Steel Company was subjected to a bomb attack.

In Rosario, RAP, the body of an unidentified female was located. The victim had been shot numerous times.

In Boulogne, RAP, the body of an unidentified male was

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
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found. The body contained numerous bullet wounds.

In La Plata, a bomb destroyed the offices of a local company owned by the defeated mayoralty candidate of the Alianza Popular Federalista.

In the Federal Capital, an attempt was made to dynamite the apartment of the Chief of the FPA.

A Municipal Housing Commission employee was kidnapped in the Federal Capital.

April 6, 1973

The body of the Municipal Housing Commission Employee kidnapped on April 7, 1973, was discovered in Buenos Aires.

April 8, 1973

In Tucuman, the law offices of three attorneys were bombed.

In the Federal Capital, the law office of an attorney was subjected to an incendiary bomb attack.

In Salta, the residence of an attorney was bombed.

In Buenos Aires, an innocent passerby was killed during an attempt against the life of a school worker's employees union.

April 10, 1973

In Zarate, a number of ERP took over the Cellulose Argentina plant and distributed extremist propaganda.

In Bahia Blanca, four private residences were bombed.

In La Plata, a medical doctor was killed in his office by terrorists.

April 11, 1973

In Santa Fe, terrorists fired upon the residence of the

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

Dean of the Economic Faculty and three incendiary bombs against his residence.

In Villa Elisa, the body of a law student was found. The victim had been shot numerous times. BAPP investigation established that the victim's father had been assassinated on August 11, 1974, by terrorists. The BAPP reported that the victim's body contained 67 bullet wounds.

In the Federal Capital, three bodies were discovered in a burned-out automobile. The victims had been shot numerous times.

In Lujan, BAP, the body of an unidentified male was found. The body bore numerous bullet wounds.

In Bahia Blanca, the residence of the secretary of the National University of the South was broken into and set fire to with an incendiary device.

In Tucuman, two bombs were recovered at a provincial agricultural station.

Again in Bahia Blanca, terrorists fired upon the residence of another functionary of the National University of the South. BAP members also painted slogans attacking a former official of the National University of the South.

April 12, 1975

In Campana, a BAPP patrol came upon a group of terrorists who had just stolen a truck containing foodstuffs. A violent shoot-out resulted and one extremist was killed. During the shoot-out, the extremists used hand grenades against the BAPP officers.

In Mar del Plata, a bomb attack was carried out against the offices of the Volin Elevator Company and against a bakery.

In Santa Fe, terrorists' bombs were set off at two private residences.

In the Federal Capital, a bomb detonated at the Administrative Offices of the Buenos Aires Subway System.

X

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

In Parana, the Automotive Transport Workers Union's offices were subjected to a terrorist attack.

In Avellaneda, the body of an unidentified male individual was discovered. The victim had been shot numerous times.

In Mar del Plata, bomb attacks were carried out against the residences of two private citizens.

April 12, 1975

In Rosario, terrorists raided the Argentine Army Arsenal killing an Argentine Army Colonel and stealing a volume of weapons.

In La Plata, terrorists fired upon the residence of a Federal Judge.

In Mar del Plata, terrorists fired upon the residence of a private citizen.

In Mar del Plata, the body of a university student was discovered on a deserted road. The victim's body bore numerous bullet wounds.

X
SECRET

3232
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1720

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM

Amembassy BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

E.O. 11652:

N/A

TAGS:

PINS, ASEC, AR

SUBJECT:

Terrorism: Journalist found alive and ex-labor leader's son found dead

ACTION:

Secstate WASHDC

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ BUENOS AIRES 3232

1. Ana Maria Guzzetti, a leftist journalist, was found beaten but alive in a Buenos Aires suburb on May 8. She was kidnapped in downtown B.A. on April 28, and it had been feared she had become yet another victim of right-wing terrorists. Guzzetti formerly worked for the banned left-wing newspaper El Mundo and gained some notoriety when she asked General Peron at a press conference for an explanation of the actions of certain paramilitary groups.

2. At about the same time Guzzetti was found alive, the body of the son of an ex-union leader was found in another B.A. suburb. Alfredo Ongaro, 21, was the son of Raimundo Ongaro and was not known to be active politically. The elder Ongaro has been in prison since November, 1974, under the terms of the state of siege. He was prominent in the printers' union before it was intervened by the GOA.

AMB
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POL/R
ECOM
USIS
USDAO
MILGP-2
SOIAT
LEGAT
RF
SY
CHRON

DRAFTED BY:
POL:DCJett:cc

DRAFTING DATE
5/9/75

TEL. EXT.
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CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
POL:WSSmith

CLEARANCES:

AMB:Robert C. Hill

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
DCM:JIMON

MAY 12 1975

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

LEGAL ATTACHE - BUENOS AIRES

3. Comment: While right-wing terrorists are probably responsible for these two particular incidents, they have in general been less active in recent weeks. No new death lists have been issued following the one with the 16 actors and journalists. The number of bodies turning up has also seemed to have fallen off even though it is possible that this results from self censorship by the press.

HILL



TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM

AmEmbassy BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

E.O. 11652:

TAGS:

SUBJECT:

N/A

PINS, ASEC, AR

Terrorism Roundup

ACTION:

SecState WASHDC

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ BUENOS AIRES 4096

1. Rightwing terrorists continued active, as evidenced by fact that bombs destroyed the offices of the Communist Party and Radical Party in Cordoba on June 14. A group of about 1000 gathered at what was left of the former to protest the act. Police dispersed the crowd and detained 300 people.
2. In addition, another burned out auto was found in a Buenos Aires suburb with the bodies of four men and a woman inside. The five have not yet been identified but all evidence indicates they are victims of rightwing death squads. on June 14
3. Leftist guerrillas, on the other hand, ~~recently~~ tried to apply their own solution to the problem of recent price increases. Six Montoneros entered a supermarket in Cordoba and told customers to take what they wanted for free. Shoppers instead panicked and ran for the nearest exit. The guerrillas then forced the housewives at gunpoint to fill their shopping

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DRAFTED BY:

POL:DCJett:mg

DRAFTING DATE

6/16/75

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CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

POL:WSSmith WSS

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JUN 18 1975

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baskets.

4. The Army released an announcement from Tucuman claiming that several guerrillas who had been detained admitted to Major having taken part in the assassination of Army/ ~~XXXX~~ Viola and his daughter in Tucuman on Dec. 1, 1974 (see BA-8812).

MONTELLOR *[Signature]*

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

Classification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Department of State

A-143

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, AR

AmEmbassy BUENOS AIRES

June 16, 1975

Political Violence in Argentina

Summary. Prospects are not good for any significant diminution of the level of political violence that has plagued Argentina in recent years. Rightwing terrorists continue to operate freely and account for nearly as many deaths as leftists and security forces together. The leftist guerrilla groups, while forced into a somewhat defensive posture, are still active and are attempting to exploit worker discontent whenever possible. Given the worsening economic difficulties, these opportunities will be abundant. End Summary.

Violence to Continue

When confronted with the topic of violence and terrorism in their country many Argentines attempt to dismiss the subject by saying "it's a worldwide problem". While political violence is certainly not unique to Argentina, the levels it has reached in this country in recent years have few parallels. Recently there has been some hope for a lessening of the violence. Operations by leftist terrorists have been somewhat reduced as security forces have had some success in combating the subversive organizations. Rightwing terrorists have supposedly announced a 90-day truce to give the government time to find effective mechanisms to combat the left (BA 3742).

Do these events offer any real hope of returning to a more peaceful political process? Unfortunately, the answer would appear to be that they do not. The basic conflicts within the society are still unresolved and neither extreme seems likely to renounce the use of violence.

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FOL/R:DLSmuck (in draft)

Chas. J. Smith Rux

AMS
FOL-3
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ECON
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ICDAO
MIGP-2
SCAT
LACAT
LW
CARRON

Violence from the left

Leftist terrorism, inspired by the example of Che Guevara, has been a common occurrence since the kidnapping and murder of former President Aramburu in 1970. Leftist Peronists, pressuring for an end to military rule and the return of General Peron, and the non-Peronist left, demanding the creation of a socialist government, both began to make increasing use of terrorism. Well organized and financed with millions of dollars raised from kidnapping, these groups operated with success and some public support prior to the election in 1973. Following the election of Peron, their popular support dropped away, and these groups found themselves isolated from the main body of Peronism as the GOA took on more and more of a rightist hue. From the point of view of the left, the Peronist government turned out to be no better than that of the military.

The GOA has had some success in hindering operations of the ERP and Montoneros, in many instances using information obtained from guerrillas who are illegally detained, tortured during interrogation and then eliminated. Newspapers are very cautious about what they publish regarding terrorism from either extreme. The stories have become nothing more than recapitulations of official press releases about successful operations by security forces. Despite the fact that tales of many unpublicized crimes are circulated, the self-censorship by the press (which the GOA enforces) adds to the image of a reduced threat from the left. The successes against the leftist guerrillas have forced them into a defensive position and brought about a change in tactics. Attacks on police and army posts have dwindled and the emphasis seems to be on trying to survive intact. In addition, a campaign to organize the workers and peasants appears to have been embarked upon, though the latter has been hurt by Army operations in Tucuman.

While leftist terrorism has diminished to some extent recently, prospects for eliminating the leftist guerrillas are not good. Their determined opposition to this government, extensive financial resources and organization, plus growing popular opposition to the government itself all militate against it.

The increasingly chaotic economic situation and continued alienation of the labor rank and file from orthodox union leaders will provide the left ample opportunities for exploitation of worker discontent.

and from the right

The Buenos Aires Herald published on May 29 its tally of the number of deaths due to political causes which have occurred since Mrs. Peron assumed the Presidency on July 1, 1974. The total number of deaths was put at 503 and was broken down as follows: 190 with leftist political affiliation, 33 with rightist affiliations, 54 policemen, 22 Army, 13 businessmen, 4 children, 1 diplomat (the U. S. Consular Agent in Cordoba), 20 others who did not fit any of the above categories, 70 unidentified bodies and 91 killed in gunfights with security forces.

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Looking at it another way, rightwing terrorists killed roughly 190 people, leftwing terrorists 128, security forces accounted for 91 and 94 more died at the hands of persons whose ideology is unclear. The vast majority of the later category were most likely victims of the right, as it is common practice for rightwing groups to disfigure their victims in an attempt to render their remains unidentifiable.

A communique supposedly signed by the leading rightwing terrorist organization, the AAA, recently called for a 90-day truce to give the GOA time to develop legal means to combat leftist terrorism. Within days, however, other death lists appeared (BA 3832) and the bodies of young leftists continue to turn up. Perhaps one section of the AAA has decided to lay low, but the rest are clearly active.

Rightwing terrorism has arisen as a reaction against the leftist guerrillas. While the judicial system remains hopelessly inadequate and sentences are lenient or nonexistent, no serious consideration is being given to court reform; rather, the official response has been the implementation of a state of siege, under which, according to official figures, 1400 to 1800 are being held without charges at the disposition of the executive power. The unofficial response has been AAA type operations and a liberal application of the "ley de fuga" - under which suspects are shot by police while supposedly resisting arrest. Such actions have taken place with the awareness of the general public and the encouragement of certain sectors of the GOA (namely Lopez Rega and his allies in the government). Indeed as long as Lopez Rega maintains his position of power, any ethical restraints in the struggle against the left will continue to be prominent by their absence. Given the success of the illegal methods being used and since legal measures have proved ineffective in the past, rightwing terrorism is not likely to disappear.

Violence and a possible change of government

The labor unions and the political wing of the Peronist party have both proved themselves inadequate to check Lopez Rega's continuing accumulation of power (BA 3425). His most recent acquisition is his own man, Celestino Rodrigo, as Minister of Economy. Given the worsening economic situation and political climate, the probable course is for the Army once again to see itself (and to be seen by many) as the savior of the country. The military could probably force Lopez Rega's ouster in a way that would not provoke widespread violence, given that the latter's base of support is so narrow. There are few who would risk their lives to protect him. If an attempt was made to set up an unconstitutional government, resistance could be met from some military commanders bent on preserving the institutions. It seems likely, however, that the coup plotters would wait to make their move until the Army develops a consensus that drastic action is necessary. While a relatively nonviolent transition seems more likely, the period following a change of government would be more violence prone. Leftist terrorists could be expected to step up their activities to whatever extent possible against a military government or one controlled by the military. Likewise, the new government would take what repressive

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

measures it felt necessary to maintain itself. While there are dozens of imponderables in any scenario of this kind, the military is not likely to move until it has a good deal of public support for such action. The lessons of 1966-73 and the unpopularity of the Armed Forces that era produced will bear heavily in the minds of the army officers. Given this, and the increasing unpopularity of Mrs. Peron's government, it is unlikely that the left or any other sector could generate enough of a reaction on the part of the public to create widespread disturbances.

U. S. Interests

The violence from the left will continue to threaten foreign investment and businessmen in general. While kidnappings have fallen off, leftist guerrillas will exploit and aggravate worker discontent whenever possible. They have also of late assassinated several executives in firms that have had labor problems. The threat of violence, and, even more importantly, the increasingly difficult economic situation, will be strong disincentives to foreign investment.

The leftist guerrillas will continue to have the capability to undertake attacks against Embassy staff members and could do so at any time. Ultra-nationalistic rightwing terrorists will probably continue to concern themselves strictly with leftists and should not pose a threat to American business interests or USG employees.

Human Rights

Since the AAA appears to have some GOA backing, rightwing violence has the potential to result in serious human rights problems. While overshadowed by events in Chile, Argentina is beginning to receive more notoriety in this area. Four French representatives of the International Federation of Human Rights and the International Movement of Catholic Jurists completed a short visit to Argentina on May 24. Upon their departure, they stated that the right to defend and freedom of expression were "empty phrases" in Argentina. A full report is to be issued before the end of June.

The New York Times correspondent here told an Emboff recently that two leftist Peronist Youth leaders have been severely tortured since they were arrested on April 17 (BA 2765) despite the fact that their detentions were well publicized. One of the two, Dardo Cabo, has lost the use of one of his arms as a result of the torture, according to his parents.

The USG, of course, deplores terrorism of any kind. Leftist terrorism is a threat to U. S. business interests and to the Embassy staff while that from the right, when officially encouraged, is a violation of human rights. It is unfortunate that the GOA has used the latter to combat the former. Any representations made to the GOA should underline the USG opposition to violence from either extreme of the political spectrum to avoid giving any indication that extralegal means are acceptable.

MOETLLOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

CHARGE D'AFFAIRES

6/30/75

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

ATTEMPTED KIDNAPPING OF GUILLERMO M. YEATTS,
DIRECTOR,
MASSEY FERGUSON
BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA

For information, during the evening of 6/21/75, captioned individual arrived at his parents' apartment building, located at #3736 Avenida Libertador in order to celebrate his mother's birthday. Upon arriving at the parking area adjacent to the apartment building, an attempt was made to kidnapp Yeatts by several armed individuals. Yeatts' bodyguards resisted the kidnapping attempt and a shoot-out ensued. Yeatts' bodyguards were able to drive off the kidnappers, it being noted that one of the bodyguards was slightly wounded with a .22 caliber bullet in his wrist. It should be noted that Yeatts is the son of Dr. Harry Yeatts, one of the approved Embassy physicians.

cc's: 1 - Addressee
1 - POL
1 - POL-R
1 - SY
1 - Consul General
2 - Bue (109-NEW) 109-789
1 - 109-103
RWS:gjk
(7)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 4-30-01 BY 1406 JELW/BLE/R
Argentina Project

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Box

109 103 274

~~SECRET~~

39063 ELW/BCE/DC Argentina Project
CLASSIFIED BY ~~SP6 AG/CAL~~
REASON: 1.5 (B) 8/26/75
DECLASSIFY ON: X5.6
#010-0371 11-24-95

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

LEGAT ROBERT W. SCHERRER

ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

CLASSIFIED BY ~~39063 ELW/BCE/DC~~
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6
Argentina Project

On 8/25/75, a ranking official of the Federal Police of Argentina (FPA) Intelligence Service provided the following information regarding the recent death of Montonero leader MARCOS OSATINSKY in Cordoba: (S) (U)

According to the FPA delegation in Cordoba, OSATINSKY, whose Montonero code name was "SANTIAGO," was picked up approximately three weeks ago by Cordoba Provincial Police and members of Governor LACABANNE's Security Detail. OSATINSKY was severely tortured by members of Governor LACABANNE's Security Detail over an extended period of time; however, he refused to divulge any information. OSATINSKY was in such bad shape that it became obvious he would have to be killed rather than produce him alive since the marks of torture would be obvious. In order to dispose of OSATINSKY, whose detention was known among extremists in Cordoba, it was decided to stage his assassination in connection with a fictitious rescue attempt. Three Cordoba Provincial Police Officers volunteered to take part in the charade with the understanding they would have to submit to being slightly wounded during the performance. (S) (U)

The hijacking of the hearse transporting OSATINSKY's body from Cordoba to Tucuman was not carried out by the Montoneros as indicated in the press, but by the same members of Governor LACABANNE's Security Staff, who had tortured OSATINSKY. The purpose of stealing his body was to prevent the body from being subjected to an autopsy, which would have clearly shown that he had been tortured. It is doubtful that OSATINSKY's body will ever turn up. (S) (U)

Attached is a photograph of OSATINSKY taken during 1972 at Rawson Prison. (S) (U)

- 1 - Addressee
3 - Buenos Aires
(1 - 109-2) (1 - 109-103)
(1 - 105-Montoneros) (1 - 80-76)
(1 - 105-1098-OSATINSKY) (1 - 80-76)

RWS:jn
(6)

CLASSIFIED BY 5931
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(2)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON INDDET

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

283

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-20-94 Page 6 of 6



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~~DECLASSIFIED~~

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THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

8/28/75

LEGAT ROBERT W. SCHERRER

ERP KIDNAPPING OF
JOHN DALOUBIEX,
BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA,
7/9/75

DECLASSIFIED BY 3906JEL/BCE/PC
ON 4-30-04
Argentina Project

An official of the Latin American Region of the Otis Elevator International, provided the following information:

Between the hours of 2:00 A.M. and 4:00 A.M. on July 9, 1975, JOHN DALOUBIEX, an executive for the Otis Elevator Company, was kidnapped from his room at the Plaza Hotel by unknown individuals, who subsequently identified themselves as members of the ERP. The ERP demanded a ransom of five million dollars U. S. for the release of DALOUBIEX.

The following chronological information was provided by the source concerning the kidnapping:

The victim along with R. W. SCHWARTZ, who is a staff member of the Otis Elevator Company, and NICOLLE RACZKOWSKI, a female of Polish ancestry, who possibly is a resident of Paris, France, all dined at the Sheraton Hotel, Buenos Aires, during the evening of July 8, 1975. After dinner, the group broke up with SCHWARTZ retiring to his room at the Sheraton Hotel, while the victim and Miss RACZKOWSKI went to the victim's room at the Plaza Hotel. Apparently Miss RACZKOWSKI was kidnapped along with the victim; however, no mention has been made of her by the ERP in their contacts with the Otis Elevator Company.

During the afternoon of July 9, 1975, the ERP contacted the local Otis Elevator International Manager in San Fernando, informing him of victim's kidnapping and indicating that they would recontact him during the evening.

A second call was not received by Otis Elevator International until the evening of July 10, 1975. Instructions were given to company officials in order to pick up an envelope which contained personal identity documents of the victim and the ERP's demand for the five million dollar ransom. Between

1 - Addressee
1 - POL/R
1 - SY 1 - ECON COUNSELOR
1 - CONGEN

3 - Buenos Aires (1 - 163-637)

(1 - 109-38) (1 - 109-103)

RWS:jn (8)

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(2)(4)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON INDET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

284

**ERP KIDNAPPING OF JOHN DACUBIEX
BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA,
7/9/75**

the period July 14 through July 16, several contacts were made by the ERP and Otis Elevator International. These contacts basically were to set up ground rules for future negotiations.

During the afternoon of July 17, 1975, the ERP again contacted Elevator Otis International, making reference to a bomb that had exploded at the residence of the company's Operations Manager on July 16, 1975. The kidnappers indicated that they were responsible for placing the bomb and had done so to indicate to Otis Elevator International officials, that they were serious in their operation. During the July 17, 1975, contact, the company offered \$150,000 for the return of the victim. This offer was rejected out of hand by the ERP as ridiculous. The ERP negotiator informed the company that contact would be made on July 21, 1975, in order to reach a final decision regarding the payment of the ransom. The ERP negotiator stated that if Otis Elevator International was not amenable to paying the ransom, then negotiations would be broken off for a six-month period during which terrorist action would be taken against random company officials and installations.

On July 21, contact was reestablished between the company and the ERP, during which a firm offer of \$600,000 was made for the victim's release. This amount was again rejected by the ERP, and a threat was made to assassinate Mr. ALFREDO SCHROEDER, an Otis Elevator International executive in Sao Paulo, Brazil. The ERP spokesman told the company representative, that a reign of terror would immediately commence against the company and its employees until the five million dollar ransom was agreed upon by Otis Elevator International.

The foregoing information should not be discussed with any foreign government officials, including those of the Argentine and Brazilian Governments.

The source noted that police officials in Argentina had not been advised of the foregoing information.

ERP KIDNAPPING OF JOHN DALOUBIEX
BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA,
7/9/75

It is noted that during May, 1973, all American employees of the Otis Elevator International, were hastily removed from Argentina and its South American Regional Office removed from Buenos Aires to Sao Paulo, Brazil, after the receipt of an alleged threat from the ERP. Additionally, during the early part of 1975, various Otis Elevator local offices and plants have been the subject of terrorist bomb attacks, which were not attributable to any specific organization.

The above information concerning the kidnapping of DALOUBIEX is disturbing from several points of view. First, he was kidnapped from a large, prominent downtown hotel, where several American executives customarily reside during visits to Buenos Aires on company business. Additionally, the Plaza is the traditional location the Argentine Government chooses to put up visiting dignitaries. Second, it would appear that those responsible for victim's kidnapping have some inside source of information at the local company office or possibly the Sao Paulo Regional Office, since the kidnappers had apparent knowledge of DALOUBIEX's presence in Argentina.

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-10-96 Page 1 of 1
90-6371

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ag/CAL/DK APR 90-6371

9/4/75

~~SECRET~~

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

On 9/3/75, an official of the Argentine Army Intelligence Service (AAIS) provided the following information: (S) (U)

In addition to the raids noted in the press which were carried out by the Buenos Aires Provincial Police (BAPP) during the weekend of 8/30-9/1/75, the AAIS, through a penetration agent in the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), extralegally detained a high ranking official of the ERP, ranking third or fourth in that organization, immediately after Mario Roberto Santucho and Enrique Haroldo Gorriaran Merlo, in Buenos Aires Province. This individual was detained with the assistance of the BAPP and is currently being interrogated by an AAIS and BAPP interrogation team. The source emphasized that the individual under detention is one of the most important ERP leaders to have been detained during the past year. (S) (U)

On 9/3/75, an official of the BAPP Intelligence Service, who is aware of the above-described detention of the ERP leader, advised it is the opinion of the BAPP that the assassination of BAPP Chief of Investigations, Comisario Alfonso Vergel in La Plata, and the attack against an Argentine Army truck during which Sgt. Anselmo Rios was killed, were acts of retaliation carried out by the ERP in answer to the extra-legal detention of the ERP official, as noted above. (S) (U)

The foregoing should not be discussed with foreign officials, including those of the Argentine Government

cc: 1 - Addressee
1 - POL
1 - POL-R
1 - DAO
1 - SY

5 - Bue (109-103)

(1-105-767

Montoneros)

(1 - 109-38 ERP)

(1 - 80-185 [Baldrich])

(1 - 80-173) [Lucero]

RWS:gjk

(10)

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Classified By 5931L

Exempt from General Declassification

Schedule of Executive Order 11652

Exemption Category 5E(2)

Automatically declassified on IMDET.

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DECLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/BCF/DCS
REASON: 10-24-95
DECLASSIFY ON: 90-6371
Argentine Project

109-103-292

5947
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1613

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM AmEmbassy BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION ~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

E.O. 11652:

TAGS:

SUBJECT:

ACTION:

N/A

PINS, AR, ASEC

British Businessman Charles Lockwood rescued after
Second Kidnapping

SecState WASHDC

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ BUENOS AIRES 5947

1. Buenos Aires Provincial police in Pilar reportedly killed four extremists and freed Charles Lockwood, 29 August. Circumstances leading to discovery of extremist cell still unknown.
2. Reportedly, upon police arrival August 29, occupants of secluded house on golf course opened fire. When the intense gun battle ended, security forces discovered four dead extremists, including one female, and one extremist seriously wounded. Also in the house were an ^{infant} ~~and two other persons~~ and Charles Lockwood, alive. Lockwood was extremely lucky. In the past, terrorists have usually murdered their prisoners when police closed in.
3. One of the dead terrorists was identified as the soldier who had been inside man for the terrorist raid on the Federal Firing Range August 18 during which Capt. Miguel Keller was killed. Some of the arms taken during that raid were also found in the house with Lockwood.

AMB
POL-3
POL/R
EGOM
USIS
USDAO
MILGP-2
LEGAT
SCIAT
RF
CHRON
SU

DRAFTED BY:
POL:RMartin:mg

DRAFTING DATE
9/2/75

TEL. EXT.
121

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
POL:WSSmith

CLEARANCES:

LEGATT:RWScherrer

AMB:RCHill

DCM:JJMont

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED

INDEXED
FILED

SEP 4 1975


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CLASSIFICATION

LEGAL ATTACHE - BUENOS AIRES

4. Lockwood was kidnapped July 31, 1975 by extremists for the second time in less than two years. The first time large ransom was paid for his release. While on Sept 1 member of Lockwood's family told Emboff he planned to remain in Argentina, following day, British Emboff told us he had departed previous evening. This confirmed by fact Lockwood gave interview in London saying he planned to return to Argentina some day, but "not now."

HILL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCN

3/4 75

LEGAT ROBERT W. SCHERRER

ERP KIDNAPPING OF
JOHN DALOUBIEY,
BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA,
7/9/75

Reference my memo concerning captioned matter
dated 2/29/75.

On 9/4/75, FRED ADEN, Director of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, Buenos Aires, advised that an official connected with the Otis Elevator Company in Buenos Aires stated that captioned individual had been released by his ERP kidnappers approximately eight days ago and had safely left Argentina. ADEN advised that the Otis Elevator Company source told him that the victim was not kidnapped from the Plaza Hotel but picked up on Calle Maipu at approximately 2:00 A.M. on 7/9/75. According to ADEN's Otis Elevator source the company paid three million U. S. dollars delivered in Argentina for victim's release.

The Otis Elevator Headquarters in New York City are being contacted by the FBI New York Office in order to confirm the above information.

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 3B(2)(4)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON INDET

- 1 - Addressee
- 1 - POL/R
- 1 - BY
- 1 - CONGEN
- 1 - ECON COUNSELOR
- 3 - Buenos Aires
 - (1 - 163-687)
 - (1 - 109-38)
 - (1 - 109-103)

RWS:jn
(8)

DECLASSIFIED BY 9015 EIA/DC/104
ON 4-30-01

Argentina Project
4-11-84 By Original
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

109-103-294

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9/4/75

~~SECRET~~

TELETYPE

URGENT-PRIORITY

5-1-04
CLASSIFIED BY 296/3FW/RC/106
DECLASSIFY ON: 1-6
134-04 Argentina Project

TO: DIRECTOR NR.
FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2); (109-103)

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION
IN THE PAST ADVISED THAT DURING THE WEEKEND OF AUGUST 30TH TO
SEPTEMBER 1, 1975 THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE, ACTING
IN CONCERT WITH THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAIS),
CARRIED OUT A SERIES OF IMPORTANT RAIDS AGAINST THE ARGENTINE
EXTREMIST TARGETS IN BUENOS AIRES AND BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE.
SOURCE NOTED THAT SEVERAL TERRORISTS BELONGING TO THE FUERZAS
ARMADAS DE LIBERATION (ARMED FORCES OF LIBERATION) (FAL), AN
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, WERE KILLED IN PILAR, BUENOS
AIRES PROVINCE. (S)(U)

ADDITIONALLY, THE SOURCE NOTED THAT THROUGH AN ARGENTINE
ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE PENETRATION AGENT, AN EXTREMELY
IMPORTANT FIGURE OF THE EJERCITO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (PEOPLE'S
REVOLUTIONARY ARMY) (ERP) WAS EXTRALEGALLY DETAINED AND IS UNDERGOING

2 - Buc (109-2)
(1) - 109-103

RVS:EJK
(2)

DECLASSIFIED BY 296/3FW/RC/106
ON 5-3-01

Argentina Project

295

~~SECRET~~
PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEVERE INTERROGATION. (S)(u)

SOURCE NOTED THAT IN WHAT IS BELIEVED TO BE RETALIATION AGAINST THE BAPP AND THE ARGENTINE ARMY, MEMBERS OF THE ERP ASSASSINATED THE BAPP CHIEF OF INVESTIGATIONS IN LA PLATA, THE CAPITAL OF BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE, DURING THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 3, 1975. ADDITIONALLY, DURING THIS ATTACK SOURCE REPORTED THAT A BAPP OFFICER WAS SEVERELY WOUNDED. SOURCE REPORTED THAT ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY TO THE ATTACK CARRIED OUT AGAINST THE BAPP OFFICIAL, THE ERP AMBUSHED AN ARGENTINE ARMY TRUCK CARRYING ARMS AND ASSASSINATED AN ARGENTINE ARMY SERGEANT (S)(u)

SOURCE REPORTED THAT ANOTHER ATTACK CARRIED OUT BY ARGENTINE TERRORISTS TOOK PLACE DURING THE EVENING OF SEPTEMBER 3, 1975 IN AVELLANEDA, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE, WHEN IT CARRIED OUT A COORDINATED BAZOOKA ATTACK AGAINST A FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA RESIDENT AGENCY. SOURCE REPORTED THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES AS A RESULT OF THE LATTER ATTACK.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931, XGDS-2~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR OSVALDO DE BALDRICH, CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, BAPP. (S)(u)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END
~~SECRET~~

F B I

Date: 9/5/75

Transmit the following in TELETYPE (Type in plaintext or code)Via TELETYPE URGENT-PRIORITY (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR

NR. 137 -05

LEGAT, BRASILIA

NR. 031 -05

FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-103)

CLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/BCE/PG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1/6
Argentina ProjectCONFIDENTIALFOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

ON SEPTEMBER 4, 1975, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN ~~OFFICIAL~~ ^{OFFICIAL} ~~OFFICER~~ WITH THE CORDOBA PROVINCIAL POLICE, REPORTED THAT LEONARDO CASTELLI, THE PUBLIC RELATIONS DIRECTOR FOR TRANSAX, A FORD MOTOR COMPANY SUBSIDIARY, WAS SERIOUSLY WOUNDED DURING THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 4, 1975, AS THE RESULT OF A TERRORIST ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT IN CORDOBA. THE SOURCE NOTED THAT THE TRANSAX COMPANY HAD RECENTLY BEEN THE TARGET OF ANOTHER TERRORIST OPERATION ON AUGUST 27, 1975, WHEN TERRORISTS ABDUCTED TRANSAX EMPLOYEE MARCELO JOSE DI FERNANDO. THE SOURCE NOTED THAT DI FERNANDO'S BODY WAS RECOVERED THE NEXT DAY IN CORDOBA.

ON SEPTEMBER 5, 1975, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS A RANKING OFFICIAL WITH THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA) (S) (U)

3- Bue (109-103)

(1 - 80-178 Salas)

(1 - 80-87 [Crovetto]) (S) (U)

RWS:gjk

(3)

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISEApproved: RWS

Special Agent in Charge

Sent 11:30 9/5/75 MPer lyk

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADVISED THAT A MEETING WAS ORDERED DURING SEPTEMBER 4, 1975 BY PRESIDENT PERON IN ORDER TO CONSIDER THE CRITICAL TERRORIST SITUATION IN ARGENTINA. THE SOURCE NOTED THAT THE ARGENTINE CABINET, THE THREE ARMED FORCES CHIEFS, THE CHIEF OF THE FPA AND DEPUTY CHIEF, PARTICIPATED IN THIS ^{MEETING} ~~CONFERENCE~~. THE SOURCE ADVISED THAT THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT MORE VIGOROUS COORDINATED ACTION MUST BE TAKEN IN ORDER TO CONTROL THE MOUNTING WAVE OF TERRORISM IN ARGENTINA. ~~(S)~~ (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931, XGDS-1 AND-2, INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. REMYCABLE, AUGUST 28, 1975 UNDER THE ABOVE DUAL CAPTION, WHICH REPORTED THE ABDUCTION OF THE TRANSAX EMPLOYEE ON AUGUST 27, 1975.

FIRST SOURCE IS COMISARIO LUIS ALBERTO SALAS, CORDOVA PROVINCIAL POLICE.

SECOND SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR JORGE CROVETTO, DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FPA. ~~(S)~~ (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

CLASSIFIED EDITIONS: UNCLASSIFIED
BY: [illegible]
DATE: 7-16-96 page 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5 on H
SP6Ag/CAL/DK 10-2-96

9/12/75

TELETYPE

URGENT-PRIORITY

TO: DIRECTOR NR.
LEGAT, BRASILIA NR.
FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

ON SEPTEMBER 11, 1975 A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO
IS A RANKING FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA) OFFICIAL,
ADVISED THAT ON SEPTEMBER 10, 1975, FPA IDENTIFICATION DIVISION
TECHNICIANS, AFTER A LENGTHY PAINSTAKING EXAMINATION, MANAGED
TO CLASSIFY FINGERPRINTS TAKEN FROM A BADLY DECOMPOSED BODY OF
A MURDER VICTIM THAT HAD BEEN DISCOVERED IN LUJAN, BUENOS AIRES
PROVINCE ON APRIL 10, 1975. SOURCE NOTED THAT THE VICTIM HAD
BEEN SHOT IN THE BACK NUMEROUS TIMES AND DUMPED BY THE SIDE OF
A RURAL COUNTRY ROAD. SOURCE ADVISED THAT THE FINGERPRINTS
CORRESPONDED TO FRANK INGNEY, AN EXECUTIVE ~~(S)~~ (U)

- 5 - Bue
(1 - 109-2)
(1 - 109-103)
(1 - 163-611 Ingrey Kidnapping)
(1 - 80- NEW Morton Rosenblum)
(1 - 105-767 Montoneros)

RWS:gjk
(5)

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301

F B I

Date:

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(Type in plaintext or code)

(Priority)

PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT
FINANCIAL INVESTMENT COMPANIES IN ARGENTINA

OF THE ROBERTS FINANCIAL COMPANY WHO HAD BEEN KIDNAPPED ON APRIL 1, 1975 BY A GROUP CALLING ITSELF THE AGRUPACION ALBORADA (DAWN GROUP). SOURCE NOTED THAT INGNEY WAS MARRIED TO THE DAUGHTER OF CHARLES ROBERTS, THE ^{AT THE} INCUMBENT DIRECTOR OF THE ROBERTS FINANCIAL COMPANY. SOURCE RECALLED THAT INGNEY'S BROTHER-IN-LAW, CHARLES "CARLITOS" ROBERTS, ^{ALSO A ROBERTS FINANCIAL COMPANY EXECUTIVE} WAS ALSO KIDNAPPED ON APRIL 1, 1975, IN A SEPARATE INCIDENT FROM THE INGNEY KIDNAPPING, BY THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION AND RELEASED A SHORT TIME THEREAFTER AFTER THE ROBERTS FAMILY HAD PAID A RANSOM OF \$300,000. SOURCE ALSO NOTED THAT CHARLES LOCKWOOD, ^{IS A MEMBER OF} AN EXECUTIVE WHO ~~SITS~~ ^{IS} ON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF SEVERAL IMPORTANT BUENOS AIRES CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING THE ROBERTS FINANCIAL COMPANY, IS MARRIED TO THE SISTER OF CHARLES ROBERTS, ^{ON} ~~SE~~ SUPRA. SOURCE NOTED THAT LOCKWOOD WAS KIDNAPPED ~~DURING~~ ^{ON} JUNE 6, 1975, BY THE MONTONERO ~~GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION~~ ^{ON} AND RELEASED AFTER A RANSOM OF TWO MILLION DOLLARS WAS PAID. IN ADDITION, SOURCE NOTED THAT LOCKWOOD HAD AGAIN BEEN KIDNAPPED, ^{IN JULY 1976} THIS TIME BY THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP) GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION AND HAD BEEN FREED DURING AUGUST, 1975 BY THE BUENOS AIRES POLICE ~~AND~~ AFTER A VIOLENT SHOOTOUT IN BUENOS AIRES.

Sent _____

M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 495-576

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

PAGE THREE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROVINCE. (S) U

ON SEPTEMBER 12, 1975, Mrs. NORMAN INGREY, MOTHER OF VICTIM FRANK INGREY, ADVISED THAT AFTER HER SON'S KIDNAPPING ON APRIL 1, 1975, THE FAMILY, ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE KIDNAPPERS, ATTEMPTED TO MAKE A RANSOM PAYMENT IN SAN ISIDRO, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE, ON APRIL 4, 1975; HOWEVER, THE RANSOM WAS NOT PICKED UP. MRS. INGREY NOTED THAT BETWEEN THE TIME OF THE ABORTIVE RANSOM PAYMENT AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF HER SON'S FINGERPRINTS ON SEPTEMBER 10, 1975, THERE HAD BEEN NO CONTACT WITH HER SON'S KIDNAPPERS. MRS. INGREY NOTED THAT BECAUSE HER SON'S BROTHER-IN-LAW ^{CHARLES "CARLITO" ROBERTS,} AND HER SON'S UNCLE MY MARRIAGE, CHARLES LOCKWOOD, HAD BEEN KIDNAPPED BY THE MONTONEROS ^{LOCKWOOD IN MAY 1975,} ORGANIZATION, ROBERTS FINANCIAL COMPANY EXECUTIVES APPROACHED ATTORNEYS WITH THE BUNGE & BORN INVESTMENT COMPANY, WHO AT THE TIME WERE ACTIVELY NEGOTIATING WITH THE MONTONEROS ^{TWO BUNGE AND BORN EXECUTIVES,} ORGANIZATION FOR THE RELEASE OF JUAN AND JORGE BORN, IN ORDER TO USE THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE BUNGE AND BORN ATTORNEYS TO RE-ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE MONTONEROS, PRESUMED TO BE HER SON'S KIDNAPPERS.

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

~~SECRET~~

PAGE FOUR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MRS. INGLEY ADVISED THAT THE MONTONEROS DISCLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INGLEY KIDNAPPING. (S)(U)

ACCORDING TO THE FIRST SOURCE, FPA RECORDS AND THE FILES OF OTHER ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES CONTAIN NO REFERENCE TO THE AGUAPACION ALBORADA. (S)(U)

A SECOND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN EXECUTIVE OF AN AMERICAN WIRE SERVICE IN ARGENTINA, ADVISED THAT AFTER THE DEATH OF ARGENTINE PRESIDENT JUAN DOMINGO PERON ON JULY 1, 1974, UP TO SEPTEMBER 10, 1975, 705 INDIVIDUALS WERE KILLED AS A RESULT OF THE MOUNTING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN ARGENTINA. THE SOURCE NOTED THAT INCLUDED IN THE 705 VICTIMS WERE 75 POLICE OFFICERS AND 34 MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO LOST THEIR LIVES AS A RESULT OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THE SOURCE NOTED THAT A MORE ACCURATE FIGURE OF VICTIMS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN ARGENTINA DURING THE ABOVE DESCRIBED PERIOD WOULD PROBABLY BE CLOSE TO 800 TO 850 ^{CONSIDERING} ^{who} INDIVIDUALS DISAPPEARED AND WHO NEVER HAVE BEEN HEARD FROM AGAIN PRESUMABLY WERE VICTIMS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE.

~~SECRET~~

~~28001~~

PAGE FIVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFIED BY 5931, XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.

ADMINISTRATIVE. FIRST [CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD IS
COMISARIO GENERAL PEDRO BRUNO GIACOMELLO, CHIEF OF CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS, FPA] (S) (U)

SECOND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD IS MORTON ROSEMBLUM,
BUENOS AIRES ^{Bureau} CHIEF, ASSOCIATED PRESS.

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END

~~28001~~

~~SECRET~~

First and Third pages missing

~~SECRET~~

PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BUE 109-2; 109-103

THAT FPA BOMB SQUAD EXPERTS WERE UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHAT TYPE EXPLOSIVE DEVICE WAS UTILIZED AND THAT FPA INVESTIGATION HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE REASON FOR THE BOMBING, SPECIFICALLY WHETHER THE JAPANESE EMBASSY OR THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE MAY HAVE BEEN THE ACTUAL TARGETS OF THE BOMB. SOURCE NOTED THAT THE UNIVERSITY OF BELGRANO HAS NOT BEEN THE RECENT SCENE OF ANY STUDENT DISORDERS AND THUS IF THE UNIVERSITY OF BELGRANO WAS THE TARGET OF THE BOMBINGS, THE MOTIVE IS NOT CLEAR. (S) (U)

SOURCE REPORTED THAT ON 9/8/75 THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT DECLARED THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION ILLEGAL, PLACING IT IN THE SAME CATEGORY WITH THE TROTSKYITE GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION, PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP). SOURCE NOTED THAT AT ONE TIME THE MONTONEROS CONSTITUTED A LEGAL POLITICAL ENTITY IN ARGENTINA AND IN FACT HAD SUPPORTED THE RETURN OF DECEASED ARGENTINE PRESIDENT ~~WENEREN~~ JUAN DOMINGO PERON TO POWER IN 1973. (S) (U) (X)

THE SOURCE NOTED THAT ALMOST ONE YEAR TO THE DAY PRIOR TO THE MONTONEROS BEING DECLARED ILLEGAL BY THE ARGENTINE (S) (U) (X)

END PAGE TWO

~~SECRET~~

9/18/75

CODE

~~SECRET~~

CABLE

URGENT (PRIORITY)

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR 150 -18
LEGAT BRASILIA NR 038 -18
FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS; IS - ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS A RANKING OFFICIAL
WITH THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, PROVIDED THE
FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON SEPTEMBER 18, 1975: (S) (U)

ON SEPTEMBER 17, 1975, MEMBERS OF THE ARGENTINE TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION, THE EJERCITO DE LIBERACION (ARMY OF LIBERATION),
AUGUST 22ND FACTION, ASSASSINATED THE CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE
OF THE ARGENTINE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, RETIRED AIR FORCE VICE
COMMODORE ROLANDO SEGUNDO SILEON. SILEON WAS ASSASSINATED
FOUR BLOCKS FROM HIS RESIDENCE IN A SMALL COMMERCIAL ESTAB-
LISHMENT LOCATED IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO A LARGE RAILROAD
STATION AND BUS TERMINAL. SILEON, WHO RETIRED FROM THE
ARGENTINE AIR FORCE IN 1970, WORKED AS AN ADVISOR ON POLICE
MATTERS TO THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR DURING THE PERIOD
FEBRUARY, 1971, THROUGH DECEMBER, 1973, WHEN HE TOOK UP (S) (U)

1 - [80-205] (VALIN) (S) (U)
1 - 80-29 (EMILIO REY)

RWS:jh

(4) CLASSIFIED BY 3906 JELW/BCE/12
DECLASSIFY ON: 2025-1-16
Argentina Project

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

109-103-304

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE TWO

BUE 109-2; 109-103

HIS PRESENT POSITION AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. THE ARMY OF LIBERATION, AUGUST 22ND FACTION, IS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION THAT HAD BELONGED TO THE TROTSKYITE GUERRILLA GROUP, THE PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP), BUT BROKE AWAY FROM THE LATTER GROUP SINCE THE ERP WAS NOT CARRYING OUT SUFFICIENT VIOLENT GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES TO TOPPLE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. (S) (U)

A SECOND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN EXECUTIVE WITH THE BANK OF BOSTON, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON SEPTEMBER 18, 1975:

REACTING TO THE MOUNTING POLITICAL TERRORIST CAMPAIGN IN ARGENTINA, THE BANK OF BOSTON HEADQUARTERS IN BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, ORDERED THE IMMEDIATE TRANSFER OF A BANK OF BOSTON OFFICIAL, CARTER GEORGE, WHO HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO BUENOS AIRES FOR THE PAST NINETEEN YEARS.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931-XGDS-2-INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - [FIRST SOURCE IS COLONEL ALBERTO VALIN, CHIEF, ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE,] (S) (U)
SECURITY, SECOND SOURCE IS EMILIO RAMON REY (NA), DIRECTOR OF/BANK OF BOSTON, BUENOS AIRES.

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END.

~~SECRET~~

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9/22/75

SECRET

CODE

CABLE

URGENT (PRIORITY)

5-1-01
CLASSIFIED BY 39063 ELW/BCE/OL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1-6

Argentina Project

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. -22
LEGAT BRASILIA NR. -22

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL EM MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON SEPTEMBER 21, 1975, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO
IS AN OFFICIAL WITH THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE, MADE
AVAILABLE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

ON SEPTEMBER 20, 1975, IT WAS ESTABLISHED THAT AN UNIDENTI-
FIED BODY DISCOVERED ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1975, IN AVELLANEDA,
BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE, JUST OUTSIDE THE FEDERAL CAPITAL, WAS
THAT OF JACK BECHT, A DUTCH CITIZEN, WHO HAD BEEN STAYING AT
THE BUENOS AIRES SHERATON HOTEL, WHILE IN ARGENTINA ON ASSIGN-
MENT FROM THE FOKKER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION. THE VICTIM HAD BEEN
SHOT IN THE CHEST AND DIED IMMEDIATELY. THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL
POLICE AND THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA HAVE ELIMINATED
ROBBERY AS A MOTIVE FOR BECHT'S ASSASSINATION. TO DATE NO

1 - SO [DE BALDRICH] (S)(u)
RWS:jn
(3)

DECLASSIFIED BY 39063 ELW/BCE/OL
ON 5-8-01

Argentina Project

10-305

~~SECRET~~

PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BUE 109-2; 109-103

TERRORIST ORGANIZATION HAS CLAIMED CREDIT FOR THE ASSASSINATION.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR OSVALDO
DE BALDRICH, CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL
POLICE. (S) (U)

END.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, a.i.

9/22/75

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

ASSASSINATION OF JACK BECHT
FOKKER AIRCRAFT COMPANY

5-1-0/
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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6
Argentina Project

As reported in the local press, captioned individual, a 33-year old Dutch citizen, disappeared in Buenos Aires on 9/2/75.

Becht had been staying at the Sheraton Hotel and had stored a large volume of money in a safe deposit box at the hotel.

On 9/3/75, a body was discovered in Avellaneda, Buenos Aires Province, just outside the Federal Capital. The cause of death was gunshot wounds in the chest area. Fingerprints taken from the body were searched through files of the appropriate police agencies in La Plata and the Federal Capital with negative results. Police recovered money and jewelry from the victim and therefore eliminated robbery as a motive for the killing.

No personal papers were discovered on the body; however, a key was located which contained no identification or information of origin; however, police experts ascertained the key belonged to some form of bank safety deposit box. Investigation finally established that the key belonged to a Sheraton Hotel safe deposit box belonging to Becht. It was thus ascertained that the body discovered on 9/3/75 was that of Becht.

On 9/22/75, an official of the Federal Police of Argentina (FPA) advised that in connection with the Becht disappearance and murder, no communique or other form of communication was established with the Fokker Company in Buenos Aires. The source reported that no terrorist group took credit (S) (U)

cc: 1 - Addressee
1 - Ambassador Briefing Book
1 - POL
1 - POL-B
1 - SY
1 - Economic Counsellor

2 - Bue (109-103)
(1 - 80-87)

[Crovetto] (S)
RWS:gjk

(8)

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Classified by 5931

Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)

Automatically declassified on Indefinite

SECRET

109-103-306

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RE: ASSASSINATION OF JACK BECHT
FOREER AIRCRAFT COMPANY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
for the Becht slaying through the usual channels. Source advised that ~~the~~ investigation established that Becht had been acting as a playboy around Buenos Aires and had been frequently seen in the company of a very attractive blonde woman during the past several weeks. Source advised the FPA are attempting to locate this woman and are convinced that the Becht slaying will be resolved after the woman is located. Police suspect the motive for the Becht slaying was extortion or a crime of passion. The source advised the FPA are relatively certain that Becht's murder had nothing to do with any terrorist group. According to the source, contrary to press reports, victim was not abducted from the Sheraton Hotel. (S) (U)

2*

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~~Argentina Project~~

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~~SECRET~~

109-103-309

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE AMBASSADOR

9/24/75

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

Cordoba was the center on 9/23/75 of several activities against U. S. business interests in that city.

During the early morning hours of 9/23/75, terrorists planted a powerful bomb at the office of the Xerox Corporation. [A Federal Police of Argentina source reported] (S) (U) that the Federal Police of Argentina (FPA) Resident Agency in Cordoba advised there were no personal injuries and moderate material damage as a result of the bomb.

An official of the Transax Company, a subsidiary of the Ford Motor Company in Cordoba, who had been kidnapped by terrorists on 9/12/75, was released unharmed in Cordoba during morning of 9/23/75. in the immediate location of the Transax Plant. [An FPA source advised that the victim, JULIO ANDRES CESAR, was given an ultimatum along with three other Transax executives to leave Argentina within 48 hours or they would be killed.] (S) (U)

5-2-01

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Argentina Project

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(2)
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ON 5/1/94

Argentina Project

- 1 - Addressee
 - 1 - Buenos Aires (109-103)
- RWS:jn
(2)

~~SECRET~~

104-105-310

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

9/26/75

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

~~SECRET~~
EJERCITO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUERTO
(PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY)(ERP)

On 9/25/75, an official of the Federal Police of Argentina (FPA) provided the following information: (S) (U)

On 9/24/75, the FPA was advised that the Army Intelligence Service (SIE) had developed sensitive information from a penetration agent in the ERP indicating that the ERP was planning the assassination of an FPA official and a Buenos Aires Provincial Police (BAPP) official during the weekend of 9/27-28/75. (S) (U)

Specific identities of the FPA and BAPP officials targeted for assassination were provided by the SIE to the FPA and the BAPP, in order that discreet security measures could be taken by the targeted officials. (S) (U)

The foregoing information should not be discussed with any foreign officials including those of the Argentine Government.

1 - Addressee

1 - POL/R

1 - SY

3 - Buenos Aires

(1 - 109-38(ERP)

(1 - 109-103)

(1 - 80-84(POIRE) (S) (U)

RWS:jn

(6)

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(2)
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CLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/BCF/26
DECLASSIFY ON 25X 1,6
Argentina Project

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

109-103-311

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

10/1/75

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

~~DECLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/BCBDC~~
ON 5-1-01

Argentina Project

INFORMATION ON THREAT AGAINST U. S. PERSONNEL

Reference Montevideo Telegram 3379 under the above caption.

On 10/1/75, I contacted Comisario Mayor BESTEIRO, Deputy Director, Department of Federal Security, Federal Police of Argentina (FPA), with regard to the information contained in referenced Montevideo Telegram.

Comisario Mayor BESTEIRO categorically denied that the FPA had any information indicating that members of any terrorist organization were planning to travel to Montevideo in order to carry out kidnappings of U. S. personnel. Additionally, Comisario Mayor BESTEIRO, after checking with Comisario Inspector ANTONIO VICTOR MAYORIN, Chief of Foreign Affairs, FPA, stated that no officials from the Montevideo Police Department had been personally in touch with the FPA in Buenos Aires during the past month. Comisario Mayor BESTEIRO stated that the FPA had not recently utilized the services of any female Spanish national, who was a member of an Argentine terrorist organization.

Comisario Mayor BESTEIRO noted that information appearing in today's news media indicating that three Uruguayan extremists had been detained by the FPA, specifically MARIO ISIDORO, EDEN MAYO, and ANTONIO TOMAS ECHENIQUE, had been detained over one week ago and were members of a Uruguayan Communist organization known as the Revolutionary Party. Comisario Mayor BESTEIRO stated that these individuals were not planning the kidnapping of U. S. personnel in Buenos Aires or Montevideo.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified by 5931~~

~~Exempt from General Declassification~~

~~Schedule of Executive Order 11652~~

~~Exemption Category 5B(2)~~

~~Automatically declassified on INMET~~

- 1 - Addressee
- 1 - POL
- 1 - POL/R
- 1 - SY
- 1 - DAO
- 1 - DEA
- 1 - Mil Grp
- 2 - Buenos Aires
 - (1 - 66-50)
 - (1 - 109-103)

RWS:jn (9)

109-103-321

INFORMATION ON THREAT AGAINST U. S. PERSONNEL

Comisario Mayor BESTIHO stated that he would alert police personnel at Aereoparque and the usual river crossings to be on the lookout for any suspicious individuals traveling to Montevideo.

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 11-9-99 Pgs. 1+2

10/2/75

CODE

~~SECRET~~

CABLE

URGENT (PRIORITY)

TO: DIRECTOR(109-12-201)NR. 17/-02
FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS; IS - ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON OCTOBER 2, 1975, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS
AN OFFICIAL OF THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE (BAPP) ADVISED
THAT BAPP OFFICER SEGUNDO C. BARRIONUEVO WAS BRUTALLY ASSASSINATED
OUTSIDE OF HIS RESIDENCE IN BUENOS AIRES ON OCTOBER 1, 1975,
BY MEMBERS OF THE ARGENTINE GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION, PEOPLES
REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP).

A SECOND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN OFFICIAL
OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA) ADVISED THAT DURING
MORNING OF OCTOBER 1, 1975, AN FPA CRUISER WAS MACHINEGUNNED
IN THE VICINITY OF AN ARGENTINE REAR INSTALLATION IN BUENOS
AIRES. THIS SOURCE ADVISED THAT FPA OFFICERS OCCUPYING THE
CRUISER MIRACULOUSLY ESCAPED UNHARMED. (S) (U)

ON OCTOBER 2, 1975, THE LAST REMAINING AMERICAN EXECUTIVE
OF THE STERLING DRUG COMPANY WAS ORDERED OUT OF ARGENTINA BY

1 - 109-38 (ERP)

1 - SO-CROVETTO (S)

RWS:jn (4)

5-1-61
CLASSIFIED BY 391063 ELM/205/106
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1-1-
Argentina Project

109-12-322

~~SECRET~~

PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BUE 109-2; 109-103

HIS COMPANY BECAUSE OF THE TERRORIST THREAT.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 AGDS-2 INDEFINITE~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - FIRST SOURCE IS COMISARIO GENERAL ANGEL
DEGASTALDI, DEPUTY CHIEF, BAPP. (S)(U)

SECOND SOURCE IS COMISARIO GENERAL JORGE CROVETTO,
DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FPA. (S)(U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END.

~~SECRET~~

10/10/75

TO: MR. ADAMS
MR. KOLOMBATOVIC
MR. CLAWSON

The Federal Police of Argentina advised that during the afternoon of October 9, 1975, an individual known as Sabat, a political cartoonist, together with Samuel Oliver, the Director of the Museo Nacional de Bellas Artes, and Daniel Martinez, the Secretary General of the Museo Nacional de Bellas Artes, were abducted by unidentified individuals as they stood conversing in the vicinity of the University of Buenos Aires Law School in the Federal Capital.

The Federal Police of Argentina advise that witnesses claim that the unknown subjects who abducted the above named individuals apparently were not after Sabat but took him along to avoid problems during the abduction of the two Museo Nacional de Bellas Artes officials with whom Sabat was conversing at the time of the abduction.

- 1 - Adams
- 1 - Kolombatovic
- 1 - Clawson
- 1 - Buenos Aires (109-103)

RWS:jn 1- 64-91 SUB A
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-1-01 BY 3906 JELW/BCE/106
Argentina Project

Box

109-103-327

10/10/75

TO: MR. ADAMS
MR. KOLOMBATOVIC
MR. CLAWSON

For your information, the political cartoonist and officials of the Museo Nacional de Bellas Artes who were abducted by unidentified individuals during the afternoon of 10/9/75, were extralegally detained by the Federal Police of Argentine (FPA) Drug Squad. The political cartoonist was released; however, the two Bellas Artes officials are being held and were legally charged on 10/10/75.

During the early morning of 10/10/75, unidentified individuals fired upon the facade, from a speeding car, at the building housing the United Arab Republic and Thailand Embassy. No terrorist organization has yet taken credit for this action.

The FPA advised that it is anticipated that the Chilean leftists who have occupied the United Nations offices in Buenos Aires since 10/6/75, will depart Argentina at approximately 5:00 P.M. this evening via Swissair to an undetermined location. It is noted that the Argentine Government has refused to negotiate with the terrorists but have allowed the United Nations to carry out negotiations based on the fact that the United Nations office is considered by the Argentine Government as a sovereign situs.

- 1 - Adams
- 1 - Kolombatovic
- 1 - Clawson
- (2) - Buenos Aires (109-103)
(1 - 64-91 Sub A)

RWS:gjk
(5)

ALL INFO CONTAINED
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DATE 5-1-01 BY 60390 B3ELW/RC/106
Argentina Project

109-103-328

1025-95
CLASSIFIED BY: SP6AG/CAL
REASON: 1.5 (B) (D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (S) (6)

10/28/75

~~SECRET~~

TELETYPE ~~Appeal # 90-0371~~ URGENT-PRIORITY

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. 193 -28

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

TWO CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES ABROAD WHO ARE [OFFICIALS OF THE
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA) AND]
THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE (BAPP) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING
SUMMARY OF RECENT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN ARGENTINA:

ON OCTOBER 23, 1975, TERRORISTS IN CORDOBA, ARGENTINA
ATTEMPTED TO KIDNAP EDUARDO J. JOHNES, THE DIRECTOR OF LABOR
RELATIONS OF THE TRANSAX COMPANY, A SUBSIDIARY OF THE FORD MOTOR
COMPANY. THE TERRORISTS ATTEMPTED TO INTERCEPT JOHNES AS HE
WAS RETURNING TO HIS SUBURBAN CORDOBA RESIDENCE; HOWEVER,
JOHNES ESCAPED UNHARMED AFTER A VIOLENT SHOOT-OUT BETWEEN THE
TERRORISTS AND HIS GUARDS, WHO WERE ACCOMPANYING HIM.

- 8 - Bue (109-2) (1 - 109-103) (80-87) (80-185)
(1 - 105-NEW Ismael Jacinto Halek)
(1 - 105-1089 Arab Terrorists Activities)

RWS:gjk
(8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

5-1-01
CLASSIFIED BY 3406 JELW/BCE/PR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

Argentina Project

~~SECRET~~

109-103-335

~~SECRET~~

PAGE TWO
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DURING THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 20, 1975 THE BAPP ARRESTED A 30-YEAR OLD ARGENTINE CITIZEN, ISMAEL JACINTO HAIK, WHO WAS OPERATING A PRINTING SHOP AND SHORT WAVE RADIO STATION FOR THE MONTONERO ARGENTINE GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION. AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST, HAIK HAD TWO PUBLICATIONS, "CUESTIONES ARABES" (ARAB QUESTIONS") AND "LA VOZ DE PALESTINA" (THE VOICE OF PALESTINE") IN HIS POSSESSION. DURING INTERROGATION, HAIK ADMITTED HE HAD BEEN A MEMBER OF A PALESTINIAN TERRORIST GROUP.

DURING THE LATE EVENING OF OCTOBER 23, 1975, TERRORISTS ATTEMPTED TO ASSASSINATE COMISARIO GENERAL HORACIO ALBERTO ROJAS, THE FPA DEPUTY CHIEF, WHO WAS RETURNING TO HIS RESIDENCE FROM FPA HEADQUARTERS. AN HOUR LONG FIRE FIGHT ENSUED DURING WHICH ROJAS' BODYGUARDS MANAGED TO HOLD OFF THE TERRORISTS UNTIL FPA REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVED ON THE SCENE. ROJAS ESCAPED WITHOUT INJURY.

MEMBERS OF THE ARGENTINE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY-AUGUST 22 FACTION, ASSASSINATED RETIRED ARGENTINE AIR FORCE COLONEL ARTURO LEOPOLDO LONGINOTTI NEAR HIS RESIDENCE IN SUBURBAN CASTELAR ON OCTOBER 26, 1975. COLONEL

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE THREE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LONGINOTTI'S SON WAS SERIOUSLY WOUNDED BY HIS FATHER'S ASSASSINS WHEN HE ATTEMPTED TO COME TO THE DEFENSE OF HIS FATHER.

DURING THE EARLY MORNING OF OCTOBER 26, 1975, MEMBERS OF THE MONTONEROS AMBUSHED TWO BAPP CRUISERS IN SAN ISIDRO, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE UTILIZING AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND HAND GRENADES. FOUR BAPP OFFICERS DIED IN THE FIRE FIGHT.

SEVERAL IMPORTANT KIDNAPPINGS ALSO TOOK PLACE IN THE GREATER BUENOS AIRES AREA DURING THE PERIOD OCTOBER 23-27, 1975. ON OCTOBER 23, 1975, REBECA MADANES DE FRIEDENTHAL, AN ARGENTINE MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE FATE TIRE COMPANY, WAS KIDNAPPED WHILE EN ROUTE FROM HER RESIDENCE TO THE FATE PLANT. SHE WAS RELEASED ON OCTOBER 27, 1975, AFTER A LARGE RANSOM HAD BEEN PAID. .ON OCTOBER 24, 1975, ARTURO R. BULLRICH, A WEALTHY ARGENTINE CATTLE BREEDER AND BUSINESS MAN, WAS KIDNAPPED BY TERRORISTS. ON OCTOBER 27, 1975, FRANZ MITZ, A WEST GERMAN CITIZEN AND THE DIRECTOR OF PRODUCTION FOR THE MERCEDES BENZ COMPANY, WAS KIDNAPPED BY THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931, XGDS-2, INDEFINITE.~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE ~~THIRX~~ FOUR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. [SOURCES ARE COMISARIO GENERAL JORGE CROVETTO, ^(S) ~~DIRECTOR~~ OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FPA] ^(S) ~~AND~~ COMISARIO MAYOR OSVALDO DE BALDRICH, CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, BAPP. ^(S) ~~(S)~~

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHARGE D'AFFAIRES

11/14/75

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

DECLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/BCE/DC
ON 5-7-01

ERJERCITO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (ERP)

Argentina Project

On 11/14/75, a source who has provided reliable information in the past, disclosed the following information:

On or about 10/27/75, (first name unknown) Buganem, an official of the Disco supermarket chain, was kidnapped by captioned organization. It is noted that Buganem acquired the Rockefeller Minimax supermarket chain from the IBEC Corporation and subsequently sold one half interest of the Minimax operation to Disco, while donating the other half to the Minimax workers. A ransom equivalent to one million dollars was paid to the ERP for Buganem's release and he was turned loose on 11/7/75 in Villa Rosa.

Buganem, after being released, disclosed that the ERP kept him chained to a bed, feeding him solid food only once a day at lunchtime. As a result of this restricted diet, he lost eleven kilos in weight and was physically and mentally at the breaking point upon being released. Buganem disclosed that during his captivity, the ERP conducted a People's Tribunal during which he was condemned to death for exploiting Minimax and Disco workers. He was told that his death sentence would be commuted after one million dollars' ransom was paid and that he leave Argentina within forty-eight hours after his release. Buganem also disclosed that Alberto Urani and Eduardo Firpo, Sr., two other Disco officials, were also tried in absentia by the ERP and condemned to death. It is noted that Eduardo Firpo, Sr. was the Ministro de Hacienda during the period of the Revolucion Libertadora between the years 1955 and 1957. In

cc's: 1 - Addressee

1 - PCL

1 - PCL-R

1 - SY

1 - Econ Counsellor

1 - Ambassador's Briefing Book

3 - Bue (109-38-ERP)

(1-80-111

Eduardo Firpo

(109-103

Argentine

Terrorist
Activities)

RWS:gjk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By 3981

Exempt from General Declassification

Schedule of Executive Order 11652

Exemption Category 5B (2)(4)

Automatically declassified on Indefinite.

Rus

109-103-339

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RE: EJERCITO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (ERP)

addition to his holdings in Disco, Firpo is an exclusive landowner and cattle breeder.

During the early part of the week of 11/10/75, an ERP communique was discovered among applications for employment at the Disco Personnel Office indicating that the ERP had sentenced Urani, Firpo, Sr., the latter's son, Martin Firpo, and the Disco Director of Personnel to death.

Approximately two weeks ago, the Federal Police of Argentina (FPA) Department of Federal Security, arrested a Disco female employee who had access to all Disco company financial records, as well as a thorough knowledge of the personal finances of Disco executives. The FPA informed Disco executives that the detained female employee was a member of the ERP. Notice of this individual's arrest appeared in the evening Buenos Aires press of 11/13/75. Disco employs off-duty members of SIDE in their Security Department and no formal "denuncia" of the Bugansa kidnapping and ransom was made to the FPA on the personal advice of the Director of SIDE.

- 2 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4 Dec 75

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

SecState WASHDC

БА 1213 (1971)

Caceres' wife was accompanying him in the truck and was kidnapped. Her bullet-ridden body was found this morning, (Dec. 4).

2. General Caceres Monie was Commander of the Gendarmerie in 1969 and was Chief of Federal Police from 1970 until 1972. Following the assassination of Second Army Corps Commander, General Juan Carlos Sanchez, Caceres Monie took over that job in Rosario.

~~As cable being typed the dead body of Gabor~~

~~WASH FIELD OFFICE HAS RECEIVED INFO THAT~~

HILL

109-103-345

POL:WSSmith

USIS:MO' ~~Br/En~~

AMB: RCH:EE

DCM: JJMont110

~~RESTRICTED OFFICIAL USE~~

CONFIDENTIAL 7899
5 DEC 75
1600

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM
Amembassy BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION
~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PINS, PINT, AR
SUBJECT: Left-Right Vengeance Killings

ACTION: Secstate WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USCINCSO ROUTINE
Amembassy LA PAZ ROUTINE
Amembassy LIMA
USCINCSO FOR POLAD ROUTINE

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ BUENOS AIRES 7999

Ref a) BA-7960, b) BA-7930

USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD

1. Montoneros reportedly have claimed credit for brutal slaying of Gen Caceres Monie and his wife (see ref a--wife's murder particularly senseless and savage; she apparently was strangled and then shot). Right-wing extremists wasted no time in retaliating. Nine students, Peruvians and Bolivians as well as Argentines, were selected at random and pulled out of student hostel in Cordoba yesterday (Dec 4) by right-wing extremists calling themselves "Caceres Monie Liberators of America." Gagged and bound bodies of students (probably none of whom had anything to do with deaths of Caceres Monie and wife) were found dumped by side of road half an hour later.

2. Meanwhile, CGT, Senate and other institutions have expressed

109-103-348

DRAFTED BY: RMartin
POL:WSSmith:cc

DRAFTING DATE
12/5/75

TEL. EXT.
128

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY
AMBASSADOR ROBERT C. HILL

CLEARANCES:

DAO: PACoughlin (in draft)

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED

DEC 9 1975

LEGAL ATTACHE-BUENOS AIRES

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

profound outrage over murder of Gen and Mrs. Caceres Monie and have issued statements condemning violence of left and right. Mrs. Peron reportedly chaired meeting of Defense Council last night which focused on mounting wave of violence.

3. In another incident, police surprised four young people passing out ~~surprised four young people passing out~~ subversive literature to factory workers in industrial suburb of Buenos Aires. Police gave chase and in ensuing gun battle, two of the subversives (a boy and a girl) were killed. Other two escaped.

4. Death toll for past four days of political violence now stands at 32.

5. Comment: Left will now doubtless respond with additional murders and vicious circle will continue its upward spiral.


HILL

WBS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM

0900

 INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM

Amembassy BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

E.O. 11652:

N/A

TAGS:

PINS, AR

SUBJECT:

Wave of Right-Wing Murders

ACTION:

Secstate WASHDC

REF

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ Buenos Aires 7930

a) BA-8812 (12/1974), b) BA-5551, c) A-252

1. Twelve persons reportedly killed in Tucuman and Cordoba

(Dec 1-2) in what appears to be wave of right-wing killings.

Seven shattered bodies were found in Tucuman Dec 1 following

detonation of bomb in back of truck. Unconfirmed press reports

indicate victims were dead before being placed in vehicle and

had hands tied behind backs. The 2:30 am blast occurred in the

same location as and exactly one year after the assassination

of Army Major Humberto Viola and his young daughter (reftel a).

It obviously was meant in retribution.

2. Right-wing terrorists also machinegunned to death Arturo Lea

Place, father of a 1972 "Trelew Massacre" victim (reftel b) in

Tucuman (Dec 2). Place's attempt to hide in car failed and the

entire family including a young daughter was killed.

3. Cordoba law student Mario Cabral was kidnapped and murdered

 AMB
 POL-3
 POL/R
 ECOM
 USIS
 USDAO
 MILGP-2
 SCIAT
 LEGAT
 RF
 CHRON

DRAFTED BY:

POL:RMartin:cc

CLEARANCES:

 109-103-349
 SEARCHED INDEXED
 SERIALIZED FILED
 12/3/75 121

DEC 4 1975

LEGAL ATTACHE - BUENOS AIRES

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

POL:WSSmith

DCM:JJMont

AMB:RCH/III

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

CLASSIFICATION

 Berens
 IT
 Could be
 Response


 YR of mm
 75

Dec 2 by the right-wing group calling itself the "Captain Viola Command."

4. Reportedly, violent deaths came to an additional five people in Argentina on Dec 1, at least two of whom appear to have been victims of right-wing terrorism.

5. Comment: Right-wing terrorism, as suggested in ref c, is obviously on the upswing again.

HILL



12/24/75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CABLE

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

5-2-01
CLASSIFIED BY 39063 ECW/BCE/DC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6
Argentina Project
-24 UTK Bureau original

TO: DIRECTOR NR.
FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~SECRET~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

ON DECEMBER 23, 1975, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS
A RANKING OFFICIAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
(AIS), PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

ARGENTINE
THE ARGENTINE AIS, THROUGH SEVERAL PENETRATION
SOURCES IN THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION, ASCERTAINED
THAT THE MONTONEROS HAD SCHEDULED AN ATTACK AGAINST AN ARGENTINE
ARMY ARSENAL LOCATED IN MONTE CHINGOLO, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE
(BAP), DURING THE AFTERNOON OF DECEMBER 23, 1975. THE SOURCE
ADVISED THAT THE ARGENTINE ARMY PREPARED AN AMBUSH AND WAITED
FOR THE MONTONEROS TO CARRY OUT THEIR PLANNED ACTION. AT
APPROXIMATELY 7:00 PM, DECEMBER 23, 1975, SEVERAL GROUPS OF
MONTONEROS NUMBERING IN EXCESS OF 100 INDIVIDUALS, BEGAN A
COORDINATED ATTACK AGAINST THE MONTE CHINGOLO ARSENAL. ADDITIONALLY (S) (U)

3 - Bue (109-2)

(1) - 109-103

(1 - 80- 205 [Col. Valin]) (S) (U)

RWS:gjk

(3)

109-103-351

PAGE TWO

~~SECRET~~

OTHER DIVERSIONARY ATTACKS WERE CARRIED OUT AGAINST VARIOUS OTHER POLICE AND ARMY INSTALLATIONS IN BAP. ~~(S)~~ (U)

THE ARGENTINE ARMY ROUTED THE MONTONEROS, KILLING OVER SIXTY AND WOUNDING AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF TERRORISTS. ADDITIONALLY, NUMEROUS PRISONERS WERE TAKEN. ~~(S)~~ (U)

THE SOURCE ADVISED THAT THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED ACTION BY THE ARGENTINE ARMY WAS THE MOST SEVERE BLOW EVER DEALT TO ARGENTINE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1970. ~~(S)~~ (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931, XGDS-2.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. ~~XXXX~~ THE SOURCE IS COL. ALBERTO VALIN, CHIEF, AIS. ~~(S)~~ (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END.

~~SECRET~~

9 Jan 78
1715

FROM

AmEmbassy BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

~~RESTRICTED OFFICIAL USE~~

| | | |
|------|----------|-------------------------------|
| E.O. | 11652: | E&A |
| | TAGS: | PINS, PINT, AR |
| | SUBJECT: | Wave of Kidnapping in Cordoba |

ACTION: SecState WASHDC

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ BUENOS AIRES 0133

Ref: BA 7930

1. According to press reports, between 10 and 13 people were kidnapped in Cordoba in the early morning hours January 8.

Several groups of 10 to 20 persons each, using cars ~~xx~~ without license plates (and in some cases claiming to be police)

carried out the operations. While accounts vary, most of the abductions appear to be the work of the "Liberators of America Command" (Comando Libertadores de America) which also claimed responsibility for the kidnap/slaying of 9 students in Cordoba late last year (reftel). They reportedly left communiques at the sites of some of yesterday's abductions.

2. The motive for the multiple kidnappings is not clear. And so far no bodies have been discovered. Local police deny that they have any of the people in question in custody.

[illegible]

DRAFTED BY:

USIS:MO'Brien:mg

DRAFTING DATE

1/9/76

TEL. EXT.

128

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

POL:VJSSmith

CLEARANCES:

1. NAME: RYScherrer

ΔΕΛΤΑ 2450-14-11

SERIALIZED

A/DCI: [redacted]

JAN 10 1970

CLASSIFIED BY SP6 Ag/can
REASON: 1.5 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: A1
APPROPRIATE
90-0371

~~SECRET~~

1/13/76

TELETYPE 390130W/SCF/CC IMMEDIATE
Argentine Project
5-3-01

5-2-01
~~CLASSIFIED BY SP6 Ag/can~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: A1~~
Argentine Project
-13

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12201) NR.
FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~SECRET~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

ON JANUARY 11, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS
A RANKING OFFICER OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
(AAIS) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: ~~(S)~~ (U)

A PENETRATION SOURCE OF THE AAIS IN THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA
ORGANIZATION ADVISED THAT THE MONTONEROS ARE PLANNING A SPECTACULAR
ACT IN ORDER TO PRESSURE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO RELEASE
ROBERTO QUIETO, A MONTONERO LEADER WHO WAS EXTRA-LEGALLY DETAINED
BY THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA) AND THE AAIS. THE AAIS
SOURCE REPORTED THAT AS OF JANUARY 12, 1976, NO DEFINITE COURSE
OF ACTION HAD BEEN DECIDED UPON BY THE MONTONERO LEADERSHIP. ~~(S)~~ (U)

IN ANALYZING THE ABOVE INFORMATION, THE AAIS BELIEVES THAT
THE MONTONEROS MIGHT ATTEMPT TO KIDNAP A RANKING ARGENTINE
GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL OR A FOREIGN DIPLOMAT IN ORDER TO ATTEMPT TO
EXCHANGE THIS INDIVIDUAL FOR QUIETO. THE AAIS ALSO BELIEVES THERE
IS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE MONTONEROS MIGHT INSTITUTE A CAMPAIGN ~~(S)~~ (U)

5 - Bue (109-2) (109-103) (105-767 Montoneros)
(105-1099 R. Quieto) (80-205 [Col. Valin]) ~~(S)~~ (U)
RWS:gjk
(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

355

~~SECRET~~

PAGE TWO

~~SECRET~~

OF INDISCRIMINATE ASSASSINATIONS OF ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS OR FOREIGN DIPLOMATS UNTIL QUIETO IS RELEASED, INASMUCH
AS QUIETO IS BEING HELD EXTRALEGALLY BY THE AAIS, THERE IS NO
POSSIBILITY THAT ANY NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE ENTERED INTO WITH THE
MONTONEROS FOR HIS RELEASE. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931-XGDS-1-AND-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. [SOURCE IS COL. ALBERTO VALIN, CHIEF, AAIS.] (S) (U)

REMYCABLE, JANUARY 9, 1976, CAPTIONED, "FOREIGN POLITICAL
MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA," [REPORTING THE EXTRALEGAL
DETENTION OF QUIETO BY THE AAIS] (S) (U) (U)

THE FOREGOING [AAIS] (S) (U) (U) INTELLIGENCE IS EXCLUSIVE AND HAS BEEN
COORDINATED LOCALLY. [REDACTED] b1 per CIA

[REDACTED]

BASED ON THE FOREGOING INFORMATION, THE AMBASSADOR HAS
INSTITUTED RADICAL SECURITY MEASURES, SINCE THERE IS A POSSIBILITY (S) (U)

~~SECRET~~

PAGE THREE

~~SECRET~~

THAT AN EMBASSY OFFICER MAY BE TARGETED BY THE MONTONEROS (S) (u) X (H)
CERTAIN EMBASSY OFFICERS HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED NOT TO REPORT TO
THE EMBASSY AND TO REMAIN AT THEIR RESIDENCES DURING THE NEXT
TWO WEEKS, WHICH IS THE CRITICAL PERIOD FOR THE MONTONEROS TO
TAKE ACTION. ADDITIONAL PATROL AND ESCORT CARS ARE BEING SECURED
AT CAR RENTAL COMPANIES AND BODYGUARDS ARE BEING ASSIGNED TO
VARIOUS EMBASSY OFFICERS WHO AT THE PRESENT TIME DO NOT HAVE THEM.
CERTAIN EMBASSY OFFICERS ARE BEING ORDERED BY THE AMBASSADOR TO
TEMPORARILY VACATE THEIR RESIDENCES AND RESIDE AT THE SHERATON
HOTEL IN BUENOS AIRES UNTIL THE CRITICAL PERIOD HAS PASSED. (S) (u) X (H)

I AM FOLLOWING THIS MATTER VERY CLOSELY AND WILL TAKE ALL
NECESSARY SECURITY MEASURES TO PROTECT MYSELF AND MY STAFF. BUREAU
WILL BE KEPT ADVISED.

end

END

~~SECRET~~

1/29/76

TELETYPE

IMMEDIATE

TO: DIRECTOR NR. -29

FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

ON JANUARY 29, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS
AN OFFICIAL OF THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE (BAPP)
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

ON JANUARY 29, 1976 AT APPROXIMATELY 9:45 A.M., FIFTEEN
ARMED INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING TWO WOMEN, FORCIBLY TOOK OVER
THE BENDIX CORPORATION PLANT IN MUNRO, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE.
THE INDIVIDUALS ENTERED THE BENDIX CORPORATION LOCATION IN A
PICKUP TRUCK AND FOUR AUTOMOBILES. THE INDIVIDUALS WERE
ARMED WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS. THE INTRUDERS DEMANDED THAT
THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER OF THE BENDIX CORPORATION BE
PRODUCED BUT WERE INFORMED THAT THE FORMER WAS IN EUROPE
AND THAT THE LATTER HAD NOT YET ARRIVED AT THE COMPANY
INSTALLATION. AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME THAT THE TERRORISTS

3 - Bue (109-2)
- (109-103)
- (1 - 80-185)

RWS:gjk
(3)

DECLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/BCE/100
ON 5-3-01
Argentina Project

109-103-357

BUE 109-2; 109-103

PAGE TWO
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WERE DEMANDING TO SEE THE BENDIX CORPORATION PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, THE CHIEF OF PERSONNEL AND THE CHIEF OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OF THE BENDIX CORPORATION, BOTH ARGENTINE CITIZENS, ARRIVED AT WORK. THE TERRORISTS UNCEREMONIOUSLY GUNNED THEM DOWN AND ALSO KILLED A BAPP CORPORAL WHO ATTEMPTED TO COME TO THE EXECUTIVES' DEFENSE.

THE BENDIX CORPORATION HAS BEEN HAVING RECENT LABOR PROBLEMS AND IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED ATTACK, ALTHOUGH AS OF 11:30 A.M., JANUARY 29, 1976, THE CUSTOMARY COMMUNIQUE FROM THE ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATIONS HAD NOT YET BEEN RECEIVED BY THE BUENOS AIRES NEWS MEDIA.

THE BENDIX CORPORATION IS AN ARGENTINE SUBSIDIARY OF THE BENDIX CORPORATION OF NEW YORK.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5031, XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR OSVALDO DE BALDRICH, CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, BAPP.

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1/23/76

LEGATT ROBERT W. SCHERRER

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA

On 1/23/76 an official of the Buenos Aires Provincial Police (BAPP) Intelligence Service provided the following information:

On 1/23/76 at approximately 9:45 A. M., 15 armed individuals, including two women, forcibly took over the Bendix Corporation plant in Munro, Buenos Aires Province. The individuals entered the Bendix Corporation location in a pickup truck and four automobiles. The individuals were armed with automatic weapons. The intruders demanded that the President and General Manager of the Bendix Corporation be produced but were informed that the former was in Europe and that the latter had not yet arrived at the company installation. At approximately the same time that the terrorists were demanding to see the Bendix Corporation President and General Manager, the Chief of Personnel and the Chief of Industrial Relations of the Bendix Corporation, both Argentine citizens, arrived at work. The terrorists unceremoniously gunned them down and also killed a BAPP corporal who attempted to come to the executives' defense.

The Bendix Corporation has been having recent labor problems and it is believed that the Montonero guerrilla organization was responsible for the above-described attack, although as of 11:30 A. M., January 23, 1976, the customary communique from the organization responsible for the assassinations had not yet been received by the Buenos Aires news media.

The Bendix Corporation is an Argentine subsidiary of the Bendix Corporation of New York.

cc: 1 - Addressee
1 - POL
1 - POL-R
1 - Econ Couns
1 - SY

3 - Buenos Aires (109-2)

(1 - 109-103)

(1-80-185)

RWS:gjk

(8)

DECLASSIFIED BY 3906 JELW/BCE/PLG
5-3-01

Argentina Project

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 5031

Exempt from General Declassification

Schedule of Executive Order 11652

Exemption Category 5B(2)

Automatically Declassified on Indefinite.

109-103-358
RWS

10-25-95
CLASSIFIED BY SP6AG/cal
REASON: 1.5 CY
DECLASSIFY ON: X 1

SECRET

XXXXXX
2/10/76

Appeal # 90-0371

Argentine Project 5-3-01

TELETYPE

IMMEDIATE

39063ELW/BCE/DG

TO: DIRECTOR

NR. 020 -10

FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

ON FEBRUARY 9, 1976, A RANKING OFFICIAL OF THE ARGENTINE
ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAIS) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION (S) (U)

AT APPROXIMATELY 7:30 P.M., FEBRUARY 9, 1976, A POWERFUL
BOMB DETONATED IN THE APARTMENT OF MARCOS LANUSSE DELL, THE
SON OF FORMER ARGENTINE PRESIDENT LT. GENERAL ALEJANDRO
AGUSTIN LANUSSE. FORMER PRESIDENT LANUSSE'S DAUGHTER-IN-LAW
MARIA CARIDE DE LANUSSE, WHO WAS INSIDE THE APARTMENT WHEN THE
BOMB DETONATED, WAS KILLED IMMEDIATELY. FORMER PRESIDENT (S) (U)

5 - Bue
1 - 109-2

1 - 109-103

1 - 80-205 Gen. Valin

1 - 80-173 Capt. Lucero (S) (U)

1 - 105-767 Montoneros

(5)

RWS:gjk

5-3-01
CLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/BCE/DG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6
Argentine Project

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SP6AG/cal/pk 11-7-6
CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-10-96 page 1, 2 + 3
90-0371

SECRET

109-103-359

~~SECRET~~

PAGE TWO
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LANUSSE, WHO WAS OUTSIDE OF BUENOS AIRES ON FEBRUARY 9, 1976, HAD BEEN SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO BUENOS AIRES WITH HIS SON MARCOS, WHO IS A PARAPLEGIC, BUT DELAYED HIS RETURN TO THE CITY DUE TO^A/LAST MINUTE OCCURRENCE. SHOULD FORMER PRESIDENT LANUSSE HAVE FOLLOWED HIS ORIGINAL SCHEDULE, HE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN IN THE APARTMENT WHEN THE POWERFUL BOMB DETONATED. (S) (U)

ON FEBRUARY 10, 1976, ANOTHER OFFICIAL OF THE AAIS PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

THE AAIS, THROUGH A PENETRATION SOURCE OF THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION, ASCERTAINED THAT THE MONTONEROS WERE PLANNING TO ASSASSINATE ARMY GENERAL ADEL VILAS, WHO HAD COMMANDED THE ARGENTINE ARMY ANTI-GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN IN THE PROVINCE OF TUCUMAN. IT IS NOTED THAT GENERAL VILAS IS SCHEDULED TO TAKE OVER THE COMMAND OF THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS IN BAHIA BLANCA ON FEBRUARY 11, 1976. ACTING ON THE INFORMATION THAT GENERAL VILAS HAD BEEN TARGETED FOR ASSASSINATION, THE AAIS ASCERTAINED THAT THE MONTONEROS PLANNED TO POISON GENERAL VILAS UTILIZING AN ARGENTINE ARMY DRAFTEE TO PLANT THE POISON IN GENERAL VILAS' FOOD. THE DRAFTEE INVOLVED WAS (S) (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE THREE

IDENTIFIED AND IS UNDER INTENSIVE INTERROGATION AT THE PRESENT TIME ~~(S)~~ (U)

THE AAIS BELIEVE THAT THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED TERRORIST ACTS WERE CARRIED OUT BY THE MONTONEROS IN RETALIATION FOR THE EXTRA-LEGAL DETENTION OF MONTONERO GUERRILLA LEADER ROBERTO QUIETO, WHO WAS PICKED UP BY AGENTS OF THE AAIS AND FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA) OFFICERS ON DECEMBER 28, 1975. ~~(S)~~ (U)

THE SECOND SOURCE NOTED THAT THERE IS KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PLANNED PROJECTED POISONING OF GENERAL VILAS IS THE FIRST INSTANCE OF TERRORISTS UTILIZING THIS MEASURE. ~~(S)~~ (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 KODS 2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. [FIRST SOURCE IS COL. ALBERTO VALIN, CHIEF, AAIS] ~~(S)~~ (U)

SECOND SOURCE IS CAPTAIN JUAN LUCERO, COMMANDER, AAIS POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE BATTALION. ~~(S)~~ (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END

~~SECRET~~

122

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

SecState WASHDC

109-103-36/

LEGAL ATTACHE--EJERCICIOS AEROS

3. Comment: Fact that Montoneros would wish to kill General Vilas, who until recently was the commander in Tucuman responsible for that province's anti-terrorist campaign, not surprising. However, death of Mrs. Ianusse appears to be yet another of the brutal and senseless killings which have become all too commonplace in Argentina.

~~16~~
HILL

CLASS: 100
13 FEB 76
1005

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM: Amembassy, Buenos Aires

CLASSIFICATION
~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PINS, AR
SUBJECT: Further Terrorist Deprecations
ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ BUENOS AIRES 1000

AMB
POL-3
POL/R
ECOM
USIS
USDAO
MILGP
LEGAT
SCIAT
RF
CHRON

1. On morning of February 11, 1976 the Commander of the Mar del Plata army garrison, Col. Rafael Reyes, was shot and killed in a terrorist attack. At the time the attack took place, Reyes was leaving his home to go to the Headquarters of the 601st ~~auxiliary~~ unit which he commands. He, along with two conscripts who act as his chauffeur and bodyguard, had gone only a short distance from his home when their vehicle was intercepted at a stoplight by at least two vehicles driven by terrorists. According to eye-witnesses, there were several persons, including at least one woman, in the cars who opened fire with machine guns and pistols, killing Reyes and wounding the conscripts. The attackers were able to make their escape. Later in the day local newspapers were advised that the attack had been perpetrated by the "Red Brigades of Workers Power", a group

| | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|--|------------------|--|--|
| DRAFTED BY: POL: FZambito: mek | | DRAFTING DATE: 2-12-76 | TEL. EXT. 121 | 109-103-262 CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: POL: WSmith | |
| CLEARANCE: DAO: PACoughlin | | SEARCHED SERIALIZED INDEXED FILED AMB: RCH | | A/DCM: WDC FEB 12 1976 | |
| | | | | LEGAL ATTACHE - BUENOS AIRES | |

believed to be closely associated with or part of the ERP.

2. In a second and presumably unrelated attack, several men drove in front of the Austrian Chancery at approximately 1:30 a.m. on February 12, firing shots at the building. A guard in front of the Chancery returned fire and apparently drove off the attackers. There were no injuries in the attack and no group has as yet taken credit for this action.

3. COMMENT: ^{/forces} Commander Reyes ~~has~~ recently have had several successes in counter-terrorist operations which may explain motive for attack. However, his death may raise suspicions in military circles as to who the real perpetrators were as Reyes had recently gotten into squabble with CGT because he had ordered the arrest of a labor leader for attempting to board a commercial aircraft while heavily armed. The attack on the Austrian Chancery is a complete mystery both as to the origins of the perpetrators and their motive for carrying out attack. Embassy unaware of any political dispute which could explain last night's incident.

HILL

~~SECRET~~

2/17/76

CODE

CABLE

ROUTINE (NITEL)

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. 000-17
FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)(P)
CONFIDENTIAL
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON FEBRUARY 16, 1976 [A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO
IS AN OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA)] ADVISED
AS FOLLOWS: (S) (U)

DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF FEBRUARY 16, 1976, THE
MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION BOMBED A FORD MOTOR COMPANY
SHOWROOM IN BUENOS AIRES. THERE WERE NO PERSONAL INJURIES AND
MODERATE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931, XGDS-2, INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE [SOURCE IS COMISARIO GENERAL ENRIQUE BESTEIRO,
DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FPA] (S) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

1 - 105-767 (MONTONEROS) (U)
1 - 80-~~201~~ (BESTEIRO) (S) (U)
RWS:jn
(4)

DATE: 7-18-96 page 1 only
SP6 AG/CAL/OK 11-7-96

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

5-3001
CLASSIFIED BY 39063/BCE/100
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 46
Argentina Project

10-26-95
CLASSIFIED BY: SP6 AG/CAL
REASON: 1.5 (D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X6

96-0371
39063/BCE/100
Argentina Project

109-103-363

FBI

Date: 2/19/76

Transmit the following in

CODE

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via CABLE

IMMEDIATE (O)

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

NR. 02-19

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-103)

CONFIDENTIAL

Argentinian Project

CLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/BCE/DC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

CLASSIFIED BY SP6Ag/KAL

REASON 1.5 (B,D)

DECLASSIFY ON: X(5)(6)

Appeal 90-0371

39063ELW/BCE/DC Argentinian

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA.

ON FEBRUARY 18, 1976, AN UNIDENTIFIED MALE, SPANISH-SPEAKING INDIVIDUAL CALLED THE PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS (PAWA), RESERVATIONS DEPARTMENT, IN BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA. THE CALLER STATED THAT THE LIFE OF HAL WILLIAMS, PAWA, MANAGING DIRECTOR FOR ARGENTINA, CHILE AND URUGUAY, WAS IN DANGER, AND THAT WILLIAMS WOULD BE EXECUTED. THE CALLER INDICATED HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE MONTONERO ALA 22 (WING 22).

GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION

THE FOREGOING INFORMATION WAS REPORTED TO THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA DURING THE AFTERNOON OF FEBRUARY 18, 1976. [A RANKING OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA ADVISED THAT RECORDS OF THAT ORGANIZATION CONTAINED NO INFORMATION REGARDING THE ALA 22 FACTION OF THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION. SOURCE REPORTED THAT MONTONERO UNITS ARE GENERALLY NAMED AFTER FALLEN MONTONERO MEMBERS AND ARE CALLED COMANDOS (COMMANDS). SOURCE NOTED THAT WHILE THE THREAT AGAINST WILLIAMS' LIFE MAY BE FROM THE MONTONEROS, BASED ON THE DESIGNATION OF THE ALA 22 FACTION THREATENING WILLIAMS.]

1 - 105-767 (Montonero)

1 - [80-Crovetto] (U)

Approved:

Sent

M

Per

RWS:jn (3) Special Agent in Charge

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENTAL REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-10-96 Page 142-2 only
SP6Ag/KAL/PK Appeal

109-103-364

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ~~SECRET~~ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via (Priority)

PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BUE 109-103

[THE SOURCE DOUBTS THAT THE THREAT ORIGINATED WITH THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION.] (S) (U)

ON FEBRUARY 18, 1976, DR. RALPH NEGRI, ARGENTINE DELEGATE, PAWA, BUENOS AIRES, ADVISED THAT PAWA IS IN THE MIDST OF ~~THE~~ NEGOTIATIONS OF WAGES/^{INCREASES} FOR EMPLOYEES, AND THAT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE ABOVE DESCRIBED THREAT AGAINST THE LIFE OF WILLIAMS MAY BE RELATED TO WAGE NEGOTIATIONS CURRENTLY BEING CONDUCTED BY PAWA. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5934 XGDS 2 AND 3~~ ⁴ INDEFINITE.

ADMINISTRATIVE [SOURCE IS COMISARIO GENERAL JORGE CROVETTO, FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA] (S) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END.

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2/19/76

**MONTONERO ALA 22 THREAT AGAINST
RAL WILLIAMS, PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS (PAWA)
MANAGING DIRECTOR FOR ARGENTINA, CHILE AND URUGUAY**

During the afternoon of 2/18/76, an unidentified Spanish-speaking male individual called the Reservations Department of PAWA in Buenos Aires and stated that the life of HAL WILLIAMS was in danger and that he would be executed. The caller stated he was a member of the Montonero guerrilla organization, Ala 22, (Wing 22). From his mode of speech, it is believed the caller is an Argentine. The caller spoke slowly, clearly and according to the PAWA employee receiving the call, had a pleasant tone to his voice. The aforementioned information was provided to the Federal Police of Argentina, Department of Federal Security, during the afternoon of 2/18/76.

A ranking official of the FPA, Department of Federal Security, advised that there is no such sub group of the Montonero guerrilla organization known as Ala 22. The source noted that the Montoneros have traditionally named their sub groups after deceased Montonero members, designating the sub groups as Commandos. (S)

During the evening of 2/18/76, Dr. RALPH NEGRI, Argentine delegate, PAWA, advised that PAWA is in the process of negotiating wage increases with the employees, and there is a possibility that the above described threat may in some way be related to the ongoing wage negotiations.

It is noted that WILLIAMS is residing with his wife in the Hotel Presidente, Room 1511.

- 1 - Addressee
1 - POL
1 - POL/R
1 - ECON COUNSELOR
1 - FAA Attache, Lima, Peru
3 - Buenos Aires
 (1 - 109-103)
 (1 - 105-767) (Montoneros)
 (1 - 80-Crovetto) 7/8

RWS:in (8)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

THE CHAIRMAN

0.6274

0-100

100

2.1.1

100

k-2

6

09-10-

—

| Age Group | Percentage of Respondents |
|-----------|---------------------------|
| 18-29 | 65 |
| 30-49 | 75 |
| 50-69 | 80 |
| 70+ | 85 |

F B I

Date: 2/27/76

Transmit the following in 058 CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)Via CABLE IMMEDIATE (O)
(Priority)TO: DIRECTOR NR. 042-27
FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-103)~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS -
ARGENTINA.

AT APPROXIMATELY 5²⁵/PM
ON FEBRUARY 25, 1976, AN UNIDENTIFIED MALE, SPANISH-SPEAKING INDIVIDUAL, CALLED THE PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS (PAWA) RESERVATIONS DEPARTMENT, IN BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA. THE CALLER STATED MM "MR. AND MRS. WILLIAMS HAVE LEFT BUT THEY LEFT THINGS AT THE PRESIDENTE. WHEN THEY RETURN WE SHALL KILL THEM BOTH." THE CALLER DID NOT IDENTIFY HIMSELF OR CLAIM TO REPRESENT ANY TERRORIST ORGANIZATION. THE CALLER WAS REFERRING TO HAL WILLIAMS, A PAWA MANAGING DIRECTOR FOR ARGENTINA, CHILE AND URUGUAY/. THE PRESIDENTE UNDOUBTEDLY REFERS TO THE PRESIDENTE HOTEL IN BUENOS AIRES WHERE WILLIAMS HAS BEEN RESIDING. AT THE TIME OF THE CALL WILLIAMS WAS OUT OF THE COUNTRY ON A TRIP TO BEIRUT, LEBANON, IN ORDER TO MAKE FINAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIS ^{TRANSFER} ~~MOVE~~ FROM THAT COUNTRY TO ARGENTINA. THE FOREGOING INFORMATION WAS PROVIDED TO THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA.

ON FEBRUARY 26, 1976, DR. RALPH NEGRI, ARGENTINE DELEGATE PAWA, BUENOS AIRES, ADVISED THAT AT APPROXIMATELY 4:30 P.M., *Rux*

RWS:jn (1)

Approved: *Rux*

Special Agent in Charge

Sent *6 30 PM*Per *109-103-369*

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)PAGE TWO
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BUE 109-103

AT THE NEGRI RESIDENCE
FEBRUARY 25, 1976, HIS WIFE RECEIVED A CALL FROM AN UNIDENTIFIED SPANISH-SPEAKING MALE INDIVIDUAL, WHO ASKED TO BE PROVIDED WITH THE HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER OF ANDREW MONTEATH, WHO RECENTLY RETIRED FROM PAWA, AND WHO WAS WILLIAMS' PREDECESSOR. WHEN MRS. NEGRI INFORMED THE CALLER THAT SHE DID NOT HAVE MONTEATH'S HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER, HE ASKED HER WHETHER SHE DISLIKED AMERICANS, IT BEING NOTED THAT BOTH DR. AND MRS. NEGRI ARE ARGENTINE CITIZENS. THE CALLER STATED HE ASKED MRS. NEGRI THIS QUESTION BECAUSE "WE DON'T LIKE THEM," REFERRING TO AMERICANS. THIS INFORMATION WAS PROVIDED TO THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WAGE NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING PAWA EMPLOYEES IN BUENOS AIRES HAD BEEN SETTLED AT THE TIME OF THE RECEIPT OF THE FEBRUARY 25, 1976, CALLS AS OUTLINED ABOVE.

ON FEBRUARY 27, 1976, HAL WILLIAMS, SUPRA, ADVISED HE RETURNED TO BUENOS AIRES FROM BEIRUT, LEBANON, ^{via} NEW YORK CITY, DURING EVENING OF FEBRUARY 26, 1976, ON ARRIVAL AT PRESIDENTE HOTEL, IN BUENOS AIRES, WILLIAMS ADVISED A LETTER DIRECTED TO

END PAGE TWO

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

PAGE THREE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BUE 109-103

HIS WIFE WAS DELIVERED TO HIM, WHICH HAD BEEN ^{DELIVERED THROUGH} ~~DEPOSITED IN~~ THE ARGENTINE POSTAL SERVICE. WILLIAMS ADVISED HE DID NOT OPEN THIS LETTER BUT CLOSE EXAMINATION UNDER STRONG LIGHT DISCLOSED IT CONTAINS WHAT APPEARS TO BE A NEWSPAPER CLIPPING SHOWING AN INDIVIDUAL POINTING A GUN. WILLIAMS ADVISED HE INTENDS TO MAKE THIS LETTER AVAILABLE TO THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA.

WILLIAMS ADVISED THAT ON THE ADVICE OF PAWA SECURITY OFFICIALS IN NEW YORK CITY DURING THE EVENING OF FEBRUARY 26, 1976, MRS. WILLIAMS, WHO WAS ACCOMPANYING HIM FROM BEIRUT, LEBANON, TO BUENOS AIRES, WAS DIVERTED TO MIAMI, FLORIDA, FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD, BASED ON A PREVIOUS THREAT RECEIVED IN BUENOS AIRES AGAINST WILLIAMS' LIFE ON FEBRUARY 18, 1976. WILLIAMS ADVISED HE INTENDS TO DEPART BUENOS AIRES ON FEBRUARY 29, 1976, FOR CONFERENCES IN MIAMI, FLORIDA, AND WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH PAWA SECURITY OFFICIALS ^{IN} ~~AT~~ THAT CITY.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 6031 XGDS-2 AND 4 INDEFINITE.~~

RE MY CABLE FEBRUARY 19, 1976, UNDER THE ABOVE CAPTION,

END PAGE THREE

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via _____
(Priority)

PAGE FOUR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BUE 109#103

WHICH REPORTED ON FEBRUARY 18, 1976, THREAT AGAINST WILLIAMS'

LIFE ALLEGEDLY BY THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION. *COORDINATED
LOCALLY.*

END.

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

~~SECRET~~

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA A/DCM

3/5/76

LEGATT ROBERT W. SCHERRER

ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

On 3/3/76, an official of the Argentine Army Intelligence Service (SIE) provided the following information: (S)(U)

Various officers of the SIE were recently issued cyanide capsules for their optional personal use, should they be the victims of a kidnapping operation by terrorists. SIE believes that as a result of numerous recent SIE attacks against the terrorist target, the terrorists will probably attempt to pick up a knowledgeable SIE officer in an effort to develop information concerning SIE informants, methods, safe-houses, etc., by means of torturing the kidnapped officer. (S)(U)

The cyanide capsules provide individual SIE officers with a last resort to being captured by terrorists in order to avoid providing vital information. The use of the cyanide capsules is based on the presumption that the terrorists, in targeting an individual SIE officer, will ultimately kill him after having subjected him to torture. (S)(U)

cc's: 1 - Addressee
1 - POL-R
1 - DAO
1 - SY
(3) - Bue (109-103)

(1) - 64-172

[Relations with SIE] (S)

(1) - 80-205

RWS:gjk

(7)

~~SECRET~~

Classified By 5931

Exempt from General Declassification

Schedule of Executive Order 11652

Exemption Category 5B (2)

Automatically declassified on Indefinite.

5-3-01
CLASSIFIED BY 39663ELW/BCE/PG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 46
Argentina Project

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

109-103-372

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 1676

15 Mar 76

1018

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM

AmEmbassy BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

E.O. 11652:

TAGS:

N/A

PINS, AR

SUBJECT:

Army Headquarters Bombed

ACTION:

SecState WASHDC IMMEDIATE

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ BUENOS AIRES 1676

Army Headquarters bombed at 0735 hours March 15. Early reports indicate 27 military injured and one captain killed.

Eleven automobiles demolished. Bombs caused considerable damage to Ministry of Defense Building and Army Headquarters.

Further details to follow.

HILL

AMB
DCM
RF
CHRON

POI
DAO
MILGP
LEGATT
SRF

109-103-373

DRAFTED BY:

AMBASSADOR ROBERT C. HILL:mg

DRAFTING DATE

3/15/76

TEL. EXT.

120

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

AMB: RCHill

CLEARANCES:

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

CLASSIFICATION

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM

Amembassy BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U.O. 11652:

GDS

TAGS:

PINS, AR

SUBJECT:

Terrorist Activities Continue at High Level

ACTION:

Secstate WASHDC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 1791

1. Summary: Against a background of increased public discussion depredations re an imminent military golpe, terrorist ~~expectations~~ in recent days have added to a mood of heightened anxiety among the

general populace. End Summary.

2. The kidnappings in Cordoba, which have run at an ~~ALMOST~~ extraordinary ~~unbelievable~~ rate in past month, continue unabated. In

addition to the fifty plus victims reported in the press

in last month, there are indications that many more cases

have gone unreported. This, along with the bombings, shootings,

and economic unrest in the province, have left the populace

badly frightened and angry. Bombings, murders and kidnappings

have also taken place in the last few days in Salta, Jujuy,

Tucuman, etc., spreading mood of anxiety throughout country.

3. In the Federal Capital, in addition to the bombing of Army headquarters which killed one person and wounded twenty-eight, terrorists have in last 48 hours set off over twenty bombs and

AMB
POL-3
POL/R
FROM
USIS
USDAO
MILGP-2
OCIAT
LEGAT
OF
CHRON

TO:

FOL:FJZambito:cc

DRAFTING DATE

3/17/76

TEL. EXT.

121

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

POL:WSSmith

FROM:

SY:GBeckett

A/DCM:WBeal

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FS-413

CLASSIFICATION

carried out several attacks against policemen and property.

A number of policemen in the Federal Capital, one in Mar del Plata, and one in La Plata, were killed in these acts. In the Barrio Norte-Palermo area of the Fed Capital, well over twenty bombs exploded on night of Mar 16.

Several American companies have reported receiving threatening calls and letters during past few days, mostly from Montoneros.

4. Leftist terrorists have taken responsibility for the majority of these acts though one of policemen killed was guarding Jesus Porto, a Peronist Congressman whose name is on the AAA's death list. Both publicly and privately, Argentines tend to see these actions as terrorist attempt to push military into final decision to carry out a coup. As one paper, La Opinion, put it, any organized society is vulnerable to terrorist acts. What is distressing about Argentine case is that the vulnerability extends far beyond the lives and property of those directly involved and given fragility of present institutional structure, these otherwise pointless acts may succeed.

5. While leftist terrorists are carrying out operations at an almost unprecedented level, one sign of internal strain surfaced this week. Apparently realizing that several recent police raids had resulted from info received from jailed Montonero leader Roberto Quieto, the Montoneros issued statement

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

"sentencing" Quieto to death for having sold out to
police.

~~XXXX~~ BEAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

3/23/76

CODE

~~SECRET~~

CABLE

ROUTINE (XXXXXX NITEL)

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. -23

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS -
ARGENTINA.

ON MARCH 22, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS
AN OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA, PROVIDED
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF MARCH 22, 1976, THE MON-
TONEROS, AN ARGENTINE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, CARRIED OUT A
BOMB ATTACK XXXXXXXX AT A STORAGE LOT OF THE CHRYSLER
CORPORATION IN SAN JUSTO, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE. THERE WERE
NO PERSONAL INJURIES AND MODERATE MATERIAL DAMAGE.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931-XGDS-2- INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - COORDINATED LOCALLY. [SOURCE IS COMISARIO
MAYOR VICENTE GATEAZZO, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE,
FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA] (S) (U)

END.

1 - 105-767 (Montoneros)
RWS:jn (3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

10-26-95
CLASSIFIED BY: SP6AG/LCH
REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X-1
Appeal # 90-0371
39063 ELW/BCE/DE Argentina Project 4-23-01

DECLASSIFIED BY: SP6AG/LCH
DATE: 7-10-96
PAGE: 1044
SP6AG/LCH/PK 10-3-96

105-767-378



~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

Classification

AC17

1606

Department of State
TELEGRAM

INDICATE

☐ CANCEL

☐ CHANGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ECOM-3.

CHARGE

C&R

RF

POL 1

LABATT

LEGATT

Chron

ACTION: SecState, WASHDC

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ BUENOS AIRES 2017

E.O.:11652:N/A

TAGS: BGEN, AR

SUBJECT: Closing of Squibb Argentine Plant

1. Squibb plant was closed by management on March 15, 1976 for a week, because of labor problems which have thoroughly disrupted operation of plant since last October. As of March 24th, plant has not yet resumed operations.
2. Because plant is closed, Embassy thus far which unable to contact Squibb management/exercised by Argentine nationals. Source in pharmaceutical industry has provided Embassy with following background information, which we judge to be generally reliable:

109-103-381

MAR 2 1976

ECOM:PEJonas:jc

DRAFTING DATE

03-25-76

TEL EXT.

316

APPROVED BY

ECOM:RMogden:

AMB:RChill

A/DCM

XXXXXX:HMMacLWoodward:

LABATT:RGamble:

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

Classification

MRN

3. In October of 1975, a number of plant labor union delegates ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ began campaign of agitation, which led, in late October, to takeover of plant and holding of executives hostage over salary and other grievances. Though demands met at that time, agitation continued. Absenteeism averaged around 25 percent. Plant engineer, factory manager and treasurer were all threatened ^{allegedly} by ERP and quit. Incident which prompted closing of plant occurred on March 10, 1976 when Montonero repeat Montonero "comando" took over plant by force of arms to harangue employees. Shortly thereafter left wing shop steward killed by unidentified group in his home and another employee wounded. Decision made to cool off plant by closing down for week after which situation would be reassessed. ~~XXXXX~~
~~XX~~
~~XX~~
~~XX~~
4. COMMENT: Source reports that Squibb managers are loath to talk about their problems even with people in same industry sector, presumably

because of threats to their personal safety. He thought Squibb personnel might prefer avoid Embassy contact for this reason. We presume Squibb will reopen when more secure climate for doing business prevails. Given change of government this could be as early as Monday, March 29th.

5. Although atypical in its virulence, the experience of Squibb is not unusual here. It is a success story for the "factory guerrillas" - proof that careful planning and hard work can bring results, and a warning as to the effectiveness of this tactic. This type of disruption ~~disruption~~ has been carried out to one degree or another in a significant number of plants in Argentina both foreign and locally owned.

HILL

~~X-100-DW-450X~~

3/29/76

CODE

CABLE

URGENT (PRIORITY)

TO: DIRECTOR NR. -29
FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103) /
CONFIDENTIAL
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES; IS - ARGENTINA.

ON MARCH 29, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN
OFFICIAL OF THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE (BAPP) INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

ON MARCH 26, 1976, TERRORISTS ATTACKED THE RESIDENCE OF A
FORD MOTOR COMPANY ENGINEER IN HURLINGHAM, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE,
FOR THE APPARENT PURPOSE OF KIDNAPPING THE ENGINEER. DURING
THE GUN BATTLE AT THE RESIDENCE, TWO FORD MOTOR COMPANY
SECURITY GUARDS WERE SLAIN AND THEIR WEAPONS STOLEN.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR OSVALDO DE
BALDRICH, CHIEF, BAPP INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

1 - SO-DE BALDRICH

RWS:jn

(3)

DECLASSIFIED BY 5916 JELW/BCG/DB
ON 5-2-01
Argentina Project

382

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

4/5/76

CODE

~~SECRET~~

CABLE

URGENT)PRIORITY)

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. -05
FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)(P)

~~SECRET~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON APRIL 2, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO
IS AN OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA),
DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY (INTELLIGENCE DIVISION) PROVIDED
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (~~S~~) (U)

FROM MARCH 1, 1976, TO APRIL 1, 1976, THIRTY-TWO POLICE
OFFICERS HAVE BEEN ASSASSINATED THROUGHOUT ARGENTINA. SINCE THE
MARCH 23-24, 1976, MILITARY INTERVENTION OF THE PERON GOVERNMENT
IN ARGENTINA, TWO SENIOR FPA OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN ASSASSINATED
BY TERRORISTS AND ANOTHER SENIOR FPA OFFICIAL NARROWLY ESCAPED A
TERRORIST ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT. (~~S~~) (U)

ON APRIL 2, 1976, A SECOND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD,
WHO IS AN KNOWN OFFICIAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE (AAIS) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (~~S~~) (U)

FROM RECENTLY ACQUIRED INTELLIGENCE, THE AAIS ASCERTAINED THAT
TACTICS OF ARGENTINE TERRORISTS WILL BE TO CONDUCT AN ACCELERATED (~~S~~) (U)

1 - 80-173 (Capt. LUCERO) (~~S~~) (U)
1 - 80-Com. Gen. BESTEIRO (~~S~~) (U)
RWS:jn (4)

5-4-01
CLASSIFIED BY 39063 EFW/BCE/PG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1-0
Arger - 117 Pro 167

385

PAGE TWO ~~SECRET~~ BUE 109-2 109-103 ~~SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN OF ASSASSINATIONS OF ARGENTINE POLICE AND MILITARY PERSONNEL IN AN EFFORT TO PROVOKE THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT INTO VIOLENT RETALIATION IN ORDER TO DISCREDIT THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH, SINCE THE MARCH 23-24, 1976, MILITARY INTERVENTION, HAS FOLLOWED A MODERATE COURSE. SHOULD THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT LED BY THE PRESIDENT, ARMY LIEUTENANT GENERAL JORGE RAFAEL VIDELA, FAIL TO REACT TO TERRORIST PROVOCATIONS, THE TERRORISTS HOPE THAT MORE RADICAL OFFICERS IN THE ARGENTINE MILITARY WILL TAKE STEPS TO TAKE OVER THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT BY REMOVING THE INCUMBENT MODERATE MILITARY JUNTA WHICH INCLUDES PRESIDENT VIDELA AND UNLEASHING A BLOODBATH AGAINST LEFTISTS AND TERRORISTS. (S)(U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931, XGDS-2, INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - [FIRST SOURCE IS CAPTAIN JUAN LUCERO, AAIS. SECOND SOURCE IS COMISARIO GENERAL ENRIQUE BESTEIRO, DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FPA.] COORDINATED LOCALLY. (S)(U)

END.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSOL: 2361

8 Apr '76
1520

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM

AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E.O. 11652:

TAGS:

SUBJECT:

ACTION:

GDS
ASEC, AR
MONTONERO WARNING TO U.S. FIRMS

SECSTATE WASHDC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES: 2361

REFERENCE: A. STATE 063212
B. STATE 063830
C. BA 633

1. TO DATE NO INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM GOA FEDERAL POLICE WHICH WOULD INDICATE THEY HAVE IDENTIFIED THE INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR BENDIX MURDERS.
2. DURING THE COURSE OF A MEETING HELD BY THE AMBASSADOR AT THE RESIDENCE, THE HEADS OF OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES, OF APPROXIMATELY 45 U.S. COMPANIES WERE PRESENT. OF THIS NUMBER 9 DIFFERENT COMPANIES KEKKE REVEALED THEY HAD RECEIVED A WARNING FROM THE MONTONEROS SIMILAR TO THAT RECEIVED BY SPERRY RAND AND BUDD. IN ADDITION ONE MEMBER OF THE GROUP REVEALED THAT NUMEROUS ARGENTINE COMPANIES (NUMBER AND IDENTITY NOT GIVEN) HAD ALSO RECEIVED WARNINGS FROM THE MONTONEROS.

109-103-388
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DRAFTED BY:

RSO:BECKETT:eg

DRAFTING DATE

4/7/76

TEL. EXT.

148

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

AME:RCH111

CLEARANCES:

ADMIN:CEE:smore

DCM:MChaplin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

GDS

OFFICIAL FORM 100
1-70 (Rev. 5-21-70)
January 1971
Dept. of State

3. RSO'S OFFICE HAS WORKED WITH AMERICAN COMPANIES WHICH HAVE REQUESTED ASSISTANCE. THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE BUDD COMPANY HAS HAD SEVERAL MEETINGS WITH THE RSO; HE REQUESTED REVIEW OF A SECURITY SURVEY MADE BY INDEPENDENT SECURITY COMPANY, SOLICITED RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS. BUDD COMPANY HAS BEEN SUPPLIED WITH ALL AVAILABLE MATERIAL (UNCLASSIFIED) RELATED TO PERSONAL PROTECTION IN A TERRORIST ENVIRONMENT. ~~ENVIRONMENT~~.. SIMILAR PROCEDURES HAVE ALSO BEEN CARRIED OUT WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE BENDIX COMPANY.


HILL

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

4/9/76

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/PC/170
ON 5-4-01

TELETYPE *Argentina Project* URGENT-PRIORITY

TO: DIRECTOR NR. *684*-09
FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

ON APRIL 8, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS AN
OFFICIAL OF THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE (BAPP) INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

DURING THE MORNING OF APRIL 8, 1976 TERRORISTS ATTACKED
THE RESIDENCE OF CARLOS SARDAN, AN ARGENTINE EXECUTIVE OF THE
PFIZER COMPANY, S.A.I.C., IN BOULOGNE, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE.
DURING THE ATTACK ONE OF SARDAN'S GUARDS WAS KILLED AND ANOTHER
SERIOUSLY WOUNDED. SARDAN ESCAPED INJURY.

IT IS NOTED THAT THE PFIZER COMPANY, SACI. IS THE
ARGENTINE SUBSIDIARY OF THE PFIZER CORPORATION, 235 EAST 42ND
STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931, XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR OSVALDO DE
BALDRICH, CHIEF, BAPP INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END

4 - Bue (109-2) (109-103) (80-185 De Baldrich)
(163- *NEW* Terrorist Attack against Carlos Sardan, R2
Pfizer Co., 4/8/76, Buenos Aires Province

RWS:gjk (4)

109-103-389

The Ambassador
THRU:DCM

APR 11 13 1976

RSO

Terrorist Incidents

At 0730 hours this morning, in Santos Lugares, a Buenos Aires suburb, there was an attack on the administrative manager of Goodyear Company. Two men and two women, using a Fiat 128 and a Chevrolet pick-up, killed his two Federal Police bodyguards, but the manager was not hurt. Information is that the group of attackers were Montoneros.

Information has also been received that the child of an angle-Argentine employee of Monsanto Co., Buenos Aires was kidnapped on April 5, 1976. No other details are available.

Distributions:

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② Unsub, Kidnapping of child &
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APR 11 1976
FBI - NEW YORK

SEARCHED INDEXED
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FBI - NEW YORK
LWS

LEGATT

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

The Ambassador

April 14, 1976

THRU : Minister Chaplin
 ECON: Williams Beal

Chrysler Marketing Manager Murdered

Herb Leshinsky of Chrysler telephoned April 14 to inform us that at 6:30 a.m. Sr. Jorge Kenny, Chrysler's Manager for Marketing, an Argentine, had been killed at his home. The house is in the Moron area and Kenny, who had been having breakfast, was machine-gunned through a large window as he walked toward the door of the house.

Although Kenny has had a guard at his house on occasion, there were no security guards at this particular time. The police believe that perhaps three persons were involved in the shooting. No indication was left as to what organization was responsible. Leshinsky said he had reason to believe Kenny might have become marked to be killed, but he did not wish to discuss further details on the telephone.

On another subject, Leshinsky said that the Chrysler engine plant at Chingolo had received a phone call this morning warning of a bomb in the plant. The plant had been evacuated and as of about 9:30 plant officials were awaiting the arrival of the bomb squad.

cc: LEGATT ✓
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 Unsub; Murder of
 JOSE KENNY, Chrysler
 Corporation, 4/14/76
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~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

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| APR 14 1976 | |
| LEGAL ATTACHE - BUENOS AIRES | |
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

16 APR 76 1015

INDICATE
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☐ CHARGE TO

FROM

Amerbassy, BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E.O. 11652:

GDS

TAGS:

PINT, SHUM, AR

SUBJECT:

Junta Record on Human Rights to Date . .

ACTION:

SECSTATE WASHDC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 2528

REF: *STATE 83929* Buenos Aires 2035, Buenos Aires 2288, Buenos Aires 2061

SUMMARY: Following the March 24 coup, the Junta put into practice its plans to arrest those members of the Peronist govt it believed most likely to have been involved in corruption, malfeasance and similar misdeeds. In addition, in line with its oft-announced war against subversion, the military moved to arrest as many known or suspected subversives as possible. Though this wave of arrests was expected, it has naturally been the source of much private comment in political circles. The golpe and the subsequent arrests were carried out against the backdrop of continuing terrorist acts by both left and right. At this point, 3 weeks after the coup, it appears that arrests have been relatively few and by and large have been carried out within the legal framework established by the new Junta. END SUMMARY.

AMB
POL-3
POL/R
ECOM
USIS
DAO
MLGRP-2
SCI
LEGATT
CHRON
RF

DRAFTED BY:

POL:FZambito:mek *713*

CLEARANCES:

IABATT:RGamble (in draft)

DAO:PCoughlin

SRF:DLsmock

DRAFTING DATE

TEL. EXT.

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

SEARCHED
4/30/76

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POL:WSSmith *713*

APR 30 1976

AMB:RCHill

DCM:MChaplin *mc*

LEGAL ATTACHE - BUENOS AIRES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATION

1. In the 3 weeks after the coup, the Junta govt has arrested approximately 1500 persons. The bulk of these are govt officials, national and provincial, and labor leaders who are being held on charges of corruption. In addition, some suspected subversives have also been arrested. Added to the 1500 persons already being held by the Peronist govt under the state-of-seige provisions, the total number of political and quasi-political prisoners is now approximately 3000. While these arrests have been the subject of much conversation in political circles, the general consensus is that the arrests so far, with few exceptions, have been carried out within legal framework.

2. Even to Peronists who may themselves yet face legal difficulties with the Junta, fact that the great majority of the names of those arrested have been released to the press is taken as encouraging sign. (Embassy will shortly be sending Washington press clips giving names of those arrested to date.)

3. In recent days, Emboffs have discussed arrest issue with wide circle of contacts and finds them in general satisfied that Junta acting with relative moderation in this delicate area. For example, former Peronist Interior Minister Rocamora told Emboffs that to his knowledge most Peronists arrested since coup are being held on straight

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

forward corruption charges and in most cases he believed the Junta would have little problem proving charges in court. Luis Rubeo, former Peronist congressman and prominent advisor of meatworkers union, told Emboffs that to his personal knowledge, meatworker officials in Buenos Aires province and Santa Fe province, where Rubeo has his base, have been treated in a fair manner. Only two second level officials of the union are being held on corruption charges. Rubeo opined that both had had their hands in till. Osella Muñoz, a leading Peronist congressman of the Anti-Verticalista tendency, agreed with analysis of his two Peronist colleagues, adding that in his view some of the labor leaders being held "with little doubt deserved it".

4. Enrique Vanoli, Political Secretary of the UCR party, indicated that Radicals were having no problem with the military in area of human rights. Both he and party leader Ricardo Balbín believe that most of the right-wing assassinations that have taken place since the coup (in the style of the Triple-A) have been carried out by off-duty policemen without the knowledge or authorization of senior Army officers. Max Heriberto Kahn, columnist for La Opinion and man close to the CINCS, agreed with Vanoli's view and added that Videla, Viola, Masserra

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CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

et al were disturbed by these incidents and realized they must stop right-wing terrorism as well as that from the left.

5. Senator Eduardo Paz, former chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, and a man who despite coup maintains good contacts with military, told Emboff that clearly some arbitrary behavior on part of authorities had occurred. He cited three cases in his home province of Tucuman where the provincial Econ Min and two men on the Governor's private staff had been severely beaten by Army troops shortly after the coup. One man died as result of beating and other two are in serious condition. Paz, upon learning of these incidents, went directly to General Harguindeguy, Interior Minister, to register a protest. He told Harguindeguy that he knew the background of the three men involved and believed they deserved legal penalties. The most severe measures the Army wishes to apply within the law will meet with public support, he added, but measures outside the law will result in public sympathy not only for clearly corrupt former officials against whom they are applied, but even for terrorists. According to Paz, Harguindeguy agreed and immediately called in aides to look into the matter, telling Paz that the military high command, try as it would, could not control every officer and thus prevent this kind of incident. However, they had made it clear that this type of arbitrary justice

was not authorized, approved or condoned by the Junta, and would be stopped wherever it came to light.

6. Our political sources, plus U.S. newsmen here (who are very sensitive to human rights issue) continue to express surprise that Junta has acted with as much moderation as it has so far, given the atmosphere of left-right terrorism which the country has endured for the last three years. Its policy is to respect human rights and it is taking measures to curb any local commander who ~~may~~, in exceeding his instructions, violate them. Even so, with arrests being made and as yet no composite list issued of those detained, horror stories based on imagination rather than fact, are inevitable. Most common and inaccurate story making rounds is that former ForMin Vignes is being held in dank cell aboard naval vessel in Buenos Aires harbor. In fact, reliable sources indicate that he, along with many prominent officials, has been placed under house detention and major inconvenience he is suffering is necessity to notify authorities before going out of his home. Another ~~inaccurate~~ story making rounds is that Raul Alfonsin, leader of liberal wing of UCR, is being held by authorities. Story is similarly inaccurate. Indeed, Alfonsin called Pol Couns yesterday regarding visa case and was most amused when told he allegedly under arrest.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

7. COMMENT: To date ~~it seems clear that~~ those human rights violations which have occurred have represented exceptions which ~~have proved the rule and~~ have resulted from excesses on part of individual military officers and police officials. They do not rpt not represent Junta policy. From personal contact and from stories relayed by our political sources, it would appear that Junta wants very much to avoid a human rights problem. In this regard, ~~we understand~~ (Apr 13) La Opinion predicts that in "next few days" military will either publicly charge those they feel are guilty of specific crimes or release them. Lab Att gives similar account from labor source who expected this process to begin after Easter holiday. Indeed, we understand from good source that Videla called in ~~xxx~~ senior generals late last week to demand that composite list of all those detained, with charges against them, be issued ASAP. He also asked for details of the recent right-wing killings, noting that he wanted this activity stopped. His subordinates claimed they still not know the perpetrators of the terrorist acts but reportedly left meeting with understanding they were to act quickly to see it ended.

HILL

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

4/20/76

CODE

CABLE

URGENT (PRIORITY)

DECLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/SCG/KG
ON 5-4-01
Argentina Project

TO: (109-12-201)
DIRECTOR NR. 100-20

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS -, ARGENTINA; IS -, ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON APRIL 18, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO
IS AN OFFICIAL OF THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE (BAPP)
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

ATTACKS AGAINST ARGENTINE AFFILIATES OF U. S. CORPORATIONS
RECENTLY INCREASED DRAMATICALLY IN BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA.

ON APRIL 13, 1976, TERRORISTS KILLED TWO SECURITY GUARDS
DURING AN ATTACK AGAINST THE RESIDENCE OF AN ARGENTINE EXECUTIVE"
OF THE GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY, S. A. IN SANTOS LUGARES,
BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE. THE GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY, S.A.,
IS THE ARGENTINE SUBSIDIARY OF GOODYEAR INTERNATIONAL, AKRON, OHIO.

ON APRIL 14, 1976, TERRORISTS ASSASSINATED AN ARGENTINE
EXECUTIVE OF THE CHRYSLER FEVRE ARGENTINA, S.A.I.C., COMPANY
AT HIS RESIDENCE IN MORON, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE. THE CHRYSLER
FEVRE S.A.I.C., COMPANY IS THE ARGENTINE SUBSIDIARY OF THE
CHRYSLER CORPORATION, DETROIT, MICHIGAN.

1 - 163-674 1 - 163-675 1 - 80-185 (DE BALDRICH)
1 - 163-New (UNSUBS ATTACK AGAINST THE CRISTALERIAS RIGOLLEAU CO.,
RWS:jn (6) BUENOS AIRES, 4/16/76)

109-103-394

PAGE TWO BUE 109-2 109-103 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ON APRIL 16, 1976, TERRORISTS WOUNDED A SECURITY GUARD DURING AN ATTACK AGAINST THE CRISTALERIAS RIGOLLEAU, S. A., COMPANY IN BERAZATEGUI, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE. THE CRISTALERIAS RIGOLLEAU, S. A., COMPANY IS THE ARGENTINE SUBSIDIARY OF THE CORNING GLASS WORKS, CORNING, NEW YORK.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931-XGDS-2-INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR OSVALDO DE BALDRICH, CHIEF, BAPP INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END.

Father and son slain

(n Space Below)

TWO YOUNG couples murdered a father and son-bodyguard team on duty outside the home of the Argentine manager of a US company in Santos Lugares yesterday.

It was the third attack on homes of foreign businessmen — in which five bodyguards have been assassinated — since the military took over the government.

The two bodyguards, retired air force noncommissioned officer Alberto Carbone, 56, and his son Jorge Alberto Carbone, a federal policeman, 22, were waiting outside the home of Antonio Claudio Trigo, the manager of the local Goodyear tyre plant, in a car parked near his house at Anchorena 1400, Santos Lugares.

They were to have escorted the businessman to work.

But a Chevrolet pick-up and a red Fiat 128 drew up, with a man and a woman in each. The two couples got out of the vehicles and closed in on the bodyguards, opening up with automatic weapons at close range.

The two men were killed instantly. Police put out a general alarm, but the terrorists got away.

Meanwhile in Córdoba, the Third Army Corps issued a communique reporting that troops killed two guerrillas and wounded one or two more in the anti-subversion campaign in the semi-tropical jungle of Tucumán.

The army said that one of the slain terrorists was identified as "Lieutenant Luis," who was the commissar of the Marxist guerrillas operating in Tucumán.

Political violence has claimed the lives of 272 people since the beginning of the year.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

P. 1

BUENOS AIRES
HERALD

4/14/76

Date:
Edition:
Author:
Editor:
Title:Character:
or

Classification:

Submitting Office:

109-103-396
☐ Being Investigated

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| APR 19 1976 | |
| LEGAL ATTACHE - BUENOS AIRES | |
| RWS | |

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Fue herido el custodio de una planta fabril

Ayer, a las 18.20, varios extremistas que viajaban en un vehículo atacaron a balazos a los custodios de la cristalería Rigolleau, ubicada en Berazategui, y quedó gravemente herido un cabo primero de la policía bonaerense.

La planta de la cristalería se halla a menos de dos cuadras de la estación Berazategui, y frente a la puerta principal, ubicada en la intersección de la Avda. Rigolleau y la calle 145, se hallaban varios custodios —no se determinó con exactitud el número— que pertenecen a la policía de la provincia de Buenos Aires.

A la hora indicada, y desde un automóvil Peugeot, de color gris, ocupado por tres individuos y una mujer, se hicieron varios disparos de ametralladoras contra los custodios. Tres disparos hirieron de gravedad en la espalda al cabo primero Juan Manuel Gómez, quien fue internado en el hospital Bartolomé Churruarín, de la Capital Federal, donde fue sometido a una intervención quirúrgica.

Los agresores lograron huir, pese al intenso rastillaje que poco después del atentado realizaron por la zona numerosos efectivos policiales.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

P. 10

LA NACION

BUENOS AIRES

4/17/76

Date:

Edition:

Author:

Editor:

Title:

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or

Classification:

Submitting Office:

109-103-397

☐ Being Investigated

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| APR 19 1976 | |
| LEGAL ATTACHE - BUENOS AIRES | |

Executive, naval officer, 3 policemen

Five murdered on bloody Wednesday

IN ANOTHER escalation of political violence, terrorists assassinated five people yesterday, including a young Chrysler executive, a navy officer and three policemen.

The murders, along with the discovery of three bodies in Córdoba which bore the hallmarks of political killings, brought the terrorism-death toll to 281 since the beginning of the

year. Over 115 people have been killed in political violence since the coup on March 24.

Bloody Wednesday began when terrorists hammered on the door of the home of Chrysler marketing and distribution manager Jorge Ricardo Kelly at Uruguay 1200, Moron. When he came downstairs in his pyjamas, they shot him dead, blazing away with automatic weapons through the side windows of the house.

At 7am, terrorists waiting in three cars and a pickup outside a navy apartment building at Parana 1279 in La Lucila drove slowly by as two officers emerged from the entrance hall. There was a burst of machinegun fire from a green Ford Falcon and José Guillermo Burgos, a 48 year old commander, fell dead. Captain Alberto Quevedo, who was with him, managed to reach cover and fired back at the assailants who fled in the four vehicles.

Then at 8.30am, terrorists ambushed a police patrol car at the intersection of Avenida San Martín and Lynch in Rafael Calzada, a southern suburb of Buenos Aires, killing a sergeant, two corporals and wounding the fourth officer in the car.

In the early hours of the morning in Boulogne terrorists shot up the house where two of former President Juan Carlos Onganía's children live. They were driven off by bodyguards.

Just before 2pm, terrorists

struck again. Two cars, with six or seven occupants, opened fire on soldiers guarding the Vicente López municipality building. Only one of the troops was wounded, slightly.

The Government House press office issued an unprecedented, four-point communique commenting on this "and other events of the day." The communique said that the aim was to make the terrorists appear more powerful than they really are in order to secure recruits and "intimidate the fearful."

● Late last night an air force noncommissioned officer was assassinated by terrorists as he returned to his home in Barrio Parque in Córdoba.

(Page, name of paper, city and state.)

P. 1

BUENOS AIRES
HERALD

4/15/76

Date:
Edition:
Author:
Editor:
Title:

Character:
or

Classification:
Submitting Office:

☐ Being Investigated

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| SEARCHED | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED | FILED |
| APR 19 1976 | |
| LEGAL ATTACHE - BUENOS AIRES | |
| Ruta | |

2571
20 APR 76
1603

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION
~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

N/A
ASEC, PINS, AR
Terrorist Activities in Buenos Aires

ACTION: SecState WASHDC

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ BUENOS AIRES 2571

1. During a 32^{hour} period from April 13-14, a resurgence of terrorist activity occurred, including the following incidents:

AMB
DCM
POL
POL(R)
LEGAT
DAO
ECON
SY
ADMIN
DEA
MILGP
CHRON

A. On April 13, at 0730 hours, a two-man bodyguard team for the Administrative Manager of Goodyear Co. was murdered by terrorists as they waited to escort the executive to work. The incident took place outside the executive's home in Santos Lugares, a Buenos Aires suburb. The Montoneros claimed credit for the action.

B. On April 14, at 0630 hours, the marketing manager for Chrysler Corp. was machine-gunned to death in his suburban Moron home. The attackers fired through a window as he went to answer the door bell.

C. At 0700 hours on the same date, two Argentine Navy Captains were killed by attackers in suburban Martinez as

DRAFTED BY:

SY:RSO:GSBECKETT:ac

DRAFTING DATE

4/19/76

TEL. EXT.

148

109-103-399
CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

LEARANCES:

POL:WSSmith

POL/R:DSmock

XXX
RELEASED

AMB:RCHILL

SERIALIZED

DCM:MCHAPLIN

APR 21 1976

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

~~Classification~~

they were climbing into their car to go to work. FAL rifles and ITHAKA shotguns were used, plus a grenade which did not explode.

D. At 0915 hours, terrorists attacked a provincial police patrol in Adrogué, Province of Buenos Aires, killing three police officers and seriously wounding a fourth. The assailants drove two pick-ups and employed shotguns and machine guns.

E. At 1430 hours, 7 persons, including one woman, using 2 cars and 2 motorcycles, attacked and wounded 3 soldiers in Vicente Lopez, a Buenos Aires suburb.

2. These attacks have been executed in ~~similar~~ similar fashion.

Usually four or more people, including women, have been involved. Both pick-up trucks and cars have been used, and both ~~xxx~~/shotguns and automatic weapons have been employed.

3. On April 14, 1976, the Security Watch Committee convened. The consensus of the SWC was that recent events showed a return of terrorist activities to pre-coup levels. Also, it was thought that possibly terrorists were now hitting targets of opportunity and their bodyguards instead of high-ranking diplomats and businessmen. The SWC recommended that people with guards on their houses instruct the guards to move back from highly visible locations and to change their positions frequently so that they would be less vulnerable to a

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~~~Classification~~

terrorist attack. Also at the Committee's recommendation, the automobile escort system (used during the high threat period in January, 1976) was reinstituted beginning April 15.

RSO COMMENT: The latest rash of terrorist incidents appear to be a ^{hit} ~~big~~ and-run style with the purpose being assassination. The targets (bodyguards, police, and military) are those which require planning and confidence for success.

~~HILL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Classification

5/4/76

CODE

TELETYPE

URGENT (PRIORITY)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. / -04
FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)(P)

~~SECRET~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON MAY 3, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS
A RANKING OFFICIAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
(AAIS) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

SEVERAL DAYS AGO AN ARGENTINE AIR FORCE LIEUTENANT COLONEL
WAS KIDNAPPED BY THE ARGENTINE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, THE
PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP). THE ERP COMMUNICATED WITH
THE ARGENTINE MILITARY GOVERNMENT INDICATING THEY DESIRED
TO EXCHANGE THE KIDNAPPED AIR FORCE LIEUTENANT COLONEL FOR
AN ERP LEADER NAMED ENRIQUEZ, WHO HAD BEEN PICKED UP BY
ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES. (S) (U)

NO NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE ENTERED INTO BY THE ARGENTINE
MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR THE RELEASE OF THE KIDNAPPED AIR
FORCE LIEUTENANT COLONEL SINCE IT IS THE FIRM POLICY OF THE
ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT NOT TO NEGOTIATE WITH TERRORISTS.

IN ADDITION, ENRIQUEZ DIED WHILE IN CAPTIVITY AND WOULD BE (S) (U)

1 - 109-38
1 - 80-VALIN (S) (U)
RWS:jn (4)

CLASSIFIED SECTIONS REMOVED
DATE: 11-9-94 Pgs 1 + 2

5-401
CLASSIFIED BY 39063-1013000
DECLASSIFY ON: 15X
Argentine Project

~~SECRET~~

402

PAGE TWO

BUE 109-2; 109-103

~~SECRET~~

UNAVAILABLE FOR ANY TYPE OF EXCHANGE. (~~S~~) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931, XGDS-2 and -4 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - SOURCE IS COLONEL ALBERTO VALIN, CHIEF,
AAIS. COORDINATED LOCALLY (~~S~~) (U)

END.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCN

5/4/76

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERREN

PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP)

On 5/3/76, an official of the Argentine Army Intelligence Service (SIE) provided the following information: (S) (U)

Several days ago, an Argentine Air Force Vice-Commodore was kidnapped by the Peoples Revolutionary Army (ERP). The ERP communicated with the Government indicating that the kidnapped Vice-Commodore would be exchanged for a detained ERP member named ENRIQUEZ. The policy of the Argentine Military Government is not to negotiate with terrorists. (S) (U)

ENRIQUEZ had been taken prisoner by Argentine Security Forces and subsequently died. (S) (U)

The foregoing information is being held very closely by the Argentine Military. This information should not be discussed with any foreign official, including those of the Argentine Government.

~~SECRET~~

1 - Addressee

- 1 - POL
- 1 - POL/R
- 1 - DAO
- 1 - SY
- 3 - Buenos Aires
 - (1 - 109-38)
 - (1 - 109-103)
 - (1 - 80-Valin) (S) (U)

RWS:jn
(8)

Classified by 5931
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)(4)
Automatically declassified on Indef

5-4-01
CLASSIFIED BY 3906 JFW/BCE/DC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6
Argentina Project

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

109-103-403

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Fue Asesinado Esta Mañana un Ejecutivo de la Fiat

El ingeniero Pedro Jorge Rota, director de la fábrica de carrocería y montaje de automóviles Fiat Concord, de El Palomar, fue asesinado esta mañana en Hurlingham, provincia de Buenos Aires, poco después de salir de su domicilio para dirigirse al trabajo. De 41 años, casado con Lilia E. Greené, deja 3 hijos, de 12, 9 y 8 años de edad. Había ingresado a Fiat Concord el 24 de junio de 1958, época en que cursaba estudios de ingeniería en la Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires. Obtuvo su título de ingeniero mecánico en 1961, des-

volviéndose en el cumplimiento de diversas funciones técnicas que le valieron graduaciones ascensor hasta llegar a su actual jerarquía de director de la fábrica de El Palomar. Pedro Jorge Rota había nacido en Italia. Llegó a la Argentina a los 15 años de edad.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

P. 8

LA RAZON

BUENOS AIRES

5/4/76

Date:

Edition:

Author:

Editor:

Title:

Character:
or

Classification:

Submitting Office:

☐ Being Investigated

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| MAY 6 1976 | |
| LEGAL ATTACHE - BUENOS AIRES | |

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

CODE

5/5/76

CLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/100/100
REASON: C, d
DECLASSIFY ON: 1/1/16

Argentine Project

CABLE

URGENT (PRIORITY)

TO: DIRECTOR NR. 117-05
FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)(P)
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON MAY 4, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN OFFICIAL OF THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE (BNP) INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ADVISED THAT ON THE MORNING OF MAY 4, 1976, TERRORISTS ASSASSINATED PEDRO J. ROTA, THE DIRECTOR OF THE FIAT AUTOMOBILE ASSEMBLY PLANT IN EL PALOMAR, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE (BAP). SOURCE REPORTED THAT ROTA, A NATURALIZED ARGENTINE CITIZEN OF ITALIAN ORIGIN, WAS INTERCEPTED BY THE TERRORISTS AS HE DEPARTED HIS RESIDENCE IN HURLINHAM, BAP.

ON MAY 5, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA), DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY (INTELLIGENCE DIVISION) REPORTED THAT FPA STATISTICS INDICATE THAT THERE HAVE BEEN 354 POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS IN ARGENTINA SINCE JANUARY 1, 1976. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGAS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - FIRST SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR OSVALDO DE BALDRICH, CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, BAPP. [SECOND SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR VICENTE GALEAZZO, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE, FPA.] (S) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

RWS:jn (1)

SECRET

100-1-1-407A

DECLASSIFIED BY 29863 EIW/DRF/H/C
ON 5-4-01
Argentine Project
CABLE

5/7/76

CABLE CODE

URGENT (PRIORITY)

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. 116-07
FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON MAY 6, 1976, JOHN LOSER, AN EXECUTIVE WITH THE ST. JOSEPH LEAD CORPORATION, ARGENTINE SUBSIDIARY IN ARGENTINA, ADVISED THAT ANGLO-ARGENTINE FAMILY FRIENDS OF THE LOSERS REPORTED THAT THEIR SON-IN-LAW, AN ANGLO-ARGENTINE EXECUTIVE WITH THE MONSANTO CHEMICAL COMPANY, BUENOS AIRES, HAD BEEN KIDNAPPED APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH AGO BY UNKNOWN INDIVIDUALS AND HIS BODY WAS SUBSEQUENTLY DISCOVERED ALONGSIDE A ROAD IN BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE. MR. LOSER NOTED THAT NO PUBLICITY HAD BEEN AFFORDED TO THE ASSASSINATION AND THAT THE INFORMATION WAS CLOSELY HELD BY THE MONSANTO CHEMICAL COMPANY.

IT IS NOTED THAT THE MONSANTO CHEMICAL COMPANY ARGENTINA IS THE ARGENTINE SUBSIDIARY OF THE MONSANTO COMPANY, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931-XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END.

RWS:jn
(2)

109-12-408

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

5/7/76

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

ASSASSINATION OF MONSANTO CHEMICAL COMPANY EXECUTIVE

Reference RSO Memo 4/13/76 captioned "Terrorist Incidents."

On 5/6/76, JOHN LOSER, St. Joseph's Lead Company, Buenos Aires, advised that family friends residing in Buenos Aires Province are the in-laws of an Anglo-Argentine executive with the Monsanto Chemical Company in Buenos Aires. LOSER reported that he was informed by these individuals that their son-in-law had been kidnapped approximately one month ago by unknown individuals and that his body was discovered approximately one week later by the side of a road in Buenos Aires Province. LOSER stated he had no additional details concerning the assassination, specifically whether or not the Monsanto executive had been picked up by common criminals or terrorists.

It is believed that the above described assassination probably refers to the 4/5/76 incident outlined in referenced memo indicating that the child of an Anglo-Argentine employee of Monsanto had been kidnapped.

- 1 - Addressee
- 1 - POL
- 1 - POL/R
- 1 - ECON COUNSELOR
- 1 - CONGEN
- 1 - SY
- 2 - Buenos Aires
 - (1 - 109-103)
 - (1 - 163-676)

RWS:jn
(8)

DECLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/BCP/DA
ON 5-4-01
Argentina Project

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 5931
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on Indef

109-103-409

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

FROM

CLASSIFICATION

GDS
ASEC, AR, ELAV
MONTONERO THREATS TO U.S. BUSINESS FIRMS

SECSTATE WASHDC

1. ON MAY 3, MR. FERNANDO GIL ZORRILLA DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS LEPRTIT (SUBSIDIARY DOW CHEMICAL) AND MR. JAIME A. BRAUN ~~MM~~ BRUNET PRESIDENT OF DOW CHEMICAL OF ARGENTINA REVEALED TO THE REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER THAT ON APRIL 19, 1976 THE COMPANY HAD RECEIVED A LETTER ADDRESSED TO MR. BRUNET BUT INDICATED HIS POSITION AS PRESIDENT OF THE LEPRTIT COMPANY. THE LETTER WAS A 3-PAGE DECLARATION SIGNED BY THE MONTONEROS DIRECTING THE COMPANY IN ITS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WORKERS AND GOA SECURITY PERSONNEL.

THE COMPANY WAS DIRECTED TO FURNISH NO INFORMATION TO FEDERAL POLICE

~~XXXXX~~ OR OTHER SECURITY ELEMENTS ~~EM~~ CONCERNING IDENTITIES OF
DRAFTED WITH LEFTIST RHETORIC

THE WORKERS. THE DOCUMENT/5 ~~CONTAINS NO INFORMATION OF INTEREST~~ ~~TO THE~~ ~~WORKERS.~~ ~~THE~~ ~~DOCUMENT~~ ~~CONTAINS~~ ~~NO~~ ~~INFORMATION~~ ~~OF~~ ~~INTEREST~~ ~~TO~~ ~~THE~~ ~~WORKERS.~~

~~ACCOMPLISHED BY BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION~~ ACTION THAT HAD BEEN CARRIED

OUT AGAINST THE BENDIX CORP. BY THE ~~XXXXX~~ ASSASSINATION OF TWO
TOP MEMBERS OF THE COMPANY IN REPRISAL FOR WORKERS SUPPRESSION (REFERENCE:
BA 0633).

DRAFTED BY: DRAFTING DATE: TEL. EXT. CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

SY:RSO:GSBeckett:eg

CHANGES:

LEGATT IN DRAFT
LABATT: RGM

DRAFTING DATE
5/5/96

TEL. EXT.

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

-AMR - PCHT I I

DCM:MCHAPL.TN/425

MAY 19/5

100-100000-100000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 153
(Formerly FD-413)
January 1976

IT WAS ALSO REPORTED THAT THE DOW COMPANY HAD RECENTLY TAKEN ACTION WITH RESPECT TO SOME OF THE LABOR FORCE. REPRESENTATIVES OF DOW WENT TO THE MINISTER OF LABOR REQUESTING PERMISSION TO DISCHARGE SOME OF ITS EMPLOYEES SUBSEQUENT TO THE CHANGE IN ~~XXXXXX~~ GOVERNMENT. THE MINISTRY INFORMED THE DOW REPRESENTATIVES THAT TO DISCHARGE THESE EMPLOYEES WOULD BE ILLEGAL. DOW EXECUTIVES CALLED IN THE SEVEN EMPLOYEES, 3 OF WHOM ~~XXXXXX~~ WERE UNION SHOP STEWARDS AND INFORMED THEM THAT THEY WOULD BE DISCHARGED. THE SEVEN EMPLOYEES NEGOCIATED WITH DOW MANAGEMENT FOR AN ACCEPTABLE SUM AND WHEN SUCH WAS AGREED UPON, THE SEVEN EMPLOYEES RESIGNED. SUBSEQUENT TO THEIR ~~XXXXXX~~ RESIGNATION, THE DOW COMPANY RECEIVED THE DESCRIBED THREAT.

THE LEGAL ATTACHE, THE LABOR ATTACHE AND THE COMMERCIAL ATTACHE WERE REQUESTED TO JOIN THE MEETING... DOW REPRESENTATIVES WERE ADVISED THAT THE THREAT SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY AND TO CONTACT THE EMBASSY IF SUBSEQUENT THREATS SHOULD BE RECEIVED. THE LABOR ATTACHE INFORMED THE DOW COMPANY REPRESENTATIVES THAT THE PHARMACEUTICAL UNION, WHICH WAS THE ONE REPRESENTED AT THIS PARTICULAR ~~PLANT~~ ~~XXXXXX~~ PLANT, HAD A HISTORY OF BEING LEFTIST AND ACTIVIST, AND THAT ANY TREAT INVOLVING THEM SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. HE ALSO ARRANGED FOR A SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH THE LABOR RELATIONS EMPLOYEE OF DOW CHEMICAL.

2. THE LEGAL ATTACHE WAS ADVISED BY HERB LESHINSKY OF THE

CHRYSLER CORP. ARGENTINA THAT FOUR MAJOR EXECUTIVES OF HIS COMPANY HAD RECEIVED THREATENING LETTERS FROM THE MONTONEROS. A REVIEW OF THESE LETTERS INDICATED THAT THEY WERE THE SAME FORM LETTER THAT HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY DOW CHEMICAL. IN ADDITION, LESHINSKY INFORMED THE LEGAL ATTACHE THAT NUMEROUS THREATENING TELEPHONE CALLS WERE BEING RECEIVED IN THE CHRYSLER OFFICE IN SAN JUSTO. LESHINSKY WAS INSTRUCTED TO TAKE THE ~~XXX~~ THREAT SERIOUSLY AND TO REPORT TO THE EMBASSY ANY SUBSEQUENT THREATS OR ACTIONS.

3. REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER COMMENT: PRIOR TO AND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT FEBRUARY 24, NINE U.S. COMPANIES HAD REPORTED TO THE EMBASSY RECEIVING THREATS IDENTICAL TO THOSE REPORTED BY DOW CHEMICAL AND CHRYSLER. IN ADDITION, ARGENTINE NATIONALS REPRESENTING U.S. COMPANIES, HAD ADVISED THE SECURITY OFFICE THAT ARGENTINE COMPANIES HAD SIMILAR THREATS.. THOSE RECEIVED BY DOW CHEMICAL AND THE CHRYSLER CORP. ARE THE FIRST REPORTED INCIDENTS ^{OF THIS TYPE} SINCE THE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT.

UP
745
14 P2

IT IS APPARENT THAT TERRORIST ELEMENTS WITHIN ARGENTINA CONTINUE TO CARRY OUT ATTACKS ON REPRESENTS OF INDUSTRY, I.E. ON MAY 4, 1976, MR. PEDRO JORGE ROTE, DIRECTOR, FIAT CONCORD AUTOMOBILE PLANT, PALOMAR WAS MURDERED BY TERRORISTS. ROTE HAD DEPARTED HIS ^{HOME} ~~WORK~~ IN HURLINGHAM, A SUBURB IN BUENOS AIRES, FOR HIS OFFICE; HE WAS OPERATING HIS OWN AUTOMOBILE AND WAS

UNACCOMPANIED.. HIS PROGRESS WAS INTERRUPTED BY A ROADBLOCK. HE REVERSED THE DIRECTION OF THE AUTOMOBILE AND TRAVELED ABOUT 200 METERS, WHEN HE WAS CUT OFF BY A SECOND ROADBLOCK. FOLLOWING THE SECOND CUTOFF, HE WAS EXECUTED APPARENTLY WITH A 9 MM SUBMACHINE GUN. IT WAS THE OPINION OF THE INVESTIGATING POLICE OFFICERS THAT 4 AUTOMOBILES WERE USED IN THE OPERATION. COPIES OF THE THREAT LETTERS SENT TO CHRYSLER AND DOW CHEMICAL WERE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE FEDERAL POLICE (NEITHER U.S. COMPANIES NOR INDIVIDUALS RECEIVING THREATS WERE IDENTIFIED). FEDERAL POLICE ADVISED THIS WAS THEIR FIRST INFORMATION ON SUCH THREATS SINCE THE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT.. THEY STATED THAT THE THREAT SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY IN AS MUCH AS EXTENSIVE LABOR UNREST EXISTED. IN ADDITION, THEY ADVISED THAT IT WAS AN ACCEPTED FACT THAT THE UNIONS WERE BEING PENETRATED BY TERRORISTS. THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF FEDERAL POLICE STATED THAT THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AS RELATED TO MANUFACTURING PLANTS RESTED WITH THE GOA ARMY AND NOT WITH THE FEDERAL POLICE. HE FURTHER STATED THAT APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY INFORMED THAT THREATS WERE BEING RECEIVED BY AMERICAN COMPANIES.

HILL


CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum

Secret
DATE: May 7, 1976

TO : ALL AMERICAN PERSONNEL

FROM : RSO *ST*

SUBJECT: Security Notice - MONTONERO AND ERP THREAT

Recently a source within the Argentine Government provided the following information: Within the next few days, the Montoneros and ERP plan to carry out penetrations against the residences of military, business, and diplomatic personnel. Disguised as door-to-door salesmen and utilities repairmen, the terrorists will attempt to gain entry for the purpose of theft, assassination, kidnapping, or bombing.

Staff are reminded that the doors of their residences should be kept locked at all times. Staff should be especially aware of unexpected callers who try to gain entry. If any situation of this nature occurs, notify Radio Control who will send a security patrol for assistance.

ST

109-103-412

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| SEARCHED | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED | FILED |
| MAY - 1976 | |
| LEGAL ATTACHE - BUENOS AIRES | |

Russ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



5010-110

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CONTROL: 3047
7 May 76
1608

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

E.O. 11652: GDS Exempt 5B2
TAGS: ASEC, AR, PINS
SUBJECT: Kidnapping Argentine Air Force Officer
ACTION: SecState WASHDC

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 3047

AMB
DCM
POL
POL(R)
DAO
MILGP
USIS
DEA
CON
LEGATT
CHRON
SY

1. SUMMARY: Argentine Air Force Commodore kidnapped by members of ERP. Purpose of kidnapping to cause release of member of Chilean Revolutionary Movement (MIR). It is believed that MIR member is dead. It is alleged that should Commodore not be released action will be taken against five ERP members in GOA custody. RSO source advised Commodore was "set up" by girl. Also that Commodore had reputation as "girl chaser". Joint actions between ERP and terrorists in neighboring countries to Argentina have previously been reported. GOA police interrupted meeting of terrorist representatives of neighboring countries on March 29. Chilean intelligence reported 4 May meeting was held in Panama between S.A. leftist units and that a Soviet and Cuban representative attended. Montoneros and ERP have been known to hold hostages for release of prisoners in the past. However,

109-103-

DRAFTED BY: SY:RSO:GSBECKETT:ac DRAFTING DATE: 5/6/76 TEL. EXT. 148 CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: AMB:RCHILL

CLEARANCES:

AIRATT
LEGATT IN DRAFT
POL(R)

DCM:MChaplin

SECRET

[this is the first incident reported in which a]
hostage has been held for release of terrorist who
was member of an organization for an adjacent country.

It is also the first time in several years that a military
officer has been held as a hostage for release of a pris-
oner. Air Attache Office confirmed kidnapping.

1. On unknown date in the latter part of April an Argen-
tine Air Force Commodore named ECHEGOYEN (believed to be
identified fully as Robert Moises ECHEGOYEN) was kid-
napped by members of the Peoples Revolutionary Army
(ERP). ERP communication with Air Force subsequent
to the kidnapping indicated that the Commodore would be
released in exchange for (FNU) ENRIQUEZ, member of MIR
(Chilean Revolutionary Leftist Movement). Available
information indicates that (FNU) ENRIQUEZ is deceased.
In addition it has been reported that the GOA Air Force
has communicated to the ERP that if the Commodore
is not released unharmed, action will be taken
against five members of the ERP being held in custody.
Available information to date indicates the GOA Commodore
is still alive and no information has been made available
reflecting that 5 ERP prisoners have been executed with

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ RESPECT TO THIS EVENT.

2. RSO COMMENT:

Source within the Argentine Air Force advised the following: The Commodore who was kidnapped had the reputation of "Girl Chaser". Some of his duties involved work with the GOA Congress. The Commodore's family was friendly with a Congressman who was considered radical. This Congressman had a daughter who was apparently working in an office connected with the GOA Presidency. The girl is connected with one of the terrorist groups. It is the opinion of GOA Air Force intelligence that the girl arranged a date with the Commodore and accompanied him to a night club in the Olivos-Martinez-area, and at some time during their stay in the night club the Commodore was abducted. The girl and her family have apparently disappeared from their home and places that they normally frequent. The Air Force intelligence representative confirmed that the Colonel had been kidnapped for exchange purposes with a Chilean ~~leftist~~ ^{leftist} (terrorist) who is deceased.

There have been repeated reports of joint action between Argentine terrorists and similar elements of countries adjacent to Argentina. In one specific incident Federal Police are believed to have broken up a meeting (March 29, 1976) in Argentina in which 50 or 60 high ranking

members of the various terrorist groups were taking PART.

~~XXXX~~. According to reports, police unwittingly, based on a nebulous complaint, walked into the meeting and were greeted ~~with~~ by a hail of bullets. The police summoned reinforcements and 14 of the terrorists were killed.

3. On 4 May the Chilean intelligence service reported to the legal attache, this Embassy, that a secret meeting was held near David, Republic of Panama, in which various Latin American terrorist organizations took part. The Chilean service ~~was~~ advised that representatives of the Soviet Union and Cuba were present at the meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to focus attention on the future objectives, strategy and tactics of the various terrorist elements represented both in- ~~dividually~~ individually and collectively. Allegedly generous financing was to be provided by the Soviet Representative.

4. Montoneros and ERP have been known to use the hostage system in attempt to obtain the release of prisoners. Consular Agent One example was when ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Egan was (subsequently murdered) kidnapped and prisoners being held by the GOA were requested to be released. ~~for his release~~. The prisoners who had been requested were deceased. A second case was the kidnapping of the Chief Justice of the Provincial Supreme Court of Buenos Aires for the release of Sergio SCHNEIDER,

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Page 5 of 5 five 3047

MRN

member of Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL) which subsequently merged with the Montoneros. Schneider was released by the GOA and the Judge was subsequently freed by the FAL. Schneider was later killed during a terrorist operation in Northern Argentina.

This is the first incident that has been reported to the RSO in which a local terrorist group has conducted a kidnapping in an attempt to ransom a terrorist representative of an element foreign to Argentina.

5. AIR ATTACHE'S COMMENTS: A general officer of the Argentine Air Force confirmed the kidnapping and the mode of operation. However, he was very reluctant to divulge anything else. He stated the Argentine Air Force is maintaining maximum secrecy over the entire affair in order to improve the chances of recovering the officer. We estimate the probability of safe recovery as very small.

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

Classification

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

5/7/76

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

RUMORS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

For your information, the following unconfirmed rumors are being widely circulated with regard to terrorist activities:

1. During the past several days, an Argentine or Dutch executive of Phillips Argentina was kidnapped by terrorists and is being held for ransom.
2. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel **ETCHEGOYEN** was assassinated by his ERP captives and the Argentine military are keeping his assassination secret. Allegedly, the ERP managed to kidnap Lieutenant Colonel **ETCHEGOYEN** by luring him into a trap through the kidnapping of the daughter of a Radical Party leader.
3. At least two other Argentine military officers have been kidnapped by terrorists and are being held in exchange for their captured brother terrorists.

Efforts are currently being made to substantiate the above rumors.

- 1 - Addressee
- 1 - POL
- 1 - POL/R
- 1 - DAO
- 1 - SY
- ① - Buenos Aires (109-103)

RWS:jn
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-4-01 BY 39063ELC/BCE/06
Argentina Project

Paul

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

109-103-413

3139
11 MAY 76
1637

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM
Amembassy BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

E.O. 11652:
TAGS: PINT, PINS, CI, AR
SUBJECT: Disappearance of Top Leader of Chilean MIR

ACTION: Amembassy SANTIAGO

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 3139

~~NOFORN~~

REFS a) Santiago 4325, b) USDAO Buenos Aires 071510Z May 76

Argentine Air Force Colonel Echegoyen was kidnapped in late April by ERP, which demanded release of MIR leader Edgardo Enriquez who it was believed had been captured or killed by

Argentine security forces. GOA has suppressed all public notice of incident. Details of matter were sent to USDAO Santiago in ref b. It is understood that Enriquez is dead. Unconfirmed rumors are circulating that ERP has killed Echegoyen, despite warning by security forces that reprisals would be taken against ERP prisoners in GOA custody if Echegoyen not released unharmed.

AMB
POL-3
POL/R
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~~USIS~~
USDAO
~~INSTR~~
~~SECRET~~
LEGAT
CHRON

HILL

109-103-414

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| SEARCHED | INDEXED |
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| MAY 11 1976 | |
| LEGAL ATTACHE - BUENOS AIRES | |

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| DRAFTED BY: POL:RSSteven:cc | DRAFTING DATE 5/11/76 | TEL. EXT. 121 | CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: POL:WSSmith |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------|---|

CLEARANCES:

DAO:PACoughlin (in draft)
LEGATT:RScherrer (for info)

DCM:MChaplin

AMB:RCHill

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Executive, corporal, 6 guer

ONE police corporal, a company executive and six terrorists were killed yesterday in violence in Buenos Aires, Rosario, Mendoza and Córdoba.

The corporal, Héctor Oscar Genolet, a winner of the police medal for valour in 1974, was killed when a terrorist group attacked police on guard duty in a place west of Buenos Aires, an official statement said.

The guards managed to throw off the attackers, killing one of them and wounding another, according to the evidence shown by blood stains in a captured car, but corporal Genolet was killed.

The police statement said that in their

retreat, a woman threw acid over the face of the dead extremist, to delay recognition. The police statement said also that guns and ammunition were seized in the car abandoned by the guerrillas.

In Rosario, Miguel Salesky, 59 industrial security chief at the Swift plant, was shot dead yesterday morning in an ambush by terrorists, when he was on his way to work.

Salesky, who lived in the Saladillo district of the city, had only just left his home and walked a block, when a car stopped in front of him and several men shot at him.

Not long ago, Salesky's home had

been the target of terrorists' shooting, and he had also received death threats.

In Córdoba, the third army corps command announced that five guerrillas, two in Mendoza and three in Córdoba, were killed in anti-subversion operations.

The two killed in Mendoza, a man and a woman, were trapped at a house which security forces tried to raid on the suspicion that it was used as a meeting place for terrorists. When the search was resisted, the forces fired on the house until resistance ceased.

In Córdoba, an abortive attempt to free two terrorists under arrest, led to the death of both and of one of the attackers.

The two captive terrorists were identified as José Angel Pucheta and Sgandorra, which the army described as members of the Marxist extremist group. The communique assumed that the dead attacker was a member of the same group, although he was not identified. Six others escaped.

Yesterday's incident in Córdoba followed rioting in the city on Thursday night. The army command said that one guerrilla was shot dead and three others captured by police. The army statement said the terrorists had a plan to burn and loot several offices. The three captured terrorists will be tried by military court, the statement said. (NA)

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

P. 1

BUENOS AIRES
HERALD

5/29/76

Date:
Edition:
Author:
Editor:
Title:

Character:
or

109-103-428

Classification:
Submitting Office:

☐ Being Investigated

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| SEARCHED | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED | FILED |
| JUN 1 1976 | |
| LEGAL ATTACHE - BUENOS AIRES | |
| Rave | |

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

(Indicate page, name of
newspaper, city and state.)

En el Interior de un Automóvil Hallan en Avellaneda los Cadáveres de Dos Agentes de la Policía de Buenos Aires

OFICIALMENTE la Policía de la provincia de Buenos Aires informó, por medio del parte N° 668, sobre el hallazgo, en el interior de un vehículo, de dos agentes policiales muertos. Dice la información que, ante una denuncia,

personal policial concurrió a la intersección de las calles Cadorna y Helguera, en Avellaneda, donde se hallaba estacionado un automóvil marca Dodge, patente 649.950. En su interior se encontraban los cadáveres de dos hom-

bres. Posteriores averiguaciones permitieron comprobar que se trataba de los agentes de investigaciones de la policía de la provincia, Rubén Daniel Romagnoli y Héctor Anibal Ricón. Se inició una profunda investigación.

LA RAZON

BUENOS AIRES

5/30/76

Date:
Edition:
Author:
Editor:
Title:

Character:

or

Classification:

Submit 109-103-429

☐ Being Investigated

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|------------------------------|---------|
| SEARCHED | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED | FILED |
| JUN 1 1976 | |
| LEGAL ATTACHE - BUENOS AIRES | |
| Rox | |

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Police search for

POLICE yesterday launched a nationwide dragnet for abducted CGT trustee Colonel Juan Alberto Pita, seized by a group of terrorists as he was driving home in his car near the city of La Plata. Colonel Pita was forced at gunpoint to board another car which then drove off, leaving behind Mrs. Pita who was unharm-

ed. The army general command on Monday morning issued a statement which said that the colonel was kidnapped on Sunday evening at about 6.40pm. This information was released too late for inclusion in yesterday's Herald.

Meanwhile in Córdoba the Third Army released details of five prominent terro-

rists who were killed in a shootout on May 20 in Tucumán city.

They include Eduardo González Paz ("Tomas" or "Martin"), who is said to have contacted Third World priests in 1971 and to have conducted indoctrination courses in Salta since 1974. He was one of the political detainees given amnesty during the 1973 government of Héctor José Campora.

Also killed was his wife, Nora Spagni, who conducted political indoctrination under the guise of social assistance.

Fernando Saavedra Lamas ("Pepo") was the military head of the organization's Buenos Aires city section.

Maria Alejandra Niklison de

Iribarren ("Mercedes" or "Mecha") lived with Gerardo Romero ("Fitipaldi") after her husband, Victor Iribarren, was killed in a Santa Fe shootout. She had been arrested and also given amnesty by Campora in 1973.

Of Miguel Angel González Cano and Atilio Brandsen it is only known that they were officers in the organization and were in charge of military operations in the eastern part of Salta province.

Meanwhile Atilio Baldassani, a postal union leader who heads the Argentine delegation to the ILO conference in Geneva, said that the delegation would refer with total reality to what is going on in Argentina as far as concerns Argen-

tine labour.

Pita's abduction was sharply criticized by several of the union men in the delegation. They referred to it as "unfortunate", "irritative" and "an obstacle to unity of the Argentine people."

Baldassani told newsmen that one of their main concerns was for labourers who are under arrest.

Truck drivers' union leader Ricardo Pérez said that "once more, the enemies of Argentina provoke an irritative action that is nothing more than an assault on the possibilities of unity of the people. This, obviously, is a provocation," he said.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

P. 1

BUENOS AIRES
HERALD

6/1/76

Date:
Edition:
Author:
Editor:
Title:

Character: 109-103-430

or
Classification:
Submitting Office:☐ Being Investigated

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| SEARCHED | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED | FILED |
| JUN 1 1976 | |
| LEGAL ATTACHE - BUENOS AIRES | |

CONTROL: 3642
2 JUN 76 1618

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM AmEmbassy BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION ~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PINS, PINT, ELAB, AR
SUBJECT: CGT Interventor Kidnapped

ACTION: SecState WASHDC

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ BUENOS AIRES 3642

1. In their most significant operation since the military takeover March 24, terrorists kidnapped Col. Juan Alberto Pita, military interventor of the CGT, Sunday evening (May 30) as he was driving home with his wife near the city of La Plata.
2. Federal and local police immediately cordoned off the surrounding streets and launched a nationwide dragnet for the abductors. Pita, who had no bodyguard and had taken no special security precautions since being named CGT interventor a month ago, was apparently forced at gunpoint to board another car which drove off, leaving Mrs. Pita unharmed.
3. The Army General High Command issued a terse statement announcing the kidnapping. Pita was the highest ranking official attacked since the March 24 coup. His abduction was apparently timed to embarrass and discredit the GOA on the eve of the International Labor Organization's annual conference

AMB
POL-3
POL/R
ECOM
USIS
USDAO
MILGP-2
LEGAT
SCIAT
RF
CHRON

DCM

DRAFTED BY
POL:VTPayer:mg

DRAFTING DATE
6/1/76

TEL. EXT.
121

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
POL:WSSmith WSS

CLEARANCES:
DAO:LTC HEBach (in draft)
POL/R:DLStock (in substance) RS
SI:GSBeckett

AMB:RCHILL
DCM:MChaplin

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

which opened today (June 1) in Geneva.

4. Pita had defined his mission as a "strategy of dialogue" between government and labor. He pledged to combat subversion and corruption in the labor movement and to follow the new government's directives in establishing a single, centralized and apolitical labor movement.

5. Pita had made it clear he intended to work exclusively through military officials, while maintaining open communications with labor leaders "on concrete subjects." He said only "authentic leaders who act as genuine representatives of the Argentine worker" ~~he~~ would be allowed to participate in the national reorganization.

6. Pita was born in San Carlos de Bariloche. He entered military academy in 1944 and occupied a number of high posts in the Army High Command. For the last two years he served as chief of the Information Department of the Army General Staff.

7. Comment. The abduction of Pita has been viewed by many as a "tactic of desperation," a relatively simple, low-risk attack calculated to reap widespread publicity for Argentine terrorists. GOA has been particularly concerned to present a unified front at the Labor Conference in Geneva and to gain international support for its policies of local labor reorganization, as well as international sympathy in its battle against subversive terrorism.

8. The kidnapping, however, was again a remarkably smooth,

swift operation carried out in daylight hours in a heavily traveled location, not 20 minutes from Pita's home.

9. A number of Argentine papers have suggested that the Pita case illustrates how the badly battered terrorist groups have been reduced to spot actions against easy targets. (Terrorists have suffered heavy losses in recent weeks, including 18 dead in a spate of raids over the weekend.) As they continue to suffer heavy losses, La Opinion predicts, the terrorists may be forced to fall back on actions that produce the most publicity with the least waste of their hard-pressed resources.

HILL

1-23 (Rev. 2-16-74)

CLASSIFIED BY

REASON

DECLASSIFIED BY

DATE

CLASS

INTERMEDIATE (OO)

(Precedence)

TO

DIRECTOR (109-12-201)

NR. 109-18

FROM

LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RE: POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;

INTERNAL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES: FPM - ARGENTINA

ON JUNE 18, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS
AN OFFICER OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA)
FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION. (S) (U)

IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF JUNE 18, 1976,

GENERAL CESAR A. CARDOZO, AN ACTIVE DUTY ARGENTINE
ARMY GENERAL, WAS KILLED WHEN A TERRORIST BOMB DETONATED IN HIS
APARTMENT IN DOWNTOWN BUENOS AIRES. GENERAL CARDOZO'S MOTHER-
IN-LAW, WIFE AND DAUGHTER WERE SERIOUSLY INJURED IN THE HOLOCAUST.
FPA AND ARGENTINE ARMY UNITS ARE CONDUCTING EXTENSIVE
SWEEPS OF BUENOS AIRES IN AN EFFORT TO DETAIN THE PERPETRATOR.
INITIAL FPA INVESTIGATION INDICATES THAT THE BOMB WAS PLACED
INSIDE OF GENERAL CARDOZO'S APARTMENT BY SOMEONE HAVING ACCESS
TO THE PREMISES, IT BEING NOTED THAT GENERAL CARDOZO HAS
NUMEROUS BODYGUARDS AND HIS RESIDENCE IS PROTECTED BY GUARDS
ON A 24-HOUR DAILY BASIS. (S) (U)

CLASSIFIED BY 6891 RGS-E INDEFINITE

ADMINISTRATIVE - SOURCE IS COMISARIO GENERAL ENRIQUE EVARISTO
BESTEIRO, DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FPA (S) COORDINATED LOCALLY

Approved:

1 - 80-214 (BESTEIRO) (S) (U)

WES: Special Agent in Charge

(3)

109-103-439

6/18/76

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

CODE

~~NOEX~~ CABLE

IMMEDIATE (OO)

~~5-4-81
CLASSIFIED BY 39063EW/200/06
PERSON 1 C,d
DECLASSIFY ON: A-1
Argentine project~~

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. 145-18
FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)

~~SECRET~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

IT WAS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT THE CHIEF OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA), BRIGADIER GENERAL CESAREO A. CARDOZO, AN ACTIVE DUTY ARGENTINE ARMY OFFICER, HAD BEEN KILLED DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF JUNE 18, 1976, BY A TERRORIST BOMB, WHICH DETONATED IN HIS APARTMENT IN DOWNTOWN BUENOS AIRES.

ON JUNE 18, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN OFFICIAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAIS) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: ~~(S)~~ (U)

THE PERPETRATOR OF THE BOMBING WHICH KILLED GENERAL CARDOZO AND INJURED SEVERAL MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED BY THE AAIS AS LILIANA CASAL, A MEMBER OF THE ARGENTINE TERRORIST ASSOCIATION, THE PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY (ERP). CASAL HAD BEEN DETAINED APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK AGO BY THE FPA BASED ON INFORMATION SECURED DURING INTERROGATIONS WITH OTHER ERP MEMBERS INDICATING THAT SHE WAS CONNECTED WITH THE GROUP. CASAL WAS A CLOSE PERSONAL FRIEND OF GENERAL CARDOZO'S ~~(S)~~ (U)

END PAGE ONE

1 - SO-~~VALIN~~ ~~(S)~~ RWS:jn (3)

107-123-440
B
W

PAGE TWO ~~SECRET~~ 109-2; 109-103

DAUGHTER, WHO ASSURED GENERAL CARDOZO THAT CASAL WAS NOT A TERRORIST. GENERAL CARDOZO ORDERED CASAL BE RELEASED FROM FPA CUSTODY ON HIS AUTHORITY AS CHIEF OF THE FPA. CASAL VISITED THE CARDOZO APARTMENT DURING EARLY EVENING OF JUNE 17, 1976, TO THANK THE CARDOZO FAMILY IN ARRANGING FOR HER RELEASE FROM FPA CUSTODY. WHILE AT THE CARDOZO APARTMENT CASAL TOLD ~~EXX~~ CARDOZO'S DAUGHTER THAT SHE WANTED TO MAKE A VERY PERSONAL TELEPHONE CALL AND CARDOZO'S DAUGHTER ALLOWED HER ACCESS TO GENERAL CARDOZO'S BEDROOM. ~~EXX~~ CASAL TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PLACE A POWERFUL BOMB MADE UP OF PLASTIC EXPLOSIVE. (S) (U)

CASAL IS CURRENTLY IN THE CUSTODY OF THE AAIS AND WILL BE TURNED OVER TO THE FPA FOR LEGAL PROCESSING. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931-XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - REMYCAB JUNE 18, 1976, WHICH REPORTED ON GENERAL CARDOZO'S DEATH. SOURCE IS COLONEL ALBERTO VALIN, CHIEF, AAIS. (S) (U)

THE FOREGOING INFORMATION IS EXCLUSIVE AND HAS BEEN COORDINATED LOCALLY.

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Violence claims three

POLITICAL violence claimed three more lives in Argentina yesterday in three separate incidents in which a retired army colonel, a businessman and an unidentified terrorist were killed in shootouts. The wife of another retired colonel was also badly injured.

Retired Colonel Juan Carlos Mendieta was leaving his Parque Centenario (BA city) home yesterday at 7am when he found the way through a narrow alley blocked by a pickup which appeared to have broken down.

He then discovered that another car, a Dodge saloon, had come up behind him. The occupants of the car got out and, according to eyewitnesses, ordered Mendieta to get out of his car and into theirs.

Mendieta resisted and was shot pointblank by the assailants who then fled in the Dodge. Ropes and gags were found in the abandoned pickup, confirming the suspicion that the terrorists wanted to kidnap Mendieta.

Later yesterday morning, in Florida, an attempt was made to kidnap retired Colonel César del Toral, who was accompanied by his wife according to information released by the army.

The information added that Del Toral resisted the attempt and fatally shot one of his aggressors, after which the remainder fled. However, Mrs Del Toral was severely injured in the crossfire although sources said last night she was "out of danger."

In what also appeared to have political connotations, businessman Mario Halpern, 46, was shot dead by a group of people in the busy Buenos Aires district of La Paternal.

Halpern was reported to have been walking down Alvarez Jon-te street when several people came up to him and shot him at pointblank range.

Halpern, identified as "an executive of the FAE Electric company", slumped to the ground and the assailants disappeared. There was no further information as to the murder or its motives.

In another development the government ordered the deportation of six Peruvian citizens who had been held under arrest under suspicion of involvement in terrorism. The government is empowered to expel foreigners "who attempt against national security."

• LATE last night it was

reported that a police officer, Carlos Bonifacio Ferreyra, was mowed down in a hail of bullets fired by three men and a woman as he was leaving his La Plata home. Ferreyra was on his way to take up his duties at a local police station. His killers escaped in a grey Ford Falcon. The dead man joined the provincial police force in 1948. He was married and father of a girl of 20 and a boy of 18. (NA)

cate page, name of
spaper, city and state.)

P. 1

—BUENOS AIRES HERALD

6/18/76

Date:
Edition:
Author:
Editor:
Title:

Character:

or

109-103-441

Classification:

Submitting Office:

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED

JUN 19 1976

LEGAL ATTACHE—BUENOS AIRES

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 4044
18 Jun 76
1455

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM

AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ SECRET

E.O. 11652:

TAGS:

SUBJECT:

ACTION:

~~XXX~~ XGDS-2

ASEC, PINS

ASSASSINATION CHIEF GOA FEDERAL POLICE

SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

DIA WASH DC

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ BUENOS AIRES: 4044

DEPT. PASS TO AMB HILL AT KEY BISCAYNE HOTEL - MIAMI

1. AT APPROXIMATELY 0200 HOURS JUNE 17, 1976 RSO WAS FURNISHED

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FROM FEDERAL POLICE SOURCES: AT 0135

HOURS JUNE 15, 1976 A BOMB EXPLODED IN THE APARTMENT OF GENERAL

CESAREO CARDOZO CHIEF GOA FEDERAL POLICE. THE BOMB HAD

APPARENTLY BEEN PLACED IN THE BEDROOM OCCUPIED BY GENERAL

CARDOZO. GENERAL CARDOZO WAS KILLED AND OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS

FAMILY WERE WOUNDED.

2. SUBSEQUENT INFORMATION FROM GOA FEDERAL POLICE REVEALED

EXPLOSIVE

THAT THE ~~EXPLOSIVE~~ DEVICE WAS APPARENTLY PLACED IN THE BEDROOM

FEMALE

BY A FRIEND OF GENERAL CARDOZO'S DAUGHTER (IDENTITY UNKNOWN AT

THIS TIME). THIS INDIVIDUAL HAD BEEN IN THE CARDOZO APARTMENT

PRIOR TO DEPARTING THE RESIDENCE. SHE SAID SHE HAD LEFT

SOMETHING IN THE BEDROOM AND PROCEEDED TO THAT LOCATION. SHE

DRAFTED BY:

SY:GBeckett:eg

DRAFTING DATE

6-18-76

TEL. EXT.

148

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

ADMIN:CEE:Enmons

CLEARANCES:

POL:WSmith

POL-R:SMOCK

LEGATT:RWScherrer

DAO:PA. COUGHLIN

Charge:MChaplin

SECRET

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~
CLASSIFICATION

CARRIED WITH HER A BRIEFCASE, ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ACTIVATED THE TIMING DEVICE, AND PLACED THE BOMB UNDER THE SIDE OF THE BED NORMALLY OCCUPIED BY THE GENERAL. THIS INDIVIDUAL IS CURRENTLY IN THE HANDS OF FEDERAL POLICE. OTHER PERSONS ~~HNKX~~ REPORTED INJURED BY THE EXPLOSION WERE THE GENERAL'S DAUGHTER AND HIS MOTHER-IN-LAW.

3. OFFICIAL NEWS RELEASE ON THIS INCIDENT IS STATING THAT THE BOMB WAS PLACED IN THE ELEVATOR AND/OR THE foyer ADJACENT TO THE ELEVATOR AT THE FRONT OF THE APARTMENT OCCUPIED BY THE CHIEF OF POLICE. IT IS ALSO BEING REPORTED THAT THE BOMB WAS ACTIVATED BY RADIO.

4. RSO COMMENT: THE GOA NEWS RELEASE IS PROBABLY DISTORTED IN ORDER TO COVER THE IDENTITY OF THE GIRL WHO IS ALLEGED TO HAVE PLACED THE BOMB UNDER THE BED. IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE THE DAUGHTER OF A PROMINENT FAMILY IN ORDER TO BE AN ASSOCIATE OF A DAUGHTER OF AN ARGENTINE ARMY GENERAL. THIS IS NOT THE FIRST INCIDENT REPORTED IN WHICH A CHILD OF A PROMINENT FAMILY HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN A TERRORIST INCIDENT. THE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE PLACEMENT OF THE BOMB IN THE GENERAL'S BEDROOM AND RELATED INFORMATION HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY THE PRESS OFFICER THROUGH PRESS MEDIA PERSONNEL WITH HIGH RANKING CONNECTIONS.

~~SECRET~~

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

Classification

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Page three of four

MRN

5. AS FOREGOING INFORMATION BEING TRANSCRIBED, LEGAT SOURCE IN ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE REPORTED PERPETRATOR OF BOMBING WAS IDENTIFIED AS LILIANA CASAL, A PERSONAL FRIEND OF GENERAL CARDOZO'S DAUGHTER. CASAL HAD BEEN DETAINED BY THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK AGO AS SUSPECTED ERP MEMBER, BASED ON INTERROGATION WITH OTHER ERP PRISONERS. HOWEVER, GENERAL CARDOZO ACTING ON THE DAUGHTER'S PLEAS THAT CASAL WAS INNOCENT, INTERCEDED ON HER BEHALF AND ORDERED HER RELEASE FROM FPA CUSTODY. CASAL VISITED CARDOZO APARTMENT EARLY EVENING JUNE 17, 1976, TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION TO CARDOZO FAMILY AND REQUESTED PERMISSION TO USE TELEPHONE FOR A PRIVATE CONVERSATION. CARDOZO'S DAUGHTER ALLOWED CASAL ACCESS TO GENERAL CARDOZO'S BEDROOM, AT WHICH TIME PLASTIC EXPLOSIVE CHARGE WAS PLACED. CASAL IS CURRENTLY IN ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CUSTODY AND WILL BE TURNED OVER TO FPA FOR LEGAL PROCESSING.

CHAPLIN



~~SECRET~~

Classification

CONTROL: 4030
21 June '76
1509

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:
ACTION:

GDS
ASEC, PINS, AR
KIDNAPPING BRITISH BUSINESSMAN AND WIFE

SECSTATE WASHDC

AMB
DCM
SY
POL
POL-R
LEGATT
ADMIN
CHRON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES: 4080

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS FURNISHED TO THE RSO BY THE SECURITY OFFICER OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN NATIONALS TO INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY PER REQUEST OF SOURCE.
2. BILL JAMES AND WIFE RUTH WERE ABDUCTED FROM THEIR HOME BY APPROXIMATELY 10 MEN, BETWEEN 0200-0300 HOURS JUNE 12, 1976. JAMES IS THE MANAGER OF THE BRITISH COMPANY YELMO WHICH MANUFACTURES ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES. HE RESIDES AT CATAMARCA 2920 IN THE SUBURB OF OLIVOS ADJACENT TO THE FEDERAL CAPITAL OF BUENOS AIRES. THE JAMES' WERE CARRIED TO AN UNKNOWN LOCATION, WERE HANDCUFFED AND HOODED DURING TRANSPORT. AT ALL TIMES WHILE IN CUSTODY, THEY WERE KEPT HANDCUFFED AND HOODED. THE ROOM IN WHICH THEY WERE DETAINED WAS BARE EXCEPT FOR A BED AND MATTRESS.

DRAFTED BY:
SY:GBeckett:eg

DRAFTING DATE 6-18-76 TEL. EXT. 148

109-103-4413
CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:

ADMIN:CEE
POL:WSmith
POL-R:SMOCK
LEGATT:SCHEERER

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
INDEXED
FILED
JUN 2 1976
LEGAL ATTACHE

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION

AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT, THE ABDUCTORS USING SOME TYPE OF CREDENTIAL IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES AS MEMBERS OF A GOA SECURITY FORCE: EXACT ORGANIZATION UNKNOWN.. THE VICTIMS WERE INFORMED THAT THEY WERE BEING TAKEN TO COORDINATION FEDERAL, WHICH IS AN ELEMENT OF FEDERAL POLICE SECURITY. DURING THE COURSE OF THEIR CAPTIVITY, THEY WERE QUESTIONED CONCERNING THE FACT THAT THEIR NAMES HAD BEEN FOUND AMONG PAPERS OBTAINED DURING THE COURSE OF A RAID ON AN ERP HIDEOUT. MR JAMES WAS ABLE TO CONVINCE THE ABDUCTORS THAT THERE WAS NO CONNECTION AND THAT HE AND HIS WIFE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE ERP OR ITS ACTIVITIES.

WHILE BEING HELD, MRS. JAMES INFORMED INDIVIDUALS AT HER RESIDENCE BY TELEPHONE ON SATURDAY AFTERNOON AND MONDAY AFTERNOON (June 14, 1976) THAT THEY WERE "OK" AND WOULD BE HOME THAT SAME DAY. THE JAMES' WERE RELEASED SEPARATELY BETWEEN 2 AND 4 AM OF THE MORNING OF JUNE 15. MRS. JAMES WAS RELEASED IN PALERMO PARK, WHILE MR. JAMES WAS RELEASED AT AN UNKNOWN LOCATION IN THE CENTER OF BUENOS AIRES. NEITHER OF THE JAMES' WERE ABUSED DURING THE COURSE OF THEIR DETENTION.

3. SOURCE ADVISED THAT BILL JAMES HAD BEEN IN ARGENTINA AS A BUSINESSMAN FOR ABOUT 12 YEARS. THAT MRS. JAMES WAS AN ARGENTINE NATIONAL WHO FREQUENTLY TRAVELED FOR BRITISH BUSINESS FIRMS ACTING AS A SIMULTANEOUS INTERPRETER. INFORMATION CONCERNING THE JAMES' ABDUCTION HAS NOT BEEN REPORTED BY ANY NEWS MEDIA IN ARGENTINA.

CHAPLIN *ML*

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Gonzalez home bombed

THREE powerful bombs yesterday completely destroyed the home where Ana Maria Gonzalez, 20, suspected murderer of police chief General Cesáreo Cardozo, lived until recently.

Miss González, wanted in connection with a bomb which went off under Cardozo's bed as he

slept, disappeared after the murder and is still a fugitive.

Eyewitness reports said the bombs used yesterday had been carefully placed at points where they would do the most damage and had been set off simultaneously for maximum shockwave effect.

All the house's lighter structure was demolished and the

walls and roof may have cracked, reports said.

It was also learned yesterday that over the weekend Miss González' parents, Dr Alberto González and psychologist Ana Maria Cabian, turned themselves in to the police.

They said they had no connection with the murder of General Cardozo and were released after their testimony.

But there was doubt about the whereabouts of Ana Maria's brother, Abel. It was not possible to confirm reports that he had been arrested.

Abel and Mrs González lived in Beccar, in the home which was blown up yesterday. Dr and Mrs González were living apart.

Reports said that Ana Maria's parents both disappeared from their homes after the girl phoned them and told them to keep clear of police. She did not, apparently, tell them what had happened.

Yesterday's explosions occurred at about 2am and shattered windows in houses for some distance around. A few minutes later, a bomb destroyed a car parked nearby, but there did not seem to be any connection between both incidents.

Indicate page, name of
paper, city and state.)

P. 1

BUENOS AIRES
HERALD

6/23/76

Editor:

Title:

Character:

or

Classification:

Submitting Office:

☐ Being Investigated

| | |
|------------------------------|---------|
| SEARCHED | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED | FILED |
| JUN 23 1976 | |
| LEGAL ATTACHE - BUENOS AIRES | |
| Ruz | |

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA ACTING CCI

7/2/76

LEGAT ROBERT W. SCHENKER

THE MONTONEROS

On 7/1/76, JUAN HARRY MARPLES, Vice President, Braniff International Airways, provided the following information:

At approximately 1:00 A.M., 7/1/76, the sister of his son-in-law, accompanied by her boyfriend, were returning to the former's residence located at J. C. Varela 1035, Acassuso, in the boyfriend's Fiat automobile. After turning right off Avenida Libertador on to Varela, the couple were overtaken by another Fiat containing five male individuals in their early 20's. The second Fiat cut off the couple's car and the five male individuals, three of whom carried machine guns, while the other two were armed with .45 caliber automatic pistols, forced the couple out of their car and made them disrobe. During the disrobing process, the five armed individuals identified themselves as Montoneros and told the couple that they were taking their car for use in a Montonero operation, and that the car would be abandoned after the operation had been carried out. Also during the disrobing process, the couple were harangued by the five armed individuals with typical Montonero propaganda and were accused of being oligarchs. Money and jewelry were returned to the couple by the five armed individuals, who took the couple's car and their clothing with them, when they departed the area. The couple obtained clothing from the girl's residence and they immediately went to the Buenos Aires Provincial Police Precinct located on Balcarce in Martinez, in order to make the appropriate denuncia. At the Buenos Aires Provincial Police Precinct the couple was told that their's was the third such incident involving Montoneros that had taken place in the jurisdiction of the precinct during the past week.

- 1 - Addressee
 - 1 - POL/R
 - 1 - DAO
 - 1 - SY
 - 2 - Buenos Aires
 - (1 - 109-103)
 - (1 - 105-767)
- RWS:jn (6)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

39063E104/20100F
5-6-81
Argentina Project

Appeal # 90.0371

107-103-446

7/6/76

~~SECRET~~

TELETYPE

URGENT-PRIORITY

TO: DIRECTOR NR. -06
FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2; 109-103)

~~SECRET~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

IT WAS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT A POWERFUL BOMB DETONATED
IN THE CAFETERIA OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA)
DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY (DFS) (INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)
DURING THE NOON LUNCH HOUR OF JULY 2, 1976, KILLING AND INJURING
A SCORE OF FPA OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES. (S) (U)

ON JULY 4, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS A
RANKING OFFICIAL OF THE FPA DFS, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION: (S) (U)

AS OF JULY 4, 1976, TOTAL DEAD AS A RESULT OF THE JULY
2, 1976 BOMBING AT THE FPA DFS AMOUNTED TO 18 INDIVIDUALS. SIXTY-
EIGHT OTHER FPA OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES WERE INJURED, SOME
CRITICALLY AND ARE NOT EXPECTED TO LIVE. (S) (U)

FPA INVESTIGATION ESTABLISHED THAT THE BOMB WHICH DETONATED (S) (U)

3 - Bue (109-2)
(1 - 109-103)
(1 - 64-2)

RWS:gjk
(3)

5-401
CLASSIFIED BY: 34063 ELW/BCE/OG
REASON: 1.5 (C,d) 1
DECLASSIFY ON: X 1 b

Argentina Project

109-103-447

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

BUE 109-2; 109-103 ~~SECRET~~ PAGE TWO

AT THE FPA FEDERAL SECURITY HEADQUARTERS ON JULY 2, 1976 HAD BEEN PLACED AGAINST A SUPPORTING COLUMN IN THE CAFETERIA LOCATED ON THE FIRST FLOOR. WHEN THE BOMB DETONATED, ~~THE~~ ^{IT} SEVERELY WEAKENED THE SUPPORTING COLUMN CAUSING THE SECOND FLOOR OF THE FPA DFS BUILDING TO COLLAPSE INTO THE CAFETERIA BELOW. EXTENSIVE STRUCTURAL DMAGE RESULTED IN THE FPA DFS BUILDING WHICH INCLUDES CRACKS UP TO SIX ^{INCHES} FT. IN WIDTH AS HIGH AS THE EIGHTH FLOOR OF THE BUILDING. NUMEROUS FILE CABINETS AND OTHER HEAVY EQUIPMENT WERE MOVED CLOSER TO OUTER WALLS AND SUPPORTING COLUMNS TO AVOID THE POSSIBLE COLLAPSE OF OTHER FLOORS IN THE BUILDING. THERE IS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY THAT THE BUILDING WILL HAVE TO BE COMPLETELY ABANDONED DUE TO STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES. (S) (U)

FPA INVESTIGATION ESTABLISHED THAT THE BOMB WAS PROBABLY PLACED BY A RETIRED FPA SERGEANT WHO HAD BEEN RECALLED TO TEMPORARY ACTIVE DUTY. IT IS NOTED THAT THE FPA SGT. IN QUESTION WAS SEEN ENTERING FPA FEDERAL SECURITY HEADQUARTERS APPROXIMATELY ONE HALF OUR BEFORE THE BOMB DETONATED CARRYING A PACKAGE APPROXIMATELY ONE FT. SQUARE, WHICH WAS BELIEVED TO CONTAIN THE BOMB. THE SGT. WAS SUBSEQUENTLY OBSERVED DEPARTING FPA (S) (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

BUE 109-2; 109-103 PAGE THREE ~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL SECURITY HEADQUARTERS WITHOUT THE PACKAGE AND HIS WHEREABOUTS ARE CURRENTLY UNKNOWN. (~~S~~) (U)

AS A RESULT OF THE BOMBING, CONSIDERABLE BAD FEELING IMMEDIATELY DEVELOPED WITHIN THE FPA COMMISSIONED OFFICERS RANKS SINCE THE RECENTLY APPOINTED FPA CHIEF, ARMY BRIGADIER GEN. ARTURO CORBETTA HAD LAID THE LAW DOWN AS IT WERE TO FPA INTELLIGENCE DIVISION OFFICIALS WITH REGARD TO EXTRALEGAL FPA ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE TERRORIST TARGET. GEN. CORBETTA HAD ISSUED STRICT INSTRUCTIONS THAT ALL EXTRALEGAL FPA ACTIVITY WAS TO CEASE IMMEDIATELY AND THAT ONLY LEGAL MEANS WERE TO BE EMPLOYED BY THE FPA DFS IN COMBATING THE WIDESPREAD TERRORISM WHICH EXISTS IN ARGENTINA. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER MANY FPA DFS OFFICIALS ARE CONVINCED THAT LEGAL METHODS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO CRUSH WIDESPREAD TERRORISM IN ARGENTINA AND IN FACT, EXTRALEGAL ACTIVITIES BY ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES, INCLUDING THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES AND THE FPA, ARE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. FEELING AGAINST GEN. CORBETTA DURING THE WEEKEND OF JULY 3-4, 1976 GREW TO THE POINT THAT SEVERAL IMPORTANT FPA DFS OFFICIALS ACCUSED GEN. CORBETTA OF BEING A LEFTIST AND EVEN A MEMBER OF THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION. (~~S~~) ONE SUCH OFFICIAL TO OPENLY VOICE HIS CRITICISM OF GEN. CORBETTA WAS THE DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL SECURITY, A CAREER FPA OFFICER WITH (~~S~~) (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

BUE 109-2; 109-103 ~~SECRET~~ PAGE FOUR

THE RANK OF COMISARIO GENERAL. THE DIRECTOR OF FPA FEDERAL SECURITY WHO VOICED HIS CRITICISM OF GEN. CORBETTA IS A TRUSTED CONFIDANT OF BRIGADIER GEN. ALBANO HARGUINDEGUY, THE INCUMBENT MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR AND FORMER FPA CHIEF. (~~S~~) (U)

ON JULY 5, 1976, A SECOND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS ALSO A RANKING OFFICIAL OF THE FPA DFS PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION. (~~S~~) (U)

NUMEROUS FPA DFS OFFICIALS WHO HAVE CLOSELY WORKED WITH THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES, SPECIFICALLY THE ARGENTINA ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, IN COMBATING GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN ARGENTINA, HAVE CONTACTED THEIR ARGENTINE ARMY COUNTERPARTS TO BITTERLY COMPLAIN ABOUT GEN. CORBETTA'S ORDERS AND HIS GENERAL BEHAVIOUR IN HIS RECENTLY ACQUIRED POSITION AS FPA CHIEF. THROUGH THESE SENIOR ARGENTINE ARMY CONTACTS FPA DFS OFFICIALS WERE ASSURED THAT GEN. CORBETTA WOULD BE REPLACED AS FPA CHIEF. SEVERAL SENIOR FPA DFS OFFICIALS FEARED THAT GEN. CORBETTA, UNLESS HE WAS PROMPTLY RELIEVED FROM HIS POSITION AS FPA CHIEF, WOULD TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION AGAINST THE FPA DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL SECURITY BECAUSE OF HIS OUTSPOKEN CRITICISM OF GEN. CORBETTA. (~~S~~) (U)

ON JULY 6, 1976, GEN. CORBETTA ~~XXXXX~~ ANNOUNCED THAT THE FPA (~~S~~) (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

BUE 109-2; 109-103 PAGE FIVE ~~SECRET~~

DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL SECURITY, AS WELL AS THE FPA DIRECTOR OF METROPOLITAN SECURITY, HAD BEEN FIRED FROM THEIR POSITIONS ~~BECAUSE~~ ~~BEFORE~~ HE HELD THEM PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE IN FAILING TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO PREVENT THE JULY 2, 1976 BOMBING OF THE FPA DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY HEADQUARTERS, AS WELL AS THE BOMBING ON ^{JUNE} ~~JULY~~ 15, 1976 WHICH KILLED THE FORMER FPA CHIEF, BRIGADIER GENERAL CESAREO CARDOSO. GEN. CORBETTA IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENT INDICATED THAT FOLLOWING HIS LINE OF REASONING IN ASSIGNING INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY RESULTING IN THE DISMISSAL OF THE FPA DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL SECURITY AND METROPOLITAN SECURITY, ^{HE} REQUESTED THAT HIS SUPERIOR, THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, ~~WHEXIXEXE~~ CONSIDER ~~ME~~ WHETHER IT BE APPROPRIATE THAT HE CONTINUE AS FPA CHIEF. (S) (U)

ON JULY 6, 1976, A THIRD CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, ADVISED THAT THE MINISTER WAS ANGERED OVER GEN. CORBETTA'S ACCUSATIONS AND STATEMENTS AND HAD INDICATED HE BELIEVED THAT GEN. CORBETTA HAD SERIOUSLY EMBARRASSED THE ARGENTINE ARMY AND WAS RESORTING TO PETTY POLITICS IN THE DISMISSAL OF THE TWO SENIOR FPA COMISARIOS GENERALES. THIS SOURCE ADVISED THAT GEN. CORBETTA WOULD BE REPLACED BY ANOTHER ACTIVE DUTY ARGENTINE ARMY BRIGADIER GENERAL, PROBABLY BEFORE CLOSE OF BUSINESS, JULY 6, 1976. (S) (U)

Handwritten: A. 15

Handwritten: X

Handwritten: (S) (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

BUE 109-2; 109-103 PAGE SIX ~~SECRET~~

THE SOURCE ADVISED THAT HE BELIEVED GEN. OJEDA, THE COMMANDER OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY ARMORED DIVISION IN TANDIL, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE, WOULD BE DESIGNATED THE NEW FPA CHIEF. SOURCE ADVISED THAT THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR HAD COMMENTED THAT FROM ALL INFORMATION REACHING HIM, THE FPA OFFICERS CORPS WAS IN A VIRTUAL STATE OF MUTINY WHICH COULD ONLY BE RESOLVED BY THE SACKING OF GEN. CORBETTA. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 KGBS-Q~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. REMYCABLE, JULY 2, 1976.

FIRST SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR CARLOS VICENTE MARCOTE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FPA. (S) (U)

SECOND SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR VICENTE GALEAZZO, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE, DFS, FPA. (S) (U)

THIRD SOURCE IS COMISARIO GUILLERMO OSCAR ICELY, FPA, DETAILED TO THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR. (S) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END

~~SECRET~~

SP6 ag/CAL
DECLASSIFIED BY 39013ELW/BCE/06
ON 5-4-01

7/6/76

Argentina Project
Appeal # 90-0371

TELETYPE

URGENT-PRIORITY

SECRET

TO: DIRECTOR NR. -06
FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

ON JULY 5, 1976, HERBERT LESHINSKY, MANAGING DIRECTOR,
CHRYSLER FEBRE ARGENTINA, A SUBSIDIARY OF THE CHRYSLER
CORPORATION OF THE UNITED STATES, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION:

DURING THE PAST WEEK, NINE EXECUTIVES OF CHRYSLER
FEBRE ARGENTINA HAVE RECEIVED A FORM LETTER FROM THE MONTONERO
GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION THREATENING RETALIATION SHOULD THE
EXECUTIVES COOPERATE WITH SECURITY FORCES IN IDENTIFYING
CHRYSLER FEBRE ARGENTINA EMPLOYEES AS GUERRILLAS. A POSTSCRIPT
TO THE MONTONERO FORM LETTER INDICATES THAT SIMILAR LETTERS
WERE BEING SIMULTANEOUSLY MAILED TO MORE THAN 2,000 OTHER
EXECUTIVES FROM 200 COMPANIES IN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL OF BUENOS
AIRES AND BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE.

- 4 - Buenos Aires
(1 - 109-2)
(1 - 109-103)
(1 - 105-767 Montoneros)
(1 - 109-38) ERP)

RWS:gjk

(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED BY 39013ELW/BCE/06
REASON: (c)(1)
DECLASSIFY ON: X 1/6
Argentina Project

SECRET

109-103-448

RWS

~~SECRET~~

BUE 109-2; 109-103 PAGE TWO ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ON JUNE 30, 1976, IT WAS NECESSARY TO SPIRIT A CHRYSLER FEBRE ARGENTINA EXECUTIVE OUT OF THE COUNTRY TO SAO PAULO, BRAZIL BECAUSE OF SURVEILLANCE AND SHADOWING ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT AGAINST THE EXECUTIVE, WHO IS THE CHIEF OF ADMINISTRATION AND PERSONNEL FOR CHRYSLER FEBRE ARGENTINA. IN ADDITION TO SHADOWING AND SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES AGAINST THIS EXECUTIVE, THREATENING TELEPHONE CALLS FROM THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION WERE ALSO RECEIVED BY THE EXECUTIVE AT HIS RESIDENCE AND AT THE CHRYSLER FEBRE ARGENTINA PLANT.

ON MAY 29, 1976, THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAIS) ADVISED LESHINSKY THAT MEMBERS OF A CELL OF (S) (u) THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP), ANOTHER ARGENTINE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, HAD BEEN EXTRALEGALLY DETAINED BY THE AAIS AND UNDER INTERROGATION PROVIDED DETAILS OF AN OPERATION IDENTIFIED BY THE CODE NAME "MORON." ACCORDING TO INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE AAIS, "OPERATION MORON" ENTAILED THE ASSASSINATION OF LESHINSKY. THE AAIS ADVISED THAT LESHINSKY HAD BEEN UNDER (S) (u)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

BUE 109-2; 109-103 PAGE THREE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SURVEILLANCE AND THAT HIS COMPANY CAR AND VEHICLES USED TO TRANSPORT HIS BODYGUARDS HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED. THE AAIS ADVISED THAT THE LEADER OF THE ERP CELL, IDENTIFIED AS "CAPTAIN MIGUEL", HAD MANAGED TO ESCAPE; HOWEVER, APPROXIMATELY 60% OF THE ERP CELL ASSIGNED TO "OPERATION MORON" HAD BEEN DETAINED BY THE AAIS. THE ASSASSINATION OF LESHINSKY WAS SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE ON MAY 31, 1976. IT IS NOTED THAT LESHINSKY SPENT THE MONTH OF JUNE, 1976 IN BRAZIL ON CHRYSLER CORPORATION BUSINESS. (X) (u)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931, RGDS-2 AND~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END

~~SECRET~~

7/7/76

SECRET

TELETYPE

URGENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

TO: DIRECTOR

NR.

-07

FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~SECRET~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

ON JULY 6, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS
A RANKING OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA)
DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY (DFS) (INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)
PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: ~~(S)~~ (U)

DURING THE AFTERNOON OF JULY 6, 1976, THE WIFE OF AN FPA
DFS COMMISSIONED OFFICER WAS KIDNAPPED IN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL
BY UNKNOWN SUBJECTS PRESUMED TO BE TERRORISTS. AS OF THE
EVENING OF JULY 6, 1976 NO COMMUNICATION HAD BEEN RECEIVED
FROM THE KIDNAPPERS. ~~(S)~~ (U)

THE DEATH TOLL FROM THE JULY 2, 1976 MONTONERO TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION BOMBING OF DFS HEADQUARTERS ROSE TO 20 ON JULY
6, 1976, WHEN TWO OTHER INDIVIDUALS DIED OF THEIR INJURIES. ~~(S)~~ (U)

3 - Bue (109-2)
(1 - 109-103)
(1 - 80-

RWS:gjk

hws(3)

[Marcotte] ~~(S)~~ (U)

CLASSIFIED BY: 39063 ELW/BCC/DC
REASON: 1.5 (c,d)
DECLASSIFY ON: X1,6
Argentina Project

109-103-449

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
BUE 109-2 109-103 ~~SECRET~~

THE FPA BOMB SQUAD COMPLETED THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE JULY 2, 1976 MONTONERO BOMBING OF DFS HEADQUARTERS AND CONCLUDED THAT THE BOMB WAS COMPOSED OF AT LEAST EIGHT KILOS OF TROTYL, SIMILAR TO PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES, AND HAD BEEN FABRICATED IN THE FORM OF A CLAYMORE-TYPE BOMB UTILIZING BALL BEARINGS TO INSURE HEAVIER PERSONNEL CASUALTIES. A SECOND BOMB WAS DISCOVERED ON JULY 2, 1976 IN A LAVATORY AT DFS HEADQUARTERS BUT HAD BEEN DEFUSED BY FPA EXPLOSIVE EXPERTS. THE FPA BOMB SQUAD CONCLUDED THAT SHOULD THE SECOND BOMB HAVE DETONATED, IT WOULD HAVE VIRTUALLY LEVELED DFS HEADQUARTERS. (S) (U)

AS ANTICIPATED, THE ARGENTINE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR CONFIRMED THE APPOINTMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL EDMUNDO OJEDA AS CHIEF OF THE FPA. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS 2 AND 4.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE. REMYCABLE JULY 6, 1976.

SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR CARLOS VICENTE MARCOTTE, ACTING DIRECTOR OF DFS. (S) (U)

END

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 4417

6 Jul 76

1815

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM
Amembassy BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION
~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

E.O. 11652:

TAGS:

SUBJECT:

N/A

ASCC, PNS, AR

Abduction of Two Mormon Missionaries

ACTION:

SECSTATE WASH DC

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ BUENOS AIRES 4417

DISTRIB.

1. The following information furnished our SO by duty Officer

July 2, 1976: During the evening of July 2, 1976, James E.

Faust, Area Supervisor for the Mormon Church and Assistant

to the Council of the Twelve Apostles, advised in substance

that on Friday, June 25, 1976, two Mormon missionaries, Peter

Allen Shaw and Thayne Larson, were contacted by a young woman

who said she had a friend who wanted to speak with them. They

agreed to meet her the following day and be taken to her

friend. On Saturday, June 26, she introduced them to a man

who took them in his car from their post in Corrientes to

Candelaria. When they arrived in Candelaria, they were taken

to a vacant house. At that point, four men armed with knives

and guns came to the car, took the two missionaries into the

house, tied them up, blindfolded them, and took them to a

canoe or boat. They set across the Parana River, but the boat

sank a short distance from the opposite bank, and they had to

DRAFTED BY:

RSO:GSBeckett"nr

DRAFTING DATE

7-7-76

TEL. EXT.

148

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

ADMIN:CEE:Emmons 104-102-451

CLEARANCES:

LEGATT:Scherrer

POL/R:DSmock

AMB:RCH

A/DCM:WBeal

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED

JUL 7 1976

LEGAL ATTACHE-BUENOS AIRES

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~
CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 103
(Formerly FS-413,
January 1975
Dept. of State)

swim and wade ashore, where they were met by four other men who took them into the Paraguayan jungle to a shack, where they stayed for two days. After this period of time, they were moved to a better house, where there were a woman and a young man (who was possibly her son). This young man said he ~~didn't~~ didn't like what was going on and was going to fetch the police. He did, and the police arrived during the night, broke into the house, and arrested those present. At the time the police raided the house, one of the missionaries reached beneath his bed to get his shoe and was shot in the shoulder by a policeman who apparently thought he was reaching for a weapon. Following the raid, Shaw (the wounded one) and Larson walked about three miles through the jungle to the Paraguayan town of Encarnacion, where Shaw was hospitalized and where the two of them are now awaiting the beginning of legal proceedings, scheduled to start on Monday, July 5. As soon as their role in these legal proceedings is over, they will be returned to their post in Corrientes for out-processing, then flown back to the United States. Shaw's shoulder wound destroyed some muscle, and he will need additional medical care in the United States.

2. On the/^{day}following ~~day~~ their abduction, i.e., on Sunday, June 27, two notes were placed in the back of the

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Classification

automobile of Mr. Gomez, the Church's branch president in Posadas, which demanded a ransom of 1.5 million dollars. The notes were issued by an organization called "Organizacion Politico Militar Paraguayan." The notes said the ransom money would be used to purchase weapons for this group. Nothing more was heard from this organization until July 2, when another note was delivered by mail from it; by this time, of course, the two missionaries had been freed by the police.

3. In addition Faust could furnish no information concerning the number of members of this organization arrested in Paraguay. He did state that the Mormon Church had recently received publicity in connection with alleged bequest from Howard Hughes which was untrue but could have led to the kidnapping. According to Faust, the position of the Mormon Church is that it does not pay ransom for its representatives even though it might result in the loss of a missionary.

~~XXXXXX~~

HILL

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

Classification

7/8/76

TELETYPE

URGENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-4-91 BY 39063ELW/RCE/PG

TO: DIRECTOR

NR.

-08

Argentina Project
UATL Bu. Original

FROM: LEGAT, BRASILIA NR. -08
LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA;

ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

FOR INFORMATION, DURING THE EVENING OF JULY 2, 1976
AN OFFICIAL OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF THE LATTER
DAY SAINTS (MORMON CHURCH), ADVISED THAT ON JUNE 2⁶₇, 1976,
TWO MORMON MISSIONARIES, PETER ALLEN SHAW AND THAYNE
LARSON, WERE ABDUCTED NEAR THEIR MISSION IN CORRIENTES,
ARGENTINA AND WERE TAKEN ACROSS THE ARGENTINA-PARAGUAY
BORDER TO A REMOTE JUNGLE AREA IN PARAGUAY.

THE ^{CHURCH} ~~FIRST~~ OFFICIAL ADVISED THAT ON JUNE 27, 1976, TWO
RANSOM NOTES WERE RECEIVED BY THE CHURCH IN POSADAS,
ARGENTINA DEMANDING A PAYMENT OF 1.5 MILLION DOLLARS FOR
SHAW'S AND LARSON'S RELEASE. THE RANSOM NOTE WAS SIGNED
BY THE ORGANIZACION POLITICA MILITAR PARAGUAYA (PARAGUAYAN
POLITICAL MILITARY ORGANIZATION) (OPMP). THE NOTES INDICATED
THAT RANSOM MONEY WOULD BE UTILIZED TO PURCHASE WEAPONS FOR
THE OPMP.

THE CHURCH REPRESENTATIVE ADVISED THAT ON JUNE 29, 1976

2 - Bue (109-2) (109-103)
RWS:gjk
(2)

109-103-451

BUE 109-2; 109-103 PAGE TWO

ONE OF SHAW'S AND LARSON'S CAPTORS APPARENTLY HAD A CHANGE OF HEART AND NOTIFIED THE POLICE, WHO SUBSEQUENTLY RAIDED THE HOUSE WHERE THE TWO MISSIONARIES WERE BEING HELD IN ORDER TO LIBERATE THEM. A GUN BATTLE ENSUED AND SHAW WAS SLIGHTLY WOUNDED IN THE SHOULDER. AT THE PRESENT TIME, SHAW AND LARSON ARE AWAITING LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN ENCARNACION, PARAGUAY WHICH WERE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN ON JULY 5, 1976.

BUENOS AIRES INDICES CONTAIN NO INFORMATION CONCERNING THE OPMP. IT IS NOTED THAT THE MORMON CHURCH HAS RECENTLY BEEN THE SUBJECT OF CONSIDERABLE PUBLICITY CONCERNING AN ALLEGED BEQUEST FROM HOWARD HUGHES, WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN THE MOTIVATION FOR THE KIDNAPPING.

THE FOREGOING INFORMATION HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY THE U. S. EMBASSY, BUENOS AIRES, TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND IS ONLY FURNISHED FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU.
END

7/8/76

SECRET

TELETYPE

PRIORITY-URGENT

CLASSIFIED BY *548* 39063 ELW/ACC/DG
REASON: 1.5 (S, A)
DECLASSIFY ON: X, 6

TO: DIRECTOR

NR.

-08

Argentina Project
UTL Bu. Original

FROM: LEGAT, BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

~~SECRET~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF JULY 4, 1976, THREE
ROMAN CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND TWO SEMINARIANS WERE BRUTALLY
MURDERED IN THE RECTORY OF ST. PATRICK'S CHURCH IN BELGRANO,
BUENOS AIRES FEDERAL CAPITAL. INITIAL REPORTS INDICATED
THAT A MESSAGE HAD BEEN SCRAWLED ON A DOOR IN CHALK TO
THE EFFECT THAT THE CLERGYMEN HAD BEEN ASSASSINATED IN
RETALIATION FOR THE TERRORIST BOMB ATTACK AGAINST THE
FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA) DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL
SECURITY (DFS) HEADQUARTERS ON JULY 2, 1976, WHICH AS OF
JULY 8, 1976, CLAIMED 21 LIVES. THERE WAS WIDESPREAD
SPECULATION THAT THE AUTHORS OF THE ASSASSINATION OF THE
CLERGYMEN MAY HAVE BEEN MEMBERS OF THE ARGENTINE SECURITY
FORCES CARRYING OUT RETALIATION FOR THE JULY 2, 1976 FPA DFS (3)(4)

3 - Bue (109-2)

(109-103)

(80-217 [Marcote]) (U)

RWS:gjk

(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SECRET

109-103-452

~~SECRET~~

BUE 109-2; 109-103 PAGE TWO ~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS BOMBING OR LEFTIST TERRORISTS WHO ASSASSINATED THE CLERGYMEN IN ORDER TO MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THE ARGENTINE MILITARY GOVERNMENT WAS RESPONSIBLE, THEREBY DISCREDITING THE GOVERNMENT. (S) (U)

ON JULY 7, 1976, INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO THE U. S. EMBASSY, BUENOS AIRES FROM AN EXTREMELY SENSITIVE SOURCE WHICH INDICATED THAT THE FIVE CLERGYMEN HAD BEEN ASSASSINATED BY A UNIT OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAIS) WHO DISCOVERED THAT THE CLERGYMEN HAD BEEN HARBORING MONTONERO GUERRILLA LEADER MARIO EDUARDO FIRMENICH. INFORMATION WAS ALSO PASSED TO THE U. S. EMBASSY BY THIS SAME SOURCE INDICATING THAT THE AAIS HAD ALSO MURDERED THREE ROMAN CATHOLIC NUNS WHO HAD FACILITATED FIRMENICH'S ESCAPE FROM ST. PATRICK'S ON JULY 4, 1976. (S) (U)

ON JULY 7, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS A RANKING OFFICER OF THE FPA DFS, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

AFTER THE JULY 2, 1976 MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION BOMBING OF FPA DFS HEADQUARTERS, NUMEROUS FPA OFFICERS EMBARKED UPON ACTIVITIES TO RETALIATE AGAINST THE TERRORIST (S) (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
BUE 109-2; 109-103 PAGE THREE ~~SECRET~~

TARGET FOR THE JULY 2, 1976 BOMBING WHEREIN MANY OF THEIR FRIENDS WERE KILLED AND MAIMED. A GROUP OF SIX FPA NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS HAD INFORMATION INDICATING THAT TWO SEMINARIANS ATTACHED TO ST. PATRICK'S PARISH IN BELGRANO WERE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES AT THE OFFICE OF THE THIRD WORLD MOVEMENT LOCATED A FEW BLOCKS FROM ST. PATRICK'S CHURCH. ~~(S)~~ (U)

THE THIRD WORLD MOVEMENT IS CONSIDERED BY MANY TO BE MARXIST-ORIENTED.

THESE SIX FPA NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, WITHOUT ANY HIGHER AUTHORITY, DECIDED TO CARRY OUT A RETALIATORY ATTACK AGAINST THE TWO SEMINARIANS, WHICH RESULTED IN THE JULY 4, 1976 MURDER OF THE THREE PRIESTS AND TWO SEMINARIANS. IT WAS EMPHASIZED THAT THE ASSASSINATION OF THE CLERGYMEN WAS CARRIED OUT WITHOUT ANY SANCTION OR AUTHORITY OF FPA SUPERIOR OFFICERS OR ANY ENTITY OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. ~~(S)~~ (U)

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ASSASSINATION OF THREE NUNS PROVIDED TO THE U. S. EMBASSY ON JULY 7, 1976, AS NOTED ABOVE, IS COMPLETELY ERRONEOUS, IT BEING NOTED THAT NO CATHOLIC NUNS WERE ASSASSINATED OR MISSING DURING THE PERTINENT PERIOD. ~~(S)~~ (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

BUE 109-2; 109-103 PAGE FOUR ~~SECRET~~

THE SOURCE OFFERED HIS PERSONAL OPINION THAT INFORMATION PASSED TO THE U. S. EMBASSY ON JULY 7, 1976 WAS PROBABLY A MISGUIDED EFFORT TO MISINFORM U. S. EMBASSY REGARDING THE ALLEGED PRESENCE OF A RANKING TERRORIST LEADER AT ST. PATRICK'S PARISH IN ORDER TO GET SOME JUSTIFICATION TO THE ATROCIOUS MURDER OF THE FIVE CLERGYMEN ON JULY 4, 1976. ~~(S)~~ (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE.. ~~XXXXX~~ THE SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR CARLOS VICENTE MARCOTE, ACTING DIRECTOR, FPA DFS. ~~(S)~~ (U)
COORDINATED LOCALLY.

THE FOREGOING INFORMATION WAS PERSONALLY DISCUSSED WITH THE AMBASSADOR HILL, WHO WAS DEEPLY DISTURBED AT ITS CONTENT. INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE U.S. EMBASSY DURING THE MORNING OF JULY 7, 1976, REFERRED TO ABOVE, WAS ALLEGEDLY MADE AVAILABLE TO THE EMBASSY'S SECURITY OFFICER BY A MEMBER OF PRESIDENT VIDELA'S PRESS OFFICE. DURING THE MORNING OF JULY 8, 1976, THE AMBASSADOR ADVISED ME THAT HE WAS VISITED BY THE PAPAL NUNCIO, WHO CONFIRMED THAT THE STORY CONCERNING THE THREE NUNS HAVING BEEN ASSASSINATED IS COMPLETELY WITHOUT ~~(S)~~ (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

BUE 109-2; 109-103 PAGE FIVE ~~SECRET~~

FOUNDATION, AS WELL AS THE ALLEGATION THAT MARIO FIRMEINICH WAS BEING HARBORED AT ST. PATRICK'S PARISH. THE PAPAL NUNCIO TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT ONE OF THE TWO ASSASSINATED SEMINARIANS DEFINITELY HAD QUESTIONABLE CONNECTIONS AND THAT THE ROMAN CATHOLIC HIERARCHY IN ARGENTINA, INCLUDING CARDINAL ARAMBURU, WERE CONVINCED THAT THE MOTIVATION FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF THE FIVE CLERGYMEN ON JULY 4, 1976 WAS POLICE RETALIATION FOR THE JULY 2, 1976 FPA DFS BOMBING. (S) (U)

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ALLEGED HARBORING OF MARIO FIRMEINICH BY THE ASSASSINATED CLERGYMEN AT ST. PATRICK'S PARISH AND ERRONEOUS INFORMATION CONCERNING THE MURDER OF THREE CATHOLIC NUNS WAS REPORTED BY THE U. S. EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES IN A U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM ON JULY 7, 1976. THIS U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM WAS HIGHLY CLASSIFIED AND WAS RESTRICTED FROM NORMAL DISTRIBUTION AND DISSEMINATION. (S) (U)

END

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4487
08 JUL 76
1812

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM

AmEmbassy BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

E.O. 11652:

XGDS-2

TAGS:

ASEC, PINT, PINS, AR

SUBJECT:

Further on Murder of Catholic Priests

ACTION:

SecState WASHDC PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 4487

Ref:

Buenos Aires 4443

AMB
POL-3
POL/R
USDAO
LEGAT
SY
RF
CHRON

1. Embassy has received information subsequent to reftel which confirms that priests were murdered by government security forces. However, it is now clear they were killed by members of Federal Police, not by Army. Police believed the two seminarians were involved with "Third World" movement of priests, which has headquarters not far from the Church; hence, they were considered fair game in wave of vigilante-type executions police have carried out in retaliation for bombing of police office on July 2 (see septel). According to Legatt sources, police never at any time believed Montonero leader Firmenich had been sheltered by priests. That is simply a fabricated story they are putting out in attempt to

DRAFTED BY:

FOL: WSSmith:mg

DRAFTING DATE

7/8/76

SEARCHED

SERIALIZED

INDEXED

FILED

CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

AMBASSADOR ROBERT C. HILL

CLEARANCES:

FOL/R: DLSmock (in draft)

LEGATT: RWScherrer (in draft)

SY: GSBeckett (in draft)

DAO: COLTACUGHAN (in draft)

JUL 9 - 1976

LOCAL ATTACHE

DCM: COHuey

justify a murder which even by Argentine standards was exceedingly brutal and mindless. Police sources have emphasized that murders were committed by non-commissioned officers without any higher authorization.

and RSO July 8.
2. Ambassador Hill/saw Papal Nuncio/~~last night~~ ~~(July 7)~~

Latter says allegation that priests had sheltered Firmenich is an out-and-out lie. He also said report that nuns had been killed was "someone's imagination." Nuncio indicated Church had been concerned that one of the seminarians might have some "Third World" connections. Nuncio emphasized, however, that even if such were the case, that hardly justified murder of seminarians, let alone of priests who were in no way involved.

3. Nuncio indicated Cardinal Aramburu had stated flatly to Minister of Interior that Church knew GOA security forces beyond any doubt that it was ~~the paramilitary forces~~ who had murdered the priests. Aramburu said further to have told Minister that it would be better that latter make no comment since a denial would simply be a lie. Minister obliged and remained silent.

4. Nuncio informed Ambassador Hill that he had been told by one ranking official of GOA that govt intended to "clean up the Catholic Church." Nuncio claimed "some generals" ~~and~~ wanted a Catholic hierarchy "such as we ~~used to have~~ had in

Argentina two hundred years ago." Nuncio speculated that murder of the priests might be first step in "cleaning up" the Church.

5. Comment. Nuncio said he feared murder of priests may presage a wave of right-wing terror worse than anything we have seen before. Given Corbetta's failure to bring police terror under control and Interior Minister's remarks last night lauding police and suggesting they will take any measure they deem necessary in combatting subversion, Embassy is inclined to agree.

~~HILL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA ACTING DCM

7/12/76

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
DIRECTED AGAINST THE CHRYSLER CORPORATION

Reference my memo of 7/2/76 captioned "Montoneros."

As indicated in referenced memo arrangements were made to personally contact HERB LESHINSKY, Chrysler Managing Director, after the July 5th Reception at the Embassy Residence. I contacted LESHINSKY on 7/5/76 and he provided the following information:

During the week of June 28-July 2, 1976, the following Chrysler executives received a mimeographed form message from the Montonero guerrilla organization:

O. L. VIGIL
Personnel Director

F. MUNOZ
Director of Tax and Insurance

N. JARVIS
Sales Manager

A. STRADA
Director of Legal Affairs and Government Relations

A. GALLI
Industrial Engineer

J. TORRES
Export Director

H. LESHINSKY
Managing Director

DECLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/PCE/DC
ON 3-2-01
Argentina Project

- 1 - Addressee
- 1 - POL/R
- 1 - ECON COUNSELOR
- 1 - SY (Encs. 9)
- 3 - Buenos Aires
 - (1 - 105-767)
 - (1 - 109-33)
 - (1 - 109-103)

RWS:jn
(7)

~~SECRET~~
Classified by 5331
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)(4)
Automatically declassified on Indefinite

109-103-455

**Argentine Terrorist Activities
directed against the Chrysler Corporation**

A. CATTANEO
Plant Security Chief

L. J. FEVRE
President

The above described mimeographed form message from the Montoneros was undated and contains a warning for recipients not to collaborate with Argentine security forces in any manner. A postscript to the above described message indicates that copies were being simultaneously mailed to 2,000 executives employed by some 200 businesses in the Federal Capital and Buenos Aires Province. It is interesting to note that in the mimeographed form message, the Montoneros claim credit for the assassination of Chrysler Executive JORGE KENNY, who had been recently assassinated at his residence in Buenos Aires Province.

The transmittal envelopes for the Montonero mimeographed form message were all typewritten with some containing misspelling and typing errors. All were directed to the above-listed executives at the Chrysler Plant in San Justo, Buenos Aires Province. Seven of the letters were directed by certified mail with postage stamps affixed. Two of the letters were sent in the regular mail without being certified with machine stamps imprinted.

Copies of the mimeographed Montonero form letters are attached for the Security Officer.

LESHINSKY stated that on June 30, 1976, OSCAR LUIS VIGIL, the Chrysler Director of Administration and Personnel was posted out of Argentina to Sao Paulo Brazil, because it was believed that he had been targeted by terrorists for some hostile action. LESHINSKY noted that on April 28, 1976, a telephone call was received at the Chrysler San Justo Plant allegedly from the Montoneros warning that VIGIL should not take any action against Chrysler personnel, such as dismissals and that salary increases should immediately be granted, otherwise the Montoneros would begin to "eliminate executives."

LESHINSKY advised on April 29, 1976, another telephone message was received at the Chrysler San Justo Plant from the Montoneros during which VIGIL was warned that he should pay attention to the needs of the workers and not take reprisals against them.

LESHINSKY advised that during the latter part of May, 1976, a personal friend of VIGIL accidentally heard a telephone conversation between two men during which VIGIL's name was mentioned.

**Argentine Terrorist Activities
directed against the Chrysler Corporation**

In addition, VIGIL's friend reported that the streets Almaguero and Irigoyen were mentioned, together with the hour 7:00 P.M. LESHINSKY noted that VIGIL's residence is about 150 meters from the intersection of Almaguero and Irigoyen. Additionally, LESHINSKY noted that VIGIL had the custom of departing from the Chrysler Plant in San Justo for his residence at 7:00 P.M. each day.

LESHINSKY said that VIGIL's friend also overheard a statement to the effect that the date of the operation would be communicated at a later date. LESHINSKY stated that the evaluation of the above overheard telephone conversation led Chrysler security personnel to believe that VIGIL had been targeted for some type of hostile action. Accordingly, VIGIL changed his residence on June 5, 1976, and returned on June 19, 1976.

LESHINSKY advised that on June 28, 1976, a friend of the VIGILS visited him at his residence, in order to relate an incident which took place during the week of June 21, 1976, at the Club Raiz de Veiga in Buenos Aires Province where VIGIL and his friend are members. VIGIL's friend related to him that individuals were asking questions at the Club concerning VIGIL's presence on weekends, etc. According to information provided by VIGIL's friend, the individuals conducting these inquiries arrived in a Rambler Cross-Country Station Wagon and a medium-sized Fiat, and did not give the impression of being connected with Argentine security forces.

LESHINSKY advised that Chrysler Security officials interpreted the inquiries at the Club Raiz de Veiga to be part of a surveillance on VIGIL, in order to set him up for hostile action, possibly kidnapping or assassination.

LESHINSKY advised that another incident took place at the Club Raiz de Veiga during January or February, 1976, when CARLOS SUAREZ, an employee of the Chrysler Transmission Factory was detected on the grounds of the Club. LESHINSKY noted that the Club Raiz de Veiga is a private club, which was founded by Spanish immigrants, and is located in San Justo near the Chrysler Factory in Buenos Aires Province. LESHINSKY noted that CARLOS SUAREZ has been identified as a follower of ROLANDO HECTOR JESUS ASTARITA, a Marxist union official. LESHINSKY stated that when interviewed during January or February, 1976, with regard to his unauthorized presence on the grounds of the Club Raiz de Veiga, SUAREZ stated that he had been invited by other associates of the Club. According to LESHINSKY, SUAREZ's claim of being invited could not be verified.

LESHINSKY indicated that Chrysler Security officials inter-

Argentine Terrorist Activities
directed against the Chrysler Corporation

puted SUAREZ's presence at the Club Raiz de Veiga as an attempted surveillance to gather information for future use against VIGIL.

LESHINSKY stated that for the above described reasons, VIGIL was evacuated from Argentina on June 30, 1976, as previously mentioned.

LESHINSKY advised that on May 23, 1976, the Argentine Army Intelligence Service (SIE) contacted Leshinsky to advise him that certain members of an ERP cell had been extra-legally detained by SIE and under interrogation provided details of a projected ERP activity known by the code name "Operacion Marron." According to information provided by SIE to LESHINSKY, "Operacion Marron" involved the assassination of LESHINSKY, which was to take place on May 31, 1976. SIE advised LESHINSKY that a major portion of the ERP cell had been detained; however, an individual identified as "Captain MIGUEL" managed to escape. SIE told LESHINSKY that Captain MIGUEL knew of the details of "Operacion Marron" involving LESHINSKY's assassination. SIE told LESHINSKY that he had been under surveillance by the ERP cell and that his company car and security vehicles had been identified. LESHINSKY departed Argentina for Brazil on business on June 1, 1976, and subsequent to his departure SIE informed Chrysler that other members of the ERP cell responsible for carrying out LESHINSKY's assassination had been killed off. SIE informed Chrysler that it was believed that "Operacion Marron" had been aborted because of the elimination of most of the ERP cell members, who were to participate in its execution.

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Fue asesinado, tras largo cautiverio, un vicecomodoro



Vicecomodoro Roberto Moisés Echegoyen

Durante un procedimiento antisubversivo realizado en San Andrés por efectivos de seguridad fue hallado en una finca, ultimado a balazos, el vicecomodoro Roberto Moisés Echegoyen, quien se encontraba cautivo de una organización sediciosa desde tiempo atrás. Durante el operativo fue abatido un sedicioso y otro detenido. En un comunicado de la Fuerza Aérea se señala que el oficial "fue asesinado por elementos subversivos".

◆ Comunicado

Por su parte el comando de la zona 1 del Ejército, al dar cuenta del hecho, puntualizó que "el 10 de julio, siendo las 6.30, fuerzas conjuntas mantuvieron un enfrentamiento con elementos subversivos que se encontraban en la finca ubicada en Ecuador 160 de la localidad de San Andrés, provincia de Buenos Aires. Cuando las fuerzas del orden penetraron en la casa encontraron a un subversivo muerto y tomaron a otro detenido".

"En una revisión posterior —agrega

el parte— se encontró el cadáver encadenado y recientemente ultimado del señor vicecomodoro Roberto Moisés Echegoyen que fuera secuestrado tiempo atrás".

◆ La víctima

El vicecomodoro Echegoyen había nacido en Córdoba el 16 de diciembre de 1918. Ingresó a la Escuela de Aviación Militar en 1948. Egresó en diciembre de 1951 con el grado de alférez.

Su primer destino lo cumplió en la II Brigada Aérea con asiento en Paraná, donde se desempeñó como oficial de escuadrón. Ascendió a teniente en 1953, se desempeñó en la Escuela de Aviación Militar y en 1959 ascendió a capitán. Con este grado continuó en la Escuela hasta marzo de 1964, fecha en que pasa a revisar en la Escuela de Comando y Estado Mayor.

Sus restos son velados en el edificio "Cónido" —sede del comando del arma— y el sepelio se llevará a cabo hoy a las 10.30 en el cementerio de Chacarita.

P. 7

CLARIN

BUENOS AIRES

7/11/76

Date:
Edition:
Author:
Editor:
Title:

Character:

or

Classification:

Submitting Office:

☐ Being Investigated

| | |
|---------------|---------|
| SEARCHED | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED | FILED |
| JUL 11 - 1976 | |
| LEGAL ATTACHE | |
| SEARCHED | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED | FILED |

5-201
CLASSIFIED BY 39013ELW/BCE/OL
REASON: 1.5 (C, d)
DECLASSIFY ON: X1, 6

7/12/76

~~SECRET~~

CODE

CABLE
Argentinian Project
UTL Bu Original

URGENT (PRIORITY)

~~SECRET~~

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-201) NR. 1 -12

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON JULY 11, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN
OFFICIAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, PROVIDED
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

ACTION ON INFORMATION SECURED FROM CAPTURED MEMBERS OF THE
PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP), AN ARGENTINE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION,
COMBINED BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE AND AAIS UNITS RAIDED A
RESIDENCE IN SAN ANDRES, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE, WHICH HAD BEEN
IDENTIFIED AS AN ERP SAFE HOUSE. THE RAID TOOK PLACE DURING
THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF JULY 10, 1976, AND A VIOLENT SHOOTOUT TOOK
PLACE BETWEEN THE ERP MEMBERS AT THE RESIDENCE AND SECURITY FORCES.
AFTER SECURITY FORCES GAINED ENTRANCE TO THE RESIDENCE THEY
DISCOVERED THE BODY OF ARGENTINE AIR FORCE LIEUTENANT COLONEL
ROBERTO ECHEGOYEN, WHO HAD BEEN KIDNAPPED OVER A MONTH AGO BY
THE ERP. LIEUTENANT COLONEL ECHEGOYEN WAS FOUND CHAINED IN ONE
OF THE ROOMS IN THE RESIDENCE AND HE HAD BEEN EXECUTED APPARENTLY
WHEN SECURITY FORCES APPROACHED THE RESIDENCE. (S) (U)

1 - 109-38 (ERP)
1 - SO[Valin] (S) (U)
RWS:jn (4)

Hand
~~SECRET~~
456A

PAGE TWO ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUE 109-2 109-103

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - RE MY CABLE MAY 4, 1976, WHICH REPORTED

[LIEUTENANT COLONEL ECHEGOYEN'S KIDNAPPING.] (~~S~~) (U)

[SOURCE IS ALBERTO VALIN, DIRECTOR, AAIS.] (~~S~~) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

LEGATT

TO : Ambassador Hill

DATE: July 12, 1976

FROM : RSO

SUBJECT: Incident Report

On Friday, July 9, 1976, Julio Cesar PUENTE, son of retired FSLE, Antonio PUENTE, returned to his father's house at 0130 hours. He had dinner and went to his apartment which has a separate outside entrance.

At approximately 0400 hours, eight persons came to the house next door, looking for Julio PUENTE. The families at this address were still awake, playing cards. They were kept inside by the young men dressed in civilian clothes whom they assumed were "police".

Antonio PUENTE, at 0900 hours, was asked by his neighbors what happened the night before. Mr. PUENTE discovered that his son was missing and that the books from his library had been taken. Mr. PUENTE called the police and then contacted two nephews of his - one an Air Force Vice-Commodore, the other a Navy Captain. The nephews made inquiries at Coordinacion Federal into the disappearance with negative results.

On Sunday morning, July 11, 1976, at 0400 hours, Mr. PUENTE received a call from the 38th Precinct. The police stated that a body fitting the description of his son was at the City Morgue with no ID papers. Mr. PUENTE went and identified the body which had been found by police at 0600 hours Friday. Indications of torture - cigarette burns on the forearm and facial bruises - were found on the body, although the police said he died of lung failure. At the morgue, the police told Mr. PUENTE they had 25 bodies under the age of 30 with no papers that they were trying to identify.


Julio PUENTE has been described as a very quiet young man with no political affiliations. He was to graduate in two months with a degree in architecture. The body was released Sunday afternoon at 1400 hours. The funeral is today at 1500 hours.

CC: POL/R
LEGATT

RSO:DLTanner:eg

Addendum

Young PUENTE had attended La Plata University, a known hotbed for subversive activities. PUENTE, Sr. said some body had been pinned to jacket front saying "I was a guerrilla" or "I was a subversive."



5010-110

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

RWS

109-103-458

| | |
|------------|---------|
| SEARCHED | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED | FILED |

JUL 13 1976

LEGAL ATTACHE

hax

7071
CONTROL: 4591
14 JUL 76 1235

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM

Amembassy, BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

E.O. 11652:

GDS

TAGS:

ASCC, PINS, AR

SUBJECT:

Repeated Threats to Chrysler Corp. Personnel

ACTION:

SECSTATE WASHDC

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 4591

REF: Buenos Aires 4420

AMB
DCM
SY
CHRON
ADMIN
POL
POL/R
LEGATT
CONS
DAO
MILGP
DEA

1. LEGATT contacted Herb Leshinsky, Chrysler Managing Director, on July 5, 1976. Leshinsky added the following to that which was reported in reftel: Five other Chrysler executives received the same mimeographed message, also claiming credit for the recent assassination of Chrysler executive, ^{Jorge} ~~Kenny~~ Kenny.

2. Leshinsky related that Oscar Luis Vigil, Chrysler Director of Administration and Personnel, was posted to Brazil because of numerous indications that he had been targeted by terrorists (para 3, reftel): (1) two threatening phone calls were directed against Vigil, (2) a friend of Vigil's overheard a phone call that appeared to be the planning of a kidnapping or assassination of Vigil, (3) unnamed individuals were making inquiries at Vigil's club concerning his activities, and (4) the unauthorized presence was noticed at Vigil's club of a Chrysler employee

DRAFTED BY:

SY:RSO:DLTanner:mek

DRAFTING DATE

7-13-76

TEL. EXT.

1487175

109-103-460
CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

EX A/DCM:WBeal

CLEARANCES:

LEGATT:RScherrer
ADMIN:CEEMmons

AMB:RCHill
JUL 1 1976

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

who is a known follower of a Marxist union official.

3. Leshinsky reported that his source of information in para 2 of reftel was the Argentine Army Intelligence Service (SIE). A "Captain Miguel" who had detailed knowledge of the assassination plan had escaped SIE's capture.

4. RSO COMMENT: "La Prensa" newspaper reported today (July 13) the death of four ERP members July 8 in Bancalari, a northern Buenos Aires suburb. One of the dead was listed as an Abigali Attademus, AKA "Captain Miguel."

5. Although Embassy officers, including RSOs, have ~~xxxxxx~~ briefed business community members on numerous occasions concerning good security practices, it still seems that these recommendations are not being observed by them. In the overheard phone call concerning Vigil, a street corner near his house was mentioned together with the time of 7 p.m. Leshinsky says Vigil customarily departed the plant at this time each day.

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HILL

7/15/76

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.~~

CODE

CABLE

URGENT (PRIORITY)

TO: DIRECTOR (109-12-2 a)

FROM: LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)

~~SECRET~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; EPM - ARGENTINA.

ON JULY 14, 1976, AN OFFICIAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAIS) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S)

DURING THE PERIOD JULY 11-12, 1976, AAIS UNITS IN JOINT
OPERATIONS WITH THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE AND THE
CORDOBA PROVINCIAL POLICE, DISCOVERED TWO PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY
ARMY (ERP), AN ARGENTINE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, PRINTING
FACILITIES IN BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE AND CORDOBA PROVINCE. (S) (U)

THE AAIS BELIEVES THAT THE ERP HAS BEEN SO BADLY MAULED
BY ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES THAT THE ORGANIZATION WILL
PROBABLY TURN TO THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION FOR
SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE. (S) (U)

AS AN INDICATION OF SECURITY FORCES' SUCCESS OVER THE
ERP, THE STATE SECRETARIAT FOR INFORMATION (SIDE), RECENTLY
DETAINED TWO OF MARIO ROBERTO SANTUCHO'S BROTHERS, AND
CAME VERY CLOSE TO PICKING UP SANTUCHO, HIMSELF. IT IS (S) (U)

1 - 105-767 (Montoneros) 1 - 109-38 (ERP)
1 - 80-VALIN] RWS:jn (5)

(S) (U)

105-767-461

CLASSIFIED BY 770-96 page 1, 2 only
DATE 7-10-96
SP6 AG / CAL / VK 10-4-96

PAGE TWO ~~SECRET~~ BUE 109-2 109-103

NOTED THAT ROBERTO MARIO SANTUCHO IS THE LEGENDARY LEADER OF
THE ERP. ~~(S)~~ (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE [SOURCE IS COLONEL ALBERTO VALIN, CHIEF,
AAIS.] ~~(S)~~ (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

END.

RSO GEORGE BECKETT

7/26/76

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
DIRECTED AGAINST THE CHRYSLER CORPORATION

Remymemo 7/12/76 captioned as above.

Attached is a copy of a report prepared by the Chrysler Fevre Argentina Security Office regarding presumed terrorist targeting against Chrysler executive OSCAR LUIS VIGIL. The attachment was provided by HERB LESHINSKY, Chrysler Fevre Argentina Managing Director.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-7-01 BY 3906 JELW/BCE/PL
Argentina Project

1 - Addressee (Attachment 1)

1 - Buenos Aires (109-103)

RWS:jn

(2)

FOR OFFICIAL USE

109 103-467

CHRYSLER PEVRE ARGENTINA S.A.I.C.

REFERENCIAS:

OSCAR LUIS VIGIL, Gerente de Administración del Personal.-

Constancia de las presiones ejercidas sobre OSCAR LUIS VIGIL en modo indirecto, por integrante de un grupo aparentemente integrado por elementos autodenominados Montoneros:

Fecha de recepción: 28 de Abril de 1976

Hora 17.15

Orden secuencial: 1°

Lugar: Sección Almacenes de Planta San Justo

Medio: Teléfono; línea 651-0088

Receptor: ALFREDO IGNACIO CORES, empleado, LP 505

Producida la llamada que atiende CORES se registra lo siguiente:

"Hablo con CHRYSLER?".-

La respuesta es afirmativa.-

"Tengo un mensaje para el Gerente o Jefe de Personal" "Avísale que"
"hablaron del pelotón ZANADREA del grupo Montonero; que a partir de"
"la fecha no tomen represalias con el personal ni despidan gente; que"
"los den los aumentos que solicitan, caso contrario comenzaremos a e"
"liminar ejecutivos".-

El empleado CORES atina a preguntar "Algo mas?".-

Contesta "Nada mas" -- Corta la comunicación.-

DETALLES: Según el empleado CORES, su interlocutor ocasional tratase de persona que se conduce con tranquilidad y aplomo notables.-

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Fecha de recepción: 29 de Abril de 1976

Horas: 09.20

Orden secuencial: 2°

Lugar: Conmutador telefónico de Planta San Justo

Medio: Telefónico

Receptor: Empleado MARIA DEL CARMEN LOPEZ de CHILE
CCHIO.- L.P.n° 417.-

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DATE 5-9-81 BY 902 JEL/DE/PL

Argentinah Project

Atendida que es la llamada puede repetir que su recurrente dijo:

///

"Escuche bien este mensaje; le hablan los Montoneros; Avise al Jefe de Personal y transmítale lo siguiente: Que atienda a las necesidades de los operarios y no tomen represalias. Los Montoneros cumplen." Se produce el corte de comunicación.-

DETALLES: Según la empleada receptora la ocasional llamada la produjo una mujer, dando la sensación de que se trataba de un mensaje leído o posiblemente grabado, ya que no atendió a pedido de repetición de lo antes mencionado.

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Fecha de recepción: Ultimos días del mes de Mayo de 1976
Lugar: domicilio particular
Medio: Teléfono
Receptor: Persona de amistad del Sr. O.L.VIGIL
Orden secuencial: 3°

Debido a causas fortuitas, presumiblemente al común "ligado" de comunicaciones, esta persona escucha al atender el aparato, una conversación sostenida entre dos personas del sexo masculino, en la que aparece nombrado el señor "VIGIL". Se menciona asimismo la intersección de las calles ALM. FUENTE e IRIGOYEN, distante 150 metros del domicilio del nombrado y las horas 19.00, común esta a la salida de VIGIL del Establecimiento CHRYSLER en forma diaria. Puede escuchar asimismo como uno pregunta al otro "...sobre la fecha en que se va a llevar a cabo la cosa..." siendo respondido "Ya avisaremos", cortándose la comunicación en ese momento.

Evaluada los detalles precedentes, los mismos confirmaron en principio la tentativa de atentar en contra del señor O.L.VIGIL, por lo que se opta aconsejar al mismo para que se ausente por período estimado como "adecuado", cosa que se lleva a cabo en fecha 5 de Junio, regresando el 19 del mismo mes a su domicilio y el 21 se reintegra a sus tareas habituales.

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Semana del 21 al 27 de Junio, transcurre sin novedades no registrándose llamadas o recepción de escritos del mismo tenor.

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Fecha de recepción: 28 de Junio de 1976
Horas: Primeras de la mañana
Lugar: Domicilio del Señor O.L.VIGIL
Medio: Personalmente

PAULINO NOVOA, empleado de la Empresa de Autotransportes "Ideal San Justo", Línea n° 96, con sede en Provincias Unidas n° 4814 de esta localidad de La Matanza, y domicilio particular en Lartigan 2536 de la misma, amigo personal de OSCAR LUIS VIGIL lo visita en su domicilio a efectos de ponerlo en antecedentes de detalles de hechos acaecidos hacia ya unos ocho días atrás, aparentemente en la semana del día 21 de Junio, en dependencias del Club RAIZ de VEIGA, sito en Médanos n° 801 de la localidad de Paso del Rey, entidad donde VIGIL y NOVOA ocupan cargos dentro del elenco directivo. Es así que NOVOA refiere:

"Que habiendo concurrido el día domingo 27 al citado club le fué impuesto por la casera del mismo, - señora de DAVIS - persona esta que reside en el lugar junto con su esposo y otro matrimonio sobre la visita que hacía unos ocho días habían efectuado unas diez personas, todas del sexo masculino, las que se desplazaban en una "rural" "Cross Country marca RAMBLER, y un FIAT de tamaño mediano. Que las mismas preguntaron directamente por el "Señor VIGIL"; "Si la quinta - por el Club - era de él; Si concurría habitualmente, a todo lo cual la DAVIS contestó negativamente, ya que por el tenor de las preguntas, estas la hicieron sospechar de algo anormal".- Siguieron los visitantes con otras preguntas, tales como si un DODGE - Coronado - era de VIGIL, a lo que la DAVIS contestó negativamente, explicando se trataba de propiedad de su esposo, siguiendo otras preguntas tales como si el coche "dormía" en el lugar, recordando que a sirilar relacionada con el Señor VIGIL pudo responder "que en todo el invierno no lo había visto". Tras lo apuntado los visitantes se retiraron del lugar, indicando previamente a la DAVIS "tratará de averiguar bien todo..., que la volverían a visitar, pero no en ese lugar..., posiblemente cuando efectuara las compras, si precisar donde o cuando".-

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Los descripto precedentemente, cuando a lo apuntado con anterioridad, y evaluadas que fueran las circunstancias en cada caso, determinó de tomara la decisión de que el Señor OSCAR LUIS VIGIL y sus familiares inmediatos (Esposa e hijos) fueron trasladados a lugar seguro fuera de su domicilio particular en primer lugar, para culminar tales medidas con la salida del país de los nombrados en fecha 30 de Junio horas 10.00.-

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DETALLES:

OSCAR LUIS VIGIL, como se dijo, es miembro del elenco directivo del Club RAIZ de VEIGA, entidad primitivamente fundada por españoles y actualmente controlada por residentes de la localidad de San Justo - Partido de La Matanza - preferentemente, entre los que se cuentan mencionado NOVOA; ANTONIO SÁENZ, y DIAMANTINO RAMOS, ambos operarios d

la Empresa CHRYSLER FEVER ARGENTINA S.A.I.C.- Ambos mencionados componen la Comisión Directiva, encontrándose enterados de lo acontecido en el Club sin cuando en memoria de detalles de los transcritos y por razones obvias ignoran los demás antecedentes.

Como detalles ilustrativos puede mencionarse que, en ocasión de llevarse a cabo un festival, en los meses de Enero o Febrero, advirtió la presencia en las instalaciones del Club RIZ de VEIGA, del llamado CARLOS SUAREZ, operario de CHRYSLER FEVER ARGENTINA, Planta de Tracción, quien al ser adecuadamente "entrevistado" dice en su momento haber sido invitado por socios de la entidad, calificándose a sí mismo de socio la misma. Practicadas diligencias, no se establece la identidad del o los socios que le invitaran, y por otra parte, cotejado el archivo del Club, consta en el mismo que SUAREZ sea socio del mismo.

Dentro del campo político gremial se lo conoce a SUAREZ como seguidor de ROLANDO HECTOR JESUS ASTARITA, activista de inclinación izquierdista profundamente marcada; responsable de la organización de la resistencia y ollas populares en el Establecimiento "INSUD", actividad culminara con el secuestro de uno de sus directivos de apellido MENDELSON y que indudablemente ligara a ASTARITA con las fracciones ilegales.

SUAREZ, que es de nombre CARLOS, es de nacionalidad argentina, nacido el 14 de Octubre de 1942, hijo de PERSILIANO y de ISABEL HIREZ, vive en Pueyrredón 2940 de la localidad de Lomas del Mirador, de Partido de La Matanza, habiéndolo hecho anteriormente en Liniers nº 253 la misma localidad. Posee Cédula de identidad nº 5516388 y Libreta de Matriculación nº 7729535. Posee seis (6) hermanos de nombre ILSIA DIALIDA; MARIA OFELIA; PEDRO MARTIN; PERSILIANO; FLORENCIA GLADYS y ROBERTO DAVID.

Su estado civil aparece como soltero, pero se sabe que convive con ANGELA MARTALIO, naciendo de dicha unión el 23 de Diciembre 1974 su hija VANINA ANABELLA, la que reconoce como legítima.

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Buenos Aires, 30 de Junio de 1976.-

*Furnished by
J. Benton,
"U.S. News & World
Report", Bureau Chief*

109-103-473

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Bob
FYI + MANY THANKS

Worldgram

INTERNATIONAL WEEK ®



FROM THE CAPITALS OF THE WORLD

BUENOS AIRES • KINGSTON • LONDON • PARIS • TOKYO

As terrorism flares and flickers in the months ahead . . .

Keep in mind the difference between the dramatic hijackings of planeloads of hostages and the steady killings of internal terrorist warfare.

Terrorist spectacles like the seizure of a planeload of civilians in Athens and the subsequent Israeli rescue raid into Uganda hit the world's headlines because they could touch off wider conflicts.

Terrorist wars get less world attention. Yet, the political violence tearing Argentina apart, the sectarian killings in Northern Ireland, the bombings and slayings by minority groups in many countries--these cause many more deaths, bring down governments, raise wider problems.

You get our reports on the Athens hijacking, the Uganda rescue and the consequences of both on page 30. For all its drama, the Israeli raid is not likely to end Palestinian terrorism, though it may speed world co-operation against plane hijackers everywhere.

As for the terrorist warfare flaring up elsewhere in the world . . .

In Argentina, terrorism is a part of daily life. Gun squads of left and right kill each other, the police and many others in increasing numbers.

"When the armed forces deposed President Isabel Perón last March without firing a shot," cabled our Buenos Aires bureau, "it was said that the bang would come later. The bang is now here.

"The remains of more than 500 victims of political violence have been found since that March 24 coup. For each body found, it's said on good authority, seven or eight other persons just disappear. That's at least 4,000 dead. All in addition to the hundreds slain in three years of Peronist rule.

"The dead and missing include corporate executives and union leaders, military men and civilians, clergymen and politicians, men and women.

Terrorists seem to be everywhere. They killed three commanders of the national police, one by a bomb placed under his bed. Another bomb killed 20, injured scores in a dining room at police headquarters. Victims are gunned down or blown to bits in homes, autos, offices, city streets--even in a church rectory."

"For Argentina, the end is not in sight. Killers on both political extremes are heavily armed, well supplied with money and, most important,

(over)

fanatically dedicated to their cause. All the experts expect a lot more blood to be spilled before calm is restored in this country.

"Elsewhere in Latin America," continues our cable from Buenos Aires, "there are signs that extremist terrorism can be crushed. In Uruguay, most of the once-dreaded Tupamaro leftists are dead or in jail, and the few remaining have been driven into exile or underground, rarely emerging. In Brazil, Bolivia and Paraguay, security forces have had similar successes against terrorists.

"In all four countries, the key to success is the same--hunt down terrorists ruthlessly and play very rough with the survivors."

Jamaica is smoldering, torn by a different kind of terrorism. Crime and politics have joined hands in Kingston's crowded shanty towns.

A state of emergency, imposed weeks ago, still covers the whole island of Jamaica, but violence has not abated. Gunmen with and without political backing had killed 163, including 19 policemen, had carried out more than a thousand armed robberies before the emergency was declared. And the terrorism persists.

Chief victim is Jamaica's economy, including tourism. The island's north-shore resorts, popular with Americans, are quiet, and many hotels are full. But tourists, businessmen and capital are leaving the Kingston area.

Prospect of elections before February increases the violence. Castro of Cuba is an interested bystander. Jamaica's leftist Prime Minister Manley paid him a visit in Havana, but Castro's return visit has been postponed for his own security. Still, Cuban agents are in Kingston, watching for opportunities.

In Northern Ireland so far this year, 184 have been killed in sectarian terrorist slayings, including 7 British soldiers. That makes it 1,575 dead since the current trouble began in 1969. One encouraging note: Irish terrorism in Britain died down after a number of terrorists were jailed for life.

West German terrorists, quiet until recently, are active again. Two young Germans, a man and a woman, helped hijack the Air France jet to Uganda and were killed by Israeli raiders. Just days later, four West German women terrorists, including one whose release had been demanded by the hijackers, escaped from a prison in West Berlin, leaving evidence of effective outside help.

In France, officials have increased protection for embassies and foreign firms. One problem is that the number of foreigners in France exceeds 4 million. Terrorist groups there--Spanish Basques, West Germans, Latin Americans, Africans, Arabs and Japanese--exchange plans and identity papers.

Japan's leftist terrorists, says our Tokyo bureau, come from a pool of some 35,000 extremists--down from a peak of 53,500 in 1969. They are divided into 22 groups and fight among themselves. Still, bombings persist. Terrorists recruit students, infiltrate factories and Government offices. Some 30 to 40 Japanese "Red Army" members overseas keep contact with foreign groups.

In Japan, as in the world, terrorism may fade, but never vanish.

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: ASEC, PINS, AR, UY
SUBJ: DIRECTED ASSASSINATIONS BY TUPAMAROS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 5159

1. JORGE BATLLE LISTED IN REFTTEL AS FIRST ASSASSINATION TARGET IS PROMINENT COLORADO POLITICIAN. EMBOFF, ON AFTERNOON AUGUST 6, SAW BATLLE, WHO DESPITE THREAT WAS UNGUARDED.

2. CORRECT NAME OF (B) IS JORGE ECHEVARRIA LEUNDA, WHOSE NICKNAME IS CHOCHO. AT LUNCH WITH EMBOFF A FEW DAYS AGO, ECHEVARRIA, WHO IS PRESIDENT OF MIXED ARGENTINE-URUGUAYAN COMMISSION IN CHARGE OF BUILDING SALTO GRANDE HYDRO-ELECTRIC PROJECT, SAID HE WAS UNDER DEAD THREAT FROM OPR-33 (A RADICAL LEFT) ANARCHIST TERRORIST GROUP). ECHEVARRIA REPORTED HAVING BEEN PROVIDED GUARDS (WHO WERE VERY MUCH IN EVIDENCE) FOR HIS PERSON AND HOUSEHOLD 24 HOURS A DAY. HE ALSO EXPRESSED COMPLETE BEWILDERMENT AS TO HIS BEING ON ANY SUCH LIST AS HE HAD NEVER BEEN A POLITICIAN OR ANYTHING BUT A MODERATE ON PUBLIC ISSUES. FONMIN BLANCO RECENTLY TOLD AMBASSADOR HE WAS UNDER DEATH THREAT FROM SAME GROUP AND THAT HE NOW WAS GUARDED TOO.

3. FNU GITALDI IS MIDDLEMAN IN CONTRACTING OF FOOTBALL PLAYERS. THERE IS NO REASON APPARENT TO US FOR HIM TO BE ON SUCH A LIST.

4. TARGET LIST IS THAT REFERRED TO IN TDFIRBD-315/06764-479
76 (HUM-5709).

SIRACUSA

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| 4-12-76 | |

RSO GEORGE BECKETT

~~SECRET~~

8/9/76

LEGATT ROBERT W. SCHERRER

MONTONEROS

DECLASSIFIED BY 39063EW/BCE/06
CV 5-8-01
Argentina Project

Attached is the original handwritten report provided by your guard during the evening of 8/6/76, together with a translation of this report. In addition to the information contained in the attached report your guard advised as follows orally in the Spanish language:

In connection with his official position with the Argentine Air Force, in the office of a ranking Argentine Air Force intelligence officer, he ascertained that the Montoneros intended to carry out the action described in the attached report. He ascertained this information from Montonero documents which he had seen within the past 72 hours.

He voiced considerable concern for his fellow Brown Security guards, especially those in mobile patrol cars who would be obvious targets for Montonero action. He indicated that since he joined Brown Security over two years ago, shift changes have been routinely conducted at the same location and at the same time for over two years. He identified this location as the YPF (former ESSO) Service Station located at the corner of General Pacheco and Santa Fe in Martinez. He indicated that according to his information, the shooting incident which took place at this service station on 8/2/76 was an attempt by terrorists to attack Brown Security Patrol cars or personnel during the shift change.

It should be noted that according to Dr. MARCELO CASTRO, the two individuals killed during the 8/2/76 shootout at the YPF station were not terrorists but innocent civilians who panicked during a routine check by the FPA and were gunned down in their automobile near the service station. According to Dr. CASTRO, the two victims were unarmed and had no connection

1 - Addressee

2 - Bue (105-767)

(1) - 109-103)

RWS:gjk

(3)

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Classified By 5931

Exempt from General Declassification

Schedule of Executive Order 11652

Exemption Category 5B(2)

Automatically declassified on Indefinite

109-103-480

~~SECRET~~

RE: MONTONEROS

with any terrorist organization. Dr. CASTRO indicated that one of the FPA officers conducting a vehicle and identity checks allowed a round to escape from his weapon, thus causing a reaction from his companions who believed the two individuals who were subsequently killed had fired upon the FPA officers.

Attachments (2)

- 2 -

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8/7/76

According to information provided by a reliable source, the ERP-Montoneros, due to the loss of weapons and backup equipment, have decided to conduct attacks against the security forces, as well as the security forces of the different Embassies who use portable radio equipment and weapons.

The probable target areas will be Olivos, Martinez, Vicente Lopez, Acassuso and Becar, inasmuch as most of the diplomatic corps reside in those areas.

It is felt that attacks against individuals will bring about friction between the government and the diplomatic community. The extremist groups have been instructed to kill the selected individual and to take radio equipment and weapons, trying to avoid confrontation with the police and the armed forces.

The Montoneros have decided to send persons posing as salesmen to the residences, ostensibly to sell articles for the home and thus gain entrance to the residence to achieve their aims.

as an employee of American company CPC International (Corn Products), came to Embassy August 10 to report incident to Poloff. He stated that at about 0200 hours August 6 a group of about ten armed men appeared at his home in Acassuso suburb (where many Embassy families reside). Group forced entry and manhandled Saenz, his wife and his twenty-two year-old sister-in-law. Mrs. Saenz and her sister are Colombian nationals. Two young Amcit children were wakened and observed incident. Armed ~~intruders~~ ^{intruders} refused to display identification, but leader said "we are Army" ("somos del Ejercito"). Saenz recognized submachine guns as type used by Argentine military and police, .45 caliber military automatic pistols, and shotguns. Intruders were dressed in miscellaneous civilian clothing, and were described by Saenz as "grubby and long-haired." They were very rough, shoving and pushing family members, breaking open locked door, etc.

3. Apparent purpose of visit was to interrogate sister-in-law who has been student at local women's librarian school for last four years. During recent absence on vacation of rest of Saenz family, sister-in-law invited female Argentine student friend from school to stay in house with her. Knowledge of and relationship with this friend was main interest of intruders. Group examined Saenz's US passport and understood early in incident that he was Amcit businessman of large US firm. He was asked repeatedly if he was Jew ~~(XXXXXXXXXX)~~ or Communist. Group examined all his papers, checked book

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

titles, etc. Individuals in group pocketed money, watches, calculator, some jewelry, and helped themselves to food and drink. Leader finally told Saenz that there seemed to be "no problem" and intruders departed at about 0330 in what Saenz described as "large American-style cars." They made no threats about leaving Argentina or about future conduct of sister-in-law.

4. Saenz noted that at no time did group appear to be concerned about attracting notice from neighbors or police. They were noisy and relaxed in behavior, and stayed over one and one-half hours until fully satisfied with information obtained. Area is one in which police and US Embassy security patrols are prominent, but intruders gave no indication of concern.

5. Saenz discussed incident with security advisor of his company morning of August 6. It was agreed that intruders were very probably from security forces and that report or protest might bring retaliation on Saenz, although group had not specifically warned Saenz not to report incident. No report has therefore been made to police. Mrs. Saenz reported incident to Colombian Embassy, which according to Saenz is considering protest to GOA. Saenz called this Embassy August 9 to ask for appointment with a political officer, but did not indicate subject or ~~immediate~~ urgency. Appointment was made for morning August 10.

8. We propose to make representations to FonOff following Saenz's departure, provided his consent is obtained, basing an aide memoire on Saenz's statement. We do not believe the words "formal protest" should be used, since they could tend to link this case with that of Father Weeks, who has been openly and formally detained by GOA under legal grounds based in state of siege. We also prefer to proceed without consulting Colombian Embassy. A coordinated approach probably has ~~xxx~~ more pitfalls than advantages. Based on our limited ^{OF} knowledge ~~and~~ the manner in which GOA military or police activities of this sort are carried out, our best chances of having some impact on future police behavior will be a memorandum to the FonOff expressing our deep concern that individuals representing themselves as Argentine military personnel would behave in manner cited, risking injury to an American citizen, his wife and children. We can only lament fact that senior official of American firm felt it necessary to flee country to avoid possibility of being further involved.

9. Whether representation is in form of protest or expression of concern reflecting on behavior of presumed members Argentine Army, GOA is certain to respond that investigation determined no GOA forces were involved in incident. We think representation will spark investigation by Army and provincial police which could have beneficial effect on their future behavior.

CONTROL: 5521
24 AUG 76 1319

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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| FROM: Amembassy BUENOS AIRES | CLASSIFICATION: SECRET |
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E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:
ACTION:

GDS
PINS, SHUM, AR
Mass Murder Highlights Trelew Weekend Violence

Secstate WASHDC PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 5521

1. During the weekend, police, who were on special alert for an expected surge of terrorist attacks to commemorate the Trelew massacre of ~~XXXX~~ August 22, 1972, ~~uprising Aug 22~~, killed five extremists in Cordoba and another

two in Buenos Aires Province. Six other persons, described as common criminals, were reportedly killed in clashes with policemen during the weekend.

2. As in the past, the Trelew anniversary provoked a weekend of fireworks--bomb attacks and volleys of machinegun fire. In Buenos Aires, bombs exploded in a number of police stations, on Friday's rush-hour subway trains, on street corners in a fashionable downtown residential district and in a Standard Electric factory.

deaths
There were no ~~casualties~~ reported, although several policemen were wounded by exploding bombs. In Cordoba, the Third Army had Corps claimed it/discovered and neutralized a plan to terrorize the city with widespread bombing and shooting attacks.

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| LD BY: POL:YThayer/WSmith:cc | DRAFTING DATE: 8/23/76 | TEL. EXT.: 128 | CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: CHARGE: MChaplin |
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ANCES.

POL/R:DSmock

DAO:Col Coughlin *fac*
RSO:GBeckett *fac*

109-103-4894

1315

3. Left-wing terrorist violence, however, paled in the face of the grisly mass murder of thirty persons by "death squads" on Aug 20. The thirty bodies, riddled with bullets and blown apart by powerful explosives, were found by workmen Friday morning (Aug 20) in a field near Pilar. A sign at the scene identified the victims as leftist guerrillas. Presumably they were killed in retaliation for Thursday's murder of retired General Omar Actis. There is no doubt that the police themselves were the authors of this atrocity (see paragraph 6). Although many of the bodies were mutilated beyond recognition, the victims were mostly young males. Most had their hands tied behind their backs. Neighbors report hearing rounds of shooting during the night and then an enormous explosion.

4. Later Friday the Interior Ministry issued its ^{strongest} ~~most powerful~~ repudiation of extremist violence to date, attributing the "vandalistic episode to the dementia of irrational groups" and pledging to use all means to find and punish those responsible. Interior Minister Harguindeguy, speaking in Salta Saturday (Aug 21), reiterated the govt's condemnation of all forms of extremism, Friday's mass bombing as well as attacks on Armed Forces officials.

5. While most of the press avoided speculating on the Pilar mass murder, La Opinion on Aug 22 deplored the atrocity and opined that unless the govt soon made good its promise to

"monopolize force", it might find itself increasingly isolated (i.e. facing increasing popular opposition). The Buenos Aires Herald said Saturday (Aug 21) that the week's events-- kidnapping of two well known UCR lawyers, murder of General Actis, and the Pilar mass murder--are the kind of acts that can provoke civil war. In its editorial, the Herald said that since the murders of the five parish priests in July, it is impossible to pretend that the daily deaths and disappearances are simply results of subversive delinquents or vengeance killings. "Some mindless Frankenstein's monster has gone berserk," said the Herald, pointing out that despite the govt's official condemnation of acts by "demented, irrational groups," not a single member of such groups has yet been taken by security forces.

6. A ranking officer in the Office of the Presidency confided (August 23) to Emboff at noon today/that for first time govt is absolutely certain as to who authored the crime and has evidence. In case of the five priests, he said, govt had strong reasons to suspect police and even had names of individual policemen it believed may have committed outrage, but it lacked proof. Given delicacy of situation and need to avoid institutional ruptures and acts which would demoralize security forces, govt must proceed cautiously. Unless sure of its facts and with evidence in hand, it is difficult for govt to move to correct abuses. In case of the mass murder on Aug 20, however, govt is repeat is

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sure and has evidence. Sanctions will definitely be taken against those responsible; he said. Only question is whether sanctions are publicized or taken privately. In either case, he promised to inform Embassy of action taken.

CHAPLIN *me*

~~SECRET~~

~~Classification~~

CONTROL: 5609
7 AUG 76 1240

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM

Amembassy BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

E.O. 11652:

TAGS:

SUBJECT:

ACTION:

N/A

ASEC, PINS, AR

Flower Bombs, Package Bombs

SECSTATE WASHDC

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ BUENOS AIRES XX282 5609

1. On August 26, 1976, two incidents were reported in which individuals received booby-trapped ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ flowers. One of the victims was Christina Esmeroni, daughter of Benito Esmeroni, ~~XXXXXX~~ former head ~~XXXXXX~~ of IBM. ~~XXXXXX~~ The ~~XXXXXX~~ second ~~XXXXXX~~ flower bomb exploded in the house. Miss Esmeroni received an orchid contained in a typical see-through plastic topped flower box which exploded when she opened it. The second flower bomb exploded in the house of a French executive representing Renault and ~~XXXX~~ Astarsa companies. Injuries and damage in this case are unknown. Reported information indicates that Christina Esmeroni ~~XXXXXX~~ lost both ~~XXXXXX~~ hands, and ~~XXXXXX~~ it is ~~XXXXXX~~ questionable whether she will recover the use of her hands.

2. In another reported incident, a gift-wrapped package containing a pen and pencil set was sent to the Director of Industrial Relations of the Ford Company. Company security

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PREPARED BY:

RSO:GSBeckett:mek

DRAFTING DATE

8-27-76

TEL. EXT.

148

109-103-485
CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

CHARGE: MChaplin

SEARCHED.....INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....FILED.....

AUG 30 1976

LEGAL ATTACHE
BUENOS AIRES

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

personnel were suspicious and detonated the package
xxx without injury.

3. RSO COMMENT: EOD supervisor GOA has been contacted and has been requested to furnish information concerning quantity of explosives and triggering of flower bombs. Such has not been received. He advised that the composition of the explosives was plastic. In addition, he was unable to advise whether the bombs had actually been implanted in the flowers or were a letter type bomb concealed ~~xxxx~~ in the envelope normally containing the greeting card of the sender. When the requested information is received, such will be reported. A security notice is being published cautioning all Post personnel with respect to this terrorist threat.

CHAPLIN *me*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM

Amembassy, BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

E.O. 11652:

TAGS:

SUBJECT:

ACTION:

N/A

ASEC, PINS, AR

Package Bombs & (Flowers/Pen & Pencils)

SECSTATE WASHDC

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ BUENOS AIRES ~~5609~~ 5673

A/SY PASS TO AMBASSADOR HILL

REF: Buenos Aires 5609

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1. On August 30, Mr. Anthony H. Rmk Pohl, manager of Security and Emergency Planning, IBM, furnished the following to RSO Beckett. On August 26, at 10:55 a.m. an apparent messenger approached the house of Benito Esmeroni, retired General Manager of IBM Argentina, and currently Chairman of the Board. Esmeroni and his household have received threats over the past 5-6 years and therefore have specific procedures established concerning the delivery of packages at the home. However, this procedure broke down as described herewith.
2. The messenger, who was wearing an olive drab shirt and blue trousers, presented a see-through plastic flower box containing an orchid. A small box commonly used for a popular pen and pencil set being sold in Argentina was presented along

109-103-486

DRAFTED BY:

RSO:GSBeckett:mek

DRAFTING DATE

8-30-76

TEL. EXT.

148

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

CHARGE:MChaplin

CLEARANCES:

ADMIN:CEEmmons

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED

AUG 31 1976

LEGAL ATTORNEY - 100-1000

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 153
(Formerly FS-413)
January 1975
Dept of State

with the flower. The guard asked the messenger the identify of the sender and was informed that it was a friend of the family. (NOTE: Guards are under standing instructions not to accept any packages but to make inquiry inside of the house of a family member concerning expected gifts.)

On the box containing the orchid was a card from a flower shop /~~shop~~. The smaller box had a label ~~xxxxx~~, addressing the item to Mr. Esmeroni. The guard entered the house carrying the packages to Mrs. Esmeroni who asked him the identify of the sender. The maid was sent from the house to check with the messenger in an attempt to determine the identity of the sender but the messenger had departed. Both packages were placed on a table. Christina Esmeroni, 30 year old daughter of Benito Esmeroni, was instructed by her mother not to touch the packages. The daughter replied that she would be careful and placed the package, ~~apparently~~ containing the pen and pencil, on top of the TV set. She stood away from the package and opened the lid. The following explosion blew off her left hand. She has remaining on her right hand thumb and little finger. She received chest and facial injuries.

3. It was the opinion of Mr. Pohl, who examined the scene of the explosion, that the blasting capacity of the bomb was sufficient to kill and that the package had been assembled by a person with professional ~~demolition~~

in the use of explosives.
[training/ According to a study of the path of the blast, it appeared that the container was shaped to cause the blast to create maximum force upward from the top. Marks of the blast along with skin tissue from the victim were on the ceiling of the room in which the package was opened. (Average ceilings in Buenos Aires are 12 feet or more.)

Mr. Pohl was also of the opinion that should an individual have been leaning over the device as opposed to examining it from arm's length, the device had adequate force to kill.

4. RSO COMMENT: On August 26, 5 more incidents similar to the one above occurred, one at a private residence and remaining 4 at factory offices: A) 10 a.m. two packages were received by Marcel Capdevila, company director and board member of Astara (Renault Argentina). He received injuries similar to those of Christina Esmeroni.

B) 1300 hours similar packages delivered to personnel manager of Ford subsidiary. He lost both hands.

C) 1400 hours, personnel director Ford Motor Company received similar packages. Having been warned by the subsidiary, he was suspicious and the items were turned over to security reps. Packages were detonated in the plant backyard, causing one meter crater. D) Personnel manager of General Motors also received packages, turned them over to security personnel and they were detonated

[without injury. E) Personnel manager of Squibb Labs.]

received the packages and called police EOD team. Member of EOD team, in attempting to neutralize the package, lost three fingers.

5. It is difficult to say that this could be the xx start of a campaign directed against U.S. industry. It should be noted that in the 6 bombing incidents, four were directed against personnel managers, all of which are located at U.S. plants. On January 29, 1976, terrorists entered offices of Bendix and, after finding the General Manager not present, murdered the personnel manager and manager for industrial relations (B.A. 0633).

CHAPLIN *Me*

CONFIRMED: 5713
31 AUG 76 1736

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

INDICATE
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FROM

AmEmbassy BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

E.O. 11652:

N/A

TAGS:

PINS, ASEC, AR

SUBJECT:

Rash of Bombings Continues

ACTION:

SecState WASHDC

Ref:

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ BUENOS AIRES 5713

Buenos Aires 5673

1. In a post-Trelew wave of bombings two synagogues, a

shopping arcade and a navy recruiting office were hit on

August 27. Damage was slight and no one was killed, although

two women suffered severe burns in the navy office explosion.

A powerful explosive was also found near La Opinion editorial offices Friday but was deactivated by police.

2. Elsewhere the same day a capsule exploded on Florida, a crowded shopping street, releasing pamphlets. Similar bombs were placed in ~~an~~ underground subway stations. One was dismantled by police but others went off. One person was

slightly burned. Two bombs were discovered and detonated by

police at the School of Architecture campus in Nunez and

another bomb blew apart an empty car in La Plata. Police

also reported August/26 two more persons---a Renault official

and an IBM employee--were seriously injured handling flower

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DRAFTED BY:

POL: YTH/er:mg

DRAFTING DATE

8/31/76

TEL. EXT.

121

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

POL: WSSmith *RS*

CLEARANCE:

RSO: GSBeckett

POL/R: DLSmock

Charge: MChaplin

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There were, in addition, three other cases of flower bombs (see ref tel). bombs. / Police issued a second warning against bomb packages disguised as flowers and pen sets.

3. A truck parked in ~~front~~ the front of the Embassy the evening of August 27 was suspected to contain a bomb. After the bomb squad had done some damage to the truck itself, this turned out to be a false alarm. The unhappy owners then drove the truck away.

4. On Saturday (August 28) a powerful explosive destroyed a pharmacy. Another bomb exploded in front of the house of former Federal Police Chief Luis Margaride.

5. Comment. With the exception of the bombs placed in front of the two Jewish synagogues, the bombings seem to have been authored by the left. The synagogue bombings were the latest of sporadic attacks upon Jewish establishments. Earlier this month, shops in a Jewish commercial district were sprayed with gunfire. A school and Jewish Cultural Institute were also attacked. La Opinion Saturday (August 28) criticized the attacks on the two synagogues, asking why, in a country that never before suffered religious conflict, religion was being drawn into Argentina's present difficulties.

6. There was nothing particularly new in the wave of bombings. For some time bombings have been commonplace in Buenos Aires. The latest ones did not suggest any increased capability on the part of the terrorist groups. The flower bombs are, to

be sure, a new innovation but they do not represent a more indiscriminate form of violence than blowing up the ~~lunchroom~~ lunchroom of a police station.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

CLASSIFIED 5774
9 SEP 76
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INDICATE
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| FROM Ambassador BUENOS AIRES | CLASSIFICATION LIMITED OFFICIAL USE |
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E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: ASEC, PINS, AR
SUBJECT: Montoneros Threaten Ford Executives

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ BUENOS AIRES 5774

REF: (A) Buenos Aires 5673, (B) Buenos Aires 5609

1. On September 2, Mr. Hector Jose Sibilla, Security Officer Ford Argentina, furnished ~~information~~ the following to the RSO. Since Aug. 26, 1976 when members of the Ford industrial complex in Argentina received bombs, seven senior executives of the Ford Co. have received threatening letters signed by the Montoneros. These letters claim credit for the bombs as being the responsibility of the Montoneros. The following is the identify of the seven: Mr. Nogueiva, General Manager of Finance; Mr. Lecker, General Manager Plant Assembly; Mr. Menjido, General Manager Supplies & Service; Mr. Fisher, Director of Export; Mr. Max Coward, President; Mr. Marcos, General Manager Stamping Plant and Mr. Muller, General Manager of Manufacturing.

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CHARGE: McChaplin
SEP 3 1976
LEGAL ATTACHE
BUENOS AIRES

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

CLASSIFICATION

2. Six of the individuals received identical letters, the body of which is set forth herewith: "Our organization since its founding has taken charge of fighting for liberation. Part of the fight is combating exploitation of the working class who must suffer and be condemned to misery so that a few might enjoy the efforts of their work. This fight includes the elimination of those who contribute in one form or another to the solidifying of this unjust situation. Thursday, the 26th, we sent with a card and envelope similar boxes with explosives to a few exploiters. But we will continue to watch you in the most discreet form and in a continuous pattern until as Eva said - "the race of the exploiters and oligarchs disappears from the land.""

3. Nogueira, identified above, was the sole recipient of a different letter, the body of which is set forth herewith: "The enclosed envelope is the one which accompanied the explosive boxes last Thursday. They were directed to businessmen and executives who suppress and exploit their workers and enjoy impunity. The army intends to drown the people in blood, but attention ... the people are not without defenses. It has its own organization and its own army - the Montonero army. Marcel Capdevila paid dearly for the disappearance of 40 workers of ASTARSA. He delivered them and the army

executed them. He thought then that everything would remain tranquil and his custody would guarantee his peace and physical integrity; however, the revolutionary justice treated him equally ... Try not to make the same mistake that he did. You won't receive only an envelope, but there will be an explosive case waiting for you at the turn of every corner. The eyes of the ^{people} ~~the~~ and its organization are watching your moves. Don't exploit or denounce; the manager who collaborates with repression is the manager who will go to the wall."

4. Both letters had the complementary close "for the people and for the country, Montoneros". All of the letters were sent ~~/signed~~ with a greeting card reflecting the name "Mont Blanc" identifying the company rep, Peter W. Collin, with a street address of Paraguay 710, Capital. Similar Mont Blanc cards accompanied the explosives which were distributed on Aug. 26 and reported in ref tel A.

5. RSO COMMENT: Marcel Capdevila, identified in letter above, was the individual ^{at} ~~for~~ the Renault Co. who received a package on Aug. 26 and who lost his hands. This incident reported in ref tels.

CHAPLIN

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

La Plata funeral halted

La Plata
POLICE yesterday prevented mourners from attending the funeral of the two university officials who were slain by extremists on Tuesday.

They were Rodolfo Achem, 34, and Carlos Alberto Miguel, 38. They had been kidnapped at 8.30 am and their bullet-riddled bodies were found an hour and a half later near Sarandi, 40 kilometres from La Plata.

The Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance (A A A) claimed responsibility for the kidnapping and killings.

Bomb blasts damaged a girls' school and a university building where the wake was to have been held. They were later taken to the La Plata university workers' union premises.

The police intercepted the funeral cortege shortly after it left the union premises and told mourners to disperse. They said only immediate members of the family could accompany the hearse.

When the coffins arrived at the cemetery three bus loads of students alighted from the vehicles and joined the few mourners. The police then went into action and fired tear gas grenades. People in the cemetery fled panic-stricken in all directions. When order was restored armed policemen escorted the relatives of the two slain men while the two coffins were deposited in the cemetery vaults. (NA)

ARGENTINA IN BRIEF

A SUSPECTED terrorist was wounded in a gunbattle with police in a patrol car in the Once neighbourhood last night.

The patrol car was attacked by the terrorists, who hurled Molotov firebombs from two speeding vehicles. The police gave chase and wounded one of the terrorist suspects, and captured several more, when they abandoned their car near the junction of Castelli and Sarmiento.

Police hunt Salamanca

Cordoba
MORE than 100 people were arrested by the local police in raids carried out to identify extremists in several parts of the province. Large quantities of weapons and subversive literature were confiscated in the headquarters of the Light and Power Union in this city.

Federal Judge Adolfo Ledesma has ordered the arrest of Agustin Fosco, secretary of the union, Rene Salamanca, former secretary of SMATA, the motor mechanics union, and Miguel Angel Mosse, former head of the regional Peronist Youth movement.

None of these people have been located and the police of other provinces and that of the federal capital have been asked to cooperate in obtaining their arrest.

During the night police reinforcements arrived in Cordoba from the federal capital.

Cordoba government officials said yesterday that the Light and Power Union headquarters was a "nest of subversion" and that it had been wiped out. (NA)

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

P. 9

BUENOS AIRES
HERALD

10/11/74

Date:
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Author:
Editor:
Title:Character:
orClassification:
Submitting Office:☐ Being Investigated107-11351-9
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SERIALIZED FILED

OCT 11 1974

Schmitt

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Standfield is free; 4 others released

DIEGO Stanfield, an Anglo-Argentine business executive was released 10 days ago by leftwing urban guerrillas who kidnapped him almost eight weeks ago, sources close to his family disclosed yesterday.

The sources did not say if any ransom was paid for the release of Stanfield, 61-year-old general manager

of the Quilmes brewery. Stanfield was kidnapped on August 6, the same day that another Anglo-Argentine business executive Maurice Kember, was snatched in Cordoba city.

Kember, 58, was rescued by police on Tuesday after a gun battle in which one of his kidnappers — also leftwing guerrillas — was killed, two others wounded, and three captured.

Kember, 58, president of the board of the Coca Cola bottling plant in Cordoba, was snatched while taking his two children to school.

During the past few weeks sources said, the kidnappers, who were demanding one million dollars for Kember's release, had been negotiating with members of the family and their victim's firm.

In the meantime, the Cordoba police had been investigating the affair. On Tuesday they acted on information that the occupants of a house on the outskirts of the city were behaving in a suspicious manner.

Kember was found in a small room dug below the floor of a bathroom. He was in relatively good health in spite of his long incarceration in such a confined space.

Another kidnap victim, banker **Leon Brill**, was freed by his captors in Cordoba last weekend after an unspecified ransom was paid by his family, police sources said. Brill, a director of the Banco del Interior, was snatched on July 26.

Miguel Scheimberg, kidnapped at Pampa de Olaen in Cordoba, on Sunday was released yesterday in Alta Gracia. He said he had been held by a group formed by four men, a woman and a young boy. Police did not say if any ransom had been paid.

Jaime Bakts, a 39-year-old industrialist, kidnapped on September 28 in Rosario was freed yesterday. His family own a large ice-cream factory in that city. It is believed they paid a large ransom to obtain his freedom. (NA)

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

P. 9

BUENOS AIRES
HERALD

10/11/74

Date:

Edition:

Author:

Editor:

Title:

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Classification:

Submitting Office:

☐ Being Investigated

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OCT 11 1974

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109-103 Sub A70

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Fue Asesinado un Teniente Coronel de Sanidad

El jefe del servicio de hemoterapia del Hospital Militar de Campo de Mayo, teniente coronel médico José Francisco Gardón, fue asesinado en la tarde de ayer por un grupo extremista. Aparentemente convocado para una "transfusión de urgencia" al hospital municipal de San Miguel, en el que también prestaba servicios, fue agarrado por dos hombres jóvenes

que, empujando armas automáticas, lo ultimaron virtualmente sin testigos, cuando iba a ingresar al nosocomio, en el momento en que arreciaba la lluvia. Fue alcanzado por cuatro impactos e intervenido quirúrgicamente en el mismo hospital, dejó de existir poco más tarde. Era muy conocido en San Miguel, y sus restos reciben sepultura en la tarde de hoy.

EN un ataque perpetrado en las últimas horas de ayer, fue asesinado el teniente coronel médico, José Francisco Gardón, jefe del Servicio de Hemoterapia del Hospital Militar Campo de Mayo, presidente de la Junta Médica de ese establecimiento y titular del mismo servicio en el Hospital Municipal Raúl F. Lacardé, de San Miguel. Precisamente el atentado se produjo frente a este último establecimiento, cuando la víctima —bajo una intensa lluvia— se aprestaba a ingresar para cumplir "funciones inherentes a su especialidad", según reza el comunicado dado a conocer más tarde por el Comando General del Ejército. El hecho, de acuerdo con eventuales testigos, se produjo a las 18.16, en momentos que llovía torrencialmente y, por tal razón, el tránsito, tanto vehicular como peatonal, era nulo. A esa hora llegó al lugar, tripulando su propio automóvil, el teniente coronel Gardón, de 52 años, casado, con una hija, con domicilio en Moine 1230, de Bella Vista. El médico, en razón de que la acera estaba totalmente ocupada por otros vehículos,

estacionó el suyo pasando la bocacalle de una de las esquinas del establecimiento y desde allí regresó a pie hasta la entrada principal. Cuando se hallaba en la vereda del nosocomio, le fue interceptado el paso por 2 personas jóvenes, vestidos con ropas de sport, y empujando armas automáticas.

Según referencias, se habría producido un corto diálogo tras el cual los desconocidos dispararon a quemarropa sobre el militar, que cayó mortalmente herido sobre un montículo de escombros existentes en el lugar. Los agresores huyeron de inmediato en un automóvil de color claro, que los aguardaba con el motor en marcha y en el que, lógicamente, se suponía había un tercer individuo. Personal del hospital, atraído por los disparos —se asegura que fueron diez estampidos— auxilió al doctor Gardón introduciéndolo al nosocomio y con la premura del caso trasladado de inmediato al quirófano donde se lo sometió a una delicada intervención quirúrgica que se interrumpió a las 20.30, hora en que se produjo el de-



Tte. Cnel. Gardón

ceso. Pudo establecerse que el militar presentaba dos impactos de bala en la cabeza, y otros dos en el tórax. Las personas consultadas coincidieron en señalar que en el momento del ataque llovía torrencialmente, por lo que la calle estaba prácticamente desierta, señalando que no era habitual que el teniente

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

P. 6

LA RAZÓN

BUENOS AIRES

10/24/74

Date:

Edition:

Author:

Editor:

Title:

Character:

or

Classification:

Submitting Office:

☐ Being Investigated

Memorandum

109-1-3 Sub 1-35

TOP NEWS

LEGATT

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION SERVICE

Published every Friday by Editorial ERPEL, Bolivar 218, 6/44, Tel. 33 - 5712

Buenos Aires

Price: One year \$ 1500.-; six months \$ 800.-; three months \$ 450.-

NUMBER 116 (4th. year)

Buenos Aires

November 8 th., 1974.

LAST WEEK

- Thursday**
October 31st. President announces results of National Bargaining Committee over Radio and T.V. networks; 15% wage increase as from November 1st; calling for austerity and increased production. ** Agricultural engineer (INTA) of extreme left found murdered near Ezeiza. **
- Friday**
November 1st. Three bodies found near San Nicolas (B.A.) identified as being Uruguayan Tupamaros. Federal Police chief Alberto Villar and wife killed when their launch blown up in Tigre. ** Extremist cell discovered in Resistencia (Chaco); 32 arrests; weapons confiscated.
- Saturday**
November 2nd. Mrs Peron attends funeral of Villar in Chacarita cemetery; incident free. ** Police inspector seriously wounded in Corrientes. ** Bomb explosion reveals terrorist hide-out in Buenos Aires; woman extremist injured and arrested. ** Terrorist hide-out discovered in Colegiales (Bs.As.); seven policemen wounded by booby-traps. ** Peronist union leader killed in bomb outrage in Tucuman; one extremist arrested.
- Sunday**
November 3rd. One member of executive committee and one member of Socialist Workers Party Youth section murdered in Bs. As.
- Monday**
November 4th. Commissioner General Luis Margaride appointed successor to Villar. ** Dr. Roberto Arce appointed president of Banco de la Nacion. ** President receives Paraguayan Minister of Commerce. ** Foreign Affairs Minister Vignes received by Italian president Leoni. ** Labour Minister Otero in hospital for heart check-up. ** All schools in Buenos Aires university again working. ** Railway signalmen working to rules; commuters suffer considerable inconvenience; hundreds of thousands of working hours lost.
- Tuesday**
November 5th. Vignes and Kissinger in 40 minute huddle in Rome; both Foreign Ministers speak to World Food Organization (FAO). ** Czechoslovakian Foreign Trade Minister Barcak arrives on commercial mission in Bs.As. ** Justice Minister Benitez representing Foreign Minister Vignes flies to Quito (Ecuador) for OEA conference. ** Railwaymen continue go-slow. ** Orthodox Peronist union leader murdered in Parque Chacabuco (Bs.As.).
- Wednesday**
November 6th. Bankers Day; all banks closed. ** Mrs Peron presides over Cabinet meeting. ** Government declares State of Siege.
- Thursday**
November 7th. Newsvendors Day; Argentina without newspapers. ** Non-teaching staff at Buenos Aires university cancel strike due threat of dismissal. ** Terrorists murder Army-Major in Santa Fe; Conscript seriously wounded. ** Police raid Socialist Workers Party head-quarters; confiscate weapons, arrest members. ** Pepsi Cola, Coca Cola and others definitely acquitted of Monopoly charges.

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"Here we go again, getting back to normal" was what one critic belonging to an opposition party was heard to say, when Mrs Peron's decision to declare a state of siege was announced over the radio and T.V. networks. In a sense, the worthy pundit actually had something there. For the past forty years the normal state of affairs in this country was, in fact, that of a state of siege. About the one and only exception was the Radical party's government under Dr. Arturo Illia (1963-66). This short-lived government, as a result was surrounded with a totally unjustified aura of brilliance by the Radicals.

The president took the important decision behind closed doors. There were only three ministers present - Lopez Rega, Rocamora and Savino. Also there, were the three Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces. Once the measure was made public, there was an immediate outcry raised against it. This came, not only from the opposition parties, but, also from within the ranks of the Peronist party itself. As a result there be no more cosy little "dialogues" between the president and the opposition.

We understand that the first lady found it hard to bring herself to sign the decree. She felt that Peronism's brightest adornment was the mantle of popular support - freely and democratically expressed by the vast majority of the population. This image, she believed, would be sadly tarnished as a result of declaring the country to be in a state of siege. Unfortunately, there was no other course open to her. The only other alternative - the National Security Secretariat - had been strangled at birth by the opposition shown to it by the three Cs-in-C of the armed forces.

The principal bone of contention was the insistence on the part of the armed forces of having a general on active service put in charge of the Security Secretariat, whereas, Mrs Peron had rather fancied appointing retired Colonel Osinde. This worthy is at present Argentine ambassador in Paraguay. It's a pity in a way, seeing that he certainly has pretty good qualifications for the post. What the Armed Forces object to is, that he would be in command of forces, although only a relatively junior officer on the retired list. When Peron was still around, he got over the difficulty by naming General Caceres as head of the Secretariat. This didn't come off either. The reason being that, the Chief of police, Villar, objected to him as being politically unacceptable - despite being a general on active service at the time. As a result, the decree was annulled.

The campaign of threats and intimidation against pupils and teachers at all the country's schools, is really only some form of excuse for declaring a state of siege. There's no denying that the general public is alarmed and indignant at such a despicable form of terrorism. Although there's no definite proof, so far, the campaign is attributed to the Montoneros. In the Ministry of Interior the Montoneros are considered to be lower down the scale of importance than ERP. As terrorists it's thought that they are eminently suited to threatening people by means of anonymous letters or telephone calls and just the sort to threaten to harm innocent school children.

The assassination of chief of police Villar and his wife hasn't as yet been cleared up. The Montoneros have claimed it as an achievement of their organization, which it almost certainly is not. The whole operation was planned and carried out in such an efficient way, that, the police are convinced that not even ERP could have carried it out on their own. It's thought that a highly specialized commando unit was brought in from abroad. In the opinion of police experts, only the Arabs or the Jews could have carried into execution such a perfectly planned coup.

Villar had already managed to inflict some staggering losses on ERP. His aim was supposed to be to eliminate them completely by the end of the year. However, it's not this fact that leads the police to believe that ERP were forced to bring in an outside gang of experts to kill Villar. It's that they have a complete file on every member of ERP and they believe that there is one with sufficient knowledge of sophisticated explosive and electronic techniques, which were used in the assassination. It's a point, however, that the police do happen to have such experts in their ranks.

Despite the degree of sophistication and specialized training displayed in the killing of Villar, the attempt would probably never have succeeded had Villar been a bit more security conscious. It's a fact that he was almost contemptuous of security measures for his own safety. This is sometimes characteristic of the man of action that Villar undoubtedly was. He'd declined the offer of the Maritime police to guard his private launch. He'd also refused to have his own personal bodyguards accompany him on his week-end excursions. Furthermore, he'd given orders not to examine the cruiser as a routine precaution before he

took it out each time. Perhaps he had his reasons for declining to accept the cooperation of these security forces. Whatever the reason, his outlook was clearly fatalistic enough to allow him to pull snooks at the Fates. Always one way of asking for it.

Villar's successor, Commissioner General Luis Margaride, is quite a different proposition. Villar was the typical leader who was prepared to place himself at the head of his men and lead them into the thick of the fray - for which reason his men would gladly have followed him anywhere, no matter how great the danger. Margaride is rather more of the intellectual type, who plans things out and directs them from his headquarters. The fight against political crime is led by him with just as much energy and probably a great deal more success than it was by Villar. His methods may differ, but, the results should show the answer. Margaride brings to his post a reputation of moral soundness which is highly reassuring. From a political point of view, he's well supported, in that he enjoys the fullest confidence and support of Lopez Rega. That's worth something these days.

The police officers as a whole are rather upset at Lopez Rega having shown up at Villar's funeral all toggled out in his natty police - general uniform. His promotion from corporal to general is probably a world record. The other officers are a bit sour about it. In fact, the whole business of the promotion is based on Peron's well-known propensity for warm-hearted gestures. It was perhaps a mistake to have put on the coveted trappings of a police-general on such an occasion, when there are so many police officers showing signs of wear and tear as a result of frustration in their careers.

This atmosphere of frustration among the police officers was precisely one of the chief reasons why it was impossible to get them to accept the armed forces' requirement of an army general in charge of the Security Secretariat. Not being able to go ahead with the Secretariat, the president had no alternative but to sign the decree bringing in a state of siege - not that she liked doing it for a moment. This is a bit of a swipe at the "Liberation" promised the people by the Peronist government. We don't know if the president, when taking the drastic decision recalled Bismark's words: "Under a state of siege, any donkey can govern". She needn't worry too much. Some of her predecessors weren't capable of governing even under a state of siege. She's shown that she's prepared to take measures that are obviously unpopular if they are for the good of the country. Isabel is a whole heap tougher than her tears would have us believe.

ERP is perhaps hard hit at the moment. Financially speaking, however, the organization is sound enough. This is shown to some extent by the way they were able to foot the bill for the Villar assassination. This is particularly so, if one considers that they had to bring in a killer-squad from abroad. Rumour has it that ERP chief Santucho was recently in Switzerland opening up one of those delightfully practical numbered accounts, so dear to the heart of big-time crooks the world over.

There has been a significant and total silence in connection with the kidnapping of the Born brothers. The Montoneros claim to have been responsible for this crime as well as Villar's killing. By making this claim, the Montoneros are trying to hide their role of second-fiddle to ERP, for instance in the filthy campaign against the schoolchildren and teachers. To us there's a connection between the sudden affluence shown by ERP and the silence of Bunge and Born - who have denied having any form of dealings with that terrorist organization.

The killing of police chief Villar, the psychological terror of the campaign against the schoolchildren, added to the discontent of the opposition parties at gradually losing their position of privilege, given to them by Peron, are the real causes of the "Internal commotion" which justify the government to establish a state of siege in accordance with the Constitution. Up to this point the leaders of the extremists were correct in their forecasts of events. Where they slipped up, however, is that the armed forces didn't carry out a coup and take over the government. It's only natural that the general worry over the situation should also affect the armed forces. We repeat our statements, made on many occasions in the past months - "For the present, there's no danger of a military coup".

This is the time of year for promotions and postings in all three armed forces. It's only to be expected, therefore, that there's a certain amount of nervousness in the air. Generally, when certain officers feel that their careers are in danger of coming to a shuddering halt prematurely - for any one of many reasons - they become susceptible to suggestions - as a rule from politicians who offer them the moon and sixpence in return for their armed support. This usually accounts for most of the rumours of coups that fly around at

this time of the year. Our information is that there's no reason to worry. The armed forces are watching events closely, but they are loyal to their supreme commander-in-chief.

The strengthening of the position of our "Prime Minister^{***}", Lopez Rega, which we mentioned in our last edition, was further demonstrated at the Last Cabinet Meeting on Wednesday of last week. The president had Lopez Rega seated on her right - in the seat normally reserved for the highest ranking minister. On her left she had Rocamora. Normally, protocol calls for the Interior Minister to be seated at the right hand of the president. The left hand seat is usually occupied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The worthy Vignes found himself relegated to the second seat on the left. Observers explain this as being due to the fact both these ministers belong to the group of ministers who aren't exactly popular favourites at top government executive level.

This group of "low-caste" ministers is known as the "Doves". It includes apart from Vignes and Rocamora, Benitez (Justice) and Gomez Morales (Economy). The other group of ministers is known as the "Hawks" and is made up of four ministers. These are: -Lopez Rega (Social Welfare), Savino (Defence), Otero (Labour) and friend Ivanishevich (Education). The Cabinet, now that the burly Gelbard is to be found on top of the political discard pile, is split up into two separate groups - a right wing and a left wing, "Hawks" and "Doves". It may only be a coincidence that the decision to declare a state of siege was taken after consultation with only five ministers; three of them "Hawks" (Lopez Rega, Savino and Ivanishevich) and two "Doves" (Rocamora and Gomez Morales). Vignes was away in Rome, Benitez in Quito and Otero was being given the works in a local sanatorium to see how his heart condition was coming along. It shouldn't be overlooked that, "Hawk" or "Dove", all eight ministers are members of the Peronist Party.

Last Thursday, the president announced the results of the Great National Wage Bargaining.^{***} The wage increases granted are considered by the employers to be somewhat excessive. This view is shared by Gomez Morales and one or two of the more discerning politicians. What happened, of course, was that the unions were under heavy pressure from their supporters and political considerations won the day. Prices have already shot up. Gomez Morales is going to find it even harder to curb the rate of inflation than he had anticipated. In the first place Gelbard had kept it back artificially, so that once the dam was breached there was little that could be done to hold it back. The budget deficit was another disgraceful example of Gelbard's workmanship, with all the catastrophic consequences it brought in its wake. Stern measures are now called for. Mrs Peron spelled them out clearly in her speech: - austerity and increased production. In the Interior Ministry equally stern steps must be taken. The state of siege is part of this hardening process.

Now that the panic buying of foreign currency has experienced a slight let-up after having reached saturation point, the Argentine peso has begun to be quoted at more or less its real value on the free exchange markets of Western countries: -

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(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

University lecturer gunned down

A UNIVERSITY lecturer was murdered yesterday as he drove home from hearing mass at the Cathedral.

Professor Carlos Alberto Sacheri was killed by a single bullet fired from a person in a car that was driven alongside that of the teacher a few metres before he reached his home in San Isidro.

Sacheri, who was married and had seven children, was returning from mass at the Metropolitan Cathedral, which was conducted by Argentina's Roman-Catholic Primate, Cardinal Antonio Caggiano.

The university teacher, a lecturer in sociology and a member of the staff of the Catholic University (UCA), had recently taken up a post in the School of Philosophy and Letters of the University of Buenos Aires. The new dean, Father Sanchez Abelenda, had appointed him to head the Institute of Philosophy of Law.

Sacheri was killed by a single shot, fired at him while he was parking.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

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Buenos Aires Herald

Buenos Aires

December 23, 1974

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(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Journalist killed in Salta 2/14

THE BODY of a Salta journalist was found blown to pieces on Friday night in what police suspected to be a vengeance murder.

The mutilated body of Luciano Jaime, 38, of "El Intransigente", was recognized by his wife because of the clothes and some papers found in a trouser pocket.

Police sources said the murder had the characteristics of recent political killings, but there were no clues because Jaime was not active in any political group. His only work outside journalism was the post he held as city council secretary, for a few months after May 25, 1973, when Miguel Ragone was the province's governor. Ragone was replaced last year by an "interventor".

"El Intransigente's front page said yesterday that 'several press workers have been threatened in recent times.'"

(Continued on page 7)

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"Buenos Aires Herald"
Buenos Aires
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